I write this in the aftermath of Sari Nusseibeh's interview with
Haaretz correspondent Akiva Eldar1. Dr. Nusseibeh, president of
Al-Quds University, esteemed Palestinian intellectual and
cosignatory with Israeli Minister Ami Ayalon of the "The People's
Choice" peace plan, states in the interview that, while he still
favors it, "time is running out on the two-state solution." Indeed,
despite declared good intentions, there remains little hope now
that the current round of talks between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
and President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) will yield tangible
results.
For different reasons, their respective political clocks are
ticking. Even before announcing his resignation from office, many
deemed that Olmert's alleged corruption would taint any agreement
that bears his signature as illegitimate. In the Israeli peace
camp, there are also those who argue that an agreement sealed at
the last minute before his leaving office could have more damaging
than beneficial effects on the support for future peace prospects
within Israeli public opinion. Others contend that an agreement
between Olmert and Abbas could still provide a basis for future
negotiations. Be that as it may, and even if present efforts to
conclude some kind of limited shelf agreement on principles does
bear fruit, the total lack of political capital at the disposal of
the present "lame duck" decision-makers on both sides, or of their
successors in the foreseeable future, is likely to render its
implementation all but impossible. An unimplemented shelf agreement
against a simmering reality of disastrous humanitarian conditions
in the occupied territories, let alone failure to reach such an
agreement, gravely endangers the validity of the "two states for
two peoples" vision and the vital support provided by the Arab
Peace Initiative. The result would be yet another cycle of violence
and bloodshed, with the very legitimacy of Israel as a democratic
Jewish state being called into question, given the quasi-apartheid
conditions in the occupied territories.
With this grim scenario in mind, and with little positive energy
left locally among Israelis and Palestinians alike, a more
proactive international involvement may turn out to be the only
option left to save the region from tragic deterioration and from
the potentially profound implications of such deterioration on its
political and economic stability. The upcoming changing of the
guard in the U.S. and a growing sense of urgency in Europe,
possibly intensified by the darkening international horizon
following the war in Georgia, provide an opportune moment to call
for such an involvement. Admittedly, some past attempts in that
direction in other regions have been less than encouraging. The
performance of peacekeeping forces in other conflict zones, for
instance, Cyprus, Bosnia and Kosovo, has been mixed.They showed
that even an enormous international effort does not guarantee an
immediate and swift solution to conflicts between national
movements when the conflicts involve disputes of legitimacy and
territory, as well as a clash of historical narratives, occupation,
terrorism and the future of refugees, sometimes intensified by
religious extremism.2
Given these and other examples, potential international
participants are not likely to agree to an open-ended commitment
and will not be prepared to get involved if it looks like the
situation could become another Cyprus. On the other hand, the
international experience in East Timor stands out as a model that
did prove relatively successful. Although geographically distant
and certainly far from being completely analogous, the application
of some lessons of the East Timor example to the Middle East should
be seriously considered.
From UNTAMET and INTERFET through UNTAET to
Independence
East Timor was administered by Portugal for centuries. In 1974, as
part of the de-colonization process, Portugal sought to establish a
provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine
the status of East Timor. Civil war broke out between those who
favored independence and those who advocated integration with
neighboring Indonesia. Unable to control the situation, Portugal
withdrew. Indonesia intervened militarily in 1976 and annexed East
Timor as its 27th province. Indonesian civilian settlers followed.
The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the
Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia's
withdrawal.
Beginning in 1982, at the request of the General Assembly,
successive secretary-generals held regular talks with Indonesia
aimed at resolving East Timor's status amidst increasing violence
in the territory Under growing international pressure, in June
1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor within
Indonesia. The UN secretary-general was entrusted with organizing
and conducting a "Popular Consultation" in order to ascertain
whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special
autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.
To carry out the consultation, on June 11, 19993 the Security
Council authorized the establishment of the UN Mission in East
Timor (UNAMET) in accordance with Resolution 1246 (1999).
The resolution stipulated that UNAMET would oversee a transition
period after the vote. Despite an extremely tight timetable, a high
level of tension and the territory's mountainous terrain, poor
roads and difficult communications, some 98% of registered voters
went to the polls on voting day, August 30, 1999. They decided to
reject the proposed autonomy in favor of transition to full
independence by a margin of 21.5 % to 78.5 %.
Following the announcement of the results, pro-integration militias
consisting partly of Indonesian settlers, and sometimes with the
support of elements of the occupying Indonesian security forces,
launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the
entire territory. Many thousands of East Timorese were killed, and
as many as 500,000 were displaced from their homes, with about half
leaving the territory, mostly to West Timor, in some cases by
force.
