For many decades Israelis and Palestinians, entranced by the
maximalist goals of Greater Israel, or Greater Palestine, refused
to negotiate, and instead attempted to achieve their aims through
intractable conflict. This situation changed after 1988 when the
PLO Algiers resolution opened the possibility of negotiating a
two-state solution. In 1993, with the Oslo agreement this
opportunity was realized.
Several assumptions guided the major shift in Israeli policy that
led to the Oslo agreement: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot
be won by military means; Israel does not want to rule the
Palestinians and therefore wants to separate from them; a political
process is vital and is only possible with the PLO headed by Yasser
Arafat; the PLO is willing to enter a political process and can be
a negotiating partner in light of the strategic changes in the
goals and policy of the organization (see Bar-Siman-Tov, Michael,
Lavie and Bar-Tal, 2005).
These assumptions guided the Israeli leadership through the 1990s,
even during the time of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who
headed a coalition led by the Likud party. Nevertheless, because of
various reasons that are beyond the scope of the present paper,
this approach was not transformed into a peaceful resolution of the
conflict.
The failed summit meeting at Camp David in July 2000, and the
eruption of the second Intifada in the fall of 2000, were the major
events that brought about a sharp change in Israeli assumptions.
Since much has been written about these two events that
dramatically changed the course of relations between Israelis and
Palestinians, we must only point out that their nature is much more
complex and multi-sided than publicly presented by the Israeli
leadership and most of the Israeli mass media. In contrast to the
widely-held perception in Israel, accumulated evidence suggests
that Israel bears much responsibility for the deterioration of the
relations between Israelis and Palestinians and the escalation of
the conflict.1
The new assumptions that began to evolve in certain political and
military circles during the last months of Ehud Barak's premiership
became dominant during Ariel Sharon's first years as prime
minister. The new assumptions suggested that the political process
must end because the Palestinians had resorted to terrorism and
violence to achieve their goals: Yasser Arafat was responsible for
the outbreak and continuation of violence and therefore he could
not be a partner to negotiations and had to be removed; Israel was
committed to negotiations, but they could only begin after complete
cessation of violence, removal of Arafat and disarmament of the
terror organizations; meantwhile Israel would continue to manage
the conflict forcefully to prevent any political and military gains
by Palestinians (see Bar-Siman-Tov, Michael, Lavie and Bar-Tal,
2005). The Israeli conditions had the purpose of avoiding any
negotiations because it was obvious to those who posed them that
the Palestinians would not accept them.
These basic assumptions are intact today with certain changes in
the wake of regional developments. Israel continues to claim that
there is no Palestinian partner for negotiation in spite of the
fact that Arafat died in the fall of 2004, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) was elected as president and later Hamas formed a
government. Various reasons were offered to explain why Israel will
not negotiate with Abbas (he is weak, he does not control the armed
groups, he does not want to crush Hamas, he does not make serious
efforts to fight terrorism, etc.). Specifically, for example,
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in an interview with the
British newspaper The Independent on June 10, 2006 said: "If, as
appears at this time, there won't be negotiations because the
Palestinians are not ready, because they are not prepared to assume
responsibility, because the extremist fundamentalist, religious
radical government of Hamas is not prepared and Abu Mazen is too
weak, then I'll try and discuss this issue with the international
community."
Of special interest are the arguments for the unilateral approach
presented by the Israeli left. They served as first-hand witnesses
of what they described as the frustrating experiences of
negotiating with Palestinians. Justice Minister Haim Ramon,
formerly a member of the dovish faction of the Labor party who
moved to Kadima, the main party in the present Israeli government
coalition, said in an interview: "I'm telling you from experience
that they can't give up on the Right of Return. And they are not
capable of reaching a compromise on Jerusalem. So there will not be
a final-status agreement. Any attempt to reach a final-status
agreement, like Camp David, will lead to a thousand more
fatalities. But they are also not ready for an interim agreement.
Therefore, the choice is between the status quo and a unilateral
process. To die or to have surgery. ("On life and death," Haaretz,
24 March, 2006).
Alon Liel, director general of the Foreign Ministry in the Barak
government, and member of the left-wing Meretz party, added more
explanations. Liel used the victory of Hamas in January 2006
parliamentary elections to justify unilateralism. He wrote: "There
is no possibility of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
through negotiations with Abu Mazen in his current situation. And
the question isn't who is nicer - Abu Mazen or Palestinian Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh. The question is whether we believe in
democracy... If it were possible to skip straight to Haniyeh, it
would be worth it, but because this is impossible, it is necessary
to proceed with more surgery, immediately." Liel argued that
negotiations with Abbas would have negative side effects. "It's
slow and wastes time. It can also cause degeneration among other,
relatively stable systems. And it doesn't treat the hemorrhaging
that the disengagement has left behind, which could be fatal. Every
day we talk to Abu Mazen, the West Bank settlers' roots will
deepen." ("Don't negotiate - just evacuate," Haaretz, 26 May,
2006).
