Since the early days of the Palestine conflict, the Palestinian
national movement has been mainly the product of Palestinian Arab
challenges to British colonialism and Zionism. In 1948, the
conflict over Palestine entered a new and complex phase as
Palestinian politics became part of Arab politics on the official
level, leading to almost-total dependence of the Palestinian
community on the Arab states. In fact, for the two decades that
followed the 1948 war, the task of liberating Palestine became
virtually the responsibility of the Arab regimes and not that of
the Palestinians themselves. Indeed, the Palestinians waited for
the new and progressive Arab leadership of the 1950s and 1960s to
help them translate into reality their longing for return to the
homeland, becoming, in the process, pawns in inter-Arab conflicts
and rivalries.1 Given this background, this paper focuses on the
ideological and structural developments in PLO political thinking
that eventually transformed its conception of its future state from
one of total liberation to a more territorially defined one.
Dependency and Traditionalism of the Old PLO
Regardless of the claim that the creation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 was necessary to fill a gap
in the political life of the Palestinians, the new organization was
the stepchild of inter-Arab rivalries and power politics. In fact,
it was President Nasser of Egypt who, during the 1964 Arab Summit
Conference, recommended the creation of the PLO, and nominated
Shuqairy to be its first chairman. A few months later, in May of
that year, the PLO was recognized by the Arab League, thus
achieving an official status. The structure and goals of the new
Palestinian organization were simple: traditionalist members were
expected to make it an elitist organization whose responsibility
was to cater more to the interests of certain Arab states than to
those of the Palestinian people. No doubt, as part of the
lip-service it paid to the Arab countries, the PLO stressed the
"Arab" rather than local character of the Palestine question and,
in line with other Arab countries, the PLO Covenant emphasized the
goals of regaining the whole of Palestine, the return of all
refugees to their homes and the unequivocal rejection of Israel's
legitimacy.2
Opposition to the PLO came particularly from the fedayeen
(guerrilla) organizations that doubted Nasser's sincerity. The
fedayeen believed they could offer a wider representation of the
Palestinians, young and old, and that they were more closely in
touch with the feelings of the Palestinian street than the PLO.
They also argued that, by being more militant than the PLO, they
could respond more effectively to the need for armed struggle
against Israel.
Militancy and Radicalism of the New PLO
The lack of popularity of traditional PLO leaders and the failure
of the Arab regimes to liberate Palestine and to ensure the return
of the refugees to their land contributed to the growth, in the
late 1950s and mid-1960s, of an independent and militant elite in
the Diaspora that identified, directly or indirectly, with the
increasingly popular fedayeen groups and with the Fatah movement.
The takeover of the PLO in 1969 by Fatah under the chairmanship of
Yasser Arafat was a watershed in the history of the Palestinian
movement, raising the hopes of Palestinians everywhere. What the
new organization did was to emphasize Palestinian independence in
decision-making. Also, in past decades, the Palestine problem was
seen mostly as a problem of homeless refugees. After the takeover,
the world community became increasingly aware of the complex
political factors involved in the Palestine issue.3 No doubt, the
fedayeen's success had largely resulted from becoming known as the
only organization in the Arab world that was not discredited as a
result of the 1967 Arab defeat. In this context, the new PLO
emerged as the new leader of the Palestinians in the Diaspora,
which soon emphasized the need for Palestinian independence of
action.
The institutional restructuring of the old PLO was accompanied by
fresh and more radical plans that largely revolved around the
principle of establishing an independent state in the whole of
Palestine through armed struggle. In its search for statehood, the
PLO pursued two main concepts: the first was liberation, rooted in
the necessity of armed struggle as the only means for liberating
the whole of Palestine. The second became gradually more connected
with a territorially focused Palestinian statehood.
The Liberationist Conception of Statehood
The shift in PLO ideology and techniques in the aftermath of the
1967 war can best be seen in a comparison between the PLO's 1964
Covenant and the revisions introduced to it in 1968.
