The central theme of current issue of the Palestine-Israel
Journal (PIJ) - the impact of the Lebanon war on the future of
Hamas and Kadima - was the topic of a roundtable discussion held at
the American Colony Hotel on Wednesday, August 30, 2006. The
participants were: Dr. Bernard Sabella, member of the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC); Menachem Klein, professor of political
science at Bar Ilan University; Naomi Chazan, professor of
political science at the Hebrew University and former deputy
speaker of the Knesset; Mustafa Abu Sway, professor of philosophy
and Islamic studies at Al-Quds University. The moderators were:
Galia Golan, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and
the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya and member of PIJ editorial
board; Khuloud Khayyat Dajani, professor of social medicine at
al-Quds University and member of the PIJ editorial board; Khaled
Abu Aker, journalist and member of the PIJ editorial
board.
Galia Golan: The idea of this issue was to look at
Palestinian and Israeli society after the elections of Kadima and
Hamas, but since the war intervened, we want the focus more on the
impact of the war on both societies and, especially, where the
leaderships of Hamas and Kadima stand right now, and then take a
look at the future.
Khaled Abu Aker: We can start with the Israeli side.
Menachem Klein: There are many similarities in my view
between the two societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, also
between the two political fields. There are also differences; for
example, many Israelis concluded from the war that Israel is weak.
As far as I read, the same conclusion is also popular in Palestine.
On the other hand, some Israelis concluded that we have to finish
the job. We have to go with massive force, either to a second round
in Lebanon, or into the Palestinian territories. Using more force
is also a lesson that some Palestinians concluded -the Katyusha is
the answer. On the other hand, the debate goes: is force the
solution, or is the political process the solution to end the
occupation? The Palestinians are dying on a daily basis and nobody
cares. So how do we push forward world public opinion to care about
the Palestinian situation? Is it by using Katyushas as Hizbullah
did, or though a national unity government, the prisoners'
document, a political initiative? So the dilemmas are very
similar.
Khaled Abu Aker: When we talk about the Israeli society, is
there now a growing awareness of a need to reach a political
agreement with the Palestinians so the Lebanon experience will not
be repeated in Gaza?
Khuloud Dajani: The main question is: How did the war in
Lebanon affect the psychology of both communities? Did it bring us
closer to peace or did it widen the gap between us? Within the
peace camp, it confirmed the belief that the use of force does not
help either party achieve any fruitful objectives, and that what is
needed are negotiations and non-violent means to reach peace and
conciliation. Outside the peace camp, a controversy exists
regarding who won, but at the same time a there is a consensus that
both adversaries lost in terms of human loss and property
destruction. Furthermore, it confirmed the idea that peace is still
unattainable.
Menachem Klein: The only one conclusion that Israelis have
reached is that unilateralism is over. Unilateralism leads to
Qassam rockets from Gaza and Katyushas from Lebanon. So what next?
Very few believe in the political process. The vast majority think
that there is no Palestinian partner - there is an axis of evil
between Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas, so the solution is more force. I
was among the very few Israelis who wrote about the changes in
Hamas. It took a long time for Haaretz to agree to publish the
article. Very few in Israel really see what's going on inside
Hamas. So for the vast majority of Israelis, definitely for the
Israeli establishment, all the religious leaders are the same; all
of them are extremists, fundamentalists, and we have to
fight.
Galia Golan: Maybe we can ask Professor Abu Sway if that's
an accurate picture. How do you see Hamas after Lebanon?
Mustafa Abu Sway: I definitely do not see the similarities
between the Israelis and the Palestinians - I saw similarities
between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. What took place in
Palestine on a mini scale was simply done on a large scale in
Lebanon. Is it a pathological remnant of past experiences that have
nothing to do with us? The use of brute force and, of course, war
crimes? I don't see any Palestinian government getting a good deal
with Israel.
Khaled Abu Aker: Perhaps you can elaborate more on the
effect of the war on Palestinian society, on the idea of resistance
itself. Did the resistance of Hizbullah boost the morale of the
Palestinian street?
Mustafa Abu Sway: It did, not only on the Palestinian
street, but all over the Arab world and, in fact, Muslims worldwide
saw that Hizbullah could stop Israel from achieving its goal of
destroying Hizbullah or getting rid of their weapons. As in the
case of the Americans in Iraq, the aims of the war changed very
fast. Definitely the morale was boosted and they could see that the
myth of Israel as a strong, invincible country is really nothing
but a myth.
