between Palestinians and Israelis, are bogged down for many
reasons, but mainly due to a basic lack of confidence. Syria
interrupted the talks with Israel because, in its view, Ehud Barak
was dragging his feet on the Golan issue by refusing to negotiate
the outline of the final border between Syria and Israel, based on
the June 4, 1967, armistice lines. Israel's insistence that
security arrangements and the content of the peace (normalization)
must be agreed upon first, provoked only distrust and resentment in
Damascus. On the other hand, Syria's high-handed manner of
conducting the negotiations - sending its foreign minister to talk
to Israel's prime minister, Farouk Al-Shara's refusal to shake
hands and to talk directly to his negotiating partner - these were
not exactly helpful in promoting a favorable climate for what,
after all, was supposed to be a peace parley.
Moreover, while Prime Minister Barak kept lauding President Assad
and the "great leader who created modern Syria," Hafez Al-Assad's
mouthpiece, the daily Tishrin, published a viciously anti-Israeli
editorial. Tishrin qualified Israel's policies as "Nazi-like
behavior" and rushed to the defense of David Irving, an English
historian who denies that six million Jews were exterminated in
Auschwitz and other death camps during the Second World War.
"Israel invented the legend of the Holocaust in order to squeeze
money out of Germany and force a guilt-ridden Europe to support its
Nazi policies... while trying to silence those who, like Mr.
Irving, try to tell the truth about what really happened during the
Second World War," wrote Tishrin.
Should one be surprised to learn, meanwhile, that a solid Israeli
majority (around 70 percent) is opposed to giving back the Golan to
Syria and does not believe in President Assad's desire to build a
meaningful peace with Israel? Either the Syrian leadership is not
really interested in the peace process or it is misreading Israel's
political map. While President Assad is able to decide, with no
questions asked, on the signing of a peace treaty with Israel,
Prime Minister Barak's signature must be approved, first by the
government, second by the Knesset (Israel's parliament) and,
finally, by a national referendum. Until now, Syria's behavior, as
dictated by Hafez Al-Assad, has systematically harmed Ehud Barak's
efforts for peace with Damascus.
The situation is completely different on the Palestinian-Israeli
track. While most Israelis believe that Yasser Arafat really wants
to reach an agreement with Ehud Barak on the terms of a mutually
acceptable peace, most Palestinians doubt that Israel's prime
minister is ready to grant them a fair deal. Ehud Barak's behavior,
both in form and in content, reflects a lack of consideration for
Palestinian feelings and aspirations. They note his persistent
refusal to consult or, at least, to inform the Palestinian
Authority in advance on the successive withdrawal maps prepared by
Israel.
Even more worrisome is Barak's rejection of Palestinian demands to
place localities close to Jerusalem, such as Abu Dis, Al-Ezariyyah
and others - today under partial Palestinian control (Zone B) -
under full Palestinian control (Zone A). This is seen by Arafat as
a bad sign for the future.
In his dealings with Syria, Israel's prime minister seems to be
more forthcoming than vis-à-vis the Palestinians. While Barak
goes out of his way to placate Hafez Al-Assad and is ready to
confront a hostile Israeli public opinion, he seems to underrate
the importance of the Palestinian issues, though most Israelis are
ready for bigger concessions on this track than Barak. Thus, though
a persistent majority of Israelis is convinced that the emergence
of a Palestinian state is inevitable, this does not prevent
Israel's prime minister from systematically refusing to take into
account the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the State of
Israel. In his negotiations with Arafat, Barak tries to get the
Palestinians to accept the carving up of the West Bank so that
Israel would annex about forty percent of the territory, creating a
truncated Bantustan-like Palestinian entity.
Even on Jerusalem, Israelis appear to be more realistic, more
flexible than Barak's government. Forty-five percent of Israeli
Jews, polled by the Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv
University, consider that Jerusalem is in effect already divided
into two cities - East and West Jerusalem. Moreover, close to
one-third of Israeli Jews (28 percent) would accept that East
Jerusalem become the capital of the future Palestinian state if
this would eliminate the last obstacle to a peace agreement with
the Palestinians.
Ehud Barak reiterates that peace with Syria will enable Israel to
normalize its relations with the rest of the Arab world, not only
with Beirut, following an agreed withdrawal of Israeli troops from
Southern Lebanon. He is thinking of countries like Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf states, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Is it
possible that he has failed to internalize the fact that, without
an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem, there will be no
real peace, but at best a fragile state of non-belligerency between
Israel and the Arab world? In that event, even the peace treaties
signed with Egypt and Jordan would remain unfulfilled promises. In
other words, the "cold peace" that Israel has been complaining
about would not evolve on a broader scale into normal, friendly
relations. This scenario is hardly compatible with the platform on
which Ehud Barak was elected.
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