A sea bird was quivering on the sandy beach, a big fin sticking out
of her beak. The bird could neither swallow nor spit out the fish
stuck in her throat. The greedy bird, who had taken in more than
she could swallow, was in her death throes. The fate of the fish
was no better. He would never return to swim in the ocean's clear
water. (Denmark, July 2002)
The events commemorating 40 years of occupation this past June
highlighted the question that occasionally enters the public
debate: whether the settlement project is still reversible. This
question divides the Israeli left into two camps. On one side are
those who believe in its reversibility and support the two-state
solution west of Jordan, and continue to focus their efforts on the
struggle against the very existence of the settlements. On the
other side are those who consider the settlement project a fait
accompli, and conclude that the struggle must focus on the regime
which Israel has instituted in the West Bank, where there is a
physical, political and legal separation between the two
populations.
This question becomes even more acute as a result of the ongoing
construction of thousands of homes in settlements carried out by
the Israeli government, at a time when the construction of the
separation barrier1 in various areas of the West Bank
continues.
This article will discuss the following aspects related to the
separation barrier:
1) What Israeli needs are met by the construction of the separation
barrier?
2) What are the problems that this barrier causes for Israel?
3) Will the completion of the separation barrier along the route
authorized by the Israeli government also mean the end of the
two-state solution?
Although a large part of the 730km-long separation barrier has
already been built, there are three different segments whose future
is yet to be determined. In these three segments the barrier cuts
deep into West Bank territory, severely curtailing Palestinian
mobility: The first is the "Ma'ale Adumim bubble," which includes,
in addition to the large settlement, several other surrounding
settlements and outposts and large open spaces between them. This
enclave cuts the West Bank in two - north and south - with
Jerusalem (which is geographically of course part of the West
Bank), where West Bankers are already forbidden entry, situated
more or less in-between the two. The second segment is the
settlement enclave of Ariel-Emannuel-Karnei Shomron, which breaks
up the territorial contiguity of the northern part of the West
Bank.2 The third segment is part of the planned route in the "Gush
Etzion District" (a territory much larger than that of historical
Gush Etzion), where the Supreme Court will have to determine the
proportionality of the harm it causes the Palestinian
population.
The Israeli government authorized the "Seam-Line Program" in June
2002, at the peak of one of the most relentless waves of terrorism.
Supposedly, this was a legitimate defensive move by a government
forced to carry out an emergency measure aimed at defending the
lives of its citizens. However, as the route of the barrier became
clear, it became apparent that this was not only a defensive
measure, but a plan of clear political logic, whose primary goal
was, and remains, to re-define Israel's eastern border, while
erasing large segments of the Green Line.
Although undoubtedly the immediate motive for initiating the
barrier project (without which it would probably not have come into
existence in this form) was the security crisis caused by the
second intifada, it is important to stress that its construction
fit well into the world view coming into prominence in the Israeli
political arena beginning in the 1990s. This world view is based on
two different and somewhat contradictory aspirations: on the one
hand, the wish to continue and strengthen Israel's grasp on
different strategic points in the West Bank; on the other hand, the
desire to minimize Israel's contact with the Palestinian civilian
population in the West Bank, all the while insisting that Israel
does not bear any responsibility for the living conditions of this
population. While the first aspiration represents the wish to
spread out to the east and "correct" the ceasefire lines agreed
upon during the final stages of the 1948 war, the second aspiration
reflects the demographic interest, well entrenched in Israeli
thinking, in upholding a "Jewish majority." The barrier's
construction on the route authorized by the Israeli government is
therefore an attempt to have the occupation cake and eat it too, in
other words: maximum land with minimum Arabs on it. On this issue
it is important to clarify that the claim repeated everywhere by
Israel's official spokespersons that "less than 10% of the
territory of the West Bank [is] to the west of the barrier" is,
while correct, manipulative and misleading in essence. This is
because it ignores the fact that control over the lands west of the
barrier will allow Israel to control the traffic between the major
cities and provinces of the West Bank, and thus make millions of
Palestinians' daily lives dependent on Israel's good will. And as
is well know in the Middle East, the availability of good will is
not something one can or should always depend on.
Of course, the first to suffer the implications of the separation
barrier are those Palestinians residing near the route of the
barrier. But the State of Israel also constantly finds itself on
the defensive, due to the harsh criticism of this policy both at
home and abroad. At the root of Israel's difficulty in implementing
the barrier's originally planned route (which it has had to change
several times over the last few years), is the contradiction
between the traditional settlement policy of Israeli governments of
intentionally building settlements in locations that would
undermine Palestinian contiguity in the West Bank, and the official
policy of recent Israeli governments (which is in complete
opposition to their policy in the field) of accepting the principle
of a Palestinian state in the West Bank territory. The barriers'
route suffers the same contradiction, for it is supposed to
maintain the contiguity of the future Palestinian state, while
drawing a continuous line between the settlements which were
constructed to fracture this very contiguity. To summarize,
Israel's aim is for the separation barrier to solve the demographic
problem, while minimizing the internal political price which Israel
will have to pay in case of settlement evacuation.
