There is much speculation among political observers about the stand
the different Palestinian political parties will take when
final-status negotiations start, in particular that of the declared
opposition groups. In fact, these groups are sending contradictory
signals in setting out to underline the bases of their respective
positions. The internal debate among them generated heated
discussions, and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was
hesitant to initiate any collective dialogue with them for fear of
getting trapped in such discussions. This article proposes to shed
some light on the possible positions that might be adopted by these
opposition groups, whose leadership operates from the different
Arab capitals.
The Official Position since Madrid: Tendency towards
Continuity
The decision of the Palestinian leadership to participate in the
Madrid Conference elicited various reactions among the Palestinian
political groups. They chose then to define themselves by the newly
developed concept of opposition. They meant to oppose the peace
process and any development it might involve. Their statements were
highly critical of the Palestinian leadership, to the point of
breaking away from the PLO. The most noted of the secular groups in
this newly formed opposition front, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), held nationwide conferences to
review the new situation created by the negotiations with Israel.
They went even further and distanced themselves from the official
position of the PLO leadership. Leaflets, lectures and meetings led
to the inculcation of the rank and file with the belief that the
peace process, as well as its initiators and supporters, were the
new enemy of the Palestinian people. The members were instructed to
cease any contact with "hostile elements" (those supporting the
peace process), and to refrain from seeking any position with the
newly established PNA. Tension and fear of a civil war grew as the
opposition leadership vowed to derail the peace process and to
hinder its success. Although none of the threats materialized, the
situation continued, nevertheless to be strained and volatile, amid
mistrust and accusations of a sell-out.
The New Reality
The Oslo agreement has initiated a process with its own built-in
dynamics: the establishment of the new authority, the appointment
of new civil servants and many economic, cultural and social
opportunities presented to the Palestinian community as dividends
of the agreement. This came at a time when the severe financial
crisis crippling the Palestinian territories had a grave impact on
the financial integrity of the political parties. Members of such
opposition groups felt they were losing a historic opportunity
¬missing the boat, so to speak.
Disappointment turned into resentment when the basic cadres
discovered that their top leaders arriving from the diaspora
immediately applied, and were accepted, for job openings in the PNA
institutions, while others tried to avail themselves of the
privileges extended to returnees as a result of the Oslo agreement.
Such discrimination between leadership and rank and file fanned the
debate which had been taking place since the establishment of the
PNA. In the face of the attractions of the new political reality,
the members, for the first time, looked for personal gain over
party allegiance. Such an attitude was at the root of an argument
intended to force the parties into adopting a more pragmatic and
liberal position vis-à-vis the PNA.
Internal Crisis - The Way Out
The opposition parties are already facing various internal and
external crises. On the one hand, these reflect the serious changes
occurring worldwide and touching the heart of the classical left
parties in the Middle East, including the Palestinian political
system. On the other hand, the peace process has been acknowledged
by friends and foes alike as a fact of life for most Palestinians,
including those associated with the opposition groups. These same
organizations have altered the strong stand they initially took
against both the agreement and the PNA. This allowed its senior
leaders to initiate contacts and to maintain a dialogue with the
PNA and its representatives, thus breaking the taboo they
themselves had imposed in the early days of the agreement.
Irrespective of the reasons, both the senior staff and the rank and
file have become interested in securing positions with the PNA and
its related institutions, as these had the greatest capacity to
absorb an increasing number of civil servants. Because of the
importance of the financial crisis within the overall problems,
some within these opposition parties feel that they have no option
but to allow for a certain maneuverability to ensure their
survival. The option of inclusion in the final-status negotiations
provides them with the salvation they need to end their
self-imposed isolation and total marginalization. This option is
conceived by some of the more enlightened elements as a
once-in-a-lifetime chance: they either seize the opportunity or
they disappear from the Palestinian political map for good.
