Perhaps the pertinent question to ask is the following: Has the
international community intervened in ending the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and failed? Or has it simply not made
sufficient efforts towards a serious and effective
involvement?
In my estimation, past international participation has been more
tentative and less vigorous than expected. There is a big
difference between attempts at intervention and genuine and earnest
involvement that gets translated into practical steps and policies
through implementations on the ground.
An Impenetrable Front
The international community has long realized that the Palestinian
question, ever since it has come to prominence with its regional
and international dimensions, has been completely and exclusively
linked to the directions in American policy, and has been subject
to the fluctuations in its position and its unwavering bias towards
Israel. A thorough scrutiny of the American voting pattern in the
United Nations, whether in the General Assembly or the Security
Council, will show the clear and overt U.S. slant in favor of
Israel, irrespective of the issue under consideration, its
magnitude or ramifications.
This unflagging American stance, exemplified by statements and
declarations coming from the White House, the State Department or
the U.S. ambassador to the UN, is testimony to the degree of
commitment of the successive American administrations to the
Israeli side in the conflict with the Palestinians or the Arabs in
general. All this leaves no room for doubt about the precedence
that American-Israeli relations take over American-Palestinian
relations that are quasi-nonexistent, or over American-Arab
relations that are contingent on strategic interests. The latter
relations remain unaffected by any development in the American
position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or by the
preferential relationship between Israel and the U.S.
Convinced of the certainty of the American-Israeli strategic
relationship and of the influence of the Jewish lobby on the
American administration, the international community has largely
accepted the reality imposed by the U.S. and Israel on the world,
as well as its own incapacity to penetrate this strong
American-Israeli front. This acquiescence has led to a state of
despondency on the part of the international community which has
evolved into a willing renouncement of its right to direct
intervention, leaving the door wide open for U.S. unilateral
action. It is only within the corridors of the UN General Assembly
that the international community has been able to circumvent the
American position and to articulate a clearer and relatively more
independent stance regarding the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
Even this little measure of international freedom would often
collide with the great economic and political influence of the
U.S., often curtailing such attempts at independent stands. Certain
retractions would follow in the face of American intransigence and
pressure or direct Jewish influence. Nonetheless, the General
Assembly remains the only venue recognized internationally, in
spite of its diminished clout and pressurizing mechanisms.
The Cold War Era
During the Cold War, there was an understanding between the two
great powers about the management of the conflict and the rejection
of solutions that favored one party over the other. The underlying
reason was the need for a continual conflict (in addition to other
incidental or pressing ones) to ensure the perpetuation of the Cold
War and to feed it, yet without allowing matters to get out of
hand. Additionally, both sides needed to periodically review their
agreement regarding the concept of the Cold War and its
constraints, which was possible due to the existence of one
conflict or another. The protraction of the Cold War meant that the
rest of the international community could not overstep this
bi-polar order, except to revolve around it without ever generating
the sufficient dynamics or desire to form a third pole. Although
the non-aligned nations made certain attempts in that direction,
they did not manage to impose themselves as a recognized third pole
alongside the other two.
A Uni-Polar Order
With the end of the Cold War and the formation of a uni-polar
organization, it became obvious that the second great pole had
vaporized completely with the unraveling of the Soviet Union and
the failure of Russia to fill its place. This resulted in a radical
redrawing of the parameters that were based on the recognition of
the bi-polar order. The non-aligned countries, for their part, have
turned into an expanded international forum devoid of substance or
implementation mechanisms, reinforcing U.S. uni-polarity even
further. Consequently, it is the wishes of the U.S. that get
implemented worldwide and countries have been vying to win its
goodwill at the expense of former alliances or their previously
principled positions regarding international crises, including the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
U.S. partiality to Israel became an indisputable fact, as revealed
by the declarations and stances of the American administration with
respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the past
decades, successive American administrations flouted their
unstinting support for the Jewish state, and the use of the U.S.
veto in the UN has become a foregone conclusion in the case of any
resolution deemed prejudicial to Israel. Israel did not fail to
exploit this situation fully and to impose itself as the darling
state within the context of a uni-polar system. Israel became
untouchable. The other states, on the other hand, became well aware
of the heavy price they were liable to pay if they refused to
comply with this reality, or pressed ahead with their attempts to
isolate or to condemn Israel in international forums. As a
corollary, a country stood to gain by establishing a close
relationship with the American administration through a
rapprochement with Israel. The countries also understood that it
was in their interest to refrain from condemning Israel in any
international forum, limiting themselves instead to raising the
issue of symmetry and asserting the right of Israel to exist and to
be recognized by the Palestinians, as well as its right to defend
itself against "Palestinian terrorism."
