The scapegoat is a recurring theme of Jewish history. In biblical
times, it was a real goat upon which the Jewish high priest cast
all the sins of the people. In exile, it was frequently the Jews
themselves, denounced and vilified for the misdeeds of others. Now
it is the turn of Yasser Arafat, the Jewish state's erstwhile
partner for peace and currently its supreme villain.
In the wake of the collapse of the Camp Oavid Summit in July 2000,
the finger of blame was instantly pointed at the Palestinian
president, charging him with wilful sabotage of the peace process
by repudiating Ehud Barak's "generous offer," by indirectly
espousing the liquidation of the Jewish state and then by launching
a violent uprising to this end. He has been reviled as an
unrepentant terrorist and an inveterate liar, who could no longer
suppress his true aims. Even U.S. President Clinton and many
self-proclaimed supporters of the Israeli peace camp - nursing a
deep sense of trust betrayed - joined the orgy of
denigration.
The accusations levelled against scapegoats are invariably false,
and this case appears to be no exception. But this is by the way.
The point of the scapegoat is to allow the finger-pointers to
escape their share of responsibility and thereby the need to
reflect on their own deficiencies. However, especially now, this is
a dangerous indulgence. It is vital for Israeli society to emerge
quickly from its shellshock, let go of its self¬righteous
indignation and start critically to examine its own part in
fomenting the current crisis.
What happened at Camp Oavid - and the conclusions to be drawn
¬matters enormously and is the primary focus of this article.
But it is not the key to what went wrong. Rather, it was the
culmination of a flawed process, pervaded by deep-seated
misconceptions and self-delusions, particularly but not exclusively
on Israel's part. This aspect will be discussed later in this
article.
The precise details of what was offered by whom at the two-week
summit cannot be stated with certainty, as there appear to be
almost as many versions as participants. As regards the big
picture, however, it is more than clear that the widespread
perception in Israel of what transpired is essentially false.
Drawing on a range of published and unpublished papers, reports and
commentaries, it is possible to analyze the salient points missing
from or misrepresented by the mainstream Israeli narrative.
Six Flaws
Firstly, the Palestinians maintained from the outset that a summit
was premature and therefore likely to fail. Prophetically, they
feared the blame would fall on them. They argued that more
preparatory work was needed in several complicated areas, notably
such vital make-or-break issues as Jerusalem and the 1948 refugees,
which had been left to the "final basket" precisely because of
their complexity and sensitivity. Against this, Prime Minister
Barak desperately needed a credible peace agreement with the
Palestinians to present to the Israeli electorate, having
unnecessarily finessed himself into calling an early election.
Coupled with the imminent termination of President Clinton/s term
of office, this became the overriding imperative. Tt was a shaky
basis for such a crucial meeting.
Secondly, Barak/s negotiating method has been compared to an
emperor dispensing gifts. Few have doubted the sincerity of his
intentions, but his manner of pulling offers from under the table,
as if they were rabbits out of a hat, meant that his interlocutors
were unprepared with concrete responses. In combination with an
allegedly arrogant take-it-or-Ieave-it, all-or-nothing style, it
suggested a basic lack of respect for his negotiating partners - a
sure recipe for failure.
Thirdly, the" generous offer/" supposedly made by Barak appears to
be a fiction. The widespread impression, still holy writ in Israel
and the Jewish world, is that the Palestinians were offered a
self-contained state in virtually the whole of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip; that in exchange for Israel incorporating between
three and five percent of the West Bank to accommodate the bulk of
the settler population, an equivalent area of the Jewish state
would be ceded to the Palestinian state.
Israeli bewilderment at the apparently abrupt rejection of such an
offer, had it actually been made, would indeed have been justified.
But all the expert accounts agree, notwithstanding the differences
of detail, that the Israeli prop.osal in fact involved substantial
annexation of West Bank territory, ranging from 9 percent to 13.5
percent, with a maximum of 1 percent land compensation. In
addition, a sizeable portion of the Jordan Valley, as well as all
international borders, would remain under Israeli control in some
form. So too would the water below and the skies above. The
remainder of the West Bank, already physically separate from the
Gaza Strip, would be effectively divided into three or four barely
connected or unconnected entities.
Whether through greed, dogma or foolishness, by advancing such a
derisory proposal in the final stretch of a seven-year negotiating
marathon, Israel forsook a unique opportunity to achieve a mutually
honorable settlement. Moreover, it may be assumed that Barak was
aware of the proposal's serious deficiencies, for why else would he
later try to dupe the public into believing he had made a
materially different offer?
Fourthly, while Barak displayed genuine courage in challenging the
taboo about negotiating over Jerusalem, and indeed by making
far-reaching proposals from an Israeli perspective, he needlessly
unnerved the Palestinians by raising the spectre of radical change
to the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. His
suggestions that Jews be allowed to pray there (despite a
long-standing Orthodox Jewish edict forbidding this), and that a
synagogue be constructed were vehemently opposed and the synagogue
idea was reportedly then dropped.
