The recently published Middle East "Road Map"2 is not the first
attempt to find a solution to the continued Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territory since 1967. Numerous agreements have been
concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
occupying power, the State of Israel. Thus far, the parties have
failed to agree on the status of issues deferred during the Oslo
negotiations process to the final stages of the "peace" process.
The failure to address these issues, and the violence, killing,
loss and destruction, which followed the parties' failure - not an
unexpected development in such situations - begs the question,
where have the parties failed? For those of us living the current
tragic reality, these are not purely academic questions, because
our own children need to cross checkpoints to reach their schools,
and because those of us destined to live here in this troubled land
need, above all else, to find a solution to the current deadlock,
and hopefully to the conflict altogether.
There may be more than one reason why the parties have failed to
reach a solution to their "differences." Politicians, security
experts, economists, sociologists, historians and others may all
try to provide possible answers, and suggest ways out of the
current crisis. I cannot put myself into any of the above
categories of experts: I am a human rights lawyer with some
expertise in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution, and
I use my training and experience to examine human rights aspects of
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process, and to identify the
weaknesses and failures of the process and/or the parties.
It is true we Palestinians and Israelis think of ourselves as
engaged in a unique conflict, which warrants "unique solution(s),"
but a short visit to, or study of, other conflicts reveals similar
claims/perceptions. Therefore, it follows that we can learn from
other peoples' experiences and conflicts.3 There are enough
similarities to make comparisons valid and differences enough to
make the exercise interesting. Without engaging in a lengthy
discussion of the validity of the comparison, however, I submit
that among the obvious similarities of many world conflicts is the
role played by the land/people nexus.4 A second common feature is
the role of, and need to, end intractable, organized, political
violence.5
The differences between the various conflicts include the rules of
international law that apply to each. In cases of foreign
occupation, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
force and other aspects of international humanitarian law apply. In
other situations international law is not as clear about the
requirements placed on the parties or the restrictions it imposes
on them. The latter group of conflicts include those in which a
minority group seeks fulfilment of a claimed right to
self-determination, or those in which it is not clear how
self-determination can be realized, given the circumstances.
Negotiation "Processes"
In most conflicts, parties negotiate with the same parties they are
fighting, although the means and timing of the negotiations may
vary. Political discussions - often described as war by other means
- traditionally are considered as the usual form of negotiation.
However, in some cases, the use of force or violence may also be an
integral part of negotiation. Although the use of force usually has
repercussions for those imposing the violence, as well as their
targets, it could therefore be seen as a means for disadvantaged
group(s) to manipulate the balance of power, in order to improve
the position from which they negotiate. In 1977, Morton Deutsch
concluded his book The Resolution of Conflict by wondering:
"Is it not obvious that, with the great disparities in power and
affluence within nations and between nations, there will be
continuing pressure for social change? And is it not also obvious
that the processes of social change will be disorderly and
destructive unless those in power are able, or enabled, to lower
their defensiveness and resistance to a change in their relative
status?"6
Thus, in a region with violent conflict, there is a need to not
simply work toward ridding the region of violence, but also - and
perhaps more importantly - dealing with and eradicating its root
causes: The absence of resolution to the conflict. Though it is
often enough for people to claim a certain conflict is
"intractable" to justify the failure of the parties to agree on its
end, it is often we humans and our leaders who make conflicts
insoluble.
According to author Thomas G Mitchell, the first and perhaps most
important stage of a negotiation process involves the search for a
formula for reaching an agreement.7 Though each party still may try
to ensure his/her interpretation of the formula driving or shaping
the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, even this manoeuvring has
to occur within the framework established by the formula. It is at
this early stage of a negotiation process that parties agree on the
formula for resolving their dispute. Thus the formula will play a
critical role throughout the negotiations, even if the process
takes years.8
Principled Negotiation?
