From the outset, the newly elected Israeli government was clearly
faced with a real dilemma: the choice between ideology and
pragmatism. Since he won the elections and formed his new
government in June 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu has been called to
bridge the gap between his ideological commitment and realpolitik.
He represents the national camp which has always championed the
Greater-Land-of-Israel concept, denied the Palestinians' right to
self-determination and opposed a Palestinian State on the west side
of the Jordan River. Indeed, for many of his colleagues, Palestine
is on the east side of the river, and they regard the strengthening
and expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank as the best
means to achieving the Greater-Land-of-Israel dream.
Realpolitik, on the other hand, demanded of Netanyahu a respect of
Israel's obligations in the peace process: redeployment in Hebron,
in Area C (which constitutes 70 percent of the West Bank), the
implementation of the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank,
the release of Palestinian prisoners and the resumption of
final-status negotiations over the issues of refugees, Jerusalem,
the Jewish settlements, borders and water.
Netanyahu realized that, like it or not, the process his
predecessors had embarked on would inevitably lead to a Palestinian
State. He therefore attempted to discontinue it and change its
direction. The peace process, in his conception, should lead only
to a kind of "administrative autonomy" for the Palestinians as a
minority living under Israeli rule. This was the main underlying
cause for lack of progress in the talks during the months preceding
the signing of the Hebron Protocol.
Six months of marathon talks, of ups and downs, and the
intervention and good offices of President Clinton, President
Mubarak, and King Hussein finally led [in January 1997] to an
accord between Israel and the PLO. At long last, the two sides
signed an agreement over the implementation of redeployment in
Hebron and the continuation of the peace process.
Matters of Principle
The dispute was over principle and substance. The substance, in
Netanyahu's view, was to guarantee continued Israeli control over
the majority of West Bank land, water, internal and external
movement and transportation, and overriding security, thus
preventing the creation of a Palestinian State. Hebron was used as
a vehicle for the achievement of this goal. Netanyahu tried to
create the impression that the issue at stake was indeed
redeployment in Hebron and to minimize the importance of all other
questions, especially redeployment in Area C. Freezing all other
issues, he thought, would allow Israel to negotiate a final
settlement with the Palestinians while it was still in control of
most of the West Bank, and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
was in possession of some scattered spots lacking territorial
contiguity.
The Palestinian leadership took such reasoning into consideration;
hence, the Palestinian delegation's unwavering insistence on a
definite linkage between redeployment in Hebron and in the rest of
the West Bank. To them, that was the only way to guarantee the
continuation of the peace process.
The more Netanyahu tried to delay redeployment in the West Bank and
to claim that Israel should retain civil control over part of
Hebron, the more obvious it became that he was seeking continued
Israeli political presence in the city.
However, as mentioned, the core of the problem was not Hebron but
redeployment in Area C. Indeed this issue had raised much concern
and discussion on the Israeli side, even before Netanyahu came into
office. It later paved the way for Netanyahu to make use of
extremist positions in order to change the direction of the peace
process as a whole, and to force a continued Israeli presence on
Palestinian land. This issue is already the subject of
confrontations between Israel and the PNA.
It will be remembered that in the Oslo II agreement the West Bank
was classified into three areas: Area A (five percent of the total
area of the West Bank) would be under full control of the PNA. Area
B (25 percent of the West Bank) would be under joint
Palestinian-Israeli control, with civil affairs the responsibility
of the PNA and security affairs that of Israel. Area C (70 percent
of the West Bank), which includes the Jewish settlements, would be
under full Israeli control, but should be transferred to the PNA in
three stages, once every six months, starting September 7, 1996 and
ending September 1997. By then, most of this area would have passed
into Palestinian hands, except for the Jewish settlements within
fences at a few yards' distance from the last house. It should be
noted that the question of settlements is among the issues to be
discussed in final-status negotiations slated to have started in
May 1996, but delayed following the election of the Likud to
government.
Netanyahu and Barak
When the Oslo agreement was presented to the late Yitzhak Rabin's
government for approval, the then-newly appointed foreign minister,
General (Res.) Ehud Barak, voted against it. He later told this
writer that he believed that Area C should stay in Israeli hands
during final-status negotiations, in order to give Israel a
stronger bargaining power. "How can we conduct negotiations over
refugees, borders, a Palestinian State, after we would have given
back all the territories?" wondered Barak.
It would seem Netanyahu was inspired by the same idea. He tried to
stop any redeployment in Area C in order to secure bargaining power
in future negotiations, and, at the same time, to remain loyal to
his ideological commitment to the Greater-Land-of-Israel concept.