The 29 articles that constitute the 1964 Palestine National
Covenant generally tried to define Palestinian relations with their
homeland, as well as the conception of their future state in
Palestine. It states that the "Palestinian personality is a
permanent and a genuine characteristic that does not disappear. It
is transferred from fathers to sons."4 This personality is
connected with a defined territory that is part of the Arab
nation.5 Palestine is, in principle, supposed to be "an Arab
homeland," part of a larger "Arab homeland." The PLO then saw no
contradiction between the two: the two identities complement each
other since they are necessary for the liberation of both Palestine
and the Arab world. Article 12 declares that "Arab unity leads to
the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of Palestine leads
to Arab unity."
A peculiar provision of the Covenant is Article 24, which states
that "this organization [PLO] does not exercise any regional
sovereignty over the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
or the Gaza Strip...." More peculiar yet is Article 26, which
promises that the PLO "does not interfere in the internal affairs
of the Arab states." However, the oddity of these provisions can
easily be explained by the prevailing circumstances: in 1964,
Nasser was the most influential Arab leader who, in effect, was
instrumental in the creation of the PLO. On the other hand, King
Hussein of Jordan was opposed to any drastic developments in the
area. He perceived any Palestinian political independence or
military formation a threat to Hashemite interests in the region,
particularly to its control of the West Bank. The PLO provisions
were thus designed to be conciliatory to King Hussein to assure his
support or at least his approval.
One significant element of the Covenant is its definition of who is
a Palestinian. Article 6 stipulates that "the Palestinians are
those Arab citizens who were living normally in Palestine up to
1947, whether they remained or were expelled. Every child who was
born to a Palestinian parent after this date, whether in Palestine
or outside, is a Palestinian."
However, Jews who are of "Palestinian origin" are also
Palestinians. This means Jews who came to Palestine after the
establishment of Israel were not Palestinians and therefore
presumably not legitimate.6 The Covenant was careful to distinguish
between Judaism and Zionism. The former is acceptable "because it
is a divine religion" and not a "nationality with independent
existence." Jews belong to the countries of which they are
citizens. Zionism is a "colonialist movement in its inception,
aggressive and expansionist in its goals, racist and segregationist
in its configurations and fascist in its means and aims."7 Finally,
Article 16 of the Covenant declares that the liberation of
Palestine is an act of self-defense "necessitated" by the U.N.
Charter. The liberation of Palestine must also be total, and must
include every inch of historic Palestine.
In July 1968, the Covenant was revised to become the Palestinian
National Charter. The revision was made by the PLO National
Congress, which was considered to be the official parliament of the
Palestinian people.
While the 1964 Covenant emphasizes the Arab character of the
Palestinian struggle, the 1968 document refocuses the struggle on
the basis of a distinct local Palestinian identity. Apparently, due
to the 1967 war, the Palestinian identity underwent a political
transformation that gradually became in PLO ideology and practices
more focused on localism rather than Arabism. Thus, the 1968
Charter stresses the need for Palestinians to "safeguard their
Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that
identity."8 In general terms, at the time, the PLO's ideology and
practices suggested the following major principles: (a) no
compromise whatsoever on the issue of central and basic goals and
insistence that these goals be achieved all at one time; (b) an
excessive emphasis on armed struggle as the only method for the
complete liberation of Palestine; (c) a dogmatic view of the
conflict by insisting on total victory and thus adopting an
all-or-nothing position and denying itself the possibility of a
compromise or partial victory.9
Against this maximalist background, the PLO subsequently changed
much of its strategies and policies. For example, by 1969, the PLO
envisioned the possibility of a new solution to the problem of
Palestine, one that satisfies the Palestinian need for
self-determination and, at the same time, recognizes the reality of
Jewish presence on Arab land. By then, the objective of the PLO
became focused on establishing what became known as a democratic,
progressive, secular state in Palestine, in which Arabs and Jews
would live together in one state.
The More Territorially Limited Conception of
Statehood
At the 1971 Palestinian National Council (PNC), the idea of a
democratic state became the official policy of the PLO.10 The
proposal called for the creation of a non-sectarian state in which
all Jewish residents who came to Palestine before 1947 would become
citizens. However, the new proposal of the democratic Palestinian
state did not openly negate the earlier PLO strategy of liberating
the whole of Palestine through armed struggle.11 Despite the lack
of clear changes in policies, the proposal was historically
important specifically because it amended Article 6 of the National
Charter, which had excluded Jews who came to Palestine after the
1917 Balfour Declaration. The new proposal entitled Jews not only
to Palestinian citizenship, but also to the same rights as Muslim
and Christian Arabs living in the country.