The developing international consensus on the universal nature of
international human rights means they are assuming much greater
importance in international relations. Evidence of the strength of
this trend is found in the overwhelming support the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court received in 1998, and the British
and Chilean judgments in the case of General Augusto Pinochet, the
former Chilean dictator.9 This increased role for human rights also
extends to the management and resolution of conflicts.10 Therefore,
in an age where human rights are celebrated as universal, and all
peoples are considered to be equal and entitled to equal rights and
treatment, internationally accepted legal and human rights norms
offer a valid lens through which the parties' behaviour can be
judged. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted this
logic in its preamble more than 50 years ago: "Recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world."
In light of the above, human rights groups worldwide call for
respect for human rights as a condition for peace. There is also an
increased emphasis on a role for human rights and international law
in resolving, and preventing, conflicts, as is evident in the many
"universally accepted" human rights and international law
instruments. This supports, and is supported by, the increasing
calls for a role for principle in processes aimed at resolving
conflicts, made by international organizations as well as
negotiation theorists. In the latest report on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, the UN secretary general stated;
"effective protection of civilians is a critical element in laying
the foundations of the peace process. The durability of peace is
dependent on a commitment to the protection of civilians from its
very inception."11
For decades there has been a trend in the field of negotiation
theory which emphasizes the importance of including principle in
negotiation processes. The proponents of the "principled
negotiation" theory believe the use of objective criteria, or
principle, in the making or design of the formula for agreement
both makes agreement possible and "wise;" that is, among other
things, durable.12 The authors of principled negotiation theory
argue that parties to conflict cannot, and in fact do not have to,
abandon principles to reach agreement.13
The exchange that occurred in 1996 and 1997 between an anonymous
writer, and Francis Boyle and Felice D Gaer on the pages of Human
Rights Quarterly about the role of principle versus pragmatism in
the search for peace, encapsulates the essence of the debate about
the need to include human rights principles in peace
negotiations.14 The place of principle in the Oslo process was
debated more recently by US professor John Quigley and Israeli
cabinet minister Shimon Shitreet.15
The Palestinian-Israeli Negotiation Process
Under international law, there is no debate about the legal status
of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, the two
parts of Palestine occupied by Israel in 1967: They qualify as
territories occupied by military force.16 The occupation is subject
to the provisions of both the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.17 The application, following the
1967 War, of Israeli laws in occupied Jerusalem, which amounts to
Israeli annexation, has also been declared illegal under
international law.18
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) originally saw the
establishment of a secular, non-racial state for all Palestinians
regardless of their religious beliefs or affiliation as its
ultimate goal.19 However, the PLO's position shifted almost three
decades ago, when the Palestinian leadership's declared goal became
the establishment of the State of Palestine over the territory of
the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Further,
even though the PLO originally resorted to violence as the means to
liberate Palestine, by the 1980s, it realized that a political
solution, through negotiation, was worth pursuing.20
With the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, the US launched an
initiative for Middle East peace based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. The initiative came at a time when the
Cold War was ending with the collapse of the former Soviet Union,
and the assumption by the US of the role of the only world
superpower. US foreign policy declared that, once the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was resolved, the US would work toward solving
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.21 Thus, the moment was ripe for
the invitations from the US and Russia for Arab countries,
Palestinians and Israel to attend the Madrid Peace Conference,
which convened in October 1991.22 Since then, the parties have
participated in numerous talks/negotiations, and concluded many
agreements, the first of which was the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli
Declaration of Principles on Self-Government Arrangements for
Palestinians (DOP).
The DOP and all succeeding Israeli-Palestinian agreements have been
criticized for the lack of attention to and use of principles
contained in international law, including human rights.23
Palestinian human rights groups identified this as one of the main
weaknesses of the process from its outset. International human
rights groups have also warned the parties to refrain from
repeating the mistakes of the past, both by failing to address key
and serious human rights issues in the agreements, and by failing
to consider the impact post-agreement practices had on the human
rights of ordinary civilians, especially those living in the
occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs).24
The DOP, in its more than 3,400 words, makes not a single reference
to the "human rights" of either the Palestinian people or the
Israelis. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, reached in Cairo on May 4,
1994, (the first of a series of Israeli-Palestinian agreements of a
transitional nature and according to which the Israeli army
redeployed in parts of the Gaza Strip and Jericho), includes a
single, general sentence on human rights: "Israel and the
Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and
responsibilities pursuant to this agreement with due regard to
internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and
the rule of law."25 The remaining provisions of the agreement put
much emphasis on policing by the PNA, and set up
Israeli-Palestinian structures for coordination, which has left the
Israeli occupation authority with wide powers in almost every
aspect of the life of Palestinians.
