HAMAS is part of the Palestinian movement against the Israeli
aggression. It is at the same time part of the international
movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Any discussion of HAMAS must be
based on an even-handed consideration of these two elements. These
two realities define the position of the Islamist Palestinian
movement, both internally and in the diaspora, and determine the
scope of its role in public life.
Two other interconnected factors should also be considered: To
include HAMAS among the Palestinian rejectionist forces does not
eliminate the essential difference between its rejection, which
emanates from its religious beliefs, and the rejection of the
secular PLO factions. And the loyalty of the Palestinian movement
to the international leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and its
commitment to adhere to its general policy does not prevent the
international leadership from endorsing the specificity of the
Palestinian case and permitting to the Palestinian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood what it would not permit to other
branches.
A Static Base of Beliefs
HAMAS abides by the same system of beliefs as any Muslim
Brotherhood movement anywhere in the world: the Muslim creed
characterized by conservative orthodoxy. The conduct of HAMAS
indicates that the movement leans toward the more conservative
strains within the international movement and stands to the right
of most other factions. Since it is a conformist movement that
follows in the path of the predecessors or aslaf, it embraces the
integrity of Muslim doctrine and does not allow its subjection to
exegesis or disputation. It maintains a hard-line stance with
regard to beliefs and social matters according to the Sunnah or
orthodox tradition. Thus, like its peers in the Muslim Brotherhood,
HAMAS banishes the argumentations of those who have challenged the
fanatics of their times, especially the theses they advanced that
place mind and reason over the dependence on al-ghayb and
al-ghaybiyya1 (the Unseen), and does not allow its adherents to
study the rich and extensive chronicles that flourished within the
context of what came to be known as 'ilm al-kalaam - the Muslim
religious thought par excellence.
The traditionalism and dogmatism that curb all aspirations for
enlightenment have resulted in a dislocation between HAMAS and the
rest of the Palestinian people - secular, but also many religious
people, who are disturbed by its religious and social fanaticism,
but who are, nevertheless, drawn to its hard-line political
stance.
However, the extent of the divergences between the Palestinian
Islamic movements and the rest of the population are not as great
as assumed. The boundaries between the different segments of the
religious, or between the religious and the secular, are not so
pronounced. On the Palestinian scene, these boundaries mix and
merge, even within the same person. Religious tendencies or social
conservatism exist among the secular; similarly, there are those
among HAMAS who vaunt their faith in the Unseen, yet adopt a
pragmatic approach in order to achieve earthly gains. In a society
where secularism is not fully entrenched, religious beliefs
continue to impact public as well as personal lives. This will not
go away, regardless of the rise of a religious political
movement.
In other words, the presence of HAMAS on the Palestinian scene is
shaped in conjunction with the developments in Palestinian society:
1) the influence of its surroundings, which stretch deep into both
Arab and Muslim domains; and 2) the failure of the PLO to arrive at
an acceptable solution to the national cause. It is clear that this
presence fluctuates in accordance with the rise and fall in
importance of these joint factors, but will not fall below the
dictates of the developments within the Palestinian context. This
means that it is not possible for HAMAS to cancel the existence of
other factions, and vice versa. Therefore, infighting will not
secure an absolute win for any of the concerned parties, and there
is no escape from working towards coexistence and dialogue, and
going back to the ballot box and the sharing of power. Would it be
possible in the current Palestinian reality to expect a course of
action that would not squander the efforts of an entire society or
debilitate it? The answer requires focusing on the discrepancies
between HAMAS and the other PLO factions, and exploring the
possibilities of bridging their differences for an eventual joint
action within the existing parameters.
The first and most difficult gap to bridge is that between those
who depend on the Unseen to determine their conduct on earth and
those who depend on realism. The Unseen for the faithful is eternal
and immutable, and those who refuse to believe in it are considered
kuffar (infidels or disbelievers). They tend to view the present
through the eyes of those who are gone and do not give weight to
the visible transformations in the realm of reality. The realists -
religious or not - note the developments in the material world and
shun absolutes. They replace the reliance on the Unseen with a
reliance on mind and reason, and see the present through the eyes
of their contemporaries. Attempts to reconcile the two approaches
have always led to the conclusion that there is no middle road:
either the Unseen does not control public life, especially in
secularized societies, or societies will suffer from stagnation or
even regression.
