There will never be a durable peace in the Middle East without a
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict acceptable both to
most Israelis and to most Palestinians. That is a fact. There will
also never be a lasting settle¬ment of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict without a solution to the status of Jerusalem acceptable
both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians. That is also a
fact, one which is increasingly difficult (and dangerous) for
anyone to ignore.
It is widely assumed that no such solution exists. This has led
Israel to insist that the status of Jerusalem should not even be
discussed until all the lesser problems of Israeli-Palestinian
relations have been resolved, at which point, perhaps, some
previously unimaginable solution may mirac¬ulously appear.
While, according to the Declaration of Principles, perma¬nent
status negotiations are to commence "as soon as possible" but not
later than May 4, 1996, and Jerusalem is explicitly one of the
"remaining issues" to be covered during those negotiations, the
Declaration of Principles is ambiguous as to whether all the
"remaining issues" are to be discussed at once. Absent a major
change of heart, Israel can be expected to refuse to commence
permanent status negotiations until the spring of 1996 and to
maintain its refusal to discuss Jerusalem until the very end of the
five-year interim period.
Many people on both sides have no faith in the current peace
process and no desire to become involved in it and to try to help
it to succeed, because they see at the end of the road a great
immovable boulder named Jerusalem which they believe condemns any
peace process to ultimate and inevitable failure. Nothing is more
likely to restore the faltering momen¬tum toward peace and to
accelerate the essential moral, spiritual and psy¬chological
transformation toward a cooperative, rather than a
confronta¬tional, view of the future of the Middle East than a
prompt recognition that a solution to the status of Jerusalem does
exist. Fortunately, there is one solution which has a real chance
of being acceptable both to most Israelis and to most
Palestinians.
Undivided But Shared
When Israelis and Palestinians speak about Jerusalem, they are not
simply laying out negotiating positions. Jerusalem has too tight a
grip on hearts and minds. Their repeated and virtually unanimous
positions must be taken seriously. If one accepts, as one must,
that no Israeli government could ever accept a redivision of
Jerusalem, and if one accepts, as one must, that no Palestinian
leadership could ever accept a permanent status solu¬tion
which gave the Palestinian state (and, through it, the Arab and
Islamic worlds) no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then only one
solution is con¬ceivable - joint sovereignty over an undivided
city. In the context of a two-state solution, Jerusalem could form
an undivided part of both states, be the capital of both states and
be administered by an umbrella municipal council and local district
councils. In the proper terminology of interna¬tional law, the
city would be a "condominium" of Israel and Palestine.
As a joint capital, Jerusalem could have Israeli government offices
principally in its western sector, Palestinian government offices
princi¬pally in its eastern sector and municipal offices in
both. A system of dis¬tricts or French-style
arrondissements could bring municipal administra¬tion
closer to the different communities in the city (including the
ultra¬ Orthodox Jewish community). To the extent that either
state wished to con¬trol persons or goods passing into it from
the other state, this could be done at the points of exit from,
rather the points of entry into, Jerusalem. In a context of peace,
particularly one coupled with economic union, the need for such
controls would be minimal.
Jerusalem is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in
hearts and minds. Undivided but shared in this way, Jerusalem could
be a sym¬bol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims,
Christians and the world as a whole. Furthermore, since a city
needs no army but only police, Jerusalem could also be fully
demilitarized, finally becoming the "City of Peace" which all three
religions have long proclaimed it to be.
Among peace-oriented Israelis and Palestinians there is a broad
consen¬sus that, in any permanent status solution, Jerusalem
should remain phys¬ically undivided. However, there is no
consensus on how the problem of sovereignty should be solved. That
issue remains almost too hot to handle.
In seeking a solution to the status of Jerusalem, it is essential
to distin¬guish between sovereignty and municipal
administration. Questions of municipal administration, including
the division of authorities between an umbrella municipal council
and local district councils, exist for any sizable city, regardless
of any questions of sovereignty. In Jerusalem's case, it would
clearly be desirable, employing the European Union's principle of
subsidiarity, to devolve as many aspects of municipal governance as
pos¬sible to the district council level, reserving for the
umbrella municipal council only those major matters which can only
be administered efficient¬ly at a city-wide level. Since there
are currently no integrated neighbor¬hoods in Jerusalem,
assuring that Israelis are subject to Israeli administra¬tion,
and Palestinians to Palestinian administration, at the district
council level this would present no practical problems.
