The Objective of the Working Group is to explore options with a
view to establishing a trilateral security regime involving Israel,
Jordan and Palestine.
1. Security throughout the Middle East and globally is indivisible.
However, it is essential to focus on specific sub-units and to
build security incrementally. Jordan, Israel and Palestine
constitute a specific geostrategic sub-unit, and have interlocking
security interests. Jordan, Israel and Palestine also constitute a
potential nucleus for a wider Middle East security regime. The
Working Group will therefore focus on trilateral security
arrangements.
2. Security comprises military, economic, environmental and
demographic aspects. The Working Group will focus initially on
military security.
3. The end product will be an outline of a trilateral security
regime, based on a set of agreed assumptions and principles.
Assumptions
The trilateral security regime, which the working group seeks to
define, is based on the existence of the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty, which comprises mutual security constraints, together with
the following assumptions:
1. Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have been concluded to the
satisfaction of both parties.
2. The three states, Israel, Jordan and Palestine, have mutually
recognized borders, each with the other.
3. Palestine is constrained from a security standpoint based on its
agreement with Israel.
These assumptions, accepted by all participants in the Working
Group, provided an indispensable conceptual framework for dialogue
about a trilateral security regime. The assumptions also
established a standard by which distinctions could be made between
relevant trilateral issues on the one hand, and important but - in
this context - irrelevant bilateral issues on the other.
All participants agreed that, for the purposes of the discussion,
there is already a Palestinian state and it has a joint border with
Jordan, but it is also subject to certain security constraints.
Only if there are mutually recognized borders among all partners is
there a rationale for discussing trilateral security. Put
differently, in the absence of a Jordan-Palestine border, i.e., if
a Palestinian state were to emerge that was completely surrounded
by Israeli territory, there would be no relevant
Jordanian-Palestinian security issues to qualify for a trilateral
regime. But the territorial length and location of the
Jordan-Palestine border - obviously, either in all of the Jordan
Valley as the Palestinians want, or in a larger or smaller section
of the valley in accordance with diverse Israeli views - were not a
topic of discussions; these issues will presumably be resolved
bilaterally between Israel and the PLO in final status talks. By
agreeing to leave them out of discussions, the Working Group was
able to involve a broader range of participants, particularly on
the Israeli side, than might otherwise have been possible.
The detailed fabric of security constraints imposed upon Palestine
by the Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement was also not
spelled out in our assumptions - again, because it is a bilateral
issue. Some security constraints became topics for discussion and
at times disagreement in the Working Group discussions; others were
not discussed. This disparity was an inevitable consequence of the
technique employed for facilitating discussions. After having
assumed the existence of a Palestinian state for the purposes of
discussions, one key objective was to provide each of the three
parties with ideas and better understanding regarding the security
issues that must be dealt with in the course of Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations over the creation of such a state - a matter of vital
interest to Jordan as well.
The methodology adopted for discussion dealt first with those
trilateral security issues that appeared to engender broad
agreement among the participants. Then, as a degree of mutual
confidence was built up regarding the feasibility of the goal of a
trilateral security regime, the Working Group increasingly tackled
conflicting interests, and in some cases was able to describe areas
of limited agreement here as well.
Nevertheless, as Working Group members suspected from the start, at
the conclusion of discussions there remained a number of very
important core security issues upon which the three parties were
not able to agree. The elucidation of the nature and content of
disagreement over these issues is at least as important for
relevant policy makers and negotiators as the agreed issues. It is
the disputed topics that are certain to be at the center of
Israeli-Palestinian final status security talks.
General Security Interests and Threat Perceptions within the
Jordan-Israel-Palestine Region
Palestine
Palestine's security requires removal of the existential threat
posed by Israeli occupation and the denial of the right to
self-determination. Additional security interests require:
1. Removing settlers who are armed and hostile and pose an internal
threat to the security of the Palestinian state.
2. Ensuring a self-defense capability that poses no threat to
others. Self defense is not defined in normal military terms but in
the ability to prevent domestic subversion, stop cross border
infiltration attempts, maintain law and order, etc. Palestine's
security requires Israel be a moderate, non-expansionist state
offering no hostile subversion.
3. Maintaining domestic stability and preventing internal conflict.
Due to the existence of an armed and ideologically motivated
opposition, there is a need to ensure that the peace agreement is
perceived as fair and supported by the majority of the
population.
4. Resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the Right of
Return and displaced persons, while protecting the civil-political
rights of the refugees in host countries until the issue is
resolved.
5. Palestine must not be deprived of access to regional water
resources.
6. The maintenance of regional stability requires Palestinian
participation in arms control efforts, including the declaration of
the region as a nuclear-free zone and the absence of any regional
military alliance that endangers Palestine.