Following the Jordanian civil war in September 1970 - known as
Black September - when the PLO was kicked out of Jordan, and after
its 1971 PNC proposal of a democratic state, it wanted to project a
revolutionary, but less radical, image of itself in the Arab world
and elsewhere. Its new emphasis on a democratic state aimed
particularly at generating international support for itself and the
Palestinian cause. As time went by, it eventually became more
apparent for the PLO that it needed to introduce more changes
before it could become accepted, regionally and internationally, as
a representative of the Palestinian people.
The 1973 war induced the PLO to follow a new path that culminated
in its acceptance of a compromise. After the war, the PLO became
gradually more receptive to the idea of a comprehensive settlement
to the conflict. At the time, the PLO leadership also realized the
need to formulate policies responding to Henry Kissinger's
diplomatic activities in the area, as well as the anticipated
Geneva Convention of December 1973. These pressures placed the PLO
leadership in the difficult position of having to choose between
maintaining its commitment to its traditional revolutionary policy
and working together with the Arab states and the world at large
for a settlement that would not ignore Palestinian claims.
At this point, the PLO shifted towards the concept of the
establishment of a mini-state idea on any part of liberated
Palestine, as the organization's ultimate objective. Accordingly,
the PLO sent out many signals expressing readiness to compromise as
a means of achieving a resolution to the conflict. This helped to
enhance the PLO's regional and international prestige and influence
by the mid-1970s.12 From then on, the PLO's moderates were able to
continue the transition from its early all-or-nothing approach to a
new era in which the organization would seek to strengthen its
diplomatic connections with the Arab states and the world at
large.
Despite these moderate changes, over the years, the PLO lacked a
clear and practical perception of its future Palestinian state. To
a large extent, it failed to present a detailed picture of the kind
of society it wanted to establish in a liberated Palestine.
Instead, from 1964 until 1974, its goals were very simple, and
largely focused on the "de-Zionization" of Israel. Another weakness
is that the PLO had for a long time viewed armed struggle as
strategy and not as tactics. The lack of clear changes in PLO
strategy and tactics at the early phases of its development were,
no doubt, often attributed to the uneasy alliance that existed
within the ranks of the PLO. For example, in 1974, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) decided to form a
"Rejectionist Front" to express its dissatisfaction with, and
opposition to, the resolutions of the 11th session of the PNC
meeting in Cairo on June 9, 1974, calling for the establishment of
a Palestinian authority on any "liberated" part of Palestine.13 In
fact, in 1974, the PLO adopted the concept of a "phased strategy"
or the "policy of stages." This new program accepted the idea of
creating a Palestinian national authority in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip as a first step toward solving the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Through its new direction, the PLO was transforming itself into a
new political force in the Middle East that could not be ignored.
It is generally believed that the roots of every major departure
from radical PLO policies, or the moving away from the
uncompromising line of the National Charter, can be found in the
resolutions adopted at the 12th PNC in 1974.14 The direction of
policy changes introduced by the PLO after that session was
continued and accelerated in subsequent PNC meetings.
After 1977, the PLO's focus became more centered on securing the
creation of an independent Palestinian national state in any part
of Palestine, which was understood to mean the West Bank and Gaza.