Further, the way in which the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was
implemented suggests the provision was not meant to represent a
serious commitment to human rights. Succeeding agreements also paid
short shrift to human rights considerations. Neither the Agreement
on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, signed
on May 9, 1996, and the January 15, 1998 Protocol Concerning
Redeployment in Hebron, contain any mention of human rights,
although by 1996 human rights groups and ordinary citizens had
expressed dismay about the deterioration of Palestinians' human
rights as the peace process unfolded.
The only reference to human rights in the Wye River Memorandum,
signed on October 23, 1998, is weak, general, and pertains only to
actions of the Palestinian police:
"Pursuant to Article XI (1) of Annex I of the interim agreement,
and without derogating from the above, the Palestinian police will
exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this memorandum
with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights
and the rule of law, and will be guided by the need to protect the
public, respect human dignity, and avoid harassment."
This provision not only fails to offer the minimum guarantees
required in the complex situation prevailing in the OPTs, but it
sent the wrong message to both parties and peoples. First, it
pertained only to the Palestinian side, so Israeli occupation
authorities, whose powers affect almost every aspect of the lives
of Palestinians in the OPTs, have no corresponding obligations to
respect human rights and rule-of-law dictates. The assumption must
have been either that Israel does not, or would not, violate human
rights, or that its violations of the rights of the Palestinians
were beyond the scope of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation
process. Neither assumption should have been acceptable for
Palestinian negotiators or the international community. Second, the
language was insufficient, as it pertained to violations of human
rights by the Palestinian police. In its analysis of the
memorandum, Human Rights Watch observed that:
"Instead of creating strong mechanisms to prevent such violations,
many sections of the Wye River Memorandum can be read as
encouraging them. Much of the document's language relating to
security is broad and categorical, as in the requirement that the
Palestinian side pursue a policy of "zero tolerance for terror and
violence" and that both sides "take all measures necessary in order
to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities." Without a
countervailing emphasis on human rights, such language suggests
that any and all measures, whether or not they accord with the
parties' human rights obligations and the fundamental principles
they have pledged to respect, are justified in the fight to
eliminate armed attacks against civilians."26
But even the above, broad and weak provision was later not
continued in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation
Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements and the
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, signed on September 4,
1999. Thus, the two Israeli-Palestinian instruments/agreements
guiding the negotiations on permanent status issues (the 1993 DOP
and the 1999 Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum) have nothing to say about
human rights. It would have been surprising if any negotiation
process based on these two components resulted in a situation where
human rights were respected or protected by the parties.
Thus, the many calls on both parties to address the numerous human
rights issues and concerns so very present in the conflict went
unanswered. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
repeated what they said at the outset of the "peace process", both
as the parties were negotiating final status issues, and even after
the beginning of the current Intifada in 2000. In 1998, Amnesty
International stated that:
"[T]he acceptance by the international community of 'peace' at any
price or of a security-led agenda involving the suppression of
'terrorism' without regard for human rights has often encouraged
violations, and the international community has a crucial role to
play in achieving respect for human rights by refusing to accept
these violations. Israelis and Palestinians must not accept human
rights violations in the name of achieving 'peace' or fighting
'terrorism'."27
In its document entitled Developing a Human Rights Agenda for
Peace, issued on March 26, 2001, Amnesty International called, "...
unreservedly for the full enjoyment of the human rights in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights for all people." It also
added:
"A major flaw of the process which began with the Oslo Agreement of
1993 was that peace was not founded on ensuring respect and
protection for human rights.The past months have shown more clearly
than ever that if human rights are sacrificed in the search for
peace and security there will be no peace and no security. Even if
the human rights agenda is not the only answer, it must be part of
the solution."28
The Road Map
With the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the
election of the Likud government in Israel in the same year, before
the Taba talks could produce results, the violence in the OPTs rose
to unprecedented levels.29 This included the Israeli army's
invasion and occupation of all West Bank Palestinian towns,
villages and refugee camps in the first half of 2002.