Fifthly, the decisive verdict of Bill Clinton about the bravery of
Barak and the culpability of Arafat was not the judgement of an
honest broker. The administration itself has since publicly
revealed that all proposals put forward by the D.S. had been
coordinated in advance with the Israeli delegation. In effect, the
most powerful country in the world teamed up with the most powerful
country in the region to induce one of the weakest non¬states
anywhere to accept a sequence of half-baked proposals, with a
threat of sanctions if it did not comply. Revealingly, it has since
been divulged that in private Clinton voiced strong criticism of
aspects of Barak's negotiating technique.
Sixthly, it is not the case that Arafat refused to negotiate.
Expert opinion is divided on the extent to which the Palestinians
responded at Camp David to Israel's proposals with
counter-proposals, but for sure the negotiations continued in a
less-frenzied fashion after the break-up of the summit, culminating
six months later at Taba. There differences were reported by both
sides to have narrowed considerably on every issue, to the point
where a compre~ensive agreement looked to be feasible with a little
more time. However, the Intifida was well under way by then and
Barak was about to be trounced by Sharon in the Israeli
election.
Territorially, the basis for deadlock at Camp David was essentially
no different from the one that had scuppered previous efforts: the
starting point for the Palestinians was the status quo in the early
morning of June 5, 1967; whereas for the Israelis it was the
situation six days later. It was the difference between "occupied"
territories and "disputed" territories.
Israel's Dilemma
The occupied territories, for the Palestinians, were where they
would build their scaled-down state. This was their great
historical compromise. It meant formally relinquishing to Israel 78
percent of the land they had previously claimed. Any encroachment
on the remaining 22 percent would be regarded as tantamount to
theft. Mutually agreed land exchanges - a legitimate subject for
negotiation - were acceptable provided this did not diminish their
overall share.
It follows that what may appear as a magnanimous territorial
concession in Israeli eyes becomes, in Palestinian eyes, a blatant
erosion of an unequivocal right. The alleged "inflexibility'" of
the Palestinians at Camp David was less the cause of the deadlock
than the illusions of the Israeli and V.S. delegations about what
was up for negotiation and their mistaken assessments about where
the vital Palestinian sticking points lay.
Now it is Israel's turn to confront its great historical dilemma.
It can have the spoils of war or the dividends of peace. It
assuredly cannot achieve both. It appears that the Israeli
negotiators at Taba finally recognized this. What remains of the
old Israeli peace camp is also coming round to this view. Other
sectors of the Israeli population will surely follow in due course.
But there are major psychological and practical obstacles still to
overcome.
At the psychological level, progress will be hard to achieve for as
long as the negotiators do not treat each other as equal partners
and do not view the two peoples as having equivalent rights. More
than 30 years of one people occupying another has inevitably given
rise to an essentially colonial mentality on the part of the
occupier towards the occupied. The Oslo principles, with their fine
sentiments of "peaceful coexistence," "mutual dignity and
security,"""historic reconciliation," and "a spirit of peace,"
would appear at first sight to contradict this point. But in
reality the terms of the accords were inherently unequal, and the
methods of implementation not just cumbersome but patronizing and
humiliating.
This was probably best symbolized by the system of drip-feeding
rewards to the Palestinians as long as they proved, and kept on
proving, they could be trusted. This one-way accountability assumed
that one of the parties did not have the natural right to run their
own lives on their own territory, but had to earn it incrementally
from the other. Far from this enhancing mutual dignity and creating
trust, it predictably fostered suspicion, contempt and even hatred
driven ever deeper during the three short-sighted and mean-spirited
Netanyahu years. As if this were not enough, the long drawn-out
timetable for the mini-withdrawals was, unsurprisingly, exploited
by both sides' saboteurs, whose deathly art fatally undermined
almost everyone's faith in the process.
The paramount need was for Palestinians to have their own state and
this should have been the primary aim. Its realization would
effectively have removed the ever-present threats of curfews,
closures and other Israeli sanctions on the one hand and violent
Palestinian resistance to the occupation on the other. This would
free the governments of two neighboring states to get on with the
business of settling their outstanding differences at a steady pace
in the knowledge that temporary setbacks would not be calamitous or
endanger the entire peace edifice. Oslo reversed the logic of this
order by making the end of occupation and the establishment of a
Palestinian state hostage to the prior resolution of all other
matters, thus locking into the process the seeds of its own
undoing.
The most aggressive aspect of the occupation has been the stealthy
requisition of land and other resources for the construction of
Israeli settlements and special roads throughout the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip over a period of many years, which actually
accelerated following the Oslo accords and continued to expand
under Barak. Even if the question of intemationallegality were set
aside, the personal distress caused to the three million
Palestinian inhabitants and the ugly and violent antics of some of
the settlers have certainly poisoned relations. For this reason
alone, it is hardly surprising that the settlers are the first
target of the intifada. But the greater menace is the threat posed
to the prospect of eventual Palestinian independence, potentially
destroying all hope, creating a sense of overwhelming despair and
fatally damaging any chance of peaceful GO¬existence between
the two peoples. Israel's standing - and indeed its very future -
in the region, may in that circumstance be placed in jeopardy too.