Khaled Abu Aker: So how does this reflect on Palestinian
resistance, the Palestinian street?
Galia Golan: Do you think this will have a lasting
effect?
Mustafa Abu Sway: I don't know whether this will have a
lasting effect or not, but people now see that Israel is like any
other country. Sometimes the use of such massive force is seen as a
weakness. And one can also learn from this that force itself cannot
solve problems. People, like Hizbullah, using a new generation of
weapons shocked everybody. Today it seems that it is possible to
infiltrate weapons everywhere. It proves that force as a response,
even when massive, cannot deliver and people have to rethink the
roots of the problem - the occupation, and Israeli
expansionism.
Galia Golan: What do you think will be the effect on the
Palestinian public?
Mustafa Abu Sway: Last week the Islamic Liberation Party
(Hizb at-Tahrir) held conferences in all major West Bank cities and
they had massive attendance. That's new; it never took place
before. They are not basically belligerent. Throughout their
history- which is a little bit more than 50 years - they never
engaged in any direct resistance to the occupation. Nevertheless,
how can one interpret this interest in a different line which is
basically redefining the map?
Khuloud Dajani: There is no doubt that the violence in Gaza
and the war in Lebanon have left the Palestinians more embittered
and more pessimistic about the future. After the death of Arafat,
the Palestinians were looking for a leader to fill his place and
many of them saw in Nasrallah that leader. They were very impressed
with the resistance, the unity, the discipline, the training, and
the resilience that Hizbullah showed during that bloody
confrontation. The Palestinians were also impressed by Hizbullah's
post-conflict social and health-care services provided to the
Lebanese hurt by the violence.
Galia Golan: Professor Chazan, how about the impact on the
Israeli scene?
Naomi Chazan: I think it really is an enormous topic. Let's
state very clearly that this is a war that Israel did not win. I
think there is a realization in Israel that it did not win. Many
circles believe it lost the war. This goes back to many questions
I'm not sure Israeli society is willing to address. The first: Why
is the instinctive reaction to the abduction of soldiers to use
military force? That goes back to a militaristic mindset which
requires self-examination. Question number two is how did Israel
make such a mess out of this effort? The mess expressed itself in
several ways - politically in terms of the decision-making process;
militarily in terms of the actual tactical, strategic as well as
logistic elements; and socially in the fact that it transpires that
the entire north of the country, and especially the destitute,
disadvantaged groups in the north, including Palestinian Israelis,
were the ones most hard hit and are still feeling the effect. The
fourth element of what went wrong is diplomatic: Israel actually
enjoyed a great deal of international understanding during the
first 48 hours of the kidnapping of the soldiers, but totally
misunderstood what the reaction to the bombing of Beirut would be.
The fundamental issue is one of mindset. I don't think an adequate
effort is being given to the fact that, conceptually, the whole
unilateral notion is overlaid by real arrogance, and by a feeling
that we can decide what is in our interest and we can implement it
and the other side, whether it be the Palestinians or Lebanese,
have to live with it. If this kind of attitude is not severely
shaken in the aftermath of the war, then Israel is incapable of
learning any lessons at all.
Khaled Abu Aker: Tell us about Kadima's retreat.
Naomi Chazan: Kadima came into office on a single-issue
platform of unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank, and within 33
days that platform has dissipated entirely. We now have a ruling
party without a platform. And not only that, but its entire
leadership is under investigation for its mishandling of the
decision-making process and the conduct of the war. So Kadima might
indeed prove to be a one-term party with no future whatsoever. But
some of the possible alternatives are worse.
Galia Golan: Let's hear Dr. Sabella on the Palestinian
side.
Khaled Abu Aker: In particular the political parties.
Bernard Sabella: I would agree with Naomi in the sense that
the Palestinian perception has always been that whenever Israel is
in trouble it relies on force. Palestinians have been facing a
problem since February [2006]. We don't have funds, our economy is
not working, our government is not working. So there were some
moments of outspoken and clear identification with Hizbullah, with
Hassan Nasrallah, with them being able to confront Israel
militarily, but it was not "hallelujah, praise the Lord; now we are
fine." In fact, when the war started, many Palestinians were
worried that the Palestinian case was going to become number two
rather than number one. What Mustafa said about the manifestation
of the Islamic Liberation Party and what I heard about them calling
for the return of the Caliphate is seen by many Palestinians as
even going to the right of the right. In other words, Hamas would
be center-right, and Fateh would be center and a little bit left.
