The recent war in Lebanon would appear to have dealt a near-death
blow to chances for Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The earlier electoral victory of Hamas prompted an Israeli (and
international) boycott of the Palestinian Authority. This was
compounded and rendered far worse by the Israeli reoccupation of
Gaza - in the wake of the kidnapping of Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
soldier Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants - which appeared to
place Israelis and Palestinians further and further apart.
A series of targeted assassinations by Israel, with their
ever-growing toll on civilians (the so-called "collateral damage"),
and the firing of Qassam rockets at Israeli population centers
together emptied the Gaza disengagement of almost any positive
value it had in the eyes of either Israelis or Palestinians.
The Lebanon War (II) then totally eclipsed the Israeli offensive in
Gaza (which in July alone took 197 Palestinian lives). It also
appeared to eclipse - possibly destroy - Palestinian efforts to
achieve a national unity pact, while the successes of Hassan
Nasrallah and his militant Shi'a movement, Hizbullah, in
withstanding the IDF appeared to strengthen not only radical
Islamic sentiment in Palestine but also support for militancy among
the general population to some degree (not only in
Palestine).
At the same time, Israel's failure in Lebanon brought with it the
threat of still stronger Israeli action against the Palestinians in
an effort to recoup some of the IDF's lost deterrent power. In
addition, the Israeli government emerged from the war greatly
weakened and buffeted, to the potential benefit of the extreme
right. Right-wing parties were bolstered by general Israeli
sentiment that the army had simply not been enabled (by the
government) to exercise the full extent of force of which it was
capable.
None of this would seem to constitute a formula for peace.
Yet there is another interpretation of these developments and of
the potential ramifications of the war. Even as Israelis blamed
unpreparedness and indecision for the IDF's apparent failures
against Hizbullah, Israeli arrogance and blind faith in the use of
force was seriously challenged.
Even as popular opinion polls showed increased militancy and
support for the war, they also reflected majority support for the
need to open a political path, that is, an understanding at least
that force alone was not enough. (Some, albeit few, may even have
concluded that force is not the answer at all.)
Unilateralism Discredited
Perhaps more significantly, the idea of unilateralism was totally
discredited. Amidst the laments that Israel had not achieved
security by withdrawing from Lebanon or Gaza (as "proven" by the
violence that subsequently emanated from both areas), the logical
conclusion that gradually emerged was that the problem was
withdrawing unilaterally. From this one could certainly extrapolate
that agreements - full peace agreements - such as those with Jordan
and Egypt are far more promising for Israeli security than
unilateralism.
Unilateralism was the main, if not the only, plank of Kadima, the
party of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Without unilateralism the
Israeli government was left without a policy: The Qassam rockets
continued to fall, the cease-fire in the north threatened to
collapse at any moment; there was little likelihood that Hizbullah
would in fact be disarmed; and Olmert was under constant criticism
and pressure. The population feared a renewed outbreak of war while
the growing threat of Iran was constantly in the news.
In the face of all this, few options were open to the government:
The government could try to deflect criticism by acquiescing to the
right-wing elements (and thereby, most likely, eroding its own
raison d'etre), or it might try to deflect the criticism by opening
a new initiative - for an agreement.
The possibility that the second path might be chosen was suggested,
indeed strengthened, oddly perhaps, by the outcome of the Lebanon
War (II). For while the war did eclipse the Palestinian issue, the
Arab-Israeli conflict was returned to center stage in the
international arena. The international community became and remains
deeply involved in the resolution of the war, concerned not only
that hostilities may break out again, but also that they may expand
within the region.
The Arab nations are particularly concerned because of the
strengthening of militants in their own country as the popularity
of Nasrallah spreads. And even the United States has spoken of the
need to deal with the "roots" of the conflict - albeit with its own
interpretation as to what those roots are. For most of the
international community, the response to the war is a call for a
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, entirely, and an
international conference to accomplish this.
A package deal would seem to be the answer. The logic - though not
necessarily the order - of such a package may be the reverse of the
customary thinking about a comprehensive solution. But the
fragility of the cease-fire in Lebanon, the strengthening of
militant Islam, and the concern over Iran have all added still more
reasons for resolving the Palestinian issue, placing it in a
broader context.
