During the past years, most of the discussions in the areas of
Islamic thought and jurisprudence have been largely focused on the
issue of the political participation of Islamist movements in
government, and the ensuing effects - positive or negative - on
these movements and on the societies in which they operate.
It is worth noting that the Palestinian context differs greatly
from other Islamic ones in many Arab countries. This is primarily
due to the Israeli occupation and the repression carried out
against all Palestinian movements and parties, regardless of their
ideological directions or whether they are Islamist or nationalist.
Nevertheless, Hamas did not see any incongruity in considering its
involvement in government as a temporary arrangement to help pave
the way for the implementation of its future program, which is the
creation of an Islamic state.
Although in Islam there are several theories and views that call
for political pluralism and the possibility of coexistence, for
Islamists movements, such positions lack the depth and backing of
jurisprudence, as well as the legal mainstay needed to preserve
their intellectual continuity in all future undertakings. It is not
acceptable, then, for any Islamist party to operate according to
theories and stances that remain of a purely political nature,
emptied of shari´a and jurisprudence attributes that underpin
its political and ideological constitution. As a result, the notion
of shura came to occupy an important and distinctive place in the
political thought of the Hamas movement in Palestine.
Hamas and a Secular System
What does it signify for Hamas to take part in the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA)?
Participating in the PNA implies operating within a secular system,
which includes political pluralism and where power is exercised and
transferred in a peaceful way through the ballot box. In addition,
there is also a constitution, an elected parliament, a separation
between the three powers, and the provision for freedoms and the
respect of the rule of law.
Thus, participation in the political act entails functioning within
the context of such a system in order to accede to power. Every
political party aspires to assume power in order to implement its
principles and aims. But there is only one way to achieve this: the
non-violent way, through a democratic process and a peaceful
transfer of power.
In Palestine, Hamas has worked very assiduously throughout the
years and has made great efforts and sacrifices in order to achieve
that aim. But is it likely that the new Hamas-led government will
show flexibility or modify its political methods, and will it be
possible for it to acquire experience in its administration of the
Authority? Will the Islamist movement, for example, cater to a
special program that would allow for genuine political pluralism,
whereby the various political parties could operate and express
their opinions freely?
The presence of Hamas in power poses several questions, many of
which remain unanswered: Having acceded to power, will Hamas
establish an Islamic regime that will make Islamic shari'a the
ruling principle in Palestinian society? Or is it under
extraordinary conditions that, perhaps, make it difficult for the
movement to reach its aim straightforwardly? Will Hamas therefore
adopt various options that will eventually enable it to realize its
ultimate goal of applying Islamic shari'a, albeit after a
long wait?
Another question pertains to the political order that will follow
the existing one. Will it be Islamic? In other words, will Hamas
allow for a smooth democratic process irrespective of the outcome?
Will it be willing to relinquish the reins of power if it does not
succeed in changing the direction of the government or if it fails
in the upcoming elections, as is the practice in democratic
countries, or will it hold on to power forever? More to the point,
does Islamic jurisprudence allow an Islamic movement to relinquish
power to a secular movement or party?
Finally, does the new political movement's presence in government
constitute a political revolution, in the sense that it will agree
to adopt political pluralism as the only means to extricate itself
from the political crisis in which the Palestinian people are
living? Hamas is now called upon to cope, with a measure of realism
and pragmatism, with the international conditions that surround us
and cast their shadows upon us, even though we might choose not to
deal with them.
The Dichotomy between Thought and Practice
Given that the existing system in Palestine is not Islamic, nor are
the laws of the country based on Islam, what would Hamas be dealing
with? It is a movement that calls for Islam, yet does not apply it
because the system is secular and it has to operate within its
confines. Hamas has reached the Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC) based on its precept that Islam is the solution, while the
laws currently in force are positive laws - not revealed. Should
the presence of Hamas in power therefore be regarded as an
exceptional situation that is not representative of Muslim society?
And will Hamas have the option to choose between Islamic and
non-Islamic rule?
The choice, then, is to stay within a secular, pluralistic
political system that guarantees a certain measure of freedom -
through which Hamas can maneuver and even govern and express its
thoughts and positions overtly to the Palestinian people. The
alternative would be to revert to jihad or to suffer blows, e.g.,
from Israel, that could undermine the movement's future fighting
capacity, regardless of its success in reaching the
Authority.
The Palestinian political arena consists of a variety of currents:
nationalistic, leftist, liberal, and Islamist. Can Hamas distance
itself and operate in isolation from them? Hamas will have to
interact with the others and participate in projects of reform and
change, work towards the efficient exploitation of the country's
resources, and foster and develop relations with Arab countries and
the international community, without losing sight of the constants
as perceived by the movement - in short, to serve the Palestinian
people and work in their best interest.