It is true that the vicious Palestinian terror causes loss of
innocent lives, spreads fear, desire for vengeance, distrust,
delegitimization of Palestinians and serves as a major obstacle to
peaceful conflict resolution. But it is time to understand that
Palestinian violence is part of the vicious cycle of the conflict,
it has causes, and is also set off by continuous Israeli violence
that harms all aspects of individual and collective lives. The
violence will only greatly diminish with the resolution of the
conflict. The absence of negotiations and prospects for a solution
are some of the reasons for increased violence.
In view of this basic position about the lack of a partner on the
Palestinian side, Israel decided under Sharon's leadership to
withdraw from Gaza unilaterally, and he executed this decision the
summer of 2005. In the fall of 2005 there was a major political
realignment and it became clear that Israel would continue its
policy of unilateral withdrawals and eventually unilaterally set
the borders of the State of Israel.
Formally, Israel has declared that it would try to negotiate a
peaceful settlement of the conflict, but if the negotiations did
not succeed, withdrawal and decisions on borders would be made
unilaterally. In his famous Herzliya speech in December 2003,
Sharon said: "We wish to speedily advance implementation of the
Road Map towards a quiet and genuine peace," adding that "we also
hope that the Palestinian Authority will carry out its part." But
right after this opening he added: "However, if in a few months the
Palestinians still continue to disregard their part in implementing
the Road Map - then Israel will initiate a unilateral security step
of disengagement from the Palestinians. We are interested in
conducting direct negotiations, but do not intend to leave Israeli
society hostage to the Palestinians. I have already said - we will
not wait for them indefinitely."
Our basic claim in this paper is that Israel does not want to
negotiate with the Palestinians because the present leadership does
not have anything meaningful to offer that corresponds to the
minimal Palestinian goals. The minimal Palestinian goals, held by
the majority of the populace and part of the leadership (see for
example, Shikaki, 2006), correspond to the contours of the Clinton
proposal, the Taba agreement, the Geneva accord or the Saudi
proposal.2 These plans refer to all the major issues, including the
refugee problem,3 and provide solutions with which both nations can
live peacefully, safely and prosperously and still retain their own
identity. In an interview in Haaretz, Abbas said that he is
confident that in one year the Palestinians and the Israelis can
reach a final status agreement along the lines of the 2002 Arab
League's Beirut resolution. This means a two-state solution on the
basis of the June 4th 1967 borders as well as an agreed solution to
the refugee problem ("You Have a Partner," Haaretz, 24 March,
2006).
All these solutions carry a very clear blueprint that outlines the
minimum that can satisfy the majority of Palestinians and lead to
the final resolution of the conflict. But in our view, Olmert (as
well as Sharon before him) has broader goals and believes that he
can achieve them, even unilaterally, with the agreement of the U.S.
and possibly Europe. The willingness of the international community
to accept the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in the
summer of 2005, and to put the Road Map on hold, signaled to the
Israeli leadership that it is possible to dictate a unilateral
approach. This, in their view, is much safer than negotiations over
difficult issues, such as Jerusalem and refugees.
A measure that has already been implemented provides unequivocal
evidence of the overall goals of the Israeli leadership: the fence
not only serves security purposes, but, in effect, swallows up
additional land for the State of Israel, since it significantly
exceeds the Green Line border of 1967. Israel's stated intentions
provide further evidence of this contention: the attempts to hold
on to the major clusters of settlements beyond the Green Line; the
recurring declarations to keep Jerusalem undivided; the attempt to
retain Ariel and the surrounding area; the plan to connect Maaleh
Adumim with Jerusalem; the scheme to establish the eastern border
along the Jordan River and annex the Jordan Rift Valley; and the
continuous expansion of Jewish settlements and roads beyond the
Green Line in the West Bank (see for example the interview with
Olmert in Newsweek, 17 April, 2006, or his speech in the British
Parliament, Haaretz, 14 June, 2006).
These goals will never be accepted by the Palestinians and no
Palestinian leader will be a party to negotiations about them.
Moreover, these demands are unlikely to win international support.
The international approach is that the June 4th, 1967 border is the
basis for any agreement and that Jewish settlements that were
erected beyond this line, after this date are illegal. If Israel
wants to annex any of the territories in order to keep the
settlements, the Palestinian demand for a land swap is likely to
gain wide international support.