The settlers - comprising less than four per cent of the Israeli
population - may claim to be the pre-eminent defenders of the
Jewish state, but the stark reality is that the settlements have
set Israel on a path of national suicide.
Opinion polls repeatedly reflect the Israeli people's desire for
peace. If they are truly serious about this, the settlers will have
to face their day of reckoning. Generous offers of compensation may
speed up the evacuation process and reduce the casualties.
A Frightening Prospect
As the Israelis will never achieve peace while the Palestinians
remain stateless, so the Palestinians will not ultimately achieve
their state, let alone make it work, without the collaboration of
the Israelis. Currently, there is a strong violent element to the
Palestinian battle for independence but, ultimately, external
support - including from within Israeli society - could be
decisive. To attract solidarity, there is a priority need for
clearly defined aims - internationally publicized - together with a
coherent strategy to achieve them. There is a danger otherwise of a
legitimate political struggle degenerating into inter-factional
conflict or even uncontrollable gang warfare, with no
winners.
The battle for Israeli public opinion is vital and winnable. The
Taba talks indicated that the Palestinian leadership recognized the
vital Israeli sticking point that any "return" of refugees would
not prejudice the Jewish nature of the state and would be subject
to Israel's sovereign decision. Without these qualifications,
President Arafat's proclaimed allegiance to the two-state solution
would indeed seem disingenuous. A major challenge facing the entire
mainstream Palestinian leadership is how to get the message across
convincingly to the Israeli people that they accept these
qualifications, without simultaneously alienating large segments of
the Palestinian people.
For the immediate future, we are faced with the frightening
prospect of Israelis and Palestinians continuing to kill, maim and
brutalize each other. Israel could seize the initiative at this
point by declaring its readiness in principle to end the occupation
and to negotiate in good faith the modalities of its withdrawal. A
public statement of such intent could, of itself, profoundly affect
the mood between the two sides and create a new momentum. But such
a pronouncement is unlikely which, in itself, is revealing. Nor is
it anticipated that the Palestinian leadership will take steps to
facilitate and expedite such a move by urgently recruiting Israeli
public opinion to its side.
The recommendations of the Mitchell Report may enable the
international community to pretend that it is doing something as an
alternative to organizing an international protection force, which
would be high on the agenda of a less irresponsible US presidency.
They also enable Sharon to pretend that he is not playing for time
and that it is only the continuation of Palestinian violence that
is delaying "confidence-building" measures as a prelude to
meaningful negotiations. But what would Sharon have to negotiate
with the Palestinians other than their effective
capitulation?
Yet the situation has deteriorated to a point where the conflict
could get completely out of hand and pose a potential threat to
regional "and possibly world peace" What is needed now is a flurry
of complementary diplomatic moves that will deliver an independent
state for the Palestinians while satisfying Israeli fears about
their existence and security and their country's future in the
region.
Urgent outside intervention is needed to act on proposals along the
following lines:
A new UN Security Council resolution, supplementary to resolutions
242 and 338, affirming a two-state solution.
A US/EU warning to Israel that it would face severe sanctions in
the event of a mass flight of Palestinians or an attempt to
re-capture their territories or to overthrow the Palestinian
Authority.
An imaginative and energetic campaign, pioneered by Arab states,
for a comprehensive regional settlement, based on the principle of
full Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories captured in 1967,
including the Syrian Golan Heights, in exchange for the end of the
conflict and full peace, involving normal diplomatic and commercial
relations and credible assurances regarding Israel's security and
integration into the region. The initiative should be pitched not
just to the Israeli government but also over its head directly to
the Israeli people. An appeal by leading Arab statesmen delivered
on Israeli soil may be particularly effective. The psychological
dimension on both sides of the conflict should not be
underestimated. Official rhetoric and propaganda hostile to Jews as
a people, to Judaism as a religion or to Israel per se, should be
brought to a complete halt.
The burgeoning movements of resistance to the occupation within
Israel and the eruption of ad hoc Palestinian-Israeli alliances on
the ground should receive international recognition and
encouragement. The further growth of Palestinian-Jewish and
Arab-Jewish groups in countries around the world should be fostered
and they should add their weight to a fair and achievable political
solution. Civil society in Arab states should reassess whether
shunning all contact with Israeli civil society is the most
productive way of delivering support for the Palestinian
cause.
The essential components of an eventual solution are well known and
were more or less rehearsed at the Taba talks in January 2001. Yet,
left to themselves, it is unlikely that the two parties will ever
resume these talks, let alone produce a successful outcome. The
purely bilateral phase has come and gone. Decisive outside
intervention to bring the broader Arab-Israeli conflict to a
belated but final conclusion is now vital and urgent and would
probably be welcomed, overtly or covertly, by most Israelis and
Palestinians caught up in a deathly vortex.