Arab Countries - A Role of Influence
It is a known fact that all Palestinian opposition parties have
their headquarters in capitals of Arab countries opposed to the
Oslo agreement. The leaders of these Palestinian parties are fully
aware that they would have no other place to go should they be
asked to leave these capitals. They try to maintain a friendly
relationship with the ruling powers there, careful to avoid the
adoption of any position that contradicts the host regime. Thus,
the high risk of losing all the privileges that they enjoy in these
respective countries, not to mention the possibility of detention,
has turned these parties into hostages of their own free
will.
Any rapprochement between these Arab regimes and the PNA will
reflect on the opposition parties' stand vis-à-vis the peace
process. Drastic changes are likely to occur in their positions if
the political situation in the Middle East evolved toward the
reincorporation of both Syria and Lebanon into the peace process,
leaving Iran as the only country in the region hostile to the
establishment of peace between the Arabs and Israel. When and if
Syria goes back to the negotiating table with Israel on the Golan
Heights (and, presumably, Lebanon will follow suit), what course of
action will the Palestinian opposition parties take then? Will they
modify their position along the same lines as the Syrians and
Lebanese? Or will they resist all change, making their isolation
complete? Experience tells us that they would be willing to modify
their position and to find a way out without much loss of
face.
A Continuation or a New Beginning?
The type of approach the opposition parties will take
vis-à-vis final negotiations will depend on the timing:
whether their decision over participation will be taken before
negotiations start or after a final agreement has been reached. It
will also depend heavily on the balance of power within the
different parties, and to what extent the crisis will have affected
the coherence of their internal structure.
In this context, two possibilities exist:
A. To continue in the same trend, and this will depend on the final
outcome of the upcoming national conference of both the PFLP and
the DFLP. If these conferences result in a strengthened role and
power base for the radical elements in the parties, then it should
be assumed that the future direction of both organizations won't
part from the existing trend. The radicals who are in power now
will try to maintain their grip on the destiny of both
parties.
The rough path the Oslo agreement is experiencing will consolidate
the radical stand within the political hierarchy. Any deviation
from the fulfillment of the agreement by the Israelis will be used
by the radical elements as an excuse to maintain their
policies.
Lack of resumption of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese
tracks, within a specified period of time, will lead Syria to adopt
a more radical stance in its dealings with Israel. This will
systematically affect the Palestinian opposition by hardening their
stand to a point where they might find themselves again drawn into
a new alliance with the Islamists.
B. To opt for a new political beginning, which implies changing
policies and joining the peace process. This will depend on the
following factors:
First, the increased personal interest and financial considerations
of the individual, both among the leadership hierarchy and the rank
and file. This is true more among the secular groups than the
religious ones. Second, the deterioration of the internal crisis
within the political organizations and the absence 'of corrective
measures necessary to salvage the existing structure and its
political heritage. Third, the accumulated successes achieved by
the PNA through its negotiations with the Israeli side, and
finally, the existence of a consensus on the importance of the
issues to be discussed in final negotiations (Jerusalem, refugees,
Jewish settlements, borders, water).
Language Interpretation
Based on the stated possibilities, the second course seems the more
likely. The opposition will opt for a new beginning in their
relationship with the PNA, and will try to find ways and means,
both to explain their position and to express their willingness to
participate in final-status negotiations. The main issue will be
for the leadership to find the appropriate wording which would
allow them .to do so without loss of face and without an indication
of a change in their official position, a matter which could
undermine their standing among their followers.
Analysis points to a compromise solution between the various trends
in both the secular and the religious parties regarding
final-status negotiations. Such a compromise will be easier for the
secular parties than the religious ones, and will depend on the
following terms:
First, participation in final-status negotiations will be
conditional. Second, participation will be limited to an
involvement in the Supervisory Negotiations Committee, with a clear
rejection of any direct involvement in the negotiating teams.
Third, participation will also take place in the joint committee of
the Supervisory and the Negotiating team, so as to assess the
overall negotiation strategies and instructions given to the team.
In other words, the opposition will be ready to sit with the
negotiating teams, but will not participate actively in
negotiations.
Such a compromise is, of course, contingent on the preservation of
the balance of power between various tendencies within the parties.
Any change in such a balance will signify an immediate change in
the position of the parties with respect to final-status
negotiations.