No Palestinian can hide the fear and anxiety regarding future
developments if events continue to unfold in the same direction
that they have taken so far. This is especially true after the
clear signals from Israel that it is bent on proceeding with its
settlement activity in the West Bank, its military operations and
its collective punishment measures against the Palestinians, taking
advantage of the Hamas victory in the legislative elections in
January 2006 and the subsequent Hamas takeover of Gaza in June
2007.
The Israeli incursion in 2002 into Ramallah and several other West
Bank towns, within the framework of the military operation dubbed
"Operation Defensive Shield," constituted a turning point in
Israeli-Palestinian relations: It put an end to any opportunity for
negotiations and left the door wide open for the escalation of
violence between the two sides. In spite of these critical
developments, the Palestinian leadership did not readily grasp the
magnitude of the danger arising from the shift in Israeli policy
after this military operation.
Operation Defensive Shield came in March 2002, following a suicide
attack in Netanya's Park Hotel on the eve of Passover, one of the
holiest feasts for the Jewish people. The result was scores of
Israeli dead and injured - most of them elderly people - who were
in the dining room celebrating the feast at the time. This action
aroused the anger of the Israeli public and spurred its willingness
to back any military operation against the Palestinians.
It is worth noting that the main aim of the suicide attacks inside
Israel was to undermine the peace process and to bring about the
failure of Fateh's moderate leadership in achieving any political
agreement with Israel. This suicide bombing took place immediately
after the declaration of the Arab Peace Initiative at the Arab
League's Beirut Summit (2002), nipping the Initiative in the bud
and leaving no doubt about Hamas' rejection of it. Furthermore, the
timing of this suicide attack contributed to a large degree to the
Israeli policy of ignoring the Initiative. It helped Israel divert
attention from the Initiative and put the focus on Palestinian
violence instead, in order to justify Israel's reluctance to engage
in serious negotiations to achieve a political solution to the
conflict. The rise in power of the right-wing among Israeli society
and military became a real obstacle to a meaningful political
compromise leading to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories and the creation of a viable independent Palestinian
state.
The Dimensions of Operation Defensive Shield
Operation Defensive Shield came to underscore the fact that Israel,
under pressure from the right-wing, had started to act on the
assumption that it does not have a Palestinian political partner,
because - as the right-wing argued - their partner, the Palestinian
Authority (PA), was incapable of enforcing its control on the
ground. The message was that there was only a "military partner" on
the Palestinian side, whom Israel was going to fight with every
means available, without exception: Hamas as well as Fateh, which
was leading the PA, the side with which Israel was negotiating and
dealing on the political level. As far as Israel was concerned,
Fateh, too, formed part of the potential Palestinian force.
Fighting and weakening it along with Hamas would help in aborting
the creation of a Palestinian state by escalating the security
tension and diffusing any pressure on Israel to withdraw to the
June 1967 lines.
The developments on the ground did not alert the Palestinian
leadership to the fundamental changes that were taking place within
Israeli politics. Even after the demise of the late President
Yasser Arafat, his successor, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), declared
his commitment to the peace process and his determination to pursue
all efforts to achieve peace through negotiations.
However, Abbas, who assumed the reins of power in a climate widely
propitious for a positive change in Palestinian internal affairs,
which would have enabled him to stem the deterioration of
Israeli-Palestinian relations, did not seize that opportunity.
Instead, he insisted on holding legislative elections before first
setting out to effect the needed reforms in the PA, or to wage a
serious fight against corruption, of which the PA was accused and
which in turn reflected on the movement of Fateh, seeing that it
formed a large part of the PA since it was established in
1994.