As the violence continued, a quartet composed of representatives of
the UN, and the governments of the US, EU countries and Russia,
developed a "Road Map for Peace in the Middle East" as part of
their efforts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation
process. The Road Map is not a treaty of any sort, but simply a
performance-based list of sequential steps the Israeli and
Palestinian authorities should take with the backing of the Quartet
members. However, it was not officially released during 2002,
although it circulated widely on an informal basis.
The Road Map was largely based on a speech the US president
delivered on June 24, 2002, in which he conditioned any support for
the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on Palestinian
"reform," including a change in the leadership of the PNA. Although
the Palestinian people elected their president in 1996, the
selection of a prime minister was done under Israeli and US
pressure, without any recourse to the ballot box.30 There is no
explicit reference to any provisions of international law in the
Road Map, and its implementation and monitoring were not entrusted
to any international organization, not even the UN. The Road Map is
based on the premise that the parties will reach a negotiated
settlement, but it does not stipulate that the outcome conform with
international law.31
Thus, the latest framework for an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation
process, the Middle East Road Map, is no better than and, indeed,
no different from its predecessors with respect to human rights.
Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have studied the
Road Map and, upon its release, made their positions clear. Human
Rights Watch expressed its concern at, "the failure of the Road Map
to incorporate into its provisions internationally recognized human
rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) principles," and
concluded that: "Other human rights and international humanitarian
law standards are incorporated not as binding obligations but as
political benchmarks subject to negotiation, political expediency,
and performance by other parties."32
Amnesty International's position is similar: "The failure of past
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians has demonstrated
that while a human rights agenda alone may not be the answer, it
must be a central part of any solution. Only a just settlement,
which respects the human rights of all parties, will
endure."33
Conclusion
Should the international community fail to rectify the current
situation, in which "peace" building does not improve enjoyment of
equal rights by affected citizens through the incorporation of
appropriate human rights guarantees, there will be a repetition of
past failures, and the hopes of both Palestinians and Israelis for
an end to the conflict will be dashed. Such a failure will also
cast the international community as accomplices to breaching the
rights they advocate in other settings, and which they helped
develop for "universal" application. Indeed, as Human Rights Watch
warned, the failure of the drafters of the Road Map to incorporate
human rights standards in its negotiation process is not novel, as
almost all preceding Israeli-Palestinian agreements have also
failed to appropriately, if at all, address human rights issues or
include protections.34
By repeating these past failures, the parties concerned will also
have failed to learn from the experiences and lessons of peace
processes in the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, South Africa,
East Timor, Guatemala and elsewhere. In these countries, "the
legitimacy and sustainability of political processes are
strengthened, not weakened, by including [international
humanitarian law] and human rights standards. All conflict-related
agreements should include and uphold human rights and international
humanitarian law standards."35
If the parties and negotiation sponsors are willing to learn from
similar processes in other areas, they will find plenty of sources
on how specific human rights issues may be addressed, including
those involving refugees, the treatment of individuals suspected of
human rights abuses, war crimes, and damage and injury caused to
property and civilians in the course of the conflict. The parties
will also have to consider how best to guarantee better enjoyment
of human rights by all in the future, when there may be
Palestinians living under Israeli jurisdiction and Israelis under
Palestinian jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, guaranteeing
equal and better enjoyment of human rights becomes even more
crucial.
However, until the parties agree to include human rights and (more
generally) international law principles and standards in their
negotiations, human rights activists, as well as interested
parties, should keep up the pressure on the parties and the
sponsors of the process to ensure these principles are accorded the
status they deserve in any Palestinian-Israeli negotiation process.
This is the duty and entitlement of all civilians who are suffering
as a result of the continuation of the occupation and
conflict.
1 Mustafa Mari LL.B, LL.M, Ph.D. (Law). The views expressed here do
not necessarily reflect those of the University of Bir Zeit or any
other organization with which the author is affiliated.