He was obviously trying to disengage himself from a process which
would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State. His main
objective was to find the method by which he could be seen to
uphold Israel's commitment to the peace process, but without
accepting the obligations it involved: implementing a continued
staged withdrawal in Area C, or resuming final-status negotiations,
or allowing the PNA any possibility of acquiring the "features of a
state," such as an airport, a sea port or open international
outlets.
In a sense, the Hebron agreement signed by Netanyahu and Arafat was
in Israel's favor. It came in the wake of severe violations by the
present Likud government of the previous Israeli government's
obligations in the peace process, regarding both the implementation
of the letter and spirit of the agreements, and compliance to their
timetable. If respected and implemented, the importance of the
Hebron agreement lies in the fact that it will mark the beginning
of a process whereby the Revisionist Zionist movement has to adapt
to reality and move away from ideology. It will also mean that
Greater Israel has become an unrealistic dream, and that the Likud
government is heading towards the adoption of the principle of
dividing the "Land of Israel" and handing parts of it to
"foreigners."
No Mental Change
One should not be deluded into assuming that Netanyahu has become
one of the Labor party "doves." Pushed by Clinton, Mubarak, Chirac
and Hussein, he made a change on paper. He also understood the
risks he ran with the European Union if he allowed the peace
process to fail. Nonetheless, he has yet to change his thinking. He
still needs to absorb and to internalize the new ideology of
realism.
Though the Netanyahu government is committed to the implementation
of three successive redeployments in Area C - once every six months
- it still refuses to implement the latter two and has diminished
the first. Hence, the unacceptable proposal to return only two
percent of Area C in the first phase of redeployment. Although the
agreement obliges Israel to evacuate more than 90 percent of the
West Bank, the government talks about less than 50 percent, and
denies territorial contiguity between the PNA areas. It insists on
keeping the West Bank divided into three separate blocks, which is
its way of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian
State.
In addition to redeployment in Area C, another "explosive" issue
testing Netanyahu's intentions lies ahead. Netanyahu has declared
that he would not negotiate over Jerusalem, although the Oslo
Declaration of Principles (DOP) stipulates that Jerusalem be one of
the issues to be discussed in final-status negotiations. No durable
and stable peace in the Middle East can be achieved when Jerusalem
remains under sole Israeli control. The city should be shared on
all levels, in order to fulfill the religious and national demands
and aspirations of both the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Other thorny, emotional issues, such as the Jewish settlements on
Palestinian land, the 1948 Palestinian refugees and borders are on
the agenda. Each of these demands courage, vision and leadership. A
genuine solution has to be reached regarding the future of the
Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories. There will be no
chance for real separation and good neighborly relations between
the two entities - Israel and Palestine - if the settlements
continue to exist as extraterritorial units on Palestinian land.
Painful surgery is necessary to give life to a healthy peace
between the two sides.
The refugee problem has to be addressed and settled once and for
all. Barring an actual return, a compromise should be reached in
harmony with UN resolution 194, which gives the refugees the right
to return or to be compensated for the loss of property and for
suffering incurred as a result of their exodus in 1948.
A demarcation of borders has to be worked out, facilitating the
process of reconciliation and the establishment of good neighborly
relations between the two entities, which may, in the future, lead
to a peaceful and mutually desired integration.
A Majority for Peace
Netanyahu need not start looking for excuses to renege on his
commitment to implement the agreement he himself has signed with
Arafat. Such excuses are readily available. Instead, he should
demonstrate a high level of leadership and strength. He might face
a tough opposition from within his own party, the Likud. Menahem
Begin faced such an opposition in 1978 when he signed his peace
with Egypt. He had the support of the opposition then. Netanyahu
will definitely enjoy the same support.
Arafat has succeeded in putting Netanyahu on the hook. It will be
incumbent on all supporters of peace in the region to help keep
Netanyahu up to par and to make the necessary change in mentality
which will lead him to accept that this is the only course to
follow. It is not an easy job. Those who will try to abort all
efforts at achieving peace are many. They are within his own
government, his own block in the Knesset and his own party. But
they are not the majority of the Israeli people. The majority of
the Israeli people are for peace. Netanyahu can become, if he so
wishes, the national leader of all Israelis who support peace and
are eager to see it achieved. To do that, he has to disengage
himself from fanatics and extremists and to press ahead with the
peace process.
Following the Hebron agreement, the door has been opened for the
great challenges that still lie ahead. Both Israelis and
Palestinians are called to show a maximum of self-discipline,
maturity, credibility, and loyalty to the peace process. Much
however, rests on Mr. Netanyahu's shoulders. Whether he will rise
to the occasion or not, the coming days will tell. There is still
room for doubt.