In an article which I published in Ha'aretz at the end of 1997, I
told of a discussion between Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu and the Jewish American senator from New York, Gary
Ackerman. The senator asked Netanyahu how he had reached a position
in which he lacked all credibility in Washington. The prime
minister replied with a question of his own: "From whom would you
prefer to buy a used car - from me or from Yasser Arafat?" Ackerman
responded without a trace of hesitation: "I would go by
foot."
The following morning I received an agitated call from the senator.
He said he knew that I was a serious journalist and though the
conversation had taken place, it was quoted out of context and had
been exploited for political reasons. The senator and Bibi were old
friends and he did not think that Bibi was a liar. He has no doubt
that the prime minister was extremely interested in the peace
process. It was most important that I explain this to my
readers.
The Peace Process as a Local Subject
Even at a time when the Israeli prime minister doesn't exactly
enjoy peak popularity in the American Jewish community, no
politician in a state where the Jews are as influential as in New
York can afford to appear to be hostile, or even critical, toward
the prime minister. For this could cost the politician millions of
dollars and determine his fate in the coming elections. It was the
publication of the story not in Hebrew but in the English edition
of Ha'aretz (with the New York Herald Tribune), which reaches New
York on the Internet, that disturbed the American politician.
This story demonstrates my thesis that in the eyes of American
decision makers, the Middle Eastern peace process is first and
foremost a domestic matter and only afterward, if at all, a matter
of foreign policy. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and
Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad can persuade Ackerman and his
colleagues that they support full peace with Israel in exchange for
the return of all the territories which they lost in wars against
Israel. There is, however, no chance that in the U.S. members of
Congress, be they Jews or non-Jews, will speak even with the
softest voice in favor of putting pressure on Israel to fulfill its
role in a deal of this sort.
Partnership of Values?
The 1991 Gulf War finally removed the strategic argument from the
arsenal of the arguments of supporters of Israel. The major
contribution of Israel to the greatest American operation in the
region was to refrain from any action. The greatest friends of
Israel no longer pretend to argue that America is making a good
military deal when it grants four billion dollars to Israel every
year in security and civilian aid.
There remains the moral argument. Dubious episodes like the Bar-On
affair (corruption in appointing the attorney-general) or the
Meshal affair (an attempted assassination in Jordan) weakened this
argument, which for years had buttressed American support for
Israel. Many of the Israelis and Americans who speak of a
"partnership of values" do not themselves believe in what they are
saying.
Two Groups in Congress
In American politics, one can divide Congress members in Washington
into two groups: those who think that the U.S.A. should distance
itself from the Middle Eastern peace process as from other distant
international subjects (Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan), and those
for whom the peace process is of interest in the context of local
politics. The first group - mainly isolationist politicians from
the South - prefers that, whatever happens, the U.S.A. shouldn't
interfere in the Israeli-Arab conflict. They fear that diplomatic
intervention will inevitably lead to American military and economic
input in the final arrangement, causing resentment among American
parents and taxpayers.
The second group looks at this conflict through the slit of the
ballot box, asking what is good for its voters. This rule is
particularly true when we are speaking of an electoral region with
many Jewish voters, or one replete with rich Jews (the Jewish
community is a minority with no more than two percent of the
population, but in mobilizing donations, mainly for Democratic
candidates, it often counts for up to fifty percent). Many, if not
most American Jews, continue to see Israel as just a victim of Arab
hostility. Whoever asks for their support and money is advised
unhesitatingly to afford full political support to the
victim.
The "common fate" shared by American and Israeli Jews is not indeed
as firm as it was. In recent times, the continuous debate between
the government of Israel and the American Jewish leadership over
changing the status of the Reform and Conservative communities has
eroded what was almost a holy alliance between the two largest
Jewish concentrations in the world, whether the Israeli prime
minister is the moderate Shimon Peres or the hawkish Bibi Netanyahu
..
Solidarity with Israel
A careful declaration by Bill Clinton, considered the friendliest
president toward Israel in recent years, that the position in the
peace process doesn't assist the American effort against Iraq, is
enough to cause even liberal Jewish organizations, like the
American Jewish community, to rise in protest. American Jewry will
in no way permit Israel to be damaged, even if many think that
Israel erred in electing its leader. A leader like Netanyahu enjoys
a free ride on this journey of solidarity.
Israel is of course not to blame for all America's troubles in the
area, and with the Arab states. One should not accept the
simplistic claim that all the problems of U.S. policy are connected
with the special relations which it fosters with Israel and the
almost official asymmetry characterizing its dealings with the
Israeli-Arab conflict. U.S. policy in the Middle East suffers from
a conservative and dogmatic approach, often reminiscent of a large
~d unwieldy ship which has difficulties in changing course. Along
with this, the protracted weakness shown by the only great power in
the world in dealing with the Oslo agreement arouses justified
suspicion among the Arabs.
Madrid and Oslo
The asymmetry in the Israel-U.S.-Arab triangle also contributed to
removing obstacles in the way of the Arabs to the negotiating
table. The Madrid conference of October 1991 was made possible
because the Gulf War proved to the Arab states that the era of the
U.S.S.R. joining them against Israel and its U.S. patron was over.
They understood that the U.S. would not present the territories to
them on a silver platter and that they had better start playing
with Israel and relying on the referee to observe reasonable rules.
They took into consideration that these rules were significantly
influenced by the special relations which the Israeli group had
with the referee's family.
The crisis in the Oslo process engendered increased American
involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In recent
months, direct negotiations gave way to two parallel negotiating
channels between the U.S.A. and each of the contending parties.
Like it or not, America's credibility is now placed on the
operating table. An Israeli refusal to implement a retreat from the
territories and to freeze settlement will be considered in the eyes
of the Arabs and of the whole world as a failure of American policy
in the Middle East. In other words, for the greatest world power it
would be a victory for internal over foreign policy, a victory for
the "old local order" over the "new world order."
A Wealth of U.S. Interests
American policy in this region is founded on the aspiration to
harmony between a wealth of interests, of which the peace process
is only one: safeguarding low oil prices; blocking Iran and Iraq;
strengthening friendly regimes like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Turkey; fighting international terror and drugs; checking Islamic
extremism; and promoting the peace process. When Israel delays this
process, she undermines one of the bases on which the U.S.A.'s
Middle East policy rests.
Israel and its American Jewish brethren did not determine the rules
of play in Washington. They know how to use the rules for their
benefit. The most difficult thing is to determine the dosage of the
use of force and to understand its limitations. The asymmetry in
the relations of the U.S.A. with the parties to the conflict in the
Middle East can only be effective up to a certain limit. Beyond
this it becomes cynical opportunism by political office-holders who
would deny all responsibility for a failure of the peace
process.
Pertinent Questions
Anyone finding it hard to believe that a minority of six million
American Jews exercises a decisive influence over the policies of a
great power with a population of 260 million must ask the
questions: What motivates the U.S.A. to grant political, military
and economic support to the small but relatively rich Jewish state
(a yearly income per head of $16,000), support which in the best
event does not contribute to U.S. interests? What would happen to
the few tens of millions of dollars which the residents of Gaza
($1,200 income per head) receive, were Yasser Arafat to declare the
annulment of the Oslo agreement and a return to armed struggle for
the destruction of Israel?
There is also room to ask the question: How would things develop
were the Arabs to have a strong, rich, devoted and efficient lobby
like AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference, as well as some tens of
Palestinian and Arab congressmen?