Jordan
Jordan is strategically located in the center of the Middle East
and provides strategic depth for both Israel and Palestine.
Jordan's security and stability are therefore essential for Israel
and Palestine. Any prolonged stagnation in the peace process might
result in violence and instability within the
Jordan-Israel-Palestine triangle. Of course, stability cannot
evolve in a region wracked by conflict. It is in Jordan's interest
to see progress on the Syrian/Lebanese-Israeli track as well.
There is a need for genuine cooperation to counter terrorism and
violence. The issue of personal/community security will always have
a great impact on attitudes towards reconciliation. Jordan has a
vital interest in resolving the issues of 1948 refugees and 1967
displaced persons. Two additional refugee migrations (from the Gulf
in 1991 and from Lebanon in 1975-1985) have left a negative impact
on Jordan's demography and economy. Poverty and unemployment are
sources of instability and frustration and fuel fundamentalism.
Jordan is therefore interested in addressing the root causes of
difficult social conditions through economic cooperation and
eventual integration.
For Jordanians, Jordan, Palestine and Israel share a number of
security interests and threat perceptions, including existential
threats, agreement violation, demographic issues, terrorism and
violent anti-peace opposition groups. Jordan believes all three
countries will need to cooperate in - confronting terrorism,
refraining from the threat or use of force, maintaining one
another's territorial integrity, exchanging information on issues
relating to security, establishing CSBMs and demilitarized zones,
and establishing joint security training for personnel.
Jordan believes that a trilateral security regime could serve as a
nucleus for a broader security regime. On the other hand, failure
within the triangle would have serious negative regional
implications.
Conflicting security interests within the triangle include
conventional and non-conventional military asymmetries, border
control issues, attitudes toward use of violence and terrorism,
Israeli settlement policies, refugees and displaced persons, water,
and movement of people and goods across borders.
Threat perceptions
These Jordanian general security interests reflect risks that could
develop into threats to national security if not addressed
effectively. Jordan is surrounded by four states that enjoy
abundant resources, larger standing armed forces and a qualitative
edge over Jordan's inventory of weapons systems. Accordingly
Jordan, as a small state, has realized its security interests by
creating simultaneous relationships with different states or blocs,
depending on the circumstances. Due to the uncertainties of the
future, Jordan must always bear in mind this geostrategic reality.
A trilateral security regime is a step in the right direction. If
it is ever to alter this reality of shifting alliances, it must be
a permanent security regime.
Jordan has serious concerns regarding the spread of NBC weapons and
their delivery systems. Accordingly it will continue to work
towards creating a Middle East free of all weapons of mass
destruction that are not conducive to regional security and
stability. In addition, Jordan will explore every avenue that might
lead to disarmament, arms control and arms reductions.
Israel
Security Interests
1. Regional stability
2. Inviolability of Israeli-Arab peace treaties.
3. No regional military alliances that endanger Israel, such as an
eastern front.
4. Jordan and Palestine are moderate, democratic and
pro-Western.
5. Existing Israeli water resources remain inviolable.
6. No armed militias or terrorist groups hostile towards Israel
shelter in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and
Palestine.
7. Jordan remains under Hashemite rule; its territorial and
demographic integrity is maintained.
8. Palestine does not project any military or irredentist threat to
Israel or Jordan.
9. The Israeli Arab minority is integrated into the Israeli
national and social fabric.
10. Security arrangements comprise, inter alia, demilitarization of
offensive weapons systems, Israeli control over the airspace west
of the Jordan, Israeli-Jordanian coordination of air space
management and regional air defense, Israeli control over the
Palestinian Mediterranean coastline. Palestine or Jordan holds no
non-conventional weaponry.
Threat Perceptions
1. Violation of peace and security treaty arrangements.
2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery
systems in the region.
3. Hostile military forces in the region.
4. Air and/or missile strikes.
5. Terrorism of any sort, anywhere, against Israel or Jewish
targets.
6. Diversion or drying up of Israeli water resources.
7. Palestinian armed forces in proximity to vital targets in
Israel.
8. Palestinian irredentism vis-à-vis Israel or Hashemite
Jordan.
9. Hostile fundamentalism or other subversion in Palestine and/or
Jordan; regime instability instigated by hostile elements.
Security Interests that Generated Broad Agreement
The Working Group's discussion of agreed security interests moved
from the regional/general, through the state specific, to
operational areas.
Regional
There are broad components of Middle East regional security that
extend geographically beyond a trilateral security regime. These
are not conditions for the concluding of a trilateral security
regime, but rather the regional conditions under which a trilateral
security regime could prosper and eventually expand, and to which
its emergence would contribute.
