Since the outbreak of the conflict between Fateh and Hamas, there
has been the widely circulated contention that Hamas is opposed to
the Palestinian national project and that its own agenda is Islamic
or Iranian-Syrian. Thus, it is not concerned with resistance, the
end of the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state;
its priorities lie in bringing about an Islamic society and an
Islamic life-style for individuals. Although this view contains a
measure of truth, it is not the absolute reality.
The National Project
Before any deliberation of these claims, a brief review of the
Palestinian national project is in order. The national project, in
my understanding, is predicated on four basic principles: 1) the
objectives; 2) the plans and mechanisms that would enable the
implementation of these objectives; 3) the people who are called
upon to struggle, to organize, to mobilize and to unite in order to
achieve these objectives; and 4) the leadership that is to
incorporate all these elements into its policies, stances and plans
of action so that these objectives can be reached in the shortest
possible time and with the fewest sacrifices. These four principles
are now nonexistent, or have been forfeited or lost.
The consensus among the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian
people is that the definition of the national aims lies within the
parameters of: the implementation of the right to
self-determination; the end of the occupation and the establishment
of the independent Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967,
including Jerusalem; and a just solution to the refugee problem in
accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. To
achieve these aims, the Palestinians have resorted to resistance as
well as to negotiations; they have founded the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and have set up the Palestinian Authority (PA),
which is supposed to be only a phase and a means for the
establishment of a Palestinian state and the attainment of the
totality of the Palestinian goals.
The crisis that has gripped the Palestinian national movement and
the whole Palestinian political order began when it became clear
that the prospects for the implementation of the Palestinian
national project have been steadily shrinking for two main reasons:
One is the policy of the successive Israeli governments to create
facts on the ground, implemented through the expansion and
intensification of settlement activity; the construction of the
separation wall; and the fragmentation of the territories through
the construction of ring roads, security and military zones, land
confiscations and the closures of areas. All these factors make the
establishment of a Palestinian state an increasingly remote
possibility. The second reason is the utter failure of Palestinian
policies, mechanisms and plans of action, and the fact that they
have not been replaced by new ones to safeguard the progress of the
national project. The Oslo agreement collapsed and was overtaken by
events after Israel utilized it as a cover for its policy of
creating facts on the ground. The agreement has ceased to be
binding for Israel, and if it has refrained from annulling it
officially, it is only out of a desire to maintain the Palestinian
commitments pertaining to the agreement. Also, Israel does not want
to be seen by the international community as the party responsible
for burying the agreement.
No New Strategies
Since the failure of the Camp David talks, there has effectively
been no peace process, not even as a matter of form. Israel tossed
aside the negotiations and the negotiated solutions and claimed
there was no Palestinian partner. To this the Palestinians reacted
emotionally. There were entreaties, claims and conciliatory moves,
but there was no crystallization of a new Palestinian strategy to
match the evolving facts and the new realities. The Palestinian
leadership - especially after the demise of Yasser Arafat - yearns
for negotiations, and is banking on negotiations - albeit
nonexistent - and the Palestinian expectations have been lowered to
contacts and meetings and plans put forth by American or
international envoys, completely removed from the political and
legal underpinnings of international law and resolutions, and where
the security of Israel has become the sole reference for
negotiations or contacts. The political horizon for negotiations
(read contacts) is obvious save to those who refuse to see that the
facts the occupation is creating make Israel's solution the only
solution on the table - unless we turn the table on the
players.
In addition, the PA has turned into an end rather than a means, and
the struggle over power, self-aggrandizement, interests and profits
has overshadowed all other considerations. It is worth mentioning
that this struggle predates the Hamas victory in the legislative
elections; it has, however, been exacerbated by the outcome. The
power struggle is not confined anymore to Fateh and its various
wings and power centers; it has now become a tug-of-war between
Fateh and Hamas, whereby each movement is seeking exclusive power
over the PA, or at least to keep the lion's share.
As for the PLO, it has become totally paralyzed and a tool in the
hands of the PA instead of the reverse. The attempts to revitalize
the PLO are now almost limited to using the organization within the
confines of inducements or conflicts between it and Hamas. It
should be remembered that the PLO is more important and greater
than all this; it is the leadership of the Palestinian people, its
national expression and its sole and legitimate
representative.
The resistance, the presumed means for the concretization of the
Palestinian goals, is now either nonexistent or lost in the search
for a reciprocal, simultaneous and comprehensive hudna that usually
ends up being a one-sided hudna. Alternatively, it has become a
card to be used chiefly in the internal struggle for the purpose of
enhancing the position of one faction or the other. The resistance
as a strategic instrument has long since fizzled out without having
achieved any of its aims. A constructive resistance must coincide
with the national interests and the justness and moral standards of
the Palestinian cause, as well as with international law, which
sanctions resistance. It should be grounded in the people, for it
is first and foremost a popular movement that aims to reinforce the
elements of sumud (steadfastness) and physical Palestinian presence
on the land of Palestine. The resistance must also understand the
nature of the struggle and its specificity, and realize that it is
a mistake to push the Palestinians into decisive battles when they
are not ready and when the likelihood of striking a balance of
power that would allow the fulfillment of the national aims is
close to nil.
Hamas - A Shift in Policy
The absence of the national project, the policy of negotiations
without the existence of negotiations, extolling the resistance
without the existence of resistance, the ever-diminishing prospects
of achieving the national aims, and the rising need to merge
Palestinian nationalism with its Arab depth and its Muslim and
international dimensions - all these factors have led to the fall
of the Palestinian national movement, especially Fateh, and to the
rise of the Islamic movement, especially Hamas. Hamas did not come
forward solely as the standard-bearer of the Islamic project; it
also attempted to espouse the national project. This became
apparent through its participation in the first intifada - which
saw its inception - and became even more obvious when Hamas adopted
suicide operations as its modus operandi, especially during the
second intifada.
To give more prominence to the national dimension, Hamas made many
changes in its positions and programs which were reflected in its
acquiescence to the Cairo Declaration and the tahdi'a, its
participation in the PA through elections, and its endorsement of
the establishment of a state within the 1967 borders. This was also
seen in several signals that Hamas sent indicating its readiness to
recognize Israel in return for a reasonable price, and its
readiness to accept a state with provisional borders in return for
a hudna. But all these policies and signals were rejected by the
United States and Israel and did not open the way for Hamas to be
reckoned with as a major Palestinian force.
Hamas now finds itself in a quandary. On the one hand, it cannot
revert to the original Hamas and to resistance; it has tasted power
and authority and has succumbed to the desire to hold on to the PA,
and is aware of the hefty price it would have to pay if it went
back to resistance. On the other hand, Hamas is unable to retain
control of the PA and maintain the process of moderation it had
initiated. It is expected to change its stance and to lay down its
arms without getting anything in return, while the problem will be
solved according to the vision of George W. Bush, without any
guarantees whatsoever for Hamas. This realization led to the
precipitation of the coup in Gaza, in the hope that this would
hasten the recognition of Hamas and would pave the way for it to
reap some benefits in return for what it has offered and for what
it is capable of offering. But it failed to achieve this goal
through the coup; instead, it became shackled by its victory.
Summary
The major element missing from the Palestinian scene is the
Palestinian national project. As a result, the PLO factions and
parties have suffered one defeat after another - from the municipal
and legislative elections to Gaza, and the rest is yet to be seen.
The national project must regain its prominence, for it is
principally aimed at ending the occupation. Barring that, we can
only look forward to a perpetuation of failures and defeats. Hamas
must recognize that it cannot hope for success unless it adopts the
national project and renounces the military option for settling
internal disputes. Otherwise we are all heading towards an
impending disaster and the abyss that is threatening the national
cause.