PIJ: You have put forward a proposal for breaking the impasse
and reviving the peace process. Can you describe the essence of the
proposal?
Yossi Beilin: The proposal is only a procedural one and is not
meant to compete with any substantial plan in the market or the
Geneva Initiative. When we came out with the Geneva Initiative in
December 2003, one of the main questions asked by people like
[then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin] Powell and [Deputy National
Security Advisor Elliot] Abrams and others in Europe was: How do
you get there? With the Geneva Initiative we just wanted to prove
that one can get a compromise on the outstanding issues. We said
nothing about procedures, intentionally, and when asked about it,
we said there is the Road Map - which had been accepted then by
both sides - and our suggestion fits into the third part of the
Road Map, which is the permanent agreement.
What's happened since is that the Road Map has become a trap more
than anything else, mainly because the first stage, which was
accepted as a kind of pre-condition for the second stage, has not
been implemented by either side. Each side blames the other, and it
makes it easier for both parties to do nothing. So my suggestion is
to skip the first stage. Israel apparently is not going to
dismantle the settlements, unauthorized or authorized, regretfully;
and the Palestinians are not going to disarm the militias. So I
suggested going to the second stage and trying to implement the
first stage during the implementation of the second. Now, in the
second phase, there is the option of a Palestinian state with
provisional borders. This was custom-made for [former Prime
Minister Ariel] Sharon, who didn't want a permanent solution and
hoped to stay in the interim stage for a very long while - he spoke
publicly of 15 years. This was precisely what the Palestinians
feared: that once they agreed to a Palestinian state with
provisional borders, it would become a kind of border dispute,
rather than a national conflict. And then the world would lose
interest and nobody would push towards the third stage. This is why
[President] Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) said all the time that he
would like to go directly to the third stage. This is impossible,
apparently. I would like to go immediately to the third phase, too,
but the Israeli government is not ready for it, and I don't know
about the Americans.
So there is a need for something in-between that would make it
easier to get to the third stage. Now [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert
shelved his unilateral convergence plan, but apparently he still
believes in something similar. Abu Mazen is emphasizing that in the
Road Map the provisional state is an option, not a must. We still
owe the Palestinians the third redeployment of the Oslo agreement,
which should be a significant withdrawal from the West Bank, in
which the Palestinian Authority will be extended. So we have to get
to the second phase by withdrawing from a very significant part of
the West Bank - I cannot refer to a specific percentage, but if
Olmert spoke of 90% unilaterally, 90% is reasonable. The parties
will have to decide what they should call it, although from my
point of view, it is marginal whether they call it an agreed-upon
convergence plan, the third phase of Oslo or the second phase of
the Road Map. And the Palestinians should decide if they prefer to
extend the Palestinian Authority or to have a Palestinian state
with provisional borders. What might sweeten the latter idea is a
decision on the principles for the permanent agreement that
contains a solution for Jerusalem, refugees and all the outstanding
issues - which will be much more than kalam fadi (empty words),
with a sentence saying that we have to solve this problem by mutual
consent, etc.
The withdrawal and dismantling of the settlements should take about
two years, and no later than the end of the withdrawal, should the
negotiations on the permanent talks begin, so that by 2010 we will
finish the job and have a permanent agreement. This is my idea, and
generally speaking, it has been accepted. I talked about it with
Abu Mazen and many leaders in the world, [then-UN
Secretary-General] Kofi Annan and [Italian Prime Minister Romano]
Prodi and foreign ministers all over Europe …
… and the Israeli government?
… and the Israeli government, of course.
The response was also positive?
Very positive, although there is no commitment from anybody. But
unlike Geneva, which was very controversial, this idea was not as
controversial, and those with whom I spoke in the Cabinet were very
positive and interested, so I think something like this is
feasible. And maybe by chance and maybe not by chance, Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni's ideas are very similar.
Let's look at the different components of the international
community. First and foremost the United States: They are obviously
a key factor, and there is the impression that something may be
changing there, given the mid-term elections, the Iraq Study Group
report and the mess that the U.S. is in Iraq - that they may want
to have progress in this area. What is your impression about the
possibility that the Americans would become more engaged?
