Prospects look rosy at first glance: the dream has finally come
true. Arafat is in Gaza, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
is already functioning, and the performance of the Palestinian
police has surpassed everyone's expectations.
But, it is premature to take a deep breath and to sit back and
relax. Indeed, the challenges that still lie ahead are enormous and
remind one of the saying: art is long; life is short. Many
contentious issues have yet to be dealt with in the negotiations,
such as the question of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, the
refugee problem and the final status of the occupied Palestinian
land, in addition to the multitude of other problems that have to
be addressed at the present stage.
One major problem facing the PNA for the moment is financial: money
is needed to enable it to function properly and effectively. Money
is also needed for the running cost of all services and
administrations, for investments in development projects in Gaza
and Jericho, for the creation of jobs, the generation of income and
the development of services.
To persevere in their support for the peace process and to lend
their full adherence to the rule of law and the maintenance of
public order, Gazans have to be encouraged by some concrete and
positive changes in their living conditions. The manner in which
this can be achieved is not within the scope of this article, but
it is self-evident that a joint effort between Israel and the PNA,
in addition to a committed and immediate support by the donor
states, can make the fulfillment of this goal, or at least part of
it, more attainable. Barring that, the already explosive situation
might get out of hand with violence and extremism as the sole
winners.
What Next?
The Gaza-Jericho First Agreement was meant to present a
breakthrough in the deadlocked peace talks in Washington and to
facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive settlement to the
Israeli-Arab conflict based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. One
should not be so dazzled, therefore, by the implementation of this
Agreement to the extent of failing to see the long road that still
lies ahead. Instead, one should proceed toward the final goal which
the comprehensive settlement is guaranteeing a just solution to the
Palestinian problem in all its aspects.
The next step should then be the early empowerment of the PNA with
other spheres of administration in the West Bank. In other words,
the process of transfer of authority from the Israeli military and
civil administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)
to the PNA should continue.
The talks which were resumed in Cairo in July 1994 over early
empowerment reflected an Israeli inclination to preserve an upper
hand in all the spheres to be transferred to the Palestinians. Why?
It seems that the Israeli negotiators and their leadership fail to
understand that this process, according to its terms of reference,
should ultimately put an end to the Israeli occupation and lead to
a situation whereby the Palestinians will govern themselves by
themselves and for themselves. It further seems that the security
argument has become so elastic in the eyes of the Israeli
negotiators that they are demanding the right of veto and control
over many aspects of Palestinian life. This, in effect, will enable
them to keep on enjoying the privileges of occupation even in an
era supposed to be one of peace following the long Israeli
occupation of Palestinian land.
This Israeli approach must change. The new era that has been
launched should be defined by a change in relationships: from the
victorious and the defeated, to equal partners trying to establish
strong and stable foundations for future relations between two
states - Israel and Palestine - based on co-existence, equality,
mutual respect and mutual recognition.
Elections
A change in this approach will not only promote the progress of
talks over the full transfer of more powers and authorities from
the Israeli administration in the West Bank to the PNA, it will
also facilitate the running of elections in order to lay down the
foundations for a Palestinian democratic system, including the
building of democratic institutions and traditions to be observed
in the future.
It could be argued that the Cairo Agreement did not make any
mention of elections in the area of the PNA. Yet, for all
concerned, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) reached in Oslo,
September 1993, should continue to be the point of reference for
the demand to run elections in the PNA area.
Some might speculate about the existence of a shared interest
between Israel and the PNA to ignore the issue of elections. They
will argue that for the PLO, elections might disturb the completion
of the process of transferring its presence from exile (shatat) to
the inside; and that some PLO leaders, who have invested most of
their lives in the PLO, now fear elections might leave them out in
the cold. Furthermore, the link between the PLO and any elected
body in the PNA has not been clarified enough. Some may fear that
an elected leadership in the PNA might substitute or undermine the
role of the leadership of the PLO.
It is true that the issue of elections in the PNA area is a
delicate matter that should be clearly defined. The executive
committee of the PLO is regarded as the source of authority for the
PNA Council. The PLO represents the Palestinian people inside the
OPT as well as in exile (shatat), and thus will still be considered
the higher body that supervises and leads the Palestinian national
struggle. No elected body should dispute or conflict with the
status and the role of the PLO.
Israel, on the other hand, has started to realize that elections in
the PNA area mean the creation of conditions that allow free
campaigning and freedom of expression. This entails, among other
procedures, the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the populated
areas in the West Bank: cities, towns, villages and refugee camps.
The Jewish settlements in the West Bank are located around these
populated Palestinian areas, and settlers regularly drive through
them. Thus, Israel can claim that the presence of the Israeli army
will still be needed for the protection of these settlers.
Moreover, it was agreed in Oslo that the Palestinians of East
Jerusalem would participate in the PNA elections. This necessitates
that election campaigning and polling take place in East Jerusalem
as well as in other parts of the PNA area. Israel is naturally
interested in skirting this issue, especially when it is fervently
trying to determine the status of Jerusalem on a unilateral basis,
and to isolate it from the rest of the territories occupied in
1967.
These and other reasons lead many observers to the conclusion that
Israel's zeal for elections in the PNA area has cooled down
considerably, and thus, for the time being at least, Palestinian
and Israeli interests might coincide.
Jerusalem
Israel imposed a closure on Jerusalem in March 1993. As a result,
Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are barred from
entering Arab Jerusalem without a special permit from the Israeli
Civil Administration. This permit is seen by many observers as a
visa Israel requires from Palestinians desiring to visit their
religious shrines or health, educational, cultural or social
institutions in the eastern part of the city occupied by Israel in
1967 and as such, considered part of the Occupied Palestinian
Territories.
