Yossi Alpher initiated the idea of conducting a workshop focusing
on the type of trilateral security regime which could be
established once there is a comprehensive peace in the region. He
supervised the first and second workshops while the third phase was
supervised by Ziad Abu Zayyad from the Palestinian Peace
Information Center (Al Jazar). Alpher is former director of the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and
former senior adviser to Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He was
interviewed by the PIJ's Hillel Schenker.
What was the origin of the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian working
group that formulated the proposal for a Trilateral Security
Regime?
Its origins go back to 1997. I had stopped being Director of the
JAFFEE Center of Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University in 1995,
and in 1997 I was Israel-Middle East representative of the American
Jewish Committee. This gave me leeway to engage in some informal
Track 2 meetings between Israelis and Arabs. In 1997 the Oslo
process was still alive, the Netanyahu government was having its
difficulties, President Clinton was very interested in maintaining
and promoting the peace process and things were relatively quiet in
terms of terrorism. I had been a veteran of Track 2 efforts even
during my period in the Mossad that ended in 1981. At the Jaffee
Center we organized a number of Track 2 efforts between Israelis
and Palestinians, dealing with final status issues, etc.
My thinking was that one way to make a contribution to eventual
Israeli-Palestinian final status talks on the security issues was
to put together a group of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians,
bearing in mind that many of our security, economic and ecological
problems are trilateral. This is one broad geo-strategic zone that
includes the original Mandatory Palestine, today Israel, Jordan and
the Palestinian Authority.
What Arieh (Lova) Eliav called Isfalur
(Israel-Falastin-Urdun).
Yes. Eliav was definitely one of the first thinkers on trilateral
issues. My main inspiration at that time was then Crown Prince
Hassan of Jordan, who I heard speak in 1995 about the need for a
trilateral security regime within the framework of final status
agreements. This was during a time when there were high hopes that
future final status talks would succeed, and some of us were
looking for ways to help them succeed. I approached a British
political scientist, Stan Windass, who ran an NGO called the
Foundation for International Security, and he provided some of the
initial sponsorship. I brought the people from Israel, Jordan and
Palestine and we had a number of meetings at Stan's house in
Oxfordshire.
What evolved was that TriSeR (an anagram for Trilateral Security
Regime) would be looking at all the security issues that involved
the three sides, in the broadest sense of the term. That meant not
only military security, but also issues like water and refugees. We
would begin with a general set of definitions, then get into the
military security issues and later deal with security aspects of
refugees and water.
The initial meetings in England, which later were known as Phase
One, were devoted to setting the parameters and jelling the team.
Phase 2, that I administered, dealt with the military-security
issues. Phase 3, administered by Ziad Abu-Zayyad, dealt with water
and refugees.
Both of us were able to get significant funding from the Ford
Foundation for the project. One of the principles that we developed
was that if Phase 2 were to be administered by an Israeli, Phase 3
would be administered by an Arab, either a Palestinian or a
Jordanian.
The basic premise we developed to carry out a rational discussion
on trilateral security cooperation was that each of the countries
would have to border on the other two. This meant that, in the
Jordan Valley, as a result of the peace process there would
eventually have to be a direct bilateral border between Palestine
and Jordan, i.e., in the end there would be joint Israeli,
Palestinian and Jordanian borders. We felt it was important to have
a right-wing Israeli in the discussions to give them a broader
basis. It was quite difficult to find someone who accepted the
premise that Israel would not control all of the Jordan Valley in
the final status arrangement, but we did.
The philosophy behind our approach was that we wanted our thinking
on a trilateral security regime to be helpful when Israelis and
Palestinians would sit down to negotiate the security aspects of
final status agreements.
We produced 30 pages of a working paper on the security issues. It
includes an executive summary, conclusions and about 20 pages of
general security interests and threat perceptions, the issues that
generated broad agreement or only partial agreement, where we had
to delineate how each side sees things. Sometimes there were
differences of opinion within the sides. The only way all the
participants were able to agree to the document was by detailing
the issues where we disagreed. Despite our differences of opinion,
we felt a sense of satisfaction when we finished, and believed that
it could be helpful to the security negotiators.