U.S. Domination, International Complaisance
The voting pattern of the U.S. in the Security Council where Israel
is concerned has imposed itself on the rest of the international
community. The big blocs forming the international community have
become very complaisant in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. They have become increasingly reticent vis-à-vis
American and Israeli intractability, adopting instead more lenient
and less confrontational stances. The European Union, as the
strongest of these blocs, has espoused the principle of
evenhandedness and began to use the terminology and buzz words of
the American and Israeli political discourse. The bloc of
non-aligned nations has completely lost its prestige with the
break-up of the Soviet Union, and with the majority of the former
Soviet states tying their security and economic interests to the
U.S. and Israel.
As for the bloc of Muslim countries, it lacked - and still does -
the mechanisms for the implementation of the set of resolutions
taken by these countries. Most of these resolutions are basically
for internal consumption and not external confrontation, especially
because of the multiplicity of interests, the disparity in
positions and the formation of alliances. The moving principle
behind these countries ceased to be the religious factor, which has
become a burden after 9/11, but primarily their economic interests
and their political and security alliances.
The Arab League countries, which are in any event members of the
Organization of Islamic Nations and non-aligned nations, haven't
got much left to offer to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict other
than what they produced in the Beirut Summit of 2002. In it they
proposed the Arab Peace Initiative, which represents the ceiling of
what these countries can offer to end the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and to achieve a permanent and comprehensive peace between
all the Arab countries and Israel.
All this data leads to one conclusion: that the members of the
international community do not possess the power - even if they had
the will - to impose a stand that contravenes the U.S., especially
regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Once these countries
realized their total powerlessness to influence developments on the
ground as far as the conflict is concerned, they resorted to new
and disparate middle positions. This means, in practice, the
withdrawal of the majority of the international community in the
face of the clear and unwavering American position pertaining to
the conflict or other regional conflicts, giving the U.S. free rein
to define not only its own position, but, through it, that of the
international community regarding any issue without exception. And
while the American position regarding the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict is clear in its absolute bias towards Israel, it means any
new move must first come from the U.S. or with its agreement;
otherwise any other attempt would be futile and doomed to fail, in
spite of its importance to the Palestinian side.
What Are the Possibilities for an International
Solution?
The important conclusion to draw here is that the international
community did not exhaust its potential to mediate or intervene to
end the conflict. It did not get involved to the limit of what can
be viewed as direct, or even indirect, intervention according to
internationally recognized understandings.
The question then arises: Are there new possibilities for the
achievement of a solution through the auspices of the international
community? The answer to this question is in the positive, but how
can this be executed? The response revolves around the
following:
* The presentation of independent initiatives by more than one
international body for the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and their justification against the backdrop of their own
interests and the achievement of peace and stability in the
region.
We have recently seen the Franco-Spanish initiative with Italian
and Portuguese backing, which was presented at the European summit
in mid-December 2006, in spite of it being censured by the Israeli
government and ignored by the American administration. At the same
time, there are constant calls by Russia, France and Spain for a
comprehensive international conference for peace in the area which
would incorporate the rest of the regional conflicts. It is not
possible for these calls to keep on being ignored, especially since
they emanate from countries with strong ties with the U.S. and
Israel.
* Direct pressure on the American administration by countries most
closely allied with it, to convince it of the importance of direct
action in order to solve the problem, which is in the interest of
international stability and security.