2 A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, released by the Office of the
Spokesman of the U.S. State Department on April 30, 2003, Press
Statement # 2003/451. Though the Road Map was developed in 2002, it
was only released following the creation by the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA), on demand from the US, of the position of
a Palestinian prime minister, and the swearing in, in April 2003,
of the first Palestinian prime minister.
3 Many authors have compared the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or
aspects thereof, with other conflicts. See for example Thomas G.
Mitchell, Native vs. settler: ethnic conflict in Israel/Palestine,
Northern Ireland, and South Africa, (Contributions in military
studies, No. 200), Greenwood Publishing Group, September 2000,
hereafter Mitchell (2000); Donald Harman Akenson, God's peoples:
covenant and land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1992, hereafter Akenson (1992). I have
treated this issue in detail in my Negotiating Human Rights in
Peace Processes: The Lessons of South Africa, Northern Ireland and
the Palestinian-Israeli Situations, Ph.D. thesis submitted to the
University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK, 2001.
4 See Mitchell (2000) on the settler vs. native origins of the
conflicts in the three cases. See also Akenson (1992). See also
Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed conflicts,
conflict termination and peace agreements, 1989-96," Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. (34) 3, 1997, pp 339-358.
5 On this generally see E. E. Azar, "Protracted international
conflicts: ten propositions," in International Interactions, Vol.
12, 1985, pp 59-70; E. E. Azar, The management of protracted social
conflict, Hampshire, Dartmouth Publishing, 1990. See also Daniel
Bar-Tal, "Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: the
Israeli case", The International Journal of Conflict Management,
Vol. 9 (no. 1), 1998, pp 22-50, and John McGarry, "Political
settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa", Political
Studies, Vol. XLVI, 1998, pp 853-870.
6 Morton Deutsch, The resolution of conflict, New Haven and London,
Yale University Press, 1977, p 400.
7 C. R. Mitchell, The structure of international conflict, London,
MacMillan, 1981, pp 206-207.
8 In the case of South Africa, negotiations lasted for years before
the parties were finally able to agree to the formula for resolving
the conflict: one man one vote, with certain power-sharing
arrangements. On the South African negotiation process see Nelson
Mandela, Long walk to freedom, Abacus, London, 1995, and T. R. H.
Davenport, The transfer of power in South Africa, David Philip
Publishers, 1998.
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc
A/Conf.183/9, 17 July 1998; Pinochet case: A landmark but rights
group disappointed if no trial, New York, Human Rights Watch,
January 12, 2000; Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugrate, [1998] 3 W.L.R.
1456 (in which the House of Lords quashed the decision of the
Divisional Court that invalidated the arrest warrants issued for
Pinochet); Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate
and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugrate (No. 2), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272,
and Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex p. Pinochet (No. 3), [1999]
2 W.L.R. 827 (in which the House of Lords finally decided to accept
the appeal and quash the decision of the Divisional Court, thus
permitting reinstatement of the arrest warrants against Pinochet).
See also "Chile: Truth and justice must not be hindered", AI Index
AMR 22/009/2001, London, Amnesty International, July 9, 2001, and
"Chile's Pinochet unfit for trial, court says", Reuters News
Service, July 10, 2001.
10 See Colin Campbell, "Peace and the laws of war: the role of
international humanitarian law in the post-conflict environment",
Review of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva,
ICRC, September 2000, Vol. 82, number 839, pp 627-651, pp 628-631,
and Christine Bell, Human rights and peace agreements, Oxford
University Press, 2000, p 4.
11 UN Secretary General Report on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2002/1300, available at
www.hrw.org.
12 Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to yes,
Penguin, 1991, hereafter Fisher et al. (1997), p 4.
13 Fisher et al. (1997).
14 See Anonymous, "Human rights in peace negotiations", Human
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 18 (2), 1996, pp 249-258; Francis A. Boyle,
"Negotiating human rights in peace negotiations", Human Rights
Quarterly, Vol. 18 (3), 1996, pp 515-516, and Felice D. Gaer,
"UN-Anonymous: reflections on human rights in peace negotiations",
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 19 (1), 1997, pp 1-8.
