For a while before the Madrid peace conference, the Palestinian
press witnessed one of its darkest hours. As the Intifada was
raging, and the world press was focusing on the Palestinian
conflict, the Palestinian press (not Palestinian journalists) was
the last place anyone would turn to in order to find out what was
happening. The interference of the Israeli military censors ranged
from banning the use of the word shahid (martyr) to negotiating
about the number of Palestinians the local press was allowed to
report killed or injured the previous day. The more important
information the public got from secret leaflets published by the
Unified National Leadership, as well as from graffiti scribbled on
walls the night before or the loudspeakers of the local
mosque.
Not only was the Palestinian press forbidden to publish
Intifada-related news and commentary, but news about the two
governments of interest to Palestinians was also out of bounds, as
it was illegal to talk to members of the PLO and politically
incorrect to talk to Israeli military or political leaders.
Instead, the Palestinian press depended almost exclusively on
second-hand reporting. News about Israel and Israeli officials was
relegated to translations from the Hebrew press or monitored
reports from Israel radio and TV. News about the PLO was taken
verbatim from wire service dispatches from Tunis or wherever the
PLO was making news.
Change of Laws and the Breakdown of Taboos
With the Madrid peace conference and the White House lawn
handshake, the Palestinian media saw some qualitative development,
together with the breakdown of the first obstacle facing the
Palestinian press. Although the PLO was still officially illegal,
the peace mood made it impossible for the then-Shamir right-wing
government to castigate journalists for holding interviews with PLO
officials. Leading Israeli newspapers interviewed PLO leaders,
including Executive Committee Chairman Yasser Araf~t. The
Palestinian press quickly took this as a green light for them. For
the first time since the occupation, Palestinian journalists were
able to conduct interviews with leading Palestinians, including
those from the PLO, without worrying about legal punishment. Long
and extensive interviews and analyses were also carried out with
members of the Palestinian negotiating team. The Madrid conference
and, later, the Washington negotiations also gave Palestinian
journalists a professional boost. Their reporting and bylines
replaced the usual wire-service stories.
Although it took much longer, talking to Israeli officials was also
becoming more acceptable as the peace process moved forward,
especially after the change of government in Israel with the
election of the Rabin-Peres team. In June 1993, this writer
suggested to the publisher of the largest Palestinian daily,
AI-Quds, to interview Yitzhak Rabin and was to be the first
Palestinian journalist ever to interview the leader of the State of
Israel for a Palestinian daily. The one-hour interview which ran
verbatim the following day in AlQuds allowed Rabin to speak
directly to the Palestinian public. It also allowed a Palestinian
journalist to question the Israeli leader on various issues dealing
with the peace process, relations with the PLO, the future of the
occupied Palestinian territories and the daily conditions there.
Rabin, who at the time had approved the secret Oslo negotiations,
refrained from attacking the PLO and suggested that the long-term
status of the Palestinian territories had to be connected with
neighboring Jordan. After that interview, the Palestinian press
interviewed other Israeli officials and, for a while, Israeli
officials started giving them press briefings about the progress of
the peace process.
Oslo's Effects on the Palestinian Media
The Declaration of Principles (DOP) which was signed at the White
House on September 13, 1993, with the subsequent Israeli army
withdrawal from major Palestinian cities and the establishment of
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), ushered in a new era for
the Palestinian media. For the first time in the history of the
Palestinian struggle, Palestinians were allowed to establish their
own radio and television station on Palestinian soil. The Voice of
Palestine and Palestine TV were able to broadcast, without official
Arab governmental pressures, and without fear of Israeli air
strikes. However, initial attempts to make the new Palestinian
broadcasting service a public institution free of official
Palestinian control failed, despite the large international support
from France, the EU and UNESCO. The Palestinian Broadcasting
Authority - later changed to the Palestinian Broadcasting
Corporation (PBC) - became the official mouthpiece of the PNA. The
Gaza office of the PBC is in the same building as President
Arafat's headquarters.
The Palestinian president officially appoints the director and
staff and the Palestinian Ministry of Finance determines the budget
and pays the salaries.
When the Israelis withdrew from major Palestinian cities, they took
with them the powerful transmitters of the Israel Television Arabic
Service. Thus, the PBC was technically unable to reach the
population of some major West Bank cities like Nablus. This
electronic media vacuum played well into the hands of a few private
media entrepreneurs who quickly set up low-power television
stations. The Palestinian Ministry of Information, headed by Yasser
Abed Rabbo, supported this move for a number of reasons: While
negotiations for the release of airwaves were being held up, they
wanted the airwaves occupied by Palestinian broadcasters so as to
make their takeover a fiat. They also wanted to provide the PNA
with alternative media outlets in case of an emergency and the
stoppage by Israel of the broadcasting of the PBC. Minister Abed
Rabbo has also stated that his support of the private radio and
television stations was his party's way of upholding the democratic
forces in Palestine by encouraging pluralistic and independent
media.
The PNA has approved 21 television stations and six radio stations
in the West Bank. No private station has been allowed to broadcast
in the Gaza Strip. The operation of these stations has not been
easy. Some have been closed by the Palestinian security forces, but
were, usually, reopened shortly afterwards. The longest closure
lasted three months when A-Ru'a Television in Bethlehem was closed
down following its broadcast of messages of support for Iraq in
January 1998, during the height of its confrontation with the
United States. The director of an educational television station
was also detained for a week in May 1997. An audiovisual law does
not exist yet, but on June 6, 1997, the Palestinian Cabinet set up
a 13-member liaison committee, with the responsibility of
regulating the work of private radio and television stations in
Palestine.
The Oslo process also produced many changes in the print media. The
largest daily newspaper, AI-Quds, continues to be published in
Jerusalem and, therefore, has to submit articles to an Israeli
censor. Two new dailies, on the other hand, were established after
the Oslo agreement: AI-Hayat AI- Jadidah and AI-Ayyam. These
papers, published in Ramallah, don't have to receive the approval
of an Israeli censor. But, while officially they are not bound by
any formal censorship, the Palestinian press has been forced to
adjust its policies to accommodate the Palestinian
leadership.
A Reverse Trend
For the most part, the Palestinian media was busy working on the
internal front. The emergence of the PNA provided the local media
with ample issues to deal with. At the same time, it continued to
cover the peace process on the political level. While the Rabin and
Peres governments had provided the Palestinian media with
possibilities of interviews with Israeli officials, the Netanyahu
government reversed what little progress was achieved in this
area.
As was the case before the peace process, the Palestinian press
continues to dedicate considerable space to translations from the
Hebrew press. These translations, often reflecting the Israeli
peace camp, provide a misleading picture of Israeli thinking. And
while no Palestinian journalist or columnist has been given a
regular column in the Hebrew press, most Israeli columnists appear
in the various Palestinian newspapers as part of the translated
material from the Hebrew press. Sadly, with few exceptions,
people-topeople projects are rarely covered in the Palestinian
media. A PalestinianIsraeli television program for children,
modeled after the Sesame Street series, as well as a few
documentaries, were some of the few moments of genuine
Palestinian-Israeli media interaction.
For their part, the Israelis pay little attention to what the
Palestinian media has to say. The only parties that show any
interest are right-wing Israeli groups that monitor the Palestinian
press in order to use it as ammunition against the PNA. Programs on
Palestinian television and articles in the Palestinian press are
forwarded to the office of the Israeli prime minister, who uses
them in his regular attacks against the PNA.