Abbas preferred to give due course to democracy; the result was his
bringing Hamas to power. Hamas set out immediately to flout the
most basic democratic rules that brought it to power from the first
meeting held by the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), when
the speaker and his deputies where elected from among the Hamas
members. It became apparent that Hamas, which had a majority,
wanted a monopoly on power and would reject any participation by
other political forces in leading the PLC. This was repeated in the
formation of the first government, which consisted mainly of Hamas
members. The new government's platform was inflexible to the point
that other factions were denied the possibility of joining a
coalition with Hamas. The price for their participation in the
coalition was to accept a Hamas takeover of the Palestinian
National Council, the Parliament of the PLO, as well.
What ultimately happened was that Hamas frittered away the past two
years without achieving its aim. It crowned its stint in power with
the Gaza takeover, which paved the way once again for Abbas to play
a political role through a non-Fateh government, led by Salam
Fayyad and enjoying U.S. and international backing.
The Fayyad-Led Government
Many presumed that this government would be short-lived, especially
since it came in the wake of the Hamas takeover and lacked the
PLC's vote of confidence, and it was assumed that the takeover of
Gaza would not last. The government was basically viewed as a
bridge to a renewed power-sharing arrangement through
reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas.
This did not come to pass for two reasons: First, the head of the
present government proved to be smart enough not to be anybody's
puppet. He took the task entrusted to him seriously and began
working incessantly to demonstrate the zeal and capacity of his
government to serve the Palestinian people, regardless of the
difficult and extraordinary situation.
Second, the Fayyad-led government enjoys the backing of Abbas. He
is holding on to it, in spite of calls for a reshuffle by some
Fateh members who are unhappy about being out of office after
becoming accustomed to being ministers and enjoying all the
privileges of functioning as such. They are pressuring Abbas for a
change, and raising all kinds of false arguments to discredit the
prime minister and cast doubt on his national credibility. But
Abbas is not giving in to their pressure and is sticking to his
conditions for dialogue with Hamas. Furthermore, this government
commands international support and credibility that works favorably
towards the provision of aid to the Palestinian people.
The Fayyad-led government has realized important accomplishments on
at least two levels in a short period of time. First, it has
succeeded in mobilizing financial backing for the PA after it had
been halted by the siege and boycott which the donor countries had
imposed on the Hamas government. The new government has already
begun to cover the budget deficits and meet its financial
obligations - especially the salaries of public sector employees,
including the arrears that had not been paid by the Hamas
government, and the expenses of governmental services, such as
health and education. All this has led to the alleviation of
hardships for large segments of the Palestinian population.
Secondly, it has started to earnestly tackle the issues of internal
security and public order. This started in the troubled city of
Nablus, one of the West Bank's major cities, where the government
succeeded in rooting out chaos and anarchy and imposing the rule of
law, internal security and public order - in spite of the Israeli
military's incursions threatening to undermine the government's
efforts.
A More Serious and Dangerous Issue
The success of the donor conference held in Paris on November 17,
2007, the donor countries' adoption of the Palestinian National
Development Plan and its allocation of $7.3 billion in funding for
its implementation is a development appreciated by every
Palestinian.
Yet, the more important and pressing issue remains the search for
the answer to the question: Where is the Palestinian government
heading on the political level?
Palestinians do not underestimate the importance of reconstruction
and development. But they cannot overlook, even for a moment, the
fact that they are living under Israeli occupation, and that any
step they take or any benefits they receive must be enlisted
towards one overriding aim: ending the Israeli occupation, and not
allowing it to be consolidated under deceptive glittering
names.
Clearly, there is an urgent need to bolster the steadfastness of
the Palestinian people in order to confront the occupation that
seeks to keep them absorbed with and exhausted by the day-to-day
worries of earning a living, and to divert them from giving the
slightest thought to their political future.
The current government can and has done a great deal to alleviate
the sufferings of the people and to shore up their steadfastness.
But the real danger that can nullify all of its accomplishments so
far, and can perhaps reflect negatively on its ambitions and
political aspirations, is for it to turn a blind eye to what is
being conspired against it regarding the political future.
Abbas and Fayyad, as well as other Palestinian figures, have
reiterated their rejection of the provisional state or the
so-called provisional borders, but will this be enough?