I'm very disappointed by U.S. policy over the last six years. It
has been a march of folly in Israel, the Middle East and everywhere
else. My expectations are not very high. The only thing that I
would like the U.S. to do is not to interfere. If they don't
disturb the process, it could go much better. In the meantime, for
example, they are very much against negotiations with Syria. All
those who don't want to negotiate with Syria, who don't want to
give up the Golan Heights, are using the U.S. as a pretext for not
doing it, and the U.S. doesn't do anything to deny this. In
informal talks they are saying we should not talk to the
Syrians.
Why should the U.S. talk with Syria?
They should do whatever they want; I'm not going to educate the
U.S. But I want to talk with Syria, because they are my enemies and
my neighbors, and they hold many keys; I believe that if we make
peace with Syria, then the Middle East will change. The Americans
don't understand that having talks with Syria and maybe peace with
Syria will have an impact on the Syrian relationship with Iran and
on the position of Iran in the Middle East. I only want peace for
myself, and they are preventing it right now.
Also regarding the Palestinians, their rigid positions
vis-à-vis the government of Hamas and other things are
mistaken. I'm all for pre-conditions for official negotiations with
a government that doesn't accept the commitments of its
predecessors, but with this cumbersome policy of enacting laws
against any talks with Hamas, any contact with Hamas, boycotting
Hizbullah, Hamas, Syria, they are neutralizing themselves. The
Americans have prevented themselves from being mediators in the
Middle East in the last six years. Their ability to do something
positive here is very, very small. Olmert is not exactly running
towards peace, but I believe they are restraining even him. They
forced Sharon to accept Hamas as a legitimate party in the
elections, which was a mistake and contradicted the Oslo
agreements, and they have made so many mistakes that I really don't
believe that they can do anything good in the next two years.
Do you think that the Baker-Hamilton recommendations are
constructive?
Yes, I do believe that their report is a very important one. I must
admit that the analysis is better than the recommendations; some of
the recommendations seemed to me quite problematic. Nevertheless,
on the issues of the Middle East and Syria, they're right, and
those should have been U.S. policy. But I understand that the
president has already distanced himself from the report, and I
don't believe that he is going to adopt the recommendations.
Let's move over to Europe. Do you believe that the Europeans are
capable of acting without the cooperation of the U.S.?
Beilin: It's up to them. If they tie themselves to the U.S., tie
their own hands, they won't be able to do anything. The big mistake
of the Europeans was to be part of the Quartet.
So you actually think that the Quartet was a mistake?
The Quartet was a huge mistake. In the past they were much more
independent in their activities. Now they have this artificial,
mutual structure, which Israel never recognized. Sharon and Olmert
never met with the Quartet as such and have boycotted the
Quartet.
They never met with Quartet Special Envoy James
Wolfensohn?
They never met with the Quartet; only with the Americans. And the
Quartet even complied with this policy. The Americans are doing
nothing, but they are leading the Quartet, so the Quartet never
moved. Among the fruits of the Quartet was the Road Map - a very
bitter fruit, and it became a trap for all of us. So what I would
suggest is that Europe be a little bit more independent. I would
say, You tried something in order to be more involved, you were
totally misled, you are much less involved than before because of
this structure, and either you can really push the other partners
of the Quartet to move, or you can break from it. But the current
situation is the worst of all worlds.
Two actions by the international community that were welcomed by
the Israeli government appear to be possible precedents: United
Nations Resolution 1701 and the increased international force,
accepted by Israel as a positive idea; and the international role
in Gaza. Do you see these as possible precedents which can be
transferred to the West Bank?
