A variety of shifts and developments have occurred in the
Palestinian political arena, with the positions of the various
political forces interlocking after Hamas started to gradually
distance itself from its project of liberating Palestine "from the
river to the sea," and to talk about a solution based on the return
of the lands occupied in 1967. At this stage, a review of the
Palestinian national project is in order, lest we lose sight of the
core principles underpinning that project.
Genesis of the Independent State
The Palestinians voiced their central goals and aspirations when
they laid out their peace initiative during the 20th Palestinian
National Council in Algiers (1991), which sprang from the desire to
implement the international resolutions pertaining to the
Palestinian question - in particular, United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and General Assembly Resolution
194, relating to the return of the Palestinian refugees. All this
came against the backdrop of the declaration of independence
(1988), which had won international and Arab recognition and had
consolidated Palestinian diplomatic and political presence. The PLO
had been recognized as the legitimate and sole representative of
the Palestinian people during the Rabat Summit (1974); this had
been followed a few months later by the recognition of the PLO by
the UN.
Consequently, the concept of an independent Palestinian state was
fixed as the basis of what is referred to as "the solution of two
states for two peoples." It was built over the ruins of the notion
of a secular democratic state on the land of historic Palestine,
which had found neither impetus nor support on either side of the
conflict, nor among the Arab states and the international
community. This, in addition to the fact that it hit at the heart
of the concept of a Jewish state, promoted and executed by the
Zionist movement at the expense of the national identity of the
Palestinian people and its right to return, freedom, independence
and the establishment of its own independent state. The idea of an
independent Palestinian state came to be considered as the only
option - the only possible one - on the lands occupied in 1967,
including Jerusalem, with the right of return for the Palestinian
refugees in accordance with Resolution 194. This was a development
of the Transitional Program (1973-1974), which took up the "right
of the Palestinian people to self-determination on any liberated
Palestinian land, including the right to establish an independent
state within the borders of June 4, 1967."
A Defined and Consistent Vision
Despite the divergences and the disagreements that have arisen
periodically among its various factions, the Palestinian national
movement has focused all its concern and concentrated all its
struggle on the implementation of this aim, which was, and still
is, articulated through the Palestinian national project.
While the PLO has defined its vision as expressed in the paradigm
of a two-state solution, based on the resolutions of international
legitimacy, the Hamas movement has not presented an official and
independent vision. From its founding leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin,
down to the lower echelons, no one has come up with any official
formula that could be in concordance with the resolutions of the
Palestinian national consensus as expressed in the various national
councils. Their rhetoric remains confused and ambivalent. Their
reluctance to recognize the Arab Peace Initiative remains one of
the sticking points that have effectively aborted the national
unity government that was formed in the aftermath of the Mecca
Agreement (2007), and has hindered the international acceptance of
that government.
The Palestinