There is a reason that the two-state solution has, in one form or
another, stayed around … and around …. and around,
since its first iteration in the British Peel Plan, also known as
the first partition plan, in 1937. It is inconceivable that
anything else can get us out of the current logjam. Not that, as we
know, the two-state solution is a panacea. As Churchill's
cliché about democracy had it; it's the worst system, except
for the alternatives.
There is a difference between Churchill's formulation and the
two-state solution. In fact there are other solutions that might
work: Federation, confederation, bi-national state, cantonization,
etc., which are all variations on the old one-state solution. All
of them have their passionate and often well-meaning advocates and
carefully thought-out programs that deal with the real issues, and
many are based on models that have worked or do work elsewhere.
Their common problem: You can't get there from here.
Aesop's fable of the cat and mice explains the problem clearly, and
there's no need to label who is who. The mice in a house were
complaining that the cat was catching and killing them, and they
were facing annihilation. They needed a new approach. Finally, one
suggested that they put a bell around the cat's neck, so the sound
would warn them whenever it came around. The proposal was examined
carefully, all thought it a superb suggestion, and they were ready
for implementation. Finally, the oldest, most grizzled mouse asked
cynically, "Who will bell the cat?"
In other words, how do we create a one-state solution, which is
opposed by virtually all Israelis, when we cannot get to a
two-state solution, with far broader, if partially nominal,
support?
Most plans I have seen content themselves with laying out the
advantages of and explaining how, when it came into force, it would
ameliorate the situation immediately, perhaps even for both sides.
But often there is not even an attempt to lay out a realistic
process for adoption and implementation, since its advantages are
supposed to be self-evident. In other words, the UN or the U.S. or
the "international community" is expected to impose it.
The Real World
That isn't how the real world works. That world bears no
resemblance to the world that has existed since the 1930's,
certainly since Israel was founded in 1948. Israel was founded on a
passionate belief in the absolute necessity of a Jewish state. The
issue is no longer, for those who want a solution to the conflict,
the rightness or wrongness of that solution, or its clear injustice
to the Palestinian people, collectively and individually. Israel
will not allow its nationhood to be fundamentally compromised, by
the U.S. or anyone else. The U.S., under any imaginable leadership,
will not force Israel to abandon the idea of a Jewish state. And
until the UN becomes a world government with the coercive power to
fight wars - something hard to imagine for a long time to come, if
ever - it cannot enforce such a policy, even if it were enacted
though some sort of "Uniting for Peace" - type resolution, which
enabled the UN to fight the Korean War in 1950-53.
While in my view and in that of many others, it is politically
possible and feasible, not to mention imperative, for the U.S. to
play a far stronger role in the peace process, including
encouragement of both sides to take steps they would prefer not to
and probably would not agree to in bilateral negotiations, the
suggestions above are of a very different order of magnitude. If
you posit a U.S., or some other world power, doing this, you might
as easily posit a supernatural force, or a change of heart towards
goodness on the part of all men and women, or the Messiah coming.
All of these are well within the realm of imagination but not
within the purview of serious political analysis.
Improbable, but it happened
Of course, determining what is "politically possible" is not an
exact science. And it is not unusual for pundits to be flat wrong,
What seemed unattainable and fantastic can, a generation later,
turn out to be - surprise! - within the realm of political
possibility.
The best single example I know is one that every reader of the
Palestine-Israel Journal is familiar with, i.e., the Zionist
movement's successful campaign to establish the State of Israel. In
1897, Theodore Herzl declared, "In Basle I established the Jewish
State. If I were to say it publicly today, the response would be
laughter from all directions. Perhaps in another five years, 50
years at the most, everyone will recognize it".
"Laughter" was a euphemism. Any sober political analyst in 1897
would have said, in my view, that the chance of the dispersed and
persecuted Jewish people establishing a state in 50 years was
insane, on the par with something demonstrably impossible, like
reaching the moon. Yet Israel was established 51 years later (and
the moon was reached only 21 years after that, but that's a
different issue). Is a one-state (or any non-two-state) solution
any more unlikely than that?