I hope so. I do believe that 1701 is an important milestone; that
the involvement of the world here is positive; and that by being
here they have a claim to help us solve the problems between us and
the Palestinians, between us and the Syrians. And I would like to
see more involvement in the political solution. There is potential
for European involvement as donors, as members of UNIFIL, as those
who see us as their backyard - for the EU an explosive situation in
the Middle East is a real threat. The problem with Europe today is
that it is one of the most cumbersome organizations in the world,
with 27 members pushing the policy to the lowest common
denominator. If you need consensus, you cannot take very bold
decisions. Still, Europe has taken very important resolutions
lately: vis-à-vis Hamas, to bypass their own conditions by
giving the money to the NGOs rather than to the government. I think
that European involvement is much more feasible and realistic than
American involvement right now.
One of the ideas that have been raised is to have another
international conference, in the style of Madrid. Do you think
that's constructive?
It is constructive if everybody is ready to participate. My
preference is to have a Madrid II, conducive to bilateral talks
between Israel and Palestine, meaning the PLO; Israel and Syria;
Israel and Lebanon. If it were possible, I would support it
wholeheartedly. I don't know whether the Americans are there; I
think that France is not there for Syria. So there are some
impediments and some obstacles, but ideally this would be the right
way to do it. Otherwise, I would like to go for just bilateral
talks. It's vital for us to talk to the Syrians, and here, at least
some of the Europeans are ready to be involved.
What we have to do is to convince the Palestinians, through the
Europeans, to have a unity government. I don't think that Abu Mazen
can hold early elections. I don't think we can ignore Hamas now,
regretfully. So there should be some kind of unity government of
professionals or experts, and this government would mandate Abu
Mazen to negotiate with us as the leader of the PLO; we would have
an agreement with the PLO; and the government would not prevent a
referendum, so that any conclusion of the negotiations between us
and the Palestinians would be brought to a referendum. Right now,
to negotiate with Abu Mazen personally would be very problematic,
if he doesn't have the procedural backing of Hamas for a
referendum.
What about the immediate region, our neighbors?
The Iraq Study Group says very clearly that the solution to the
problem of the Middle East is the creation of a coalition among the
pragmatic Arab states and Israel. This coalition - which I believe
is the real future of the region - can be established only if we
solve the Palestinian problem. This is another reason why we should
solve it soon.
Do you think that the neighboring countries can have a role in
moving the process forward?
They can have a role and they do have a role. Their contribution of
the Arab Initiative was a very, very constructive one, and it
should be now part of any consideration of the continuation of the
peace process. We should know, in the backs of our minds, that at
the end of the day, all of the Arab countries are ready to
normalize relations with Israel. This is not something marginal.
What Egypt is doing in Gaza is also very important. I think that
today, the Arab moderate countries are more open to being involved
with Israeli-Palestinian relations than before, because they
understand what all of us understand: that a pragmatic coalition is
vital for all of us.
The underlying question concerning the whole process is: Does
the solution basically depend upon the two parties - the Israelis
and the Palestinians - moving forward, or upon the will and the
readiness of the international community to help to move things
forward?
I have no doubt about it; it is mainly for the two parties to
decide. The others can help, but no more than that. Usually when
the two parties were ready to move, they moved, and when one of
them was not or both of them were not ready to move, nothing
happened. So the role of the world is secondary, but not
unimportant. It's very important; sometimes it's almost impossible
to finish the job without them. But the world is not going to
determine for us whether we're going to go for negotiations or
not.
To conclude, when you look at the possibilities, are you
optimistic, cautiously optimistic, pessimistic? What is the
prognosis?
For me, it was never a question of general optimism or pessimism.
The only question was whether we can do something. What is our
role? Can we still do something right now? I must say, with the
victory of Hamas, I became less optimistic. Many of us were sure
that even if Hamas was strengthened, it would not win. And the fact
that today there is a Palestinian government that, paralyzed as it
is, doesn't recognize Israel, doesn't want to negotiate with us and
doesn't believe that peace with us is a possibility is a huge
setback. Now, is it the end? It is not the end. I think that the
Palestinian people want peace. It is not just a slogan; I see the
polls. And the Israeli people would like peace; again, I see the
polls. But neither of them believes that it is feasible. The role
of people like myself is to bridge this gap between their
preference and the feasibility that they attribute to this
preference. This is why I am restless. This is why I'm talking to
whoever I can in order to promote the ideas and to push for peace.