The Lebanon war may have exacerbated the political situation. We
may be in more of an impasse than before. With Lebanon being the
preoccupation of the Israelis and, to an extent, the Americans, now
we are left in effect to fend for ourselves. There is a feeling
that we came out weaker from this war politically and we have
become much weaker on the international scene. It doesn't have to
do with Hamas or Fateh; it could have been a Fateh government, or a
coalition government. If we continue with this impasse and this
weak position, then not only will the Palestinian Authority (PA)
collapse, but we will have militias taking over. Some may argue
that the stage is set for the right of Fateh to take over with the
blessing of the Americans and others. I am not sure that on the
street this will pass very easily, unless it is backed by a kind of
a political solution that will tell people our economic situation
will improve and the checkpoints will become easier. So you cannot
judge the effects of the war without taking the overall context -
which is very negative.
Khaled Abu Aker: By a solution you don't mean a
process?
Bernard Sabella: No, a solution meaning a process that would
take another 20 years? No.
Khuloud Dajani: There has been a lot of criticism of Hamas
and Kadima; there has been a big shift in paradigms from that of
peace to that of force and violence. Peace is becoming an
implausible dream - it's even started having negative
connotations.
Galia Golan: Menachem, can you address what we heard just a
minute ago, the fact that the right wing was strengthened in both
societies?
Menachem Klein: That came to mind while I was listening to
Mustafa. Another similarity is that, while in Palestinian society
the Islamic Liberation Party is becoming more popular than ever, in
Israel the the anti-withdrawal, settlers camp, reconnected
themselves to the State of Israel following the war. Last summer
they were isolated, they were divorced from Israeli nationalism,
from public opinion. Then with the war, with the failure of Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Israel army Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz,
they feel that once again they are in the game; they are getting
more support; they have a role in Israeli nationalism, and they are
once again connected with the mainstream. It's very similar because
the hardcore of the settlers camp is religious, national religious,
similar to the national religious camp in Palestine, not in methods
but in basic beliefs. This can lead to another round of violence
with the conclusion that only violence can bring us to achieve our
national goals. Unfortunately, the camp on both sides that calls
for a political process is very weak at the moment. I don't know
how the future will look. Israel may seek another round. Some
groups inside Palestine may try to emulate the lessons of
Hizbullah's success in firing Katyusha rockets. I agree with you
Mustafa. I don't see any Israeli government that can accept the
prisoners' document or even the Clinton Parameters as a framework
for a political process. But here civil society is called to take
the lead. Citizens' diplomacy is needed in order to pave the way
for a political process.
Mustafa Abu Sway: Hizb at-Tahrir has zero nationalistic
components. Zero.
Menachem Klein: My point is not about the popularity, about
the support.
Mustafa Abu Sway: The second point is that the Hizb
at-Tahrir does not translate into violence. More than 50 years of
existence with basically zero violence. But it shows that people
are disenchanted. On the political scene, they see that Israel
simply does not deliver. This is where I would differ from Dr.
Khuloud. You cannot put Hamas and Kadima on the same level. There
is no new reality for us who have been living under occupation
throughout the years.
Khaled Abu Aker: Is it true, Dr. Abu Sway, that there is
dissatisfaction in the Palestinian street with the way the
government is dealing with the political situation?
Mustafa Abu Sway: You cannot say that this particular government
could not deliver on its platform because of internal problems. For
the Palestinian government, the cause is external. Israel's problem
is also external. Is it really the Americans who were pulling the
strings? Did Israel, for example, want to stop the war in Lebanon
sooner, but the Americans insisted it continue? We want to know
exactly who is leading whom - is it AIPAC?
Khuloud Dajani: In the Israeli street, you see
disappointment with Kadima's performance; also in the Palestinian
street, you see disappointment with Hamas's performance. People on
both sides are getting disenchanted with their leaders and their
parties. Both governments are unable to deliver the goods for
different reasons but the results are the same - broken promises
and no peace efforts.