Middle East regional stability will include, first and foremost,
the achievement of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, as well as the
conclusion of additional regional disputes. In parallel, a
successful regional arms control regime is envisioned,
characterized by a system of confidence and security building
measures (CSBMs) and encompassing conventional as well as
non-conventional weapons, and leading to the creation of a Middle
East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The emergence of
regional stability will contribute to the prevention of surprise
and/or external attack against any of the trilateral regime
parties, will enable regional states to limit or cope with the
influence of violent groups and regimes, and will facilitate the
non-violent resolution of all regional conflicts and
disputes.
In this context, the trilateral security regime could copy the
provision regarding a commitment to non-conventional disarmament
that is incorporated into the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Article
5, paragraph 7 reads:
7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as
soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group
on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the
following:
a. the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile
alliances and coalitions;
b. the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass
destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context
of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the
renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and
goodwill.
State-specific, bilateral and trilateral
As a security bloc, the trilateral security regime will provide
strategic depth for each of its members. Each of the partner
states, too, will have an interest in maintaining the domestic
stability of the others: reducing threats of destabilization or
violent subversion, encouraging democracy, open polity and
pluralism, and demonstrating sensitivity to the implications of its
own domestic policies or activities for the domestic stability of
its partners.
The regime will take priority in its members' bilateral relations.
Thus, in the event of contradiction between the provisions of the
trilateral security regime and previously existing bilateral
agreements among its members, the previous agreements will be made
compatible with the regime. Further, while the three parties will
also maintain bilateral security agreements among them, they will
refrain in future from joining bilateral or multilateral security
agreements that contradict or jeopardize the security regime.
Moreover, trilateral consultation will guide the formulation of new
bilateral security arrangements within the regime, as well as of
new multilateral security arrangements. And internal political
changes within any regime member state will not release that state
from its regime treaty obligations.
Under the trilateral security regime, the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the partners will be maintained. This
comprises secure and mutually recognized borders; prevention of
violence and subversion against one another; prohibition of
incitement to delegitimize or alter the borders of fellow regime
states [the precise definition of incitement in this context
requires further elucidation; see Terrorism, below]; and
non-interference by each party in the internal affairs of the
others. The parties will also refrain from using security as a
pretext to hinder or abuse the free movement of people and
goods.
Terrorism
The parties to the trilateral security regime agree to the
following premise: the threat or act of violence by an individual
or group, possibly sponsored by an organization or state, aimed at
destabilizing or delegitimizing the security regime, or aimed at
one of the regime states, as well as the advocacy, encouragement or
incitement of such acts, will elicit counter-terrorism cooperation.
This will be directed primarily against armed groups, the
accumulating of illegal weapons and the training of
terrorists.
This premise requires a number of qualifying remarks. First of all,
it clearly avoids inclusion of internal terrorism originating in
and taking place in a single state. Thus, for example, an attack by
an extremist Palestinian organization on an Israeli military
vehicle inside Israel, inside Palestine, or by weapons fire across
the Jordan River, would be considered terrorism because the motive
is to destabilize the security regime. But such an attack on a
Palestinian police vehicle inside Palestine would constitute
terrorism under the regime's criteria only if its motive was to
destabilize trilateral security arrangements; otherwise it would be
considered a purely domestic Palestinian incident. By the same
token, a violent attack by a Jewish extremist organization within
Israel against an Israeli target would be considered an internal
issue, unless its aim was to destabilize security regime
arrangements.
Secondly, the definition clearly requires further elucidation in
several sections. For example, the problematic nature of a
definition of incitement was alluded to above. How does one prevent
the reciting of holy verses from the Koran or the Bible that are
deemed by some to be inciteful? Thus the rhetorical issues are
problematic: the "advocacy, encouragement or incitement" of acts of
terrorism might be interpreted differently, and dealt with
differently, by different states in which large minorities may
subscribe to an ideology or religion deemed inciteful by others.
So, too, the nature of the destabilization or delegitimization of
the trilateral security regime, i.e., the alteration of the
political-security status quo, must be pinpointed.
The three partners will undertake certain unambiguous
counter-terrorism steps, such as the outlawing of terrorist
movements, groups and organizations and their activities, including
fundraising, arrests, cooperation in extradition, etc. The banning
of certain organizations might be more problematic:
Israeli-Palestinian peace is liable to be opposed at the political
level by Hamas as well as by some Israeli groups. These should be
able to use a political forum to advocate change; but the point at
which they are seen to be inciting to violence requires further
discussion.