In the international corridors of power, the talk these days
revolves around a provisional Palestinian state, a state without
defined borders. In other words, there will be institutions,
ministries and titles, but without actual control over the land. It
is incumbent upon the Palestinian leadership not to downplay the
imperative to thwart any attempt aimed at turning into a fait
accompli the state with provisional borders, or one without control
over the land - irrespective of through what means or what
justifications this is done.
A Palestinian state "in the air," without defined borders, would
allow Israel to continue its policy of building and expanding
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. This would kill any
possibility of solving the conflict on the basis of two states
alongside each other: Israel and Palestine - which is the basis of
United States President George W. Bush's vision and the core of the
Arab Peace Initiative.
The recent Annapolis meeting under the auspices of Bush failed to
achieve a declaration of principles addressing the ground rules for
a future settlement. Instead, it announced the beginning of
intensive talks between Israel and the Palestinian leadership for
the conclusion of a political settlement to the conflict. The
implementation of the first phase of the Quartet's Road Map of
March 2003 is the first step on the path to such an agreement. This
phase includes an Israeli commitment to freezing all settlement
activity in the occupied territories. Israel, however, seems
unwilling to comply, and its reluctance will likely undermine the
whole political process.
In response to a question regarding the ongoing construction in the
settlement of Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa) south of Jerusalem,
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni (December 12, 2007), claimed
in a press conference that it was "agreed" in Annapolis that the
negotiations would proceed in isolation from what is taking place
on the ground - in other words, regardless of the expansionist
settlement activity. Similarly, an unnamed high official in the
Israeli Prime Minister's Office stated the next morning that Israel
would not embark on the construction of new settlements, but would
continue building inside the borders of the settlements' master
plans. And if we bear in mind that these master plans were made
unilaterally by the Israeli occupation's so-called Civil
Administration, and that they gobble up more than half of the West
Bank, and that the surface area of the settlement Ma'aleh Adumim's
master plan, for example, is twice the size of the master plan of
the city of Tel Aviv, as is the case with many other settlements,
then we understand the gravity of the danger facing the Palestinian
cause, despite all the talk about negotiations, agreements,
reconstruction and development plans.
Israel is forging ahead, with international connivance, to execute
its plan and to impose on the Palestinians a reality which, in the
best case scenario, would spell the end of their national rights
and their genuine desire and aspiration to arrive at a just and
lasting peace with the Israelis, which will enable them to live in
peace, security and dignity in an independent Palestinian
state.
In a climate where the consolidation of faits accomplis appears to
be the objective, the Palestinian leadership has to pay extra
attention to reconstruction and development, because it is an
important element underpinning steadfastness. At the same time, it
has to be vigilant about the machinations against the Palestinian
people and to prevent the imposition of a reality that does not
lead to the ultimate achievement of the Palestinian national
aspirations: a real state - not a name without substance, "a
provisional state."
Israel has already begun preparations for the celebration of the
60th anniversary of its creation and is looking for international
participation on a grand scale, with several world leaders
attending. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, under whose auspices
the November 2007 donors' conference was held, was the first leader
to confirm his intention to attend the celebration in May 2008, and
Bush, who is to visit the region in January, did not dismiss the
possibility of returning in May.
This same occasion also marks the 60th year of the Palestinian
Nakba - the dispossession of the Palestinian people through the
loss of their homeland, Palestine, and the turning of two-thirds of
the population into refugees scattered worldwide. It is time for
the redressing of the historical injustice committed against the
Palestinian people and for bringing an end to their
suffering.
The Arab Peace Initiative, which was reaffirmed at the Arab League
summit conference in Riyadh in March, 2007, presents a rare
opportunity to achieve relative justice for the Palestinian people
and, at the same time, to provide Israel with an enduring peace and
normal relations with the Arab and Islamic world, and to bring
stability to the troubled Middle East. What more could Israel want?