The question arises here of whether the interests of the
Palestinian people coincide with those of Hamas and its general
aims. Hamas now is presented with the opportunity to work with
non-Islamist forces within the context of a pluralistic order. Will
it base its performance on Islamic shari'a, and, if so, is working
in a secular system compatible with Islamic shari'a?
If we talk about the presidency and Hamas (the Green) and review
the possibilities of cooperation between the presidency and the
government, we should remember that President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) is a true Muslim. He is a firm believer in God, His angels
and prophets, including Moses, Issa [Jesus], and Mohammad. He has
been on pilgrimage, he prays, and he pays zakat.1 But it is also a
known fact that Abbas champions democracy and firmly believes in a
secular multi-party system. Is sharing the government with him a
legitimate and permissible act from the perspective of shari'a, or
would it be considered aiding and abetting in oppression?
It is possible that Hamas is following along the lines of many
other Islamic forces that cite examples to justify the feasibility
of working within non-Islamist systems and with rulers who,
although Muslims themselves, do not apply Islamic law. The example
regularly used is based on the fact that the Prophet Yousef
(Joseph) took up a position in the ministry of finance during the
reign of the Pharaohs in order to save the people of Egypt from
famine (Surat Yousef). If Hamas agrees to share power with a
non-Islamist president, does this mean that it is following in the
footsteps of the Prophet Yousef, and will it be able, like him, to
save the Palestinian people from an impending famine?
Hamas has accepted to enter into the political game, and it can
have at its disposal a variety of justifications if it wants to
remain in the government. If it has agreed to all that has been
presented, then it is imperative that it form a national unity
government without delay. This would be a last chance to break the
deadlock that the Palestinian people are living under and from
which nobody has been able to free them.
In my estimation, Hamas has a number of options, which can be
summarized as follows:
* Hamas can oversee the performance of the PLC and prevent the
misuse of power, and enforce accountability against offenders and
violators of the law.
* As long as it has agreed to engage in politics, and as it knows
the nature of the political equation in this world, it has to act
in accordance with local, Arab, and international givens and their
implications. In this respect, the path for Hamas is a national
unity government in order to extricate itself from the crisis and
subsequently to shoulder the responsibilities that are part and
parcel of being in government and a player in the political
arena.
* Hamas can consider a return to the principle of armed resistance,
which in practice it has repudiated but would like hold on to from
a theoretical point of view, for this is what gave it an edge in
the last elections. This issue has many repercussions both on Hamas
and on the Palestinian people.
Hamas is in a strong position to make its own choices, as it
commands the majority in parliament. However, it cannot stay
forever without reaching radical solutions, holding the Palestinian
people hostage with it.
The movement's victory in the elections and its involvement in the
political process do not imply that the people would automatically
embrace its platform and rush to join it, individually or as
groups. The people's response will be commensurate with the
political program and goals that Hamas offers them. They will also
be considering the practical steps the movement undertakes, as well
as its accomplishments within the framework of the political system
through which it has agreed to operate.
Abbas has shared in paving the way for Hamas to come to power after
his many attempts to build an Authority different from that which
existed under the late President Yasser Arafat. Last year, in a
lecture organized in Amman by Orayb al-Rantawi, director of the
Jerusalem Center for Educational Enrichment, I stated that Abbas
wants "to join summer and winter - Fateh and Hamas - over the skies
of al-Muqata'a," thus providing Hamas with an opportunity to enter
the political game. This way, Abbas assumes control and becomes the
central figure, and Fateh people will have to accept him
willy-nilly. He does this because he knows he lacks the charisma
and the historical heritage that Arafat enjoyed and, in this
respect, he needs Hamas to the same degree that Fateh needs
him.
Hamas has got a historic opportunity to get out of its present
crisis by opening venues of cooperation with the president, with
Fateh, and with all the other political forces. It can thus achieve
internal and external (re)conciliation without giving up the
constants, especially since the overwhelming majority of the
Palestinian people - and at their forefront Fateh - hold on to
these national constants and struggle for them. The siege against
Arafat that has impacted Fateh so deeply was, in effect, the
response to Arafat's and his movement's position regarding
Jerusalem and their refusal to give in on the national
constants.
Therefore, Hamas needs to review the political vision that it is
pursuing at present. It has to provide conditions conducive for
collective work in a democratic climate throughout the whole of
Palestine. It has to pursue an inclusive approach that will
incorporate all the parties and political forces, irrespective of
their divergent tendencies, their pluralism, and their
distinctiveness.
1 Zakat means alms. It refers to a certain fixed proportion of the
wealth of each Muslim to be paid yearly for the benefit of the
poor. It is obligatory as it is one of the five pillars of Islam.
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