Mustafa Abu Sway: Eighty-two percent of Israelis supported
the war and this means, if you deduct the Arabs - the Israeli
Palestinians - almost 100 percent of Israeli Jews were pro-war.
When Palestinians demonstrate against the government, it's because
it has failed to deliver.
Khaled Abu Aker: It's true. But our issue is Hamas and
Kadima. If there were elections today, the Palestinian voters would
vote differently, maybe for Hizb al-Tahrir. There would be a
political change, so Dr. Sabella, concerning the dissatisfaction in
the Palestinian street, was Hamas trapped by forming the
government?
Bernard Sabella: I think the disappointment with the
Hamas-led government is due to the fact that when they came to
power, the majority of the people who voted for had great
expectations - that they would improve the social-economic
situation. Many people were happy with their tough position towards
Israel because Israel taught us not to be too soft and, therefore,
with a tough government we would be able to negotiate or go forward
with Israel. The biggest disappointment was that the Hamas-led
government has not been able to fulfill its social responsibility,
its contract with its electorate. The reasoning behind this failure
is that there is a political cost and Hamas is not willing to pay
it. Likewise, when I look at the Israeli government, I see that
they have done a big disservice to their electorate by going to war
in Lebanon; they could have explored political processes. In the
Palestinian case, Hamas has not been able to really transform its
position from a party, from a movement, into a national government.
Its problem was that it did not transform its program into one that
is practical and pragmatic.
If there were new elections, I would say Hamas would still have its
supporters and, while they might not get 75 seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), I think they may well get
60-65 seats. The wishful thinking on the part of of us liberals,
and what you call leftists, Fateh and whatever, that Hamas
disappear is not going to happen. Hamas has become a political
force. Certainly it will come out weaker from this experience, but
it will not go away. Menachem, you mentioned civil society. I think
with separation we have a serious problem. You will have less and
less Palestinian intellectuals, academics, civil-society people who
would be willing to work with you. I rarely go to Arab-Israeli
encounters. There are people who think that we can play the same
civil-society game that was played in the 1980s. We missed the
boat. You are not going to change the realities of Palestinian
political life. Not you, not I.
Galia Golan: Professor Chazan, I would like to go back to
the Israeli political scene. You said Kadima is a one-issue
party.
Naomi Chazan: First of all I want to make it very clear: the
protests in Palestine and the protests in Israel are very
different. The Palestinian protests express frustration with the
situation that is deteriorating and that has no outlet. They do not
have one direction; they have got a number of targets. And some of
them aren't even antagonistic to Hamas; they are also antagonistic
to those who are isolating Hamas and not allowing it to move. They
are a long-term, maybe escalating type of political protests that
are of a totally different order to what is happening in Israel. In
Israel, the protests are entirely focused on very recent events.
There are very clear people they are meant to target: the Prime
Minster, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff - Olmert,
Amir Peretz and Halutz. They are of a totally different order to
the protests that developed after the 1973 war, which were
broad-based. These are not gathering strength. I even see two
protest movements in the meager protests that exist. The success of
this type of protest usually lies in the capacity to bring an
alternative. If there's no alternative it will dissipate.
I think Kadima was fragile from the beginning. Now it finds itself
without a platform. It's going to invent a platform which is
totally uninteresting to the people sitting around this table, and
that is the rehabilitation of the Galilee. They can't agree on
anything else. What is going to keep them in office, at least for
the next few months, is the fact that the alternatives don't have
enough power, or are so suspect themselves, that Kadima is going to
be allowed to muddle through. The Israeli political system is in
very severe difficulties and there are no clear answers to how to
get out of them and how to start making certain kinds of
governmental reforms. The question is: What will these people do
with the little margin of time that one has in this kind of
situation?
What can be done? We can start analyzing how the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed as a result of the
Lebanese war. I think that's a critical question and part of the
answer to it has emerged. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been
regionalized by the war. If before it was a bilateral affair, or a
non-affair, today it has many regional elements, some that have
nothing to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, except
extremely indirectly. A second point is that the emphasis on
Lebanon is diverting attention away from the Palestinian issue to
the detriment of the latter. The question is how to bring it back
to center stage? There may be a silver lining in that the process
could be pushed forward taking into account the new elements. I
just want to say two other things. Number one, it is a gross
mistake to go back to the old language of Clinton and Oslo and
Taba, etc.