If the devolution of authority to the district council level were
broad and deep, the potentially inflammatory issue of the
percentage representations of the two communities on the umbrella
municipal council would be much less problematic. If elected
district councils named their own representa¬tives to the
umbrella municipal council, a more technocratic and less
dem¬agogic style of municipal government might be possible. If
the percentage representations of the two communities, through
their respective munici¬pal districts, on the umbrella
municipal council were fixed at an agreed level and made impervious
to subsequent demographic changes within the municipal boundaries,
the issue of post-peace "immigration" of Israelis and Palestinians
into Jerusalem would become a non-issue. The purely political
motivation for building more Jewish residential districts in
expanded East Jerusalem or expanding the current municipal
boundaries even further to incorporate additional Jewish population
centers would evaporate.
While municipal administration involves numerous practical
questions, sovereignty over Jerusalem is fundamentally a symbolic,
psychological and virtually theological question. Symbolism,
psychology and theology are extraordinarily important in connection
with Jerusalem (more so than with any other city on earth), but it
is important to recognize that this is the nature of the question.
An internationalization of the city, with neither Israel nor
Palestine possessing sovereignty, was recommended in 1947 by U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 181. This recommendation has never been
revoked and continues to enjoy significant international support
and moral authority. However, internationalization would serve no
useful symbolic or psychological purpose for those most directly
involved and thus cannot be a realistic option today.
The Advantages of Undivided Sovereignty
One of the strengths and beauties of joint undivided sovereignty,
and a potential advantage in making it acceptable to both peoples
and to their leaderships, is that it would not require either
Israel or Palestine to renounce sovereignty over any territory over
which it has asserted sover¬eignty. The state of Palestine
asserts sovereignty only over those Palestinian lands conquered and
occupied in 1967. Of those lands, the State of Israel asserts
sovereignty only over expanded East Jerusalem. Under a
"condominium" solution, in the only place where current sovereignty
claims overlap, sovereignty would overlap and be shared.
Potentially intractable negotiations over where to draw
international borders through and even within Jerusalem would be
completely avoided, since the city would not be divided but
shared.
Israelis should ask themselves what (if anything) they would
actually be giving up in accepting joint undivided sovereignty over
Jerusalem. Roughly 70 percent of the city's residents are now
Israelis, and Palestinian residents already have the right to vote
in municipal elections. That would not change. Put most simply, all
Israel would have to do is say this: "United Jerusalem, within the
expanded boundaries which we have uni¬laterally established,
is the eternal capital of Israel ... but, in order to make peace
possible, we accept that it is also the capital of Palestine."
That's all. While, today, only Costa Rica, El Salvador and Zaire
even recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and no country
recognizes Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, if Israel
adopted such a position and implemented it with Palestinian
consent, virtually all countries would promptly recognize united
Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Embassies would move there. Is this
real¬ly so awful and unthinkable for Israelis? Is this really
impossible?
There is a widespread misconception among Israelis that, under the
sta¬tus quo, Israel possesses sovereignty over expanded East
Jerusalem. It does not. It possesses administrative control. A
country can acquire adminis¬trative control by force of arms.
It can acquire sovereignty only with the consent of the
international community.
Israel has possessed and exercised administrative control over
expanded East Jerusalem for more than 27 years. To this day, not
one of the world's other 192 sovereign states has recognized its
claim to sovereignty. Furthermore, Israel's purported annexation of
expanded East Jerusalem has been declared null and void and
Jerusalem has been explicitly includ¬ed among the Occupied
Palestinian Territories in a long series of United Nations
resolutions, most recently Security Council Resolution 904
con¬demning the Hebron mosque massacre.
Israel could retain administrative control over expanded East
Jerusalem indefinitely. That is a question of military strength and
political will. However, it is most unlikely that it will ever
acquire sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem un1ess it agrees
to a permanent solution to the sta¬tus of Jerusalem along the
lines set forth above. That is a question of law. Indeed, since the
right of a country to declare any part of its sovereign
terri¬tory to be its capital is not contested, the refusal of
virtually all countries to recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's
capital and the maintenance of virtual¬ly all embassies in Tel
Aviv is striking evidence of the refusal of the interna¬tional
community, pending an agreed permanent solution to the status of
Jerusalem, to concede that any part of the city is Israel's
sovereign territory. A clearer understanding of what the legal
status quo regarding Jerusalem really is could make Israeli public
opinion less reflexively resistant to con¬templating any
modification of the status quo, even in return for peace.