In this respect, it appears that the British government is willing
to get involved through the person of its prime minister. He has
resolved to pursue this file during the end of his tenure and to
commit to it as part of his direct responsibilities, banking on his
special ties with the American president and his persuasive
capacity in this domain. With the confirmation of the
Franco-Spanish initiative, the EU may be able to perform the same
job on the level of the G8, through European-American lateral
contacts or through the Quartet.
* The reactivation of the Quartet and the amplification of the role
of the rest of the partners in it, after its having been hijacked
by the U.S. since its formation.
It is possible to put to advantage the latest developments on the
internal political scene in the U.S., with the Republican defeat in
Congress and the resignation of former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld due to the failure of the American intervention in
Iraq.
There have been repeated calls by Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas, as well as by the moderate Arab states, for the revival of
the Quartet. This has been echoed by the other partners forming the
Quartet, who are willing to resume their roles and to intervene
directly in the achievement of a permanent settlement.
* A demand by the parties to the conflict for the international
community to intervene in order to end the conflict.
In the absence of a consensus in this respect, it would be
sufficient for the Palestinian side to pursue this demand through
continued pressure on the various components of the international
community. In his speech commemorating David Ben-Gurion's death
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asserted that a military
solution to the conflict was not possible and that the Palestinian
situation was to be dealt with through contacts and communication
with the concerned parties on the Palestinian side. This is a
positive step, especially with the existence of a reciprocal desire
on the Palestinian side to deepen these contacts and the dialogue
for the sake of reviving a comprehensive negotiating process.
Indications are pointing towards a shift in the Israeli position,
as well as in Hamas, regarding an understanding of the conflict and
the need for an acceptable formula to end it peacefully.
Olmert's need for a positive development on the Palestinian arena
is growing by the day, with mounting problems on the domestic
front. Hamas is also convinced of the necessity of an extended
hudna as a basis for a future agreement, or a part of it,
especially since Hamas is now in the Authority and is interested in
safeguarding the achievements reached and in amplifying them in
order to remain in power as long as possible. In this sense, the
interests of both sides coincide, and the time factor becomes of
the essence for a bilateral Israel-Hamas agreement.
* The conviction on the part of the international community of the
need for serious and collective action to end the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to assist the peace process and
establish stability in the area, which will impact directly and
indirectly on international stability and peace.
There is heightened awareness among several international parties
about the centrality of the Palestinian question and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, consequently, of the need for a
serious search for a solution. The American administration has been
listening, but apparently not enough, to embark on an American
initiative or to lead a wider international move for the purpose of
bridging points of view or imposing peace on the parties. This
could translate into an adoption by the Security Council of a new
resolution to replace 242 and the rest of the relevant resolutions
in accordance with Article 7. The new resolution would comprise
implementation mechanisms, including the dispatch of international
forces to patrol borders and to enforce peace during a limited
transitional period.
* To take preliminary steps on the part of the Palestinian and
Israelis to impose a tahdi'a and a cease-fire as a first stage
towards the implementation of wider measures and putting the peace
process back on track.
This would allow the two conflicting parties to return to the
negotiating table, and to produce comprehensive peace plans which
would allow for a gradual shift from tahdi'a to withdrawal and the
implementation of the stages comprised in the Road Map and other
signed agreements between the two sides.
Conclusion
It is important to revise the reading of the international map with
its different components - American, Israeli, Palestinian - and
within its Arab and regional dimensions, especially the Lebanese
situation and the effects of the last war on Israel, as well as the
Iranian problem and its impact on the region. Other elements to
consider are the American failure in Iraq and the possibility of
the fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian lines, with a spillover
of Sunni-Shii'a alignment in the region; the Arab division into
moderate and non-moderate camps, including the success of moderate
Islam in more than one Arab election; the victory of Hamas in the
Palestinian elections; the result of the American elections, and
the Baker-Hamilton Commission and its repercussion on American
foreign policy in the region. It is imperative that all the above
issues be considered along with other factors. This will contribute
to the reevaluation of the situation under a new light, conceivably
with some cautious optimism, which will lead to new paradigms of
political actions and external intervention in favor of a bilateral
agreement with broad international backing.
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