The three security regime partners should therefore commit to
developing a joint education strategy, and subscribe to a joint
curriculum based on using the same texts to teach youth to shun
violence and prefer coexistence, tolerance, and the primacy of
agreements and the ethics of peace. In parallel, the regime could
create a voluntary non-binding tripartite body composed of senior
judges, educators and the like, to discuss protests by any side
regarding incitement, and to make non-binding but morally forceful
recommendations.
Finally, at the military operational level, cooperation would range
from exchange of intelligence information, through a joint staff
dedicated to planning, coordination and training, all the way to a
tripartite anti-terrorist unit comprising contingents from all
three sides. The parties were not, however, able to agree on the
deployment and operation of this unit (see Anti-terrorist
operations in Chapter 5, Security Interests that Generated Partial
Agreement, below).
Fourth party forces
The model for agreement regarding the entry and movement of fourth
party armed forces within the trilateral security regime states is
the relevant clause-Article 4, paragraph 4-in the Israel-Jordan
peace treaty:
4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build
regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence,
the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:
a. joining or in any way assisting, promoting or cooperating with
any coalition, organization or alliance with a military or security
character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which
include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility
against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the
present Treaty;
b. allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory,
or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel of a third
party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security
of the other Party.
The trilateral security regime would prohibit the inviting or
deploying of fourth party armies and/or military advisers, unless
agreed by all three members.
Verification
Existing verification arrangements involving one or more of the
regime states are quite diverse. The Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), for example, is extremely intrusive. Jordan has signed and
ratified it; Israel has signed but not yet ratified. Thus
Palestinian adherence and Israeli ratification would commit all
trilateral security regime parties to this intrusive regime-but
only in the chemical sphere. In any case, non-conventional arms
control is a regional and international issue that goes beyond the
realm of the trilateral security regime (see Regional,
above).
Israel is involved in two regimes using third party verification:
UNDOF verifies Israeli-Syrian compliance on the Golan, and the MFO
verifies the Sinai regime. Both involve demilitarized zones, force
reduction and weapons limitations. In the case of Sinai, under the
Egypt-Israel peace treaty the two parties themselves help finance
the regime. Egypt and Israel also cooperate bilaterally at the
tactical level regarding drug smuggling, border infiltration, etc.
In contrast, Israel and Syria enjoy excellent supervision by UNDOF
even though they have no relations. Finally, the UNIFIL
(multilateral) regime in South Lebanon has a mixed record, while
the five-country committee verifying the Grapes of Wrath
understandings in Lebanon appears to be a step forward insofar as
it entails direct Israeli-Syrian contact.
The Israel-Jordan peace treaty does not include any verification
arrangements, third party or otherwise. Arrangements are based on
cooperation, coordination, common interest and mutual trust.
In the case of a trilateral security regime, there is a wide
variety of arrangements to be verified, ranging from
demilitarization to force deployment and counter-terrorism measures
(note: verification of arrangements provided by the
Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement is not discussed here
but will likely be related). Since a trilateral security
regime-unlike existing Israel-Arab arrangements-involves very
asymmetrical force limitations, it calls for asymmetrical
verification, and this is problematic. Hence a fourth party might
help ensure objectivity and partially right the asymmetries, and
might be necessary at least in the early stages.
One possibility would be to approach the US, which already
exercises a verification and intelligence role between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority. At a minimum, the US would probably be
needed in an umbrella role, for moral-political support, to deter
or convince other regional actors who may initially erroneously
view the trilateral security regime as some sort of hostile
alliance, and for financial and technical assistance, arbitration,
and leadership of joint committees.
Security Interests that Generated partial Agreement
Military emergencies and early warning
The disputed security interests are best introduced by means of the
Joint Working Group's discussion of military emergencies. Here, as
in the case of terrorism, above, a generally acceptable premise or
definition was reached. Accordingly, a strategic military emergency
for the trilateral security regime involves one or more of the
following (in order of declining importance or relevancy):
1. the entrance of foreign forces, or the threat thereof, into any
of the three states, under any of the following
circumstances:
a) land invasion
b) expeditionary force without prior coordination
c) invasion of air space and/or territorial waters
d) missile launch.
2. armed conflict, or the threat thereof, involving Israel, Jordan
or Palestine, across their borders with non-regime states, i.e. in
the Sinai, the Golan, South Lebanon, and with Jordan's
neighbors.
3. armed conflict, or the threat thereof, somewhere in the Middle
East but not directly involving the regime states.
4. finally, tactical emergencies are defined as those involving
terrorism, as treated above.
These definitions should not imply that the trilateral security
regime is an alliance. At a minimum it would consult regarding the
above external emergencies. It would not be realistic to discuss
any sort of Israel-Arab alliance until there is comprehensive
peace. The trilateral security regime should not contradict
Arab-Arab relations, but rather complement a wider Middle East
security regime.
