At a time when there is more uncertainty than ever about the future
of governance and political leadership in the West Bank and Gaza,
it may be useful to consider the political orientations and
preferences of ordinary Palestinian citizens. For much of the
1990s, from the time of the Oslo agreement until the outbreak of
the current intifada, support for the regime led by Yasser Arafat
and Fateh remained fairly constant at around 40-45 percent. Support
for Islamic factions, primarily Hamas but also Islamic Jihad,
declined from around 20 percent during the early years of this
period to about 15 percent or even less by the late 1990s. Support
for all other factions, including both leftists and independents,
totaled 30-35 percent in the early post-Oslo period but it, too,
had declined by the end of the decade, being no more than 20
percent in 1999. Only support for "None of the Above" increased
during this period, reaching 35 percent in 1999 and reflecting
growing popular discontent with the way the Palestinian territories
were being governed. (1)
Changes Since September 2000
The situation has changed considerably since the Al-Aqsa Intifada
began in September 2000. Views about Yasser Arafat are complicated.
There was dissatisfaction with many aspects of his leadership,
including both the corruption and cronyism that have become
widespread and his steadfast opposition to any sharing of political
authority. On the other hand, he remained the embodiment of
Palestinian national aspirations, and his treatment by the Israeli
government caused many who might under other circumstances be more
critical to rally to his cause. Beyond Arafat himself, however,
support for Hamas, and to a lesser extent Islamic Jihad, increased
dramatically during the last four years. It is currently in the
range of 70 percent. Much of the support for Islamist factions
appears to be instrumental, based less on the appeal of their
ideology than on their role in delivering services at the
grassroots level and, equally, on the absence of any credible and
appealing alternative.
Preferences of Ordinary Men and Women
Against this background, and with Palestinians discussing whether
and at what levels to hold elections, information about the
political system preferences of ordinary men and women may be
particularly instructive. The present report draws upon a public
opinion survey carried out in December 2003 to shed light on these
political orientations. Rather than assessing the degree of support
for particular leaders or factions, however, it examines the kind
of political system that is favored by Palestinians. It asks, in
other words, not by whom but how ordinary citizens would like their
political community to be organized and governed.
The survey was organized by the author, with funding from the U.S.
National Science Foundation, and carried out by the Palestine
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). Khalil Shikaki,
PCPSR director, collaborated on the design of the research, as well
as how it was conducted. The survey is also being administered in
several other Arab countries as part of a larger comparative
investigation of the nature and determinants of attitudes toward
governance in the Arab world. Multi-stage area probability sampling
was used to select respondents in the West Bank and Gaza. This
involved randomly selecting "counting areas" based on the 1997
census, randomly selecting households within each counting area,
and then randomly selecting within each household one person over
the age of 18 to be interviewed. A total of 1,320 individuals were
interviewed.
The first set of findings to be presented concerns attitudes and
preferences relating to political systems in general and to
democracy in particular. Figures 1 and 2 present the distribution
of responses to the following two sets of questions:
I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask
what you think about each as a way of governing our country. For
each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad
or very bad way of governing your country?
-The systems described are: Strong Ruler, Experts Rule, Military
Rule and Democracy.
I am going to read a list of things that people sometimes say about
a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you
agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly?
-Three questions ask whether democracy leads to the following
problems: Economy Runs Badly, Too Indecisive, Too Little
Order.
- A fourth question asks whether, despite any problems, democracy
is still the best form of government.
High Support for Democracy
Figure 1 shows that support for democracy is higher than support
for any other political system; and Figure 2 shows that, regardless
of whether they believe there to be problems associated with
democracy, most respondents believe democracy is still the best
form of government. More specifically, 86 percent consider
democracy to be a good or very good way of governing "our country,"
and 80 percent judge democracy to be the best form of government. A
question being investigated in the larger study, which is beyond
the scope of the present report and thus can only be acknowledged,
concerns the understanding that people have of democracy: whether
they express support for democracy because they understand and
embrace its principles and are thus genuine democrats; or whether
they simply believe democracy will improve their lives and thus
might be termed instrumental democrats.
Role of Religion
Democracy, whether embraced for reasons of principle or
instrumental reasons, is not necessarily defined in secular terms.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of responses to the following
questions about the degree to which religious officials should play
a leading role in political affairs.
Please indicate for each of the following statements whether you
agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly:
It would be better for our country if more people with strong
religious beliefs hold public office.
Men of religion should have not have any influence over decisions
of the government.
The distribution of responses to each of the preceding questions is
very similar, and in each case there is a roughly even division
between those who favor and those who oppose a strong association
between religion and politics. More specifically, 52 percent
strongly agree or agree, and 48 percent disagree or strongly
disagree, that it would be better for the country if more people
with strong religious beliefs hold public office. Similarly, 56
percent strongly agree or agree, and 44 percent disagree or
strongly disagree, that men of religion should have influence over
the decisions of the government.
The relationship between attitudes toward democracy and views about
the political role of religion are shown in Figure 4. The two items
measuring attitudes toward democracy have been combined to form a
four-point scale, ranging from very strong support to no support.
The question asking whether it would be better if more people with
strong religious beliefs held political office is used to assess
views about the relationship between religion and politics. These
two measures are dichotomized and then cross-tabulated in the
contingency table shown in the figure, which thus yields the
following four-fold categorization:
Support for democracy and for a strong political role for religion:
23.9 percent.
