The Middle East has never been readier for a solution than it is
today. The parties to the conflict have matured, and all conditions
on the ground point to the necessity of ending the crisis and with
it the suffering of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. Although
some people are still talking about the Road Map as a tool for
breaking the deadlock in the political process, it is clear that it
has become an outdated document that cannot form an adequate basis
for a solution. The Road Map was born with inherent discrepancies,
inconsistencies, and rationalizations that hamper its
implementation. Those who still propose the Road Map today have
either been swayed by the name rather than the substance, or are so
desperate that they are grasping at straws, or else they have not
read it and have no idea about its contents.
Intricate and Inherently Flawed
It would be futile to expound upon a document that to all practical
purposes is defunct. Suffice it to mention that the first stage of
the Road Map comprises a number of steps that were supposed to be
implemented separately by both Israel and the Palestinians. The
squabbling about whether these steps were to be carried out in
parallel or in sequence, and the arguments about what was meant by
phrases like "dismantling the infrastructure of terror" took up
years - during which the occupation continued to tear apart the
Palestinian land and the Palestinian people. This first stage was
meant to incorporate an Israeli withdrawal to the positions held by
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) before September 28, 2000, in order
to enable the Palestinians to hold elections and to complete their
reform processes, yet Israel did not withdraw. The Palestinians
insisted on going ahead with the elections in the shadow of the
occupation guns, its repression practices, and its continued
settlement activity. The results changed their whole internal
political balance. Hamas is now leading the government and holds
the majority in Parliament. It is self-evident that this new
development has rendered impossible the implementation of certain
clauses included in the first stage, such as the dismantlement of
Hamas and the collection of its weapons.
Israel's mantra had become its repeated calls upon the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to "dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism" and
to collect the weapons of "terrorist organizations" ahead of any
Israeli undertaking within the framework of the Road Map. This
dithering provided Israel with an opportunity to carry on with its
policy of extra-judicial execution of Palestinian activists, to
build the separation wall, to expand the Jewish settlements, to
tighten its siege on the Palestinians, and to destroy all aspects
of Palestinian life. In short, Israel seized this pretext to kill
the Road Map and to block the execution of the steps pertaining to
the first stage. Had these been accomplished, they would have, in
all likelihood, contributed to improving the atmosphere between
Israelis and Palestinians and, perhaps, led to the resumption of
the political process.
The Road Map consists of a collection of intricate measures and
stages that are interrelated to the extent that if one is halted or
delayed, the entire Road Map comes to a standstill. Furthermore,
absent in the Road Map are any interconnectedness between the
second and third stages and, more importantly, a guarantee securing
the final outcome, which is supposed to be two states alongside
each other.
Today, when some international leaders or diplomats and some
Palestinian leaders scurry to talk about the Road Map, one cannot
help but wonder where it will all lead. These people are fully
aware that the Road Map has lost its validity, and that reverting
to some of its clauses simply means spending many more years in a
maze of deliberations about the dismantlement of the terrorist
infrastructure or about a provisional state - i.e., a state without
defined borders! - a situation that does not exist in any context
of international law.
Troubled Times on Both Sides
To go back to my initial point: The present conditions lead to the
assumption that both Israelis and Palestinians have reached a state
of exhaustion which makes them amenable to contemplate a solution.
At the same time, they're starting to feel the pressure coming out
of the region to close the Israel-Palestine file so that attention
can be turned to other more pressing issues that impact on other
countries in the area, such as the developments in Iraq and their
implications on neighboring countries, as well as Iran's nuclear
program. For this reason, some countries in the region are inclined
to view their interests as lying more in working with Israel than
against it. At the same time, they recognize that the continued
Israeli occupation and its oppression of the Palestinian people,
preventing them from establishing their state and enjoying their
right to freedom and independence, will always remain a stumbling
block in the face of their forging tighter relations with Israel
based on their shared regional interests.
In the Lebanon War, Israel was the loser. For the first time in its
history, it came out with wings clipped, licking its wounds,
gloating about illusory victories, and looking for a scapegoat upon
which to heap all responsibility.
The view in Israel today is that there is a government led by Ehud
Olmert and Amir Peretz that has abandoned the political and
security platforms upon which it was elected. It is now gnawing at
itself, groping around trying to get its bearings. Olmert's Kadima
Party is "a supermarket" that is made up of leaders from Likud that
chose to join Kadima in order to remain beside the "father" Sharon,
and defectors from Labor who also joined Kadima. The Labor Party is
for the first time led by an Oriental (Sephardi) without any
military background, who suddenly found himself in the position of
defense minister. It was Peretz who had insisted on the post
although it was beyond his capacities; he reckoned it would enhance
his qualifications to become the future prime minister. Instead, he
emerged from the Lebanon War fighting for his political survival.