Thus far the parties agree. But there is no clear agreement
regarding the ramifications for one party of an external conflict
involving another, particularly with regard to transit of one
another's territory. From the Palestinian standpoint, a great deal
depends on the formal status of Israel's relations with possible
aggressor states beyond the trilateral security regime. To cite but
one current example, from the Palestinian perspective, assuming
conditions approximating the status quo, an Israeli air strike in
Lebanon, or an attack from the sea against Israel, should not
impose costs on the Palestinians.
A number of scenarios appear to illustrate the difficulty of
agreeing in advance on collective measures to be invoked in the
event of emergency, particularly with regard to air and land
transit rights.
Scenario 1: The dilemma of an Israel-Syria war on the
Golan
In the event of aggression against Israel by Syria (or for that
matter, any other state) after that state has signed a peace treaty
with Israel, a number of measures could be agreed whereby the two
other security regime states would support Israel. These would
apply equally to aggression against Jordan by one of its Arab
neighbors. But if, on the other hand, Israel still occupies the
Golan and has no peace agreement with Syria, then Jordan and
Palestine would argue that they have no obligation to cooperate
with Israel in the event of war with Syria. Nonetheless, Israel's
security regime partners would be obliged to address the question
of accommodation of Israel's military needs.
Were Israeli aircraft to overfly the West Bank on their way to an
Israeli-Syrian front (or for that matter on their way into
Jordanian airspace), Palestine would protest diplomatically this
violation of its sovereignty. But because it possesses no
anti-aircraft capabililty (as part of its demilitarized status), it
presumably would not present Israel with a military dilemma. Even
assuming this tacit set of circumstances is acceptable to
Palestine, it would not be to Israel, which would argue that there
must be agreed arrangements for overflight, or for that matter,
land passage, in times of emergency.
Scenario 2: Israeli overflights in Jordan
Jordan would perceive considerable danger in any Israeli attempt to
traverse Jordan's skies in order to deal with a threat from the
east. At a minimum, Israeli use of Jordanian airspace has to be
coordinated bilaterally, with close intelligence coordination based
on Israeli advanced early-warning capabilities. But Jordan would
not join forces with Israel against Jordan's neighbors. A parallel
case is an Israeli-Arab missile war in which Israeli Arrow
anti-missile missiles intercept Iraqi or Iranian missiles in the
skies above Jordan, with the warhead exploding or dispersing in
Jordan. In the Israeli view, enhanced bilateral cooperation and/or
technological innovation might obviate this scenario. Thus, Israel
could deploy its Arrow batteries in east Jordan; that way the
intercept phase would take place over Iraq. Alternatively, the
successful deployment of boost-phase interception might enable
interception to take place over Iraq.
Scenario 3: Israel seeks to reinforce the Jordan Valley against
an eastern front
In this event, Israel would presumably need to send land forces
across Palestinian territory. Assuming that Israel has signed peace
agreements with the eastern front aggressor states and/or that the
gathering eastern front constitutes an act of aggression against
Jordan or is perceived as a threat to Palestine (e.g. an
Iranian-led Islamist coalition), then Palestine would presumably
support Israel's logistics effort to move forces across the West
Bank into the Jordan Valley (where, according to the Palestinian
vision of Jordan Valley security provisions, it would merely be
reinforcing a larger joint force).
However if this scenario unravels in circumstances approximating
the Israel-Arab status quo, i.e., the eastern front aggressor
states have never signed peace agreements with Israel, then from
the Palestinian standpoint the situation would be similar to that
broached earlier regarding Israeli emergency military overflights
of the West Bank on the way to a Golan warfront. Since Palestine
would already have consented to the complete demilitarization of
the roads that Israel might use to reach the Jordan Valley, its
reaction to an Israeli decision to send its military convoys along
these routes would likely not exceed a diplomatic protest. Here
again, Israel would deem this tacit set of circumstances to be
inadequate, and would argue for a more comprehensive consultation
mechanism regarding entry by one regime partner into the territory
of another.
Scenario 4: A Palestinian or Jordanian domestic
insurgency
This sort of 'internal' scenario does not raise the question of
whether a state of peace or war prevails between Israel and
additional neighbors. In the Palestinians scenario, Palestine
requires reinforcements in Gaza to deal with an internal threat or
an invasion from the sea. It wants Israel to agree to the arrival
by land or air of Jordanian or Egyptian troops. Here Israel would
likely be conscious of Palestinian sensitivities (preferring Arab
rather than Israeli help). In the Jordanian scenario, an uprising
by radical or extremist groups erupts in Gaza, the West Bank and
Jordan simultaneously. Here again, Palestine would request that
Jordanian or Egyptian forces come to its aid.