The Security Council and then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
undertook strenuous diplomatic efforts to halt the violence,
pressing Indonesia to meet its commitments. A Security Council
mission visited Jakarta and East Timor's capital, Dili, to rally
support for a multinational force authorized by the Security
Council to bring the situation under control. As the mission
concluded its visit to Jakarta, the Indonesian government acceded
to the offer of assistance from the international community. The
Security Council mandated the multinational International Force for
East Timor (INTERFET) under a unified command, initially led by an
Australian and later by a Thai force. The INTERFET's mission was to
restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support
UNAMET in carrying out its tasks, to facilitate assistance
operations and to fill the vacuum created by the eventual departure
of the Indonesian military and police forces. The authorized
maximum strength of INTERFET, later reorganized into a UN
peacekeeping force, consisted of 9,150 military personnel.4
On October 25, 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1272,
establishing the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) as an integrated operation fully responsible for the
administration of East Timor during its transition to
independence.5 Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to provide security
and maintain law and order throughout the territory; to monitor the
withdrawal of Indonesian forces and the departure of the Indonesian
civil authorities; to establish an effective administration for the
development of civil and social services; to support
capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the
establishment of conditions for sustainable economic development.
UNTAET consisted of a governance and public administration
component, a civilian police component of up to 1,640 civilian
police commanded by a Canadian chief superintendent, and an armed
UN peacekeeping force into which the INTERFET force was integrated.
In a donors' meeting in Tokyo in December 1999, the necessary funds
were pledged for the financing of INTERFET's activities.
Soon after, INTERFET's administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello from
Brazil, in consultation with the East Timorese political
leadership, established the National Consultative Council (NCC), a
political body consisting of 11 Timorese and four UNTAET members.
The NCC's major assignment was to oversee the decision-making
process during the transition period leading to independence. This
included setting up a legal system, re-establishing the judiciary,
creating an official currency, setting up border controls, taxation
and creating the first consolidated budget for East Timor.
The process of transformation and institution- building would later
lead to the formation in August 2000 of a transitional cabinet
consisting of eight portfolios. The cabinet approved the creation
of an East Timor defense force composed of troops drawn primarily
from the ranks of the former East Timor pro-independence
guerillas.
In October 2000, a National Council (NC) was formed to replace and
expand on the former NCC, and prepare the election of the
Constituent Assembly. It comprised 36 members from East Timor's
civil society - businesses, political parties, NGOs and the
territory's 13 districts. On August 30, 2001, following the civil
registration of all residents and two years after the Popular
Consultation, more than 91% of East Timor's eligible voters went to
the polls again; this time to elect an 88-member Constituent
Assembly tasked with writing and adopting a new constitution, and
establishing the framework for future elections and a transition to
full independence. Shortly thereafter, 24 members of the new
all-East Timorese Council of Ministers of the Second Transitional
Government were sworn into office.
On March 22, 2002, East Timor's Constituent Assembly signed into
force the territory's constitution, and following the presidential
elections on April 14, José Alexandre Gusmão was
appointed president-elect of East Timor. With both these
preconditions for a hand-over of power met, the Constituent
Assembly transformed itself into the country's parliament on May
20, 2002. Just after midnight on the same day, Annan formally
handed over power to Gusmão. East Timor was proclaimed the
first newly independent country of the 21st century.
UNTAP Along the Lines of UNTAET
There can be no argument with those who claim that there is no
one-to-one resemblance between East Timor and the Israel-Palestine
conflict. Indeed, the latter is far more complex. Unlike East
Timor, it involves not only disputes over tangibles such as
territory, settlements, sovereignty and borders, refugees,
occupation and security, but also much more difficult to resolve
intangibles such as issues of legitimacy and zero-sum-game clashes
between historical and religious narratives. In contrast to East
Timor at the time that UNTAET was established, in Palestine there
is already in place a nominal and arguably functioning Palestinian
Authority (PA), headed by an elected president. However, it is
largely the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that are preventing Hamas
from mounting a military challenge to Abbas' control and stopping
the West Bank from going the way of Gaza. Yet the more Abbas
depends on the IDF, the more he is discredited in the eyes of the
Palestinians. One of their most immediate and just demands is the
removal of IDF roadblocks in the West Bank - which are rapidly
turning the situation into a humanitarian disaster - to be followed
by the gradual dismantling of Jewish settlements and, ultimately,
an end to the Israeli occupation. But this will not happen until
there is a dependable security force capable of filling the vacuum
and taking effective control - something the PA cannot credibly
assure. Palestinians need to rebuild their destroyed security
capacity, but the Israelis require guarantees that their
withdrawal, needed to provide the "space" necessary for such
rebuilding, will not result in yet another Gaza-like terrorist
state on their eastern border. While there has been increasing
convergence in recent years on the parameters of a peace agreement
between Palestinians and Israelis, the remaining gaps between the
parties are extremely difficult to bridge, especially with the
overshadowing total lack of trust between people on both
sides.