The 13th PNC of 1977 more clearly and explicitly called for the
creation of a national state on the soil of the Palestinian
homeland. At this point, it became clear that the PLO would accept
the two-state solution. From then onward, the PLO was interested in
finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict that would lead to
such a goal. However, certain events in the region blocked this
positive development in PLO policy. The Iraq-Iran war and the 1982
Lebanon war were to diminish the centrality of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the international arena. More
importantly, the victory of Menachem Begin and his right-wing Likud
coalition in the Israeli elections of 1977 turned PLO attention in
other directions. As the new Likud government intensified its
crackdown on PLO supporters in the occupied territories, the PLO
was forced, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to shift its
strategy from aiming at the creation of a Palestinian state into
adopting new defensive policies. It was primarily concerned with
finding ways to secure and safeguard its military bases in Lebanon,
and preserve its political status as representative of the
Palestinian people. The idea of creating a Palestinian state was
thus put on hold for many years to come.15
The PLO's expulsion from Beirut in the wake of the 1982 Lebanese
war drove home the realization that the occupied territories were
the last option from which it could operate. The new reality
convinced the PLO leadership that their old liberationist-radical
strategy had entered the realm of the impossible. As a consequence,
they determined to shift PLO strategy toward diplomacy and to
refocus attention on the occupied territories in order to achieve a
political settlement to the conflict. In the 1980s, the PLO began
pursuing an even more flexible policy regarding what had formerly
been considered as the absolute right of Palestinians. The goals
and means adopted aimed at formulating a moderate political
approach focused on the creation of a Palestinian mini-state on
parts of Palestinian territory, to wit, the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.
Relegating the Palestinian Diaspora to the background by the
mainstream leadership of the PLO was in itself a radical shift in
the organization's political orientation.16 Ironically, the PLO,
which historically was considered an organization of the Diaspora,
became in the 1980s and 1990s exclusively connected with the West
Bank and Gaza. Moderates from the occupied territories welcomed the
PLO's political moderation and encouraged its leadership to accept
a peaceful settlement to the conflict, if it ensured the creation
of a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. The PLO
leadership decided, in the 1990s, to adopt numerous changes in the
organization's general strategy and orientations, that eventually
changed the PLO's entire attitude towards both Israel and the
United States. In 1991 the PLO went to the Madrid peace conference
to negotiate with Israel a peaceful settlement to the almost
century-old conflict. The conference culminated in the signing in
September 1993 of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and
Israel on mutual recognition and interim Palestinian
self-government.
The staggering during the Netanyahu period of the peace process,
coupled with a lack of economic prosperity in the Palestinian
territories, has exacerbated a legitimacy crisis in Palestinian
politics. The main source for PLO political legitimacy was
previously derived from its radical ideologies and practices. The
main issue that continues to challenge the legitimacy of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in the territories nowadays has largely
to do with the unfinished business of creating an independent
Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel.
Endnotes
1. Brad E. O'Neill, "Toward a Typology of Political Terrorism: The
Palestinian Resistance Movement," Journal of International Affairs
(Spring/Summer 1978), p. 20.
2. "The Draft Constitution of the Palestine Liberation
Organization," in Laqueur and Rubin (eds.), The Israeli-Arab Reader
(N.Y.: Penguin, 1984), p. 131.
3. Arnold Toynbee, The Palestine Question: A Brief History (N.Y.:
The Arab Information Center, 1980), p. 22.
4. The Palestine National Covenant, Article 5.
5. Ibid., Article 2.
6. Ibid., Article 7.
7. Ibid., Article 19.
8. The Palestine National Charter, Article 12.
9. Y. Harkabi, The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning (London:
Valentine, Mitchell, 1981), pp. 9-28.
10. Al-Wathaiq al-Filastiniyeh (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1971),
pp. 8-12.
11. Mohammad Rashid, Toward a Democratic State in Palestine
(Beirut: PLO Research Center, November 1970), summary.
12. Moshe Ma'oz, "New Attitudes of the PLO Regarding Palestine and
Israel," Ben-Dor (ed.), The Palestinians and the Middle East
Conflict (Haifa: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1976), p.
549.
13. The 12th Palestine National Council Resolutions, Al-Kitab
al-Sanawee, 1974 (Beirut: PLO Research Center).
14. Rashid Khalidi, "The Resolutions of the 19th Palestine National
Council," Journal of Palestine Studies, 74 (Winter 1990), p.
39.
15. Hussam Mohamad, "Palestinian Politics on the Defensive,"
Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives (Vol. 16, No. 3
& 4, 1997), pp. 185-214.
16. Samih Farsoun and C. Zachary, Palestine and the Palestinians
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).