Several of the above scenarios generated disagreement regarding
Israel's need for early warning facilities. In one Arab view,
Israel's use of satellites, coupled with Jordan's function as
strategic depth for Israel, might render unnecessary Israeli early
warning stations on the West Bank. Another Arab position holds that
Palestine could take over Israeli radars on the West Bank, and that
all three states could link-up their early warning radars, with
Israel relying on Jordanian and Palestinian ground radar
capabilities, and with Israeli airborne early warning capabilities
covering Jordan and linked to both Jordan and Palestine. An
additional Arab suggestion posits that the three partners could
exchange radar controllers as a confidence-building measure, with
Israeli and Palestinian controllers stationed on Jordan's eastern
border and Jordanian controllers in Israel. The Israeli response is
that reliance on Jordanian radar is not certain enough, insofar as
it depends on Jordan's remaining a friendly regime; as for
Palestine, it should have no radar capabilities. And Israeli
electronic early-warning capabilities on the West Bank would be
manned exclusively by Israelis.
These disagreements could conceivably be at least partially
mitigated through phasing. Israel might agree to remove its
early-warning stations from Palestine once it is satisfied that
trilateral regime cooperation works and the threat from the east
has been diminished. The Palestinian interest in accelerating the
creation of a tripartite early-warning network is precisely to
diminish the strategic importance for Israel of the West Bank, and
to defuse the Israeli argument for keeping its forces there.
This discussion of emergency scenarios points to a number of key
areas of disagreement, primarily between Palestine and Israel, that
require further discussion and elaboration, based on an
understanding of the two parties' diverse viewpoints. As for
Jordan, in general it will endorse whatever measures the two
parties agree upon, and will be available to participate in agreed
joint forces west of the Jordan.
Transit rights and deployment in the Jordan Valley
The Israeli viewpoint
Israelis want to maintain bases, early warning stations and
military forces in or overlooking the Jordan Valley to deal with
strategic and tactical (anti-terrorist) emergencies. Among Israelis
there is some disagreement as to the size and mission of these
forces, with the maximalist approach calling for a force with
warfighting capabilities deployed in a larger expanse of Jordan
Valley territory west of the River, and the minimalists calling for
a tripwire force that could quickly be reinforced without
interference by Palestinians. But all Israelis agree that the
independence of this force, and its eventual termination, be
subject solely to Israeli considerations. An Israeli minimalist
position argues that this force would be stationed mainly on
Palestinian territory in the Jordan Valley, which would be
extensive; Israeli maximalists hold that it would be deployed
mainly on extensive Israeli-held territory in the Jordan Valley. It
could be at least partially integrated into a joint, trilateral
force for the purpose of patrolling against terrorism; this could
involve Jordanian as well as Palestinian units in the western
Jordan Valley, as well as exchange of liaison officers.
Israel could conceivably pay Palestine for the use of its
territory. There are possible precedents in the region. The US
leases Incerlik from Turkey, the British lease bases in Cyprus, and
the US maintains bases in Germany. In all but the Cyprus case, the
parties involved are part of a military alliance. In Germany and
Cyprus, a foreign military presence was ended on condition that the
bases be leased; the sovereignty of the host country remains
limited inside the base areas.
Regarding the reinforcement of this force, or the movement of
Israeli forces across West Bank territory toward the Golan, Israel
wishes to maintain a clearly defined right to transfer its forces
in a totally unfettered manner, by agreement, in the event of a
predefined emergency. Israel should be aware of Palestinian
sensitivities, and strive to avoid approaching these deployment
areas via Palestinian population concentrations, instead using Bet
She'an and/or approaching form the south/southwest.
The Palestinian viewpoint
A successful Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement must
recognize Palestinians' sovereignty over their territory. As long
as Israel maintains unilateral jurisdiction over forces in the
Palestinian Jordan Valley, there can be no final status agreement.
Thus Israeli forces could only be deployed in the Jordan Valley, or
anywhere else on Palestinian territory, within the framework of a
tactical trilateral force designed essentially to deal with
terrorism, and anchored in a relationship of reciprocity.
Under peace, Israel does not need a strategic military presence in
the Jordan Valley; it could suffice with access to the Jordan
Valley, coupled with the strategic depth provided by Jordan, and
Israel's command of the air. If Israel wishes to lease land for
bases from Palestine, it should first end the occupation and
recognize Palestinian sovereignty. Then it might be possible to
negotiate an Israeli presence, but even then, only within the
framework of a mixed Palestinian-Israeli force. The evolution of a
Jordan-Palestine confederation could encourage Jordanian
participation, too.