In Oslo, it was agreed that Jerusalem would be discussed in the
second phase of the negotiations, but since the OOP, Israel has
been ceaselessly tightening its grip over the city. Members of the
PNA are not allowed to visit Jerusalem, not even to participate in
academic or cultural activities. The process of building Jewish
neighborhoods in and around the city has been enhanced. Joint
efforts in this regard have been intensified between Benyamin Ben
Eliezer, the Labor Minister of Housing, and Ehud Olmert, the Likud
Mayor of Jerusalem.
In the Cairo Agreement of May 4, 1994, Israel acknowledged the
importance of the PA institutions in East Jerusalem, their right to
exist and the need to preserve them. Yet, in violation to this
commitment, the Israeli Cabinet, in July 1994, reviewed a proposed
law to prevent Palestinian national and political activities from
taking place in the city, and passed it to be endorsed by the
Knesset (the Israeli Parliament). This Israeli policy and all
measures taken accordingly, raise many questions as to Israel's
real intentions. It should be clear, though, no real, stable peace
can be achieved when the rights and feelings of Palestinian Muslims
and Christians in the Holy Land, with Jerusalem at its center, are
disregarded.
The Washington Declaration
In the wake of the Oslo OOP, it seems the Jordanians felt that they
had been betrayed by the PLO, and feared that this lack of
coordination between them and the PLO would mean they were being
side-stepped in the peace process unless they acted fast. This fear
proved to be a boon for Israel, giving it better leverage in its
negotiations both with Jordan and the PLO.
Israel now assumes that it can exploit what it believes to be
competition between Arafat and Hussein over who will visit
Jerusalem first, in order to extract concessions from both parties
over Jerusalem. Israel will try to trivialize the conflict and
reduce it to a mere dispute over the holy sites while it continues
to claim sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.
The question of Jerusalem was placed as an item for discussion on
the agenda of the talks with Jordan which have achieved real
substantive progress, and have culminated in the Hussein-Rabin
summit in Washington on July 25, 1994. Accordingly, Israel will
give Jordan the priority in future negotiations over the control of
Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.
Although this goes in contradiction with Israel's commitment in the
OOP that the issue of Jerusalem would be debated between Israel and
the PLO in the second phase of the negotiations over the final
status of the OPT, the Israeli offer to Jordan could be viewed as a
positive development. It represents the first Israeli concession
over Jerusalem. As such, this should lead to further substantive
concessions to the PLO when the issue of Jerusalem will be
discussed within the framework of the negotiations on final
status.
For the Palestinians, terms like "God's sovereignty over the holy
places" are nothing but cliches. For them, all Jerusalem is holy.
It is part of the occupied Palestinian territories and the future
capital of the Palestinian state; therefore, whatever is ultimately
agreed upon between Israel and Jordan regarding the religious
shrines in the city, Muslim as well as Christian, should not and
will not jeopardize the Palestinian national rights to the Arab
part of Jerusalem occupied in June 1967. The continued Israeli
disregard of the national rights of the Palestinians over East
Jerusalem will only constitute a time-bomb which is liable to go
off any moment and be the cause of a violent and fierce war, not
between Palestinians and Israelis, but between Muslims and
Jews.
Many Palestinians would also like to see the coordination between
the PLO and Jordan restored, and competition ended for the sake of
Arab national rights, especially over Jerusalem. The recent
historic talks between Israel and Jordan in the Arava Valley
(Abronah), and the Washington Declaration should then be viewed as
a positive development in the overall efforts of making peace in
the Middle East. Any progress in anyone track of the peace talks
should lead us closer to the comprehensive settlement. The
launching of negotiations over normalization of ties between Israel
and Jordan constitutes a very promising agenda for the future of
the region. In fact, ending the state of war between Jordan and
Israel will help the Palestinian negotiators refute Israel's
security argument to keep a substantially wide military zone along
the Jordan River for the defense of Israel in the face of any
military aggression from the Eastern Front. Consequently, this zone
should be transferred into Palestinian hands.
Settlements
No real progress was achieved in the talks which took place in
Taba, and later in Cairo in the fall of 1993 and subsequent dates,
to work out an agreement based on the DOP. Any advance in the
discussions was stymied by the consideration of the settlers'
interests, and as a result, many substantive issues were postponed
to the second phase of negotiations over the final status of the
OPT.
Consequently, without solving the problem of Jewish settlements in
the OPT, there will be no real chance for further progress in the
peace process. Those who have worked hard to establish Jewish
settlements in the OPT in order to abort any future withdrawal have
- so far - achieved their goal. Something has to be done in the
opposite direction to prove that peace is more desirable than
settlements.
Conclusion
The establishment of the PNA in the Gaza Strip and Jericho
represents an important step on the road to peace, and the
functioning of the Palestinian police is deemed very impressive.
Yet, it must be acknowledged that much time has been wasted. The
structure of the PNA has to be completed immediately in order to
stem the excuses proferred by the donor states to delay full
financial support to the PNA. When this materializes, the daily
life of the Palestinians will improve and the peace process will
gain momentum.
The Israeli Government has also to accept the fact that this peace
process is based on UN Resolution 242 which means trading peace for
land, that is, Arab recognition in return for Israeli withdrawal
from occupied Arab land. Israel cannot have both the land and the
peace. Once Israel comes to terms with this fact, a different
attitude will emerge regarding the talks on early empowerment, the
elections, the Jewish settlements in Palestinian lands, Jerusalem
and the final shape of the comprehensive settlement.
The process has started. Some progress has been made on the
Palestinian¬Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli tracks; a similar
progress on the Syrian track remains essential. New vision and
leadership courage is needed to demonstrate that this process is
irreversible.
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