Both he and Olmert have suffered severe damage to their
credibility, and all public polls are showing a decline in their
popularity and an increase in the support for the right-wing
camp.
The Israeli government is faced with a dilemma. It cannot linger
for long without accomplishing some kind of an achievement. At the
same time, it is unable to confront the grave danger rearing its
head - the growing popularity of the right under the leadership of
Binyamin Netanyahu, and the radical right led by Avigdor Lieberman.
Conceivably, the two might form together a future government that
will cater to the radical and fascist tendencies in Israel. It will
be predicated upon the assurance that Israel will retrieve its
deterrent capability and the army its former glory; the
Palestinians will be taught "lessons in good behavior," and Israeli
hegemony will be extended over the region. Faced with this reality,
the Olmert government is left with the logical option of seeking a
political success in the form of a breakthrough towards a solution
to the conflict. It is the only way it can save face and regain
popularity. However, signals coming from the prime minister's
office point to a radicalization on the part of Olmert, who is
attempting to compete for the right-wing votes. Olmert maintained
there was a necessity to expand the support base for his government
in the Knesset. He sees a lack of discipline in the Labor Party
which is likely to lead some of its members in the Knesset to
disregard their leadership position and vote against the
government. He has recently succeeded in adding Avigdor Lieberman
to his coalition, thus deepening the right-wing support for his
government and, by the same token, splitting the
Lieberman-Netanyahu camp.
The situation on the Palestinian side is just as bleak. The
Hamas-led government is in trouble. It is torn between the
movement's ideology, the pressure from its leaders in exile, and
its obligations towards the international community. It will have
to meet the conditions placed upon it by the international
community if its wants to acquire international legitimacy. The
only way to help Hamas out of the predicament in which it has
maneuvered itself is by convening an international peace conference
which will include all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and which will lay down the foundations for a comprehensive peace
settlement in the region.
A Climate Conducive to Peace
The climate on the international scene, especially the European
one, seems ripe for forging ahead with a just solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The urgency is being felt especially
after the Lebanon War and its devastating effects, and the signs
coming from Iran about its intentions of going ahead with its
nuclear program. The international community is concerned about
seeing that such a probability does not materialize.
At the same time, Syria is sending almost daily signals through its
president, Bashar al- Assad, expressing readiness to make peace
with Israel if the latter withdraws to its military positions on
the eve of the 1967 war. Many observers argue that the U.S. should
deal with Syria and take it out of Iran's sphere of influence. The
Syrians will try to impede any progress in the political process if
they are left behind. This could explain the tough posture of Hamas
leader Khaled Mash'al, who is sitting in Damascus and hampering any
show of flexibility on the part of the Hamas-led government in the
Palestinian Authority. He is doing the job for the Syrians who want
to be part of any Middle East peace process, and are playing every
possible card to impress upon the international community their
strategic importance and influence in the region.
The reality in the region dictates putting to rest the Road Map and
seizing instead the precious opportunity presented by French
President Jacques Chirac. During the last UN General Assembly in
September 2006, Chirac called for an international peace conference
in the Middle East with the aim of reaching a solution to the
Israel-Palestine conflict to be underpinned by international
guarantees for its implementation. He reiterated his position a
week later in Rumania, during the summit of the French-speaking
nations.
The French position can be deemed principled, lucid and cognizant
of the intricacies of the conflict. It also shows an awareness that
the so-called Road Map is neither viable nor workable for
spearheading any political process. The solution lies in the will
of the international community to thrash out the problem in an
international conference and to come out with a resolution complete
with mechanisms, timelines, and international guarantees to enforce
its implementation. Such a conference can incorporate the Arab
peace initiative or use it as a starting point for the
discussions.
An Opportunity Not to Be Missed
Recent declarations emanating from Washington have sounded positive
with regard to the Palestinian President and Fateh leader Mahmoud
Abbas, who is viewed in the international arena as a man of peace.
Reference was also made to the suffering of the Palestinian people
and the necessity of solving the conflict through the establishment
of a viable Palestinian state. Past experience has taught that
American initiatives are seasonal and lack robustness when it comes
to their implementation or to follow-ups. The possibility should
not be disregarded that the current American declarations are
connected to the congressional primaries in November 2006 and the
measures the American administration is contemplating
vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear issue. In her recent visit to the
area, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not hide the
administration's intention to form a coalition of regional
countries allied with the U.S. to "confront the growing threat of
the Iranian nuclear armament."
It might prove naïve to expect any serious and radical action
on the part of this American administration to find a sustainable
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, especially since it is
controlled by the Jewish lobby and the Christian Right, and bogged
down with its problems in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Latin America,
and at home. However, we must not let the opportunity provided by
the favorable international climate slip by us, or get sidetracked
from Chirac's call for a conference. We should work on merging both
American and French moves. An international peace conference in the
Middle East, with the participation of all parties to the conflict,
seems the only option and must not be delayed any further.