It is against this background, and given the fundamental weakness
of both the Israeli leadership and the Palestinian governing
institutions, that reputable observers of the Middle East scene are
renewing their call for trusteeship-like solutions.6 Accordingly,
the West Bank to begin with, and at a later stage Gaza, is to be
held in trust for the Palestinians for a pre-determined
transitional period, while the trustees work with responsible
Palestinian partners to create the institutions of a viable,
independent state. As in East Timor, a UN Security Council-endorsed
international force will replace the Israeli army in the occupied
territories. The force will be responsible for maintaining order,
preventing terror attacks against Israeli targets and rebuilding
Palestinian security forces. According to expert projections7 it
will have to consist of at least 10,000 troops, led by special
forces and supplemented by civil police contingents (CivPol). U.S.
or NATO leadership of the force is usually seen as a requirement
for its success. European participation may provide a much-needed
perception of impartiality to the effort. Arab and Muslim
participation in the force would provide legitimacy, particularly
if units from countries with open channels to both Israelis and
Palestinians are included, such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco
and the Gulf States, under a consensual Arab League umbrella. Arab
participation in the multinational force is of the utmost
importance, in order to prevent its being construed as yet another
neo-colonialist exercise in the region.
The security component of the trusteeship, as assertive as it may
be, is of limited use on its own. Again, as in East Timor, albeit
on a much larger scale, it must be linked to a wide-ranging
humanitarian, economic and state-building effort on the part of the
international community. The objective of that effort will be to
develop the social, economic and institutional infrastructure for a
viable Palestinian state. As has been pointed out before jointly by
Israeli, Palestinian and international experts,8 what is urgently
required is a comprehensive model of involvement, with clearly
defined benchmarks, that rationalizes the present myriad agencies,
aid programs and projects already on the ground. The need is for a
coherent transitional civil structure under a single and strong
political leadership, working hand-in-hand with the PA to build a
stable governance capacity toward full sovereignty.
The planning considerations, underlying assumptions, mandate
guidelines and the conditions that will have to be met for a
massive and effective international intervention in the occupied
territories have been spelled out in great detail before and need
not be repeated here.9 However, two essentials should be
re-emphasized: First, for any international intervention in the
form of the proposed UN Transitional Administration in Palestine
(UNTAP) or otherwise to have any prospect of success, it cannot be
imposed, either on the Palestinians or on the Israelis. It needs to
be credible and acceptable to both sides and to be supported by the
majorities of their respective publics. Given the weakness of the
political leaderships of both parties, civil societies and peace
NGOs in Israel and Palestine, working together as they already do,
could have a critical role in mobilizing such support.
Finally, UNTAP's role should not be confined to the need to
facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, nor should it
be viewed as a substitute for an ongoing political process. It
should serve as a catalyst for bringing about a fundamental change
in the overall conflict environment, by preparing the ground for
the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure
Israel, within the framework of the two-state solution.
Endnotes
1. Haaretz.
com. August 15, 2008.
2. Shlomo Avineri, "What Cyprus, Bosnia and Kosovo Can Teach Us,"
Haaretz.com, July
4, 2008.
3. http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm
4. http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm
5. http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm
6. See, for instance, Martin Indyk, "Is Trusteeship for Palestine
the Answer?" foreignaffairs.org, June 27, 2007.
7. Uri Sagi and Gilad Sher, "Political Position Paper" (Hebrew),
The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, August, 2002.
8. Amjad Atallah, Jarat Chopra, Yasser Dajani, Orit Gal, Jim
McCallum and Joel Peters, "Planning Considerations for
International Involvement in the Israel-Palestinian Conflict -
Parts I and II." U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacs/Publications/Planning.
9. Amjad Attalah, et al, op. cit. See also Joel Peters and Orit
Gal, "International Intervention for Conflict Management and
Resolution," Mark A. Heller and Rosemary Hollis (Eds.), Israel and
the Palestinians (London: Chatham House, 2005), pp. 73-99.