In my view, it is, with a couple of caveats. Between 1897 and 1948,
the world went through two world wars and the Nazi Holocaust, and
was well on the way to dismantling the Euro-centric system of
colonialism and imperialism (while many Arabs may see the
establishment of Israel as part of that system, at the time most
Europeans and Americans emphatically did not). The Zionist
movement, with a combination of extraordinary luck, shrewd timing,
and pragmatism was positioned to use these events and catastrophes
to achieve its aim of a Jewish state. It was improbable, but it
happened.
Is a revolution possible?
Could not a similar cascade of events theoretically bring about a
one-state or (non-two-state) solution? Of course. But only if you
posit a world order fundamentally different from today's, with the
neutralization of the United States (or a complete change of its
political culture and perception of its interests), the
non-existence of an Israeli nuclear capacity, and a world polity
(or new power) both willing and able to force a one-state solution
on a recalcitrant Israel. Then it is possible. All of these are
conceivable, and it is possible that some equally unlikely
scenarios will actually come to pass. But the chance of a
revolution in the world order both occurring and being able to
bring about such a specific change in a usable form is highly
unlikely. Revolutions are blunt and clumsy instruments, and the
ultimate failure of most of them in the 20th century testifies to
their weaknesses.
Focusing on the apocalyptic has its costs. It is hard to pursue
evolutionary, consensual change while simultaneously seeking
revolutionary, coercive transformation. It tends to destroy your
credibility. And the political momentum necessary for one is
usually very different from that required for the other.
In 2003-04 there was a renewed spate of interest on the part of
some members of the Jewish left in the one-state solution. Veteran
historians and analysts such as Prof. Tony Judt and Dr. Meron
Benvenisti argued that the two-state solution was simply no longer
attainable, and that the only alternative was some form of
one-state. Benvenisti, of course, has been making similar arguments
since the 1980's. With genuine respect for both of them, I don't
think their analysis holds water.
Two-state solution or no solution
The alternative to the two-state solution is not one-state but
rather no solution, which is what we have had for the last sixty
years. Or rather, a partial solution, benefiting Israel and doing
little for the Palestinians. The inertia of stalemate is an
extremely powerful force. Given the unlikelihood of war
accomplishing the aim of restructuring Israel and Palestine into
some form of one state, or of Israel imploding like the Soviet
Empire (a highly implausible scenario, despite some recent
statements of pessimism from Prime Minister Olmert and other
Israelis), it is more likely that, in the absence of two-states,
twenty years from now we will still have some version of what we
see today.
The seeming post-Oslo decline of the two-state impulse does not
really strengthen the move towards one-state, though it does
increase Palestinian desperation. The growth of settlements,
refusal to share Jerusalem (though this has simultaneously become
more popular in some unlikely sectors, such as with the current
Prime and Foreign Ministers) do not make a one-state solution any
more plausible. Who will bell the cat?
Two-states - a door to other options
Does that mean that confederation, bi-nationalism, or some other
solution that recognizes the need for political and economic
cooperation and equality between Israelis and Palestinians is
impossible? Not at all. But the only possible road to them is
through the two-state solution. It is unlikely that there is any
other way.
The (viable) two-state solution is the clearest possible statement
of a pragmatic willingness to accept the permanent national
presence of the "other" in the Middle East. Declarations of
Principles and revisions of charters don't cut it. In today's
world, as post-nationalist as (Western) Europe, at least, may be,
self-determination is the gold standard of acceptance and
responsibility. "Post" means "after". Europe could not reach
post-nationalism without first attaining national responsibility,
though some of the states now surrendering elements of their
sovereignty only received it, theoretically or practically, in
1989-90, others a bit earlier in 1919.
Once the two-state solution works (I'm convinced it will, but
others are understandably skeptical), then other possibilities
emerge. Once real circumstances show Israelis and Palestinians -
and their neighbors and partisans - that the other side is
genuinely willing to focus on things other than eliminating them,
other options will open up. In other words, the two-state solution
is an open, not a closed door. But further developments must await
the construction of trust between the two sides, on a societal as
well as a governmental level, which is now at an abysmally low
point.
I'm of the majority school that is deeply pessimistic at the
moment. I see scenarios for positive movement - a number of them -
but I am less than convinced that any of them will ripen soon,
though the real possibilities exist. However, I see no plausible
scenarios for a consensual one-state solution - whatever the
variation. The one-state solution is not a default option. It will
not happen just because two-state is stalemated. Getting there
would require surmounting all the two-state hurdles - and then
some. It is not a serious option.