Thus a package deal might take the following lines: One element
would be a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Israel would
have to give up the Golan (and the Shib'a Farms). But in return it
would gain peace with Syria, the one remaining confrontational
state on our borders; eliminate the critical assistance Damascus
has provided Hizbullah - and the militant wing of Hamas; plus drive
a wedge between Syria and Iran. Syria would get its territory back,
a significant achievement that would serve to stabilize the
faltering government of President Bashar Assad.
The U.S. would have to be part of the package, given Israel's
unwillingness to act against American wishes. Syria would provide
the U.S. with the closure of the Syrian-Iraqi border and the end of
cooperation with the Iraqi resistance, closure of the offices of
the militant groups in Damascus, and the isolation of Iran. In
return Syria would receive reinstatement in the good graces of the
U.S., including revival of its seriously declining economy, as well
as the end of its isolation in the Arab world.
The package might include Lebanon, with Syria no longer fueling
Lebanon's internal divisions via Hizbullah and others and striking
a less threatening balance in the country (possibly even defining
the Lebanese-Syrian border and opening diplomatic relations).
Meanwhile a Lebanese-Israeli peace would become possible, with the
Shib'a Farms issue settled, accompanied by an exchange of
prisoners.
Syria has repeatedly signaled its interest in an agreement with
Israel, even after Lebanon II. Much would depend, however, upon the
attitude of U.S. President George W. Bush. If this attitude were
based on ideology ("the Axis of Evil" theory), there would be no
compromise or willingness to let Israel speak to Syria. If,
however, it were based on what one American analyst has called
"desperate pragmatism" due to the U.S. debacle in Iraq, especially
before congressional elections, Bush might see the Libya-ization of
Syria as a worthwhile achievement to tout. Frequent visits to the
White House by former Secretary of State James Baker III and former
U.S. Ambassador to Syria Edward Djerejian during the summer
suggested that Bush might at least be considering the pragmatic
path.
But the package deal does not stop with Syria nor deal sufficiently
with the Iranian/Shi'a/militant Islamic threat. For Israel, the
further isolation of Iran would help, immediately complicating
Iran's maintenance of Hizbullah, but in the longer term and more
fundamental sense, Israel could be extricated from the threat only
by ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. And the key to that is the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Iranian/Shi'a/militant Islam will find other pretexts and causes
for its extremist rhetoric, but they will find it far more
difficult if not impossible to focus on Israel. Their onslaught
will continue to center not only on the West in general, but also
on the secular/Sunni regimes, but the latter will be strengthened
by the absence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, free (or freer) to
cooperate with both Israel and the U.S., in their own struggle to
prevent the extremists from using or taking over their territory.
Indeed, resolution of the Palestinian issue is critical to dealing
with the broader problem and therefore an essential part of the
package deal.
This is what the Arab states realized some years ago, and what was
fully understood by Yitzhak Rabin. This is what gave birth to the
Saudi Initiative, codified in the Arab League resolution of 2002 as
a Peace Initiative - namely principles for a comprehensive peace,
including Lebanon and Syria, as well as Palestine. Endorsed by all
the Arab states and reaffirmed in May 2006, this resolution offers
"normal peaceful" relations with Israel, provided Israel returns to
its 1967 borders. Given previous Israeli agreements to land swaps,
and the old Clinton parameters for Jerusalem, this demand might
well be met.
The remaining, most difficult issue, that of the refugees, is to be
resolved, according to the Arab League resolution, through an
"agreed" solution - phrasing that should ease some of Israel's
concerns. Thus there is a basis for the package deal, in addition
to the urgent need. And the vehicle proposed by the Arab League at
the end of August, an international conference under the auspices
of the UN, has been advocated by many in the international
community.
Even the Lebanese cease-fire has contributed to the deal in the
form of providing for what is supposed to be a strong international
force to assist the national army in protecting the border - a
potential model for ensuring security for the states of Palestine
and Israel in the future. Of course, models have existed before, as
have suitable vehicles. And while these may create some pressure or
perhaps facilitate the achievement of peace, the critical element
remains the will of Israelis. It is not inconceivable that the war
has created conditions for the emergence of such a will.