As for Israeli emergency access to the Jordan, assuming the purpose
is to oppose a threat recognized by the trilateral security regime
(e.g. a radical onslaught on Jordan), then access would be
unfettered. In circumstances disputed by the Palestinians,
demilitarization provisions might oblige Palestine to limit its
protest to the diplomatic sphere regarding Israeli transit of
Palestinian air space or territory.
The Jordanian viewpoint
Jordan would support any mutually acceptable agreement between
Israel and Palestine on these issues. If invited, Jordan would
participate in a trilateral tactical force in the Jordan Valley
(west of the Jordan River only) dealing with border security. As
for the Israeli strategic military presence, Jordan would advocate
planning a phased approach for its eventual removal, or
alternatively for the emergence of a joint Israeli-Palestinian
defense network.
Anti-terrorist operations
The parties of the Working Group agreed (Chapter 4, Security
Interests that Generated Broad Agreement) on ways to define
terrorism, and on a number of aspects of operational cooperation,
including a tripartite anti-terrorist unit. But they were unable to
agree on the deployment details regarding this unit and its
operations.
The Palestinian viewpoint
According to one Palestinian approach, trilateral joint patrols
would operate along all the bilateral borders of the security
regime, i.e. not only in the Jordan Valley, but along the
Israeli-Jordanian borders in Bet She'an and the Arava and the
Israeli-Palestinian borders around Gaza and the West Bank. They
would deal with infiltration and smuggling, and their overall
mission would be to protect the joint security regime. In this role
they could conceivably even patrol the Jordan-Syria and
Israel-Egypt borders. This approach is based on the notion that all
three security regime participants envision security as being
mutual, egalitarian and collective. Accordingly, beyond
demilitarization there should be no uneven measures that impose
greater security burdens on the Palestinians than on others.
A more minimalistic Palestinian approach toward the joint patrol
idea argues that the security regime would require a Palestinian
component within a trilateral patrol only along the West
Bank-Jordan border. It would also require a Jordanian component on
the West Bank side, to diffuse Israeli-Palestinian tensions. This
would in effect constitute a step toward the gradual phasing-out of
IDF occupation. The tripartite anti-terrorist unit, too, would deal
with cross-border terrorism in this region. But current security
issues along the other security regime borders would be handled
bilaterally by the countries involved, i.e. the Palestinians need
not insist on a parallel Palestinian presence in, say, the Arava,
or a Jordanian presence between Tul Karm and Netanya. The Jordan
Valley joint patrol would involve units from all three countries
deployed on the West Bank of the Jordan. A DCO office at each end
of the Jordan Valley would be manned trilaterally. Its primary area
of reference would be the Jordan Valley, but on the Israel-Jordan
borders each side, on its own, would report to the DCOs. The entire
joint operation could be phased out only on the basis of a
consensus.
Another Palestinian idea concerned a joint operational unit, with
rotating command, to deal with terrorist threats that are not
necessarily located along borders. In one Palestinian variation,
the force would be an observer unit; actual combat would involve
only local national units. An Israeli variation held that, while it
is too early to define the geographic deployment and functions of
such a unit, in theory at least it could operate anywhere within
the security regime, for example against aircraft hijackers at one
of the airports.
The Israeli viewpoint
The Israeli approach to the Jordan Valley joint anti-terrorist
patrol calls for a mixed Israeli-Palestinian force on the western
side of the Jordan Valley; on the eastern, or Jordanian side, the
force would be strictly Jordanian. This proposal also raises the
possibility of attaching a Palestinian liaison officer to the
structure of Israeli-Jordanian joint security efforts in the Arava
or the Bet She'an area, but emphasizes that only the Jordan Valley
constitutes a special case for a joint patrol. These arrangements,
like other security arrangements that involve Israeli forces on the
West Bank, could eventually be phased out, but only on the basis of
a genuine improvement in the security situation that minimizes the
threat from terrorism. Another aspect of phasing might be to expand
the use of a joint force geographically: once it proved its
viability in a limited region, its jurisdiction could be broadened
to include additional sectors.
The Jordanian viewpoint
Jordan believes that there may be no need for joint patrols, or
that they could be phased out in due time, consistent with
advancement in peacebuilding operations, normalization of relations
and enhancement of trust among the parties.
Management of shared borders
The Israeli viewpoint
Whether there would be a very short, shared Palestinian-Jordanian
border at Jericho, with the rest of the Jordan Valley held by
Israel for strategic reasons, or a longer Palestinian-Jordanian
border in the Jordan Valley (this a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
issue), Israel would retain overall security control and
supervision at the crossings with regard to the entry of terrorist
elements and material, and possible abuse of the entry into
Palestine of Palestine refugees. These provisions could eventually
be phased out, based upon the satisfaction of objective criteria,
but at least in first phase Israel would have jurisdiction, veto
power, right of inspection, etc.
