The signature of the Palestinian-Israeli declaration of principles
in mid-September, and the Arab and international acclaim for this
pact, constitutes a breakthrough in Middle East political dynamics.
This agreement provides the opportunity for the other Arab parties
to reach similar agreements with Israel without any obstacles or
hindrances. It also paves the way on the Palestinian level for the
PLO, its institutions and its army, to play a greater role in the
formulation and development of the recognized Palestinian entity.
All of this will also permit the resolution of many of the
Palestinian-Arab problems.
In the economic sphere, the agreement determines the basis for a
volume of bilateral agreements with Israel, or regional
agree¬ments with the Arab states in the areas of water,
energy, tourism, industry, credit, and others. Hence it creates the
opportunity for the economic factor to complement the political
factor in determining the stability of the area and preserving the
continuity of peace. Despite the positive implications of the
above-mentioned reference to economic cooperation, the agreement
does not detail nor does it specify the extent of this cooperation.
Furthermore, the reference is to cooperation and not economic
merging. There is no clear reference in the agreement to
complicated issues such as that of currency control or the borders
of trade exchange and its dimensions. The agreement does not make
any reference either to the issue of mobility of Palestinian
laborers who work in Israel, or the exchange of goods particularly
agricultural produce with Israel. I point out these omissions, only
as examples, not to minimize the importance of this agreement in
its general outline, but to point out the more difficult tasks in
filling in the details, especially in the more disputed
issues.
In this context, I must stress two basic points:
The first is that the peace process and the current agreement do
not put an end to the Israeli¬-Palestinian conflict, because
the most difficult issues have been postponed to the second stage.
This means that the stability of the region, and the stability of
the agreement itself, will remain uncertain as long as issues of
the land, sovereignty and borders remain unresolved. In concrete
terms, the implementation and the delineation of the features and
degree of cooperation depend in great measure on the progress of
the negotiations in the second stage.
The second point is that most aspects of this accord are strongly
linked to the Jordanian position on most of these issues. The
Occupied Territories have two primary outlets, Israel and Jordan,
and it is inconceivable that a detailed agreement be outlined with
one without the other, especially taking into consideration that
the Palestinian option is mainly an Arab one, connected to Jordan.
Therefore, I believe that it is premature to discuss the details of
the relationship that links the Palestinian interim government with
Israel before this issue is discussed in detail with our brothers
in Jordan.
In any case, a number of priorities remain on the Palestinian
agenda that need to be addressed relevant to the planning and
implementation of this agreement, and to prepare the groundwork for
the interim period beginning in the first few months of the coming
year. These can be summarized as follows:
1. The establishment of an emergency relief fund to support large
national institutions that have faced financial collapse during
recent months. By these institutions I mean universities,
hospitals, and charitable societies. This fund will contribute
toward raising the standards of living and alleviating financial
burdens of the residents during the next four to six months.
2. The training of Palestinian personnel, who will plan and
implement the agreement and operate the interim authority in all
fields. This requires a quick international and Arab
campaign.
3. Launching the Palestinian-¬Jordanian and
Palestinian-Israeli committees that will detail the bilateral and
multilateral economic relations during the interim period on
principles of mutual interest, equality, and respect.
4. Establishing the main institutions that will serve the economic
sectors, including the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, the
Palestinian Development Bank, the Center for Encouraging Exports,
and others.
5. Launching the work of legal committees, which will modify
rules and regulations concerning economic activity, and open the
way for Palestinian and Arab investors and the private sector, to
invest in the occupied territories under positive conditions that
guarantee a return competitive with investment in other
geographical areas.
6. Completing the task of preparing the Palestinian development
plan and its funding in cooperation with concerned parties,
especially in the field of the infrastructure, and the relationship
with the World Bank in particular, and to prepare the required
visibility studies to support this task in the first year at
least.
The tasks detailed above do not exclude other priorities, but they
are the most significant during the next six months to prepare the
setting for constructing and maintaining a solid agreement. They
will also ensure Arab and international guarantees for its
continuity and its transformation into a final and comprehensive
plan that would end the long historical conflict between the Arab
nations and Israel.