The second gap is the societal discrepancies, which basically are
linked to and emanate from the divergences in belief, though not
exclusively. Normal religiousness can lead to conservative social
conduct, but can also allow for openness. Only religious fanaticism
leads to fanatic social conduct that constrains non-fanatics,
religious and secular alike. But there are also factors that are
not religion-based that shape social conduct, and these affect
societies where religious political movements exist, as well as
societies where they do not. In the Palestinian case, we can
isolate one factor that is specific to this context: the perceived
threat to the existence of the Palestinian people since the
inception and execution of the Zionist project to transform
Palestine into a state exclusively for Jews. Cleaving to the
inherited body of knowledge and tradition became for the
Palestinians one way of preserving their existence and their
national characteristics from dispersal. It should be noted that
the gap here between HAMAS and the other forces is smaller than
expected.
Politics Is Less Difficult
The third difference is political. It is, naturally, linked to the
former two, but not exclusively. The influence of current
conditions on the political sphere is deeper and more far-reaching
than its effect on the religious or the social. And, specifically
in the Palestinian case, which is governed by its struggle against
the Israeli occupation, these very present effects allow the
divergences between the various forces to narrow, and a common
denominator that could be conducive to common actions, mutual
understanding and the desire for cooperation to gradually
expand.
Thus, in the political sphere, the disagreements between the PLO
forces - characterized as secular - and the Islamic movement HAMAS
- with its religious attributes - in essence revolve around
international legitimacy and its prerogatives. The disagreement
with FATEH and its followers becomes more acute when it comes to
the intentions of the former to forge a political settlement with
Israel based on two states for two peoples. HAMAS' rejection of
such a solution springs from its rejection of international
legitimacy and its tenacity in upholding what it considers divine
legitimacy, which does not permit the recognition of any rights for
the Jewish people in the land of Palestine.
It is certain, however, that HAMAS is fully aware that the present
conditions are not conducive to rejectionism, and that the
Palestinians' call for a settlement must persist - even with
Israel's continued attempts to block a just solution - for the sake
of containing the catastrophe that has befallen them, and in order
to salvage what they can of their rights, their land and their
national existence. But because HAMAS had headed the rejectionist
forces, it was unprepared to deal with the new parameters and
exaggerated its reliance on religious dogma in order to validate
its continued rejectionism, and to expand the circle of its
supporters who come from among those disheartened by and
disappointed in other factions. But, in point of fact, and
notwithstanding its overemphasis on religion, this political
Islamic movement did not neglect to form constructive relations
with forces and regimes that embraced a peaceful settlement.
Liberating HAMAS from Rejectionism
Would it be possible to alter this rejectionist stance and to
prevail upon HAMAS to move from opposing the settlement efforts to
getting involved in them? In answer to this question, it should be
recalled that liberating HAMAS from its rejectionism is the key to
finding a stable political common denominator between the forces
acting on the local Palestinian arena, and to providing hope for
the preservation of unity and the avoidance of existential crises.
For this, a number of factors should be considered. The first is
that the linkage between religious beliefs and political conduct is
not difficult to dismantle. Muslim tradition abounds in examples
where religious beliefs had to be bypassed out of political
necessity. One example is the Hudaybiyya truce, where the Prophet
Muhammad deleted from an agreement he was forced to sign with the
infidels in Mecca the reference to himself as the Prophet of God,
although acknowledging that is an imperative for becoming a Muslim.
The Prophet also suspended temporarily the hajj, although going to
hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam.
The implication here is that there is not one among the HAMAS
people, with their varying degrees of fanaticism, who can claim a
deeper attachment to the Muslim creed than the Prophet of Islam.
This leads to a two-fold conclusion: 1) There are those among HAMAS
who rely on religion to achieve worldly benefits; and 2) there are
those who are genuine in their beliefs and who will not fail to
dismantle religious fanaticism in favor of political openness when
the right conditions are available.
Another element to consider: A discussion with religious forces
over matters of creed tends to block the chances of reaching common
denominators. This is not true of politics, and that is why it is
necessary to always lure HAMAS to a political dialogue and to
eschew matters pertaining to the Unseen. For the time being, HAMAS
has been avoiding pushing its religious extremism and conservative
social conduct on the population. This reticence to give them high
priority points to a certain pragmatism, and gives a glimmer of
hope for the possibility of HAMAS reaching common ground with
secular forces.
Since the Palestinian Islamic movement took up resistance against
the Israeli occupation 20 years ago, HAMAS ended up heading the
rejectionist front and achieved prominence as one of the most
radical movements to oppose a political settlement involving
recognition of the State of Israel or ceding any part of Palestine
to the Jewish people. Nevertheless, HAMAS did not remain static.
Its opposition to Oslo was followed by its refusal to participate
in any of the national organizations that emanated from Oslo. HAMAS
refused to participate in the 1996 elections, calling for their
boycott, and continued to refuse to participate in PLO
organizations. Yet HAMAS did not stop cooperating with factions
that supported Oslo and did not refuse to conclude understandings
of one type or another with FATEH that has established the Oslo
order in Palestine. With the second intifada in 2000, HAMAS took a
step that it had not taken during the first intifada: It joined the
National and Islamic Forces, an umbrella group of 14 factions that
coordinated the affairs of the intifada and most of which supported
the Oslo agreement. At the same time, HAMAS began to scale back its
participation in the group of 10 factions opposed to Oslo. At the
end of the day, and through worldly rather than otherworldly
factors, HAMAS participated in the legislative elections, obtaining
a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council - a body of
government emanating from the Oslo agreement. Later, out of
pragmatic considerations, HAMAS formed a unity government with
FATEH in accordance with the Mecca agreement, and found itself
propelled along the thorny path of looking for a settlement to the
conflict.
How Long the Road to Realism?
Throughout the decades, the Muslim Brotherhood stayed removed from
the evolutionary current that was taking place on the political
stage. Even after Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
in 1967, they remained outside the current events and avoided
confrontation with the occupation. When the 1987 intifada broke
out, the Palestinian Muslim Brothers took their most important
historical step by deciding to give precedence to the resistance to
the occupation, and established their resistance "arm," HAMAS. This
was the genesis of the subsequent events.
Thus, the involvement of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the
action against the occupation has been dictated by the conditions
of the age, after they had long been preoccupied with bygone
matters. It is the duty of nationalists, especially progressives,
to work with the Muslim movement, to push HAMAS towards liberating
itself from its political fanaticism, from its conduct alienating
it from the spirit of the age, and from its inability to balance
between what is essential and what is possible to achieve. Take the
recognition of Israel: HAMAS' refusal to recognize Israel is not a
position to be judged solely by whether it is right or wrong; it is
a disavowal of an entire age, its values, laws and orders, and of
international legitimacy for which the existence of Israel and its
right to continue to exist are vital elements. Furthermore, it
places the recognition of Israel as a condition that Palestinians
must meet in order to retrieve some of their rights and land. One
marvels at how a political power can reject the reality and logic
of its age, its legitimacies and values, and then persist in asking
the people of this age to treat it and its people with
equity.
It is my conviction that the involvement of HAMAS - albeit late -
in the preoccupations of the times will gradually ease the Islamic
movement down from its heaven to earth, instead of it raising the
earth to its heaven. All it will take is for HAMAS to adopt some
political realism. It will make mistakes and will experience the
pain that FATEH experienced when it made the switch from
rejectionism to the search for a peaceful settlement. Those who
wish for HAMAS to evolve must not give in to the ugly enmity that
is inflamed by impatience arising from interests divorced from
Palestinian national interests.
In return, every HAMAS member must realize what has become
impossible to ignore: that the survival of HAMAS as a respectable
political force is contingent upon its respecting the convictions
of others, and ceasing to rely on what it attributes to heaven in
its dealings with earthly issues. Earthly matters are dealt with
according to the criteria of our world and not by guidance from the
world of the Unseen. It is certain that many in HAMAS are looking
to bridge the gap between their movement and the spirit of the age.
And the willingness of other forces to adopt the dialogue approach
with HAMAS can only solidify their influence.
* This article was originally published in the Arabic quarterly
Falastinyat, No.2 (Ramallah). It was translated and abridged by
kind permission of the writer.
1 The ultimate truth that transcends our senses, upon which humans
base their knowledge and experience. It connotes, among other
things, the existence of a Power that stands beyond our knowledge
and beyond our sight - the Unseen.
At the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, June 2007.
(Photo by Muhammad Abed / www.activestills.org)