The trilateral security report was completed and distributed in
August, 1999, almost a year before Camp David. The outbreak of the
second intifada overwhelmed the possibility of completing the other
two sections, so we only have a preliminary report on water and
refugees. We defined water and refugees as being relevant to
security, though they are not only security-related. It is
important to note that we did take a broad approach to the question
of security
Given that you completed the project in 1999, is it still relevant
today?
.
Clearly if we were to write the report today, after the breakdown
of the peace process and the outbreak of the intifada, it would
contain some differences. As an Israeli, I believe we would want to
look at some of the border-crossing and border-patrolling issues
more severely in view of the lessons of the past three and a half
years - the smuggling of weaponry, etc. There would have to be some
reevaluation, but not completely. The framework definitely remains
relevant, and someone looking at it today would say - let's talk
about what's changed, and adapt it.
How did the dynamic of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians
working together flow? Was it problematic? Was there a basic common
ground?
The participants were all veterans of Track 2 contacts. I believe
that Track 2 techniques are one of the singular characteristics of
the Israeli-Palestinian, and perhaps the general Israeli-Arab peace
process. We have all these non-official gatherings of scholars,
former diplomats and former security people and journalists.
I recently met a very senior Pakistani diplomat who was sitting in
on meetings between Arabs and Israelis. He said to me, "The
strongest impression from all of this is that you guys talk to one
another! We and the Indians don't do this." Someone else told me
about attempts to organize Track 2 meetings between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, who all these years had never met.
Still, it's interesting to note that the Indians and Pakistanis and
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are at this point ahead of us in
solving their problems, so maybe Track 2 isn't as important as we
make it out to be. Yet given the severity of our conflict and the
lack of a solution, maybe it's all we have, and we should recognize
its uniqueness.
The people we got together were all familiar with one another,
including the right-wing Israeli. We all knew one another on a
first name basis, recognized and respected differences of opinion,
and were well beyond the need to plead one's narrative and to prove
that the other's narrative is defective. This still occurs when
right-wing Israelis meet with Palestinians for the first time,
where there's an outpouring of the narrative - why we're right and
you're wrong. We're beyond that.
It was a very constructive process, and most of the meetings took
place in Jerusalem, either in my office in West Jerusalem or in
East Jerusalem.
The fact that a Track 2 project could be organized and run on a
rotating basis and in the area, and not by a third party from
Europe or America who pays to fly you to Italy, London or
Washington, constituted one of the peaks of the peace process. This
was also one of the few Track 2 efforts that was entirely
self-managed.
I'm afraid that to, no small degree, we've regressed. In
conjunction with this issue we have been trying to get together a
round table discussion on Regional Security in the American Colony
Hotel in East Jerusalem. Former IDF Chief-of-Staff General Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak was scheduled to be one of the participants, and on
the Palestinian side we had Ziad Abu-Zayyad and General Abdel
Razzaq al-Yahya. Each time we were on the verge of holding it the
(Israeli) Coordinator for the Territories dragged out the final
confirmation of travel permits until they found an excuse why not
to do it. The last time was because of the suicide bombing in
Ashdod.
Yes, this has been true ever since the second intifada began. It's
become harder and harder. And when you want to do it abroad, it's
hard to get the Palestinians out. One reason that there has been a
rise in Track 2 meetings in Jordan is that it's easier for
Palestinians to get to the Allenby Bridge than to Ben-Gurion
Airport or even to Jerusalem. So meetings are held on the
(Jordanian side of the) Dead Sea. This is a regression, without a
doubt. Even during the first few months of the intifada, Ziad
continued to host meetings in East Jerusalem. Until we reached the
point where the Jordanian participant cited pressures at home not
to come because of the danger and it became increasingly hard for
the Palestinians to get permits to come to Jerusalem, East or West.
Of course the atmosphere, the suicide bombings, etc., didn't
help.
Within the context of your discussions, did you ever raise the
question of a broader security regime for the Greater Middle East,
along the lines of the OSCE in Europe? Did you ever go beyond the
trilateral approach?
One of the basic assumptions that brought us together was that
Israel, Jordan and Palestine have a certain geo-strategic
commonality that none of them has with its other neighbors. This is
where you start, but it is also a building block. There should also
be an aspiration to expand.
In addition to dealing with water and refugees, we noted that once
we reach a framework agreement there would be a necessity to bring
in the Egyptians because they border on Gaza. We all realize that
many Egyptian scholars and politicians frown on the idea of an
Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian trilateral regime, because it doesn't
correspond with the Egyptian view of Egypt's central role in
regional security issues. When I heard Crown Prince Hassan
originally present this notion in Amman, at a broad convocation
with Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, Egyptians and others, one
Egyptian ex-general got up and took exception to the idea, arguing
that Egypt was far too central to be left out. We were all
sensitive to this, but we felt that if you try to talk about a
broader Middle East security regime, you'll miss the heart of it.
One central component is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and
Jordan's close proximity to it. Egypt is separate not only due to
its peace agreement with Israel but because the demilitarization of
Sinai places a large and essentially empty desert between us,
though this may end if we bring Egypt in to police its side of the
Gaza Strip, a fascinating development.
In our conclusions, we noted that the joint working group
recognizes that "the interests of additional states may be involved
here. Egypt, Syria and Lebanon stand out. The trilateral security
regime is not intended in any way to adversely affect the interests
of these or other countries, rather as a geographic geo-strategic
stepping stone. Accordingly, the next phase of the working group's
discussions will seek to identify these fourth party interests as
well." We never got to that.
If the Middle East is any closer to a regional security regime
today, it's not because of TriSeR but because of the Americans in
Iraq. There is some thinking that regional security is more
possible today, though there is also some thinking that it is less
possible.
How have 9/ll and the war in Iraq affected the outcome of your work
in TriSer?
These are very heavy questions, that haven't gone through the
filter of our joint discussions. If we were to renew the
discussions today, we would have to factor in the post 9/ll
developments - the globalization of Islamic terrorism, the American
response against terrorism in general and Iraq in particular, but
before either development we would have to factor in the fact that
the peace process collapsed and the intifada developed. At the
local level, these are more significant developments in terms of
their influence on our thinking.
We could possibly talk about ways of integrating a trilateral
regime into broader aspects of some type of American-sponsored
regional security regime, particularly with regards to terrorism,
less so concerning weapons of mass destruction.
Does the question of weapons of mass destruction have any relevance
to the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian context?
The Jordanian participant asked us to mention the clause in the
Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty that calls for the nuclear
demilitarization of the entire Middle East. That's part of their
policy, the Israeli government agreed to include it in the peace
treaty, and we agreed to include it in our working paper without
any problem.
But since we're not dealing here with Israel's relations with Iraq,
Iran, Syria or Libya, I don't think that weapons of mass
destruction would be a big issue. We could try to factor in a
broader regional or global anti-terrorism regime and a more
prominent American presence. On the other hand, we would have to
factor in the collapse of confidence between Israel and Palestine,
the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, Israeli
lessons from the past four years with regards to the need for
stronger controls, and everything to do with borders would get more
demanding attention. The Palestinians are undoubtedly drawing their
own lessons from the past four years and applying them to their own
security thinking as well.
How relevant to TriSeR are the Geneva Accord security
provisions?
My major criticism of the Geneva Accord is that, on both sides,
Yossi Beilin and Yassar Abed-Rabo, basically said we're picking up
from where we left off at Taba. You can see this most clearly on
the security issues. The Geneva security provisions are almost a
carbon copy of the Taba security provisions. This appears to
indicate that neither side went through a process of saying that,
since Taba, some terrible things have happened, mostly in the
security sphere. It behoves us to sit down and evaluate what
lessons we can draw from the collapse of the Camp David-Taba
process, from the years of violence since then, to take a new look
at the security issues and to apply the lessons learned. I think
this would be a necessary exercise, for both sides. I assume that
the Jordanians would have something to say here as well.
To what degree do you believe that such a process can still be
self-managed by the three parties, or because of what has happened
is it essential to have external American, European or any other
third party involvement?
Stan Windass was present throughout our process, and while it was
essentially self-managed, he was very good at smoothing out
organizational issues, like determining that Phase 1 was managed by
the British, Phase 2 by an Israeli and Phase 3 by a Palestinian. He
provided a concept that enabled us to manage on our own.
Today, if the security problems of moving about and meeting were to
disappear, I don't see any problem of continuing such a process on
a self-managed basis. Some of our views may have changed, but I
don't think that any of us have changed our basic approach, or our
acceptance of the basic assumptions. I don't see any problem in
trying to renew this type of Track 2 activity, though it's possible
that the areas of only partial agreement might expand as a result
of the collapse of trust of the past four years and the very
serious security situation that has emerged.