The present leadership of Israel in the Kadima party, especially
those who split from the Likud, still continues to believe that
Jews have full rights to the land. On presenting his new government
Olmert said: "I, like many others, also dreamed and yearned that we
would be able to keep the entire land of Israel. Only those who
have the land of Israel burning in their souls know the pain of
relinquishing and parting with the land of our forefathers. I
personally continue to advocate the idea of the entire land of
Israel as a heart's desire. I believe with all my heart in the
people of Israel's eternal historic right to the entire land of
Israel. However, dreams and recognition of this right do not
constitute a political program." (Haaretz, 5 May, 2006).
It is our contention that Israel's political program is affected by
dreams and the present leadership attempts to expand beyond the
Green Line within its unilateral political program block any
possible negotiating process. However, this cannot be said aloud
because the majority of Israelis prefer negotiations to unilateral
moves (see survey carried out by the Harry Truman Research
Institute for the Advancement of Peace, March 2006), and it also
does not resonate well in the international community. So Israel
will continue to publicly declare its willingness to negotiate, but
at the same time do all it can to jeopardize this
possibility.
It has to be noted, though, that although Israelis would like to
settle the conflict via negotiation and a great majority of them
support the two-state solution, most of them also want to keep
Jerusalem undivided, connect Maaleh Adumim with Jerusalem, and
retain the Jordan Rift Valley and the major settlements that are
close to the green line. They also support the present line of the
fence - even if all these steps torpedo a peace agreement (see
survey results carried by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
Research and Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv
University). However, 55% of the same public believes that the
Palestinians' main condition for a permanent agreement is an
Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders (Zakay, Klar, & Sharvit,
2002). This contradictory slew of opinions cannot advance a
solution.
A turning point in the Israeli public's collective psyche took
place following the Six Day War when the great majority of Israeli
Jews began to view the territories as "liberated," rather than
"occupied." From then on any attempt to solve the conflict under
the principle of "land for peace" was perceived as "giving up land"
rather than justly sharing land belonging to two nations.
We believe that a brave Israeli leadership, freed from ideology and
recognizing the validity of Palestinian claims, could lead the
nation to an acceptable solution. It was Sharon, who had the
courage to say in the Knesset: "It is impossible to hold 3.5
million Palestinians under occupation… occupation cannot last
without end" (May 26, 2003). After years of indoctrination and
manipulations, he stated clearly that Israel was occupying the
territories. When this view is fully acknowledged in Israel it will
serve as a major force in the bid to solve the conflict. An end to
the occupation and justice for the Palestinians would also be
beneficial for the Jews, who only then will be able to devote
themselves to the challenge of building a just, safe, and moral
society. It would be the time to abandon narrow ethnocentric
considerations of how much Israel can expand in favor of the
universal moral principles of justice that Israel demands from
other nations.
The ascendance of Hamas to power in the Palestinian Authority
serves the goals of the present Israeli leadership. The
obstructionist views of the Hamas government allows Israel to adopt
a harsh policy line, ignore Abbas, pay lip service to the principle
of negotiation, while carrying out a unilateral political program
that will result in the continuation of violence. The idea of
removing a few dozen isolated settlements looks attractive to many
Israelis, including those who consider themselves "liberal."The
unilateral option seems to them as a risk-free way out of the
deadlock, unlike the path taken by the Labor-left coalition in
signing the Oslo agreement.
It is our belief that Israel's present path ensures the
continuation of the violent conflict. Thus it is important to
illuminate the intentions, goals and policies of the Israeli
government that have an effect on the well-being of two nations,
the region and the international community. It is Israel that holds
the great majority of the keys that could help resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We hope that eventually reason and
morality will prevail to take the parties in direction of
difficult, but possible, negotiations for the settlement of this
conflict that have a high probability of bringing badly needed
peace and security to Israelis and Palestinians.
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1 See for example Baltianski, 2005; Bar-Tal & Halperin,
in press; Ben Ami, 2004; Dor, 2004; Lessons of the Arab-Israeli
negotiating, 2005; Peri, 2006; Pressman, 2003; Ross, 2004; Shamir
& Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Sher, 2001; Swisher, 2004.
2 Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amos Malka, who served at the time as commander
of the intelligence branch of the Israel Defense Forces, outlined
to Barak, before he went to the Camp David summit, the contours of
the settlement that could be accepted by the Palestinians. These
correspond to proposals by Clinton and others (Malka, 2004, p.
20).
3 In all the four plans, the proposed solutions of the refugee
problem do not change the demographic nature of Israel and allow it
to determine how many refugees would be allowed to enter.