Support for democracy but not for a strong political role for
religion: 30.1 percent.
Support for a strong political role for religion but not support
for democracy: 27.2 percent.
Support neither for democracy nor for a strong political role for
religion: 8.8 percent.
Figure 4 shows that while there is broad support for democracy,
there is disagreement about whether democratic politics should
assign an important role to religious authorities. Among
Palestinians who express strong support for democracy, a majority
embraces secularism but almost 40 percent do not favor a secular
conception of democracy. Additionally, more than one-quarter of all
responds endorse a political formula that assigns importance to
religion but does not attach much importance to democracy.
Attitudes According to Age and Education
The final set of findings examines the distribution of these
attitudes and preferences across demographic categories based on
age and education. There are three age categories: under 30, 30-49,
and 50 and over. There are two education categories: less than high
school and high school or more. Figure 5 shows the number
respondents in the six resulting age and education categories. As
expected, younger men and women are more likely than their older
counterparts to be better educated. Figure 6 shows for each of the
six demographic categories the distribution of preferences for the
various political formulae shown in Figure 4.
Figure 6 reveals a number of noteworthy patterns about the
demographic distribution of political system preferences. First,
there is surprisingly little difference in aggregate support for
democracy across the six demographic categories. Taken together,
those who support democracy with a prominent role for religion and
those who support a more secular version of democracy represent
45-55 percent of the respondents in each demographic category. The
figure dips to 46 percent among less well-educated respondents
under 30, and it rises to 55 percent among better-educated
individuals in the 30-49 age group. This narrow range of variation
indicates considerable similarity in aggregate support for
democracy among Palestinians who differ in age and education.
Second, moving beyond undifferentiated support for democracy,
Figure 6 shows that among Palestinians who express strong or very
strong support for democracy, less well-educated individuals prefer
a political model that incorporates a prominent role for religion
more frequently than a secular model, whereas better-educated
respondents prefer a secular model more frequently than one that
assigns an important role to religion. The latter pattern is
particularly pronounced among better-educated respondents over the
age of 30. This finding shows the impact of education on attitudes
toward the political role of religion among men and women who
support democracy. Among respondents in each age category, and
especially among those over 30, better-educated and less
well-educated advocates of democracy differ significantly in their
views about the appropriate relationship between religion and
politics. Put differently, better-educated and less well-educated
men and women do not differ very much in the degree of their
support for democracy, but they do differ significantly with
respect to the kind of democracy they support.
Growing Support for Political Islam
Third, support for a strong connection between religion and
politics but not for democracy, is the most frequently preferred
political formula among all respondents with less than a high
school education, regardless of age. It is also the most frequently
preferred alternative among better-educated respondents under the
age of 30. This means that among respondents in these four
demographic categories - less well-educated individuals in all age
groups and younger individuals in both educational categories the
number of respondents who favor a strong connection between
religion and politics, either within or not within a democratic
context, exceeds the number of respondents who favor democracy,
either with or without a strong religious dimension. Put
differently, this means that with the exception of well- educated
men and women over the age of 30, support for political Islam in
one form or another is not only strong, it is also stronger than
support for democracy in one form or another.
Finally, there appears to be an important generational split
pertaining to preferences about governance among better-educated
respondents. Individuals 30 and over are more likely than
respondents in any other demographic category to favor democracy
and secularism, to support democracy strongly or very strongly but
to disagree with the proposition that it would be better for the
country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public
office. By contrast, those under 30 are much more likely not only
to favor a strong connection between religion and politics but to
favor a political system that is not democratic in character. The
views of these younger individuals may evolve as they grow older,
or their current attitudes may remain unchanged, reflecting the
basic political learning that sometimes marks an age cohort whose
introduction to political life takes place during a distinctive
historical era. Only time will tell which is the case. For the
present, however, it appears that among better-educated
individuals, from whose ranks will come most of the leaders of
Palestinian society, there is a significant division of opinion
about the way the Palestinian political community should be
governed.
Findings Salient to Many Arab Countries
Concerns about governance, including debates about democracy and
the political role of religion, are by no means unique to the
Palestinians. The issues explored in this article are highly
salient in many Arab countries, and in many other countries, as
well. Accordingly, as noted earlier, the West Bank and Gaza survey
reported here is part of a larger comparative and cross-national
study. A major purpose of this larger project is not only to
discern citizen attitudes and preferences pertaining to governance,
but also to chart the locus of important patterns and
relationships, to determine which patterns and relationships are
broadly generalizable, and which, if any, obtain only in political
communities with particular attributes and experiences. Some very
preliminary conclusions, based on a comparison of findings from
Palestine and Jordan, suggest that similarities may be more
important than differences, although this aspect of the research is
still at an early stage. In any event, when completed, this
analysis will shed light not only on the nature and distribution of
Palestinian views about how their community should be governed but
also on the degree to which these political orientations are a
product of the Palestinians' unique situation or, alternatively,
are shaped by broader currents and thus are similar to those found
in other countries.
1 See Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey. "Palestinian Political
Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data from the West Bank and Gaza."
Israel Studies 4 (Spring 1999): 22-43.