Bernard Sabella: And it's not acceptable to both
peoples.
Naomi Chazan: First and most importantly, if there is any
chance to grab the moment politically in terms of a process, it
seems to me you have to go for everything and that is a full,
comprehensive, permanent-status negotiations now. It's all or
nothing. I don't think there is going to be another opportunity.
That is why Taba, or Clinton is not interesting. By the way, in
Israel there's been an understanding, that this is true. Go for the
whole package. Number two, you have to link it to the regional
question because, if you don't, it's not going to fly. That's why I
like the Arab initiative now. Because it does two things that are
very important: it contextualizes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and it puts it in center stage.
Khaled Abu Aker: I don't know how far this is true, but
after the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers there were reports of
the existence of al-Qaeda elements in Gaza. Now there is also the
Hizb al-Tahrir phenomenon; where are we heading with this issue?
The failure of the Hamas government has created a feeling that it
was a mistake for Hamas to go into politics. The success of
Hizbullah is sending another message to the Palestinians: our
rockets have succeeded in defeating Israel. And today there was a
statement from Damascus by senior Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzuk
saying that Hamas is considering adopting the Hizbullah model of
resistance. What is this phenomenon of the Islamization of
Palestinian society that is leading to more and more support for
parties that previously had none.
Khuloud Dajani: I believe that the word to be used here is
"radicalization" and not "Islamization" of Palestinian society
because Islam is a religion of peace and not a religion of
violence. Muslims need to dispel this stereotypical image that
portrays their religion as one of war and not peace. This
perception is due to the fact that Muslims mix religion with
politics. Hamas as simultaneously a religious and a political party
tends to confuse what is religious with what is political. This
raises the question: Can Hamas be a partner to negotiations with
the Israelis? Can religious Hamas allow political Hamas to
negotiate a peace deal? The Prophet Mohammed had set an example
when he made peace with Jews, but will Hamas follow that
example?
Mustafa Abu Sway: It would be easier to answer if you define
what is meant by "partner." It's a very difficult experience for
the Palestinians to try to establish a government under occupation.
Yasser Arafat was a non-partner and Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas (Abu Mazen) is a non-partner, and nobody is really a partner.
It's an absurd notion. I am trying to see why, for example, Dr.
Sabella did not speak about the larger picture. He did not speak
about the collective punishment against Palestinians - beginning
with Canada. Why would Canada immediately declare a boycott on the
Palestinians? Israel itself boycotted Yasser Arafat. Israel
prevented Abu Mazen from moving around. We tend to think if we
reduce the problem to the current government, we can understand the
problem better. No. The claim that the biggest problem is the Hamas
government is not true. The problem is accepting the Palestinians,
not as partners, but as people under occupation with legitimate
rights. We have lost our country; we have lost everything; we have
no freedom of movement. For the last few weeks, there has been a
very big question amongst the Palestinians about dismantling the
PA, because they don't see where we are going. The ministers are in
prison, the PLC members are in prison. Nobody, including the
highest ranking Palestinian officials, can move from one place to
the other without a permit. We are under occupation.
Khaled Abu Aker: What about this growing support for the
idea of Islamization rather than for national issues?
Mustafa Abu Sway: I don't see any change. In 1996, two
Norwegian sociologists carried out a study on Palestinian society
and they found that three-quarters of the Palestinians supported an
Islamic state. So in ten years nothing has changed. It is not as if
we are talking about something out of the blue. There were
Christians who cast their ballots for Hamas. There were people from
Fateh, who were disenchanted and voted for Hamas. Let me talk about
Islamization. It's not a new phenomenon. There were periods when
people subscribed, say to the left, in the 1970s, not because of
interest in Marxism, but because they thought it would bring
liberation. At one point they found that this did not bring change.
It has been claimed that if we run elections in all Arab countries
now, the Islamists will win. It's not because of the occupation;
there are deeper associations with Islam and one cannot reduce them
to one line only.
Galia Golan: I would like to move towards a conclusion which
we would like everybody to answer: Where we go from here? Professor
Chazan speaks of regionalization of the conflict and therefore of
the regionalization of the solution. There is a question whether
there is a government in Israel that can do that, and I think the
same question could be asked of Palestinian society: in which
direction do you think the society and the government today in
Palestine could go regarding the conflict with Israel?