15 See John Quigley, "The role of law in a Palestinian-Israeli
accommodation", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,
1999, Vol. 31 (2/3), pp 351-381, and Shimon Shitreet, "Negotiations
and agreements are better than legal resolutions: A response to
Professor John Quigley", Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, 2000, Vol. 32 (2), pp 259-272.
16 On this see The legal status of the West Bank and Gaza, United
Nations, 1982.
17 IVth Hague Convention Relative to the Customs of War on Land and
its annex Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, and Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, of 12 August
1949.
18 On this see Ian S. Lustick, "Has Israel annexed East
Jerusalem?", Middle East Policy, Vol. V (number 1), January 1997,
pp 34-45. See also UN Security Council resolution 465 of March 1,
1980 and resolution 904 of March 18, 1994, and Usama Halabi,
Al-Quds: athar "dam Al-Quds ila Israel" 'ala hoqouq wawad' sukaniha
al'Arab (Jerusalem - the Effects of Israel's Annexation of
Jerusalem on the Rights and Position of its Arab Population),
Jerusalem, The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of
International Affairs, 1990.
19 PLO Covenant, article 6. See also Mahmoud Abbas, Through secret
channels: the road to Oslo, Garnet Pub Ltd, September 1997, pp
11-13, hereafter Abbas (1997).
20 PLO Covenant, article 9. See also Abbas (1995), pp 13-14.
21 Haider Abed Al-Shafi, "A Political reading of the DOP," in
Challenges facing Palestinian society in the interim period,
Jerusalem, PASSIA, 1994, pp 11-18.
22 US-USSR Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference,
jointly issued by the US and the USSR on October 18, 1991.
23 A Human Rights Assessment of The Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements for Palestinians, Ramallah,
Al-Haq, 1993.
24 See Human Rights Should Not be Sacrificed in The Name of Peace,
Amnesty International, AI INDEX: MDE 15/011/1996, February 12,
1996; An Analysis of the Wye River Memorandum, Human Rights Watch,
November 1998; Five Years After The Oslo Agreement: Human Rights
Sacrificed for "Security", Amnesty International, AI Index: MDE
02/004/1998, September 1, 1998. See also Human Rights Neglected in
Theory And Practice by All Involved in "Peacemaking", Amnesty
International, AI Index: MDE 02/009/1998, 23 December 1998, and
Developing a Human Rights Agenda for Peace, Amnesty International,
AI Index: MDE 15/012/2001, 26 March 2001.
25 Article XIV, Interim Agreement.
26 An Analysis of the Wye River Memorandum, Human Rights Watch,
November 1998.
27 Five Years After The Oslo Agreement: Human Rights Sacrificed For
"Security", Amnesty International, op. cit. See also Human Rights
Neglected in Theory and Practice by All Involved in "Peacemaking",
Amnesty International.
28 Developing a Human Rights Agenda for Peace, Amnesty
International.
29 In December 2000 and January 2001, just weeks before the Israeli
elections of February 6, 2001, and while the Palestinian Intifada
and violence continued throughout the OPTs, Israeli and Palestinian
teams conducted negotiations in which progress was made, though
they did not reach agreement on any of the issues discussed. See
"Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement", issued at Taba, Egypt,
January 27, 2001, published in The Jerusalem Post, January 28,
2001.
30 The US and Israel explicitly demanded the PNA replace its
elected president, Mr Yasser Arafat. When the PNA refused, the US
accepted an alternative plan, by which much of Mr Arafat's powers
have been transferred to an appointed prime minister, a position
that did not exist in the Palestinian political-constitutional
system until the PLC adopted relevant amendments to the Basic Law
on March 18, 2003.
31 See Road Map Fails Rights Test, Human Rights Watch, May 8, 2003.
See also The Road Map: Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes,
Human Rights Watch, May 8, 2003.
32 Op. cit.
33 Human Rights Should Not be Bargained Away in Road Map
Negotiations, AI Index: MDE 15/050/2003, June 3, 2003.
34 See The Road Map: Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes, Human
Rights Watch.
35 Op. Cit.