A Mutually Accepted Solution
It is clear that joint undivided sovereignty is not the first
choice of either Israelis or Palestinians. Exclusive Israeli
sovereignty over the whole city would clearly be the first choice
of most Israelis, but this is equally clearly unacceptable, not
only to Palestinians, but also to the Arab and Islamic countries
with which Israel wishes to have normal diplomatic and
eco¬nomic relations (which would accept any permanent status
terms which the Palestinians might accept except that one), as well
as to significant seg¬ments of the international community
beyond the Arab and Islamic worlds. A division of sovereignty and a
redivision of administrative con¬trol strictly in accordance
with the pre-1967 border (and hence with international law and U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242) would clearly be the first choice
of most Palestinians, but, particularly in light of the
pres¬ence of the Western Wall, enormous new Jewish residential
districts and even a slight Israeli population majority in expanded
East Jerusalem, this is equally clearly inconceivable from the
Israeli standpoint. (While expand¬ed East Jerusalem is
effectively indistinguishable from the other Occupied Territories
as a matter of international law, it is most certainly
distinguish¬able and distinguished as a matter of Israeli
domestic law and, most impor¬tantly, in Israeli public
perception.)
These irreconcilable "first choice options" must, logically, be
discarded by all who truly wish to achieve peace. Such people
should be searching now for a mutually acceptable "best second
choice." If one accepts the two premises that no Israeli government
could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem and that no Palestinian
leadership (and certainly not the Arab and Islamic worlds) could
ever accept a permanent status solution which gave the Palestinian
state no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then, as a matter of
pure logic, joint undivided sovereignty is the only possible
sec¬ond choice if peace is ever to be achieved.
The "condominium" solution has the advantage of being consistent
with both the letter and the spirit of the formal American position
on Jerusalem, which urges that the city should remain undivided and
that its permanent status should be determined through negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians. It is even consistent (at least
up to a point) with the letter (if not the spirit) of the formal
Israeli position, as restated by Yitzhak Rabin during his joint
press conference with President Bill Clinton in Jerusalem on
October 27, 1994: "Jerusalem must remain united under the
sovereign¬ty of Israe1." Whether a united Jerusalem could be
shared under the sover¬eignty of Israel and Palestine has not
yet been formally addressed. However, the absence of the word
"exclusive" from the official Israeli for¬mulation may be
taken as an encouraging sign. By leaving this word unsaid, the
current Israeli government has avoided tying itself up in a
rhetorical straitjacket and has left open the door to eventually
adopting the "condominium" solution without excessive political
embarrassment.
The "condominium" solution is further from the traditional
Palestinian position with its steadfast reliance on international
legitimacy. With an exceptionally weak hand to play in terms of
military strength and power politics, Palestinians have long drawn
comfort from their certainty that international law is on their
side. However, the decisions to enter into the Declaration of
Principles and its follow-up agreements reflect a mature acceptance
of the brutal truth that a strong position under international law
does not alone ensure even the slightest measure of justice.
Agreeing not to insist on their strong position under international
law with respect to expanded East Jerusalem and to share
sovereignty in the only part of the former Palestine Mandate where
current sovereignty claims overlap may be the practical price which
Palestinians must pay for successfully assert¬ing Palestine's
strong position under international law and Palestinian sovereignty
with respect to all other Palestinian lands conquered and
occu¬pied in 1967. Indeed, in an interview with the BBC on
July 3, 1994, Yasser Arafat suggested that Israelis and
Palestinians should share Jerusalem as the joint capital of their
two states, thereby hinting at a more flexible state of mind which
could, in time, be susceptible to the charms and practical merits
of the "condominium" solution.
If Israelis and Palestinians can agree (even if only silently for
the moment) that a mutually acceptable solution for the status of
Jerusalem does exist, all the other pieces in the delicate peace
puzzle should fall into place. Without a mutually acceptable
solution for the status of Jerusalem, every¬thing will fall
apart. That cannot be permitted to happen.
The road to interim self-rule may start in Gaza and Jericho, but
the road to peace starts in Jerusalem. The time to think and talk
about Jerusalem is now.