Khaled Abu Aker: We need an analysis, not a political
statement.
Galia Golan: We ask you to give an analytical answer, not
necessarily what you want to see but what you think are the
directions that are possible. We'll start with Dr. Klein.
Menachem Klein: Can Israel live with the current level of
conflict between Israel and Palestine? Definitely the vast majority
of Israelis will say: Yes, we can live with it. We have succeeded -
with the wall, with the army, all kind of solutions - we can
control the Palestinians. The cost for us is very limited. Rightly
or wrongly, but this is the mood. I do not expect Labor or Kadima,
even Meretz to agree to an Arab peace plan which gives up the
Golan, with the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, and
Palestine. So if we cannot find a way out through the political
system, we must go back to civil society, elite groups in both
civil societies, and I agree with Naomi regarding the need to
conclude a package deal, but a deal between the elite groups on
both sides. Hamas must be part of these elite groups. If we build
up citizens' diplomacy, as in the 1980s, we can show a way out and
bypass the governments. I do not expect the governments to open
negotiations, neither do I expect the third parties, Europe or the
U.S. to intervene and mediate between Hamas and Israel. The boycott
of Hamas is still enforced by European diplomats. So the only way
out is by civil society which must confront the radicals, the
groups that are in favor of using more force.
Naomi Chazan: Many Israelis, as Menachem said, are willing
to live with the ongoing occupation. I think they are wrong. If
Israel doesn't vigorously move to end the occupation and reach a
negotiated settlement, I emphasize - a negotiated settlement - I
think Israel will confront an existential problem. By that I mean
existential in the basic, ideological, moral, military, economic,
and political sense within a period of 5-10 years and, therefore,
the question of ending the occupation is imperative whether it has
national support or not. Point number two: as for two elite groups
in civil society leading the way, I must admit to a major
disappointment with the performance of the elites on both sides in
the last few years. I'm not sure the salvation is going to come
from elite groups, but I don't underestimate the importance of
civil society in elite groups - but it is meaningless unless it
affects decision-makers.
I would go precisely in the opposite direction that Menachem
suggested. I would hang on to the new elements, and one of the
important new elements that I see is the ceasefire in Lebanon. It
is the first time that Israel has embraced an international force
and argues for an international force with teeth. Why is that
important? Because there is a basic and new agreement that there is
an internationalization of the conflict. I would say take the next
four months of 2006 and make sure you convene an international
conference now, because Israel, number one is not instinctively
adverse to internationalization; number two, it's relatively weak;
its leadership is grasping for new ideas. Now is the time to do it
and go for the official level absolutely, and I can't find a better
idea than the good old idea of an international conference. And I'm
not talking about a Madrid Two. There's an international conference
in the probably dead Road Map in phase two and in phase three. So
you could pick up on that and you could pick up on the new Arab
League initiative calling on the UN to convene an international
conference, so the conveners could either be the Quartet expanded,
or some kind of a UN initiative. I want to remind everybody that
Madrid was convened by the U.S. and Russia, under UN auspices. We
need an international conference and the international community
should get into the act now. With all due respect to the activities
of civil society, which I support and will continue to do, I also
know that I want those activities to be directed at the one
concrete thing that can make some difference at this point, and I
would argue it is an international conference on
negotiations.
Khuloud Dajani: I don't agree that regionalization of the
conflict is the answer. The problem lies in the fact that there is
an Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands, and unless
this occupation comes to an end, the conflict will be perpetuated.
Unilateralism has proved to be a failed policy and a return to the
negotiation table is the best option, especially since both people
want peace. According to the polls, more than 68 percent on either
side aspire for peace - some with coexistence, others with
separation.