The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestine will have complete control over its international
borders, including the bridges on the Jordan River. Each of the
three parties will have full control and responsibility over its
side of the border with the others. The trilateral security regime
countries will cooperate and coordinate their efforts to fight
terrorism at border crossing points.
A shared viewpoint
Regarding the smuggling of prohibited material, all three parties
argue that this is essentially a verification issue, as the nature
of the prohibited material would be agreed upon (see
Demilitarization and military doctrine, below). Further, it was
suggested that CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) challenge rules
could here be applied to the security regime, expanding them to
include suspect material and dual-use items imported into
Palestine; a tripartite verification team could be
introduced.
Security-related control over air space
The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestine would insist that any disarmament provisions and/or
Israel Air Force (IAF) presence in its air space be negotiated in
final status talks, thereby recognizing and respecting the
principle of Palestinian equality in terms of sovereignty of
airspace. Any agreed IAF presence in Palestinian air space would
have to be paid for.
In the Palestinian view, Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement
will impose constraints on the Israeli presence in the air and on
the ground in the West Bank. Palestinians oppose Israeli control
over early warning sites in the West Bank, and dispute Israeli
freedom to overfly the region for training purposes. The early
warning sites, Palestinians suggest, should either be under joint
Palestinian-Israeli control or be manned by a multilateral force,
as in Sinai.
The Israeli viewpoint
According to the Israeli concept, regional military cooperation in
the air will involve only Israel and Jordan. Ground-based early
warning will require ongoing Israeli control over a few specific
sites in the West Bank, in coordination with Jordanian early
warning east of the Jordan. The IAF will carry out training and
exercises over the West Bank, respecting the same limitations as in
Israeli-populated areas regarding low flying and air-to-ground
training, and respecting agreed civil air corridors - over which
the IAF can take control in emergencies (though the definition of
emergencies is not agreed - see Military emergencies and early
warning, above). While Israel rejects Palestinian demands for
additional constraints, it could indeed pay Palestine for the use
of its airspace - balancing these payments with Palestinian transit
payments for Palestinian aircraft that cross Israel.
A shared viewpoint
While the parties could not agree on joint military cooperation in
the air, they concur broadly on arrangements for civil aviation.
Israel, Jordan and Palestine will decide on air corridors on a
trilateral basis, with the cooperation, where required, of
additional parties (e.g. the air corridor to Gaza International
Airport via Egypt). These will be subject to Israeli and Jordanian
flight information regions (FIRs). Technically, it would be
impractical to establish a separate FIR for Palestine. In all other
ways Palestine will operate in a sovereign manner in the realm of
civil aviation. Palestinian international airports will have the
same air control status as Ben Gurion and Queen Alia International.
Palestinian aircraft will enter local Palestinian air control (5-7
nautical miles around the airport center) of a Palestinian airport
via the Israeli and Jordanian (and Egyptian) FIRs.
Ground and naval forces demilitarization and military
doctrine
The Israeli viewpoint
There will be a general prohibition on Palestinian acquisition or
deployment of heavy weaponry: armor, artillery, missiles,
anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry, mines, and non-conventional
weapons. Palestinian security forces would have light arms unless
otherwise specified. There would also be a ceiling on the number of
persons under arms. Production of weapons would be prohibited. From
a doctrinal standpoint, the mission of the Palestinian force would
be public order and internal security; accordingly, there would no
company or battalion level training, with the possible exception of
anti-terrorism forces. On the Mediterranean Sea (and, according to
one Israeli viewpoint, the Dead Sea as well), Palestine would need
a coast guard to maintain public order and prevent smuggling and
naval-based terrorism.
The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestinians reject any attempt by Israel to unduly limit
Palestinian capabilities. Understandably, Palestine will not have
the capability to defend itself against an Israeli or Jordanian
attack. But it should be capable of deterring small scale
cross-border attacks by gangs and marauders. At present
Palestinians are permitted (under the Oslo agreements) up to 15
light, unarmed riot vehicles in the West Bank and up to 45 wheeled
armored vehicles in the Gaza Strip, and a total of up to 15,000
light personal weapons and up to 240 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5"
caliber. They will need more, as well as anit -tank weapons capable
of destroying vehicles. They will also need a coast guard to patrol
the Palestinian shore of the Dead Sea. Palestinian forces should be
able to deploy anywhere in Palestine except designated areas where
joint patrols take place. Thus from a doctrinal standpoint,
Palestine will have no warmaking capability, but it will have a
limited deterrent capability vis-à-vis terrorists, smugglers
and other criminal elements.