What would you propose to rebuild this trust, to enable the process
to be renewed?
I'm an advocate of unilateral Israeli withdrawal, redeployment,
dismantling of settlements, a fence/barrier along the Green Line
(1967 borders). I think it would help to reduce the level of
violence, if it were done the way I'm suggesting - no settlements
beyond the fence, and a fence based essentially on the Green Line.
Only the settlements in the Green Line blocs, the Jerusalem area
and the Jordan Valley would remain, pending the final status
agreements, but there would be a reduction in the presence of the
most volatile and provocative settlements, those in Gaza and the
mountain heartland. There would be a Green Line-based fence that
would reinforce the political meaning of the Green Line and
radically reduce suicide bombings. All of this could contribute to
a general reduction in violence, and in turn produce an improvement
in trust.
This is the most realistic way of moving forward today. The vast
majority of the Israeli public and the American government believe
that we don't have a Palestinian negotiating partner today - and
the current Israeli government, which doesn't have a realistic
strategy for peace, nevertheless appears to be moving toward a
realistic strategy for disengagement. It's more doable than
anything else. It also provides a lot of material for Track 2
meetings between the sides, to the extent that they can be held.
There's plenty of room for coordinated unilateral steps, and
perhaps for unilateral steps to stimulate some genuine willingness
to negotiate.
The two biggest steps towards rebuilding confidence are reducing
the friction caused by the settlements and reducing Palestinian
terror attacks, particularly the suicide bombings. The formula I've
suggested can achieve both of those things. I hope, though I'm not
sure, that this can contribute to a rebuilding of trust. A fence
badly done, as is being done today, can reduce trust even further.
But that's the only game in town, and I'm happy to say that the
fence is moving back towards the Green Line, under international
pressure, some Israeli pressure and a few very successful
Palestinian non-violent protests. I don't see any other likely
course of action that might contribute more towards rebuilding
trust. I say this with all due respect to the Geneva Accord - and I
believe that kind of exercise has increased trust, at least within
some sectors of both populations. But it hasn't affected the
overall strategic political conflict. And it's not in any way
likely to be adopted by the current leaders.
It may have been one of the factors that led to Sharon coming out
with his disengagement proposal.
Absolutely. This is a classic example of the law of unintended
consequences. If you had said to Yossi Beilin and Yassar Abed-Rabo
when they began that the only thing you're going to accomplish is
to push Sharon into dismantling settlements, they wouldn't have
engaged in this exercise to begin with. They had different
expectations. But it's undoubtedly true that their project, coupled
with the very prominent protests by Israeli reservists, pilots, the
former heads of the General Security Services, etc., all together,
led to Sharon's disengagement proposal.
Sharon said recently in the Knesset that there's a vacuum, and from
his standpoint there's a danger that this vacuum will be filled by
peace initiatives, some local and some international, which will
demand of Israel more far-reaching concessions than those he's
suggesting within the framework of unilateral redeployment. To
prevent the vacuum from enveloping us, he believes we have to take
the initiative. He was admitting that he recognized the importance
of Geneva, and also the fact that after the November elections in
the US, either a new Democratic president or a second term Bush
might take a tougher attitude towards Israel. The Bush vision of
June 24, 2002, when you get beyond terrorism, talks about a
Palestinian state based upon the 1967 lines. The disengagement idea
is Sharon's response to all of this. No one anticipated that he
would embrace the idea of unilateral moves being advocated by
certain portions of the Israeli center and left. But that's what
happened.
Does your proposal consider the use of international monitors to
help maintain the security regime?
Not international, but rather trilateral. We talked about various
possibilities of trilateral forces patrolling the borders. We
didn't go beyond that. It's possible, maybe even probable, that if
we were to sit down today, one of the Palestinian lessons of the
past four years would be to insist on a broader international
presence on some of these borders. That's included in the Geneva
proposal. In 1999, we weren't thinking along those lines. Not only
does the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty not require joint border
patrols, it requires no patrols. It's a very normal situation.
These were the models we were relating to at the time. That would
probably change. Yet the Israeli participants would probably
continue to be skeptical about the idea of introducing
international forces.