Bernard Sabella: Since I went into the PLC, I have become a
politician, yet now I am more confused, less focused and I really
don't know where things are going. At the present time I see that
the Palestinians don't have a political plan. And when we look at
the scenarios of government formations, we have the continuation of
the Hamas government that needs to change its platform, to
subscribe to the PLO, to the Arab League Peace Plan and to
international legitimacy. Nobody is asking Hamas to recognize
Israel; what we are asking Hamas to do is to be part of the
political process. You don't want to be a part of the political
process, then why are you in the government? Arafat signed the Oslo
Accords and we don't need to go back to that. Or, some people are
talking about a coalition government, which will not be acceptable
to the Israelis or the Americans. Some people are talking about Abu
Mazen coming up with an emergency government which he can do for
three months, but again this will not lead us anywhere in my
opinion. So we are in an impasse. We are more preoccupied with our
internal divisions and our internal problems. We don't have a plan
to seek even the fruits of regionalization, I'm not sure we are
ready for internationalization. I think that we are at such a low
point that really we need to bring a government that can pull us
together. Israelis ask if they can live with Palestinians behind
the Separation Wall and the hundreds of checkpoints? The answer of
the majority of the Israeli people is yes they can live with that.
But at what cost to your society and to the moral and ethical
fiber? When I see Israeli soldiers at the checkpoints and how they
behave according to a system of control, my heart really breaks; I
say this is a totalitarian army. It's not an army of occupation
anymore; it's an army of control; it's an army that is trained to
suspect every Palestinian. To be in such a situation of total
control over our lives carries more dangers for Israel than for the
Palestinians. But on our part, we need as Palestinians to assess
our situation and to locate ourselves in the political regional and
international contexts without pretension and without exaggerating
our strength or hiding our weakness. As I said before, I don't
think the civil-society model is tenable anymore. I think we need
to examine the whole model seriously because I don't see how I can
go with Israelis to London, to Geneva, or even to meet here in
Jerusalem to talk about peace when the wall and the philosophy of
separation are the order of the day. I don't think the U.S.
administration will help us in the next couple of years and if we
get another Republican administration like the present one, then we
all are stuck. I have one hope; I don't know if it's realistic. I
keep asking myself, Could there be an Israeli De Gaulle who would
come out and say: we ought to face it; we are becoming a
totalitarian society; we are going down the drain morally and
ethically; we are going against our Jewish tradition?
Mustafa Abu Sway: If there is such a person on the Israeli
side it has to be someone who is not corrupt, who is not getting a
kickback when buying or selling an apartment like the Israeli Prime
Minister; who does not have shares to sell knowing that he is going
to war like the Israeli Chief of Staff! And that's very hard. The
discussion amongst the Palestinians about a national unity
government or the government of technocrats does not seem to be on
the table or realistic. The option of the national unity government
will mean that the boycott against Hamas will continue because
there are no guarantees that the Israelis or the Americans will
accept them, but in practical terms, it means that such a
government will only enable "humanitarian assistance" - the flow of
some cash so that the ministries can function and people can
receive salaries. It means that, as long as the Palestinians
behave, as long as they are good, then at least they can eat or
function according to the rules of the prisons or Bantustans in
which we live. I cannot see a solution predicated on Palestinian
performance, whereby if we basically are good and we don't do
anything, then we can get our rights. We cannot depend on the
generosity of the Israeli side. That will not happen. I agree with
Naomi. Look at the failures, not only of the Palestinians but also
of the Israelis, and failures not only of the official tracks, but
even the non-formal ones, like the Geneva accords. Everything
should be on the table once and for all - no process. Everything on
the table and immediate implementation. Even if you can get a "good
deal," if it takes time to implement, then that's enough reason for
failure.
Khaled Abu Aker: But do you see a chance for having
negotiations on final-status issues?
Mustafa Abu Sway: Why not?
Bernard Sabella: I am in the opposition, I am against Hamas
and I would like to have a national unity government to get out of
this impasse. But let's face it: Hamas is part of the political
spectrum. Do you want us to come out and say Well, Hamas cannot be
a partner? Why not? Someone told me when Russian President Vladimir
Putin invited Hamas to Moscow, the Russians were expecting Hamas to
at least come out and say that even if they didn't agree with the
Road Map and that they would want to change it, it could be a start
and they could subscribe to it.
Khaled Abu Aker: Dr. Abu Sway, is it possible for Hamas to
come out with such a declaration? Is it possible to create a
separation between the government itself and Hamas as a political
and military party?
Mustafa Abu Sway: Hamas has its own specific religious
narrative which has nothing to do with Israel. If Israel is
interested in bringing Hamas to the table, then probably a respect
for that narrative should be part of the process.