However, the Green Line was not the only thing blurred by the
construction of the barrier. The dreams of the "Greater Israel"
advocates also consequently suffered a harsh blow. The construction
of the barrier marked the first time an Israeli government was
forced to carry out a measure implying admission of the failure of
the attempt to annex the West Bank. The settlers were the first to
understand that the barrier's route does not only reflect security
concerns but a new geopolitical and, for them, dangerous
understanding. For decades they have been the best interpreters of
Israeli public opinion, seeing as their collective existence
depends on their deciphering of the "Israeli psyche." And here,
ironically, it was the eastern settlements, founded by hard-core
settlers, who were left on the Palestinian side of the barrier's
route. The attempts by the settler Council of Judea, Samaria (and
previously Gaza) to dramatically change the barrier route to
encompass the densely populated Palestinian Areas A and B and
prevent some of the settlements from being left on the east side of
the route failed. Thus the claim that the construction of the
barrier was essentially unnecessary was left (for opposite reasons,
no doubt) to the two extreme ends of Israeli politics.
One cannot address the issue of whether the construction of the
barrier along its current route destroys the chances of a two-state
solution without first answering two questions:
1) Will the barrier actually be built in full (meaning the the
Ma'ale Adumim bloc, the Ariel-Kedumim Bloc and Gush Etzion)?
2) What is expected to happen in terms of settlement construction
and population enlargement in the occupied territories to the west
of the barrier route?
In answer to the first question, I tend to think, though not
unequivocally, that the route will not be completed in full, due to
international pressure. Therefore, the barrier's damage to a
long-term solution will remain similar to that of today. At the
same time, building statistics show that most of the large-scale
settlement construction underway, with massive government
involvement, is taking place in what the Israeli government calls
"settlement blocs" - about which we are always told there is a
"national consensus." All indications are that these trends in
settlement construction and population growth will proceed at a
similar pace in the coming years.3 Construction and development in
the settlements east of the barrier are continuing as well, though
not as massively.4 It is not surprising that there are those (among
whom many are Palestinians, who tend to be more suspicious of
Israel's intentions) who consider the barrier route as a minimum
line on which Israel will aim to stabilize its borders in the
future, while trying to annex more settlements to the east of the
barrier.
In any case, recent Israeli governments have not demonstrated a
consistent policy on the future of settlements. Two contradictory
approaches coexist in these governments: 1) the traditional view
that most of the West Bank settlements (east and west of the
barrier) should continue to grow (although at varying rates); and
2) the view that Israel must reduce the territories which it
directly controls. This second approach led to the dismantling of
settlements in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005. One should not
search for some hidden, enlightened logic behind the ongoing
contradiction between these two simultaneous policies. This
contradiction is first and foremost a result of the crisis the
Israeli political system is immersed in. This state of crisis
hinders the emergence of a leadership that will squarely face the
difficulties arising directly from Israel's policy failures over
the last four decades. In this context, it is clear that the
ongoing construction in the settlements and outposts east of the
barrier route postpones the battle every government will eventually
have to wage against the ideological right-wing settler factions -
the day any decision will be made requiring any kind of partial
Israeli withdrawal and redeployment in the West Bank.
The relevance of the two-state solution has to be considered when
taking into account the real options before Israel. To do this we
must answer the following questions: Is it likely for Israel, today
or in the foreseeable future, to formally and unilaterally annex
the territories west of the barrier, even if it is built in full
(despite my counter-assessment here)? The answer to this is most
probably negative. Will Israel be able to endlessly postpone
dealing with the contradictions arising from the settlement project
in terms of its definition as a Jewish national and democratic
state which exists on a land which is in fact bi-national? The
answer to this question is certainly negative. In these
circumstances, the most the barrier can do is postpone the
confrontation with difficult and painful issues. It cannot do away
with the need to tackle them. Meanwhile, the price paid by both
sides, the bird and the fish, is rising daily.
1 In this article, I chose to use the relatively neutral and
technical term "barrier," instead of "wall" or "fence," which are
not as accurate.
2 Despite the construction of the "fingernails" (meaning Special
Security Zones) around some of these settlements, the construction
of the parts that are supposed to connect these "fingernails" to
the barrier's major route has not yet begun.
3 As of 2001, the number of constructions begun in the settlements
is about 1,500-2,000 housing units a year. The rate of growth of
the settler population in these years has been about 5-6% a year,
which is three times faster than the total national population
growth.
4 A clear expression of this was the Maskiot settlement planned for
the evacuated settlers of Gush Katif, published in the final days
of 2006 and currently postponed. For further details on Maskiot,
see:
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/he/peace.asp?pi=57&docid=2131&pos=87&total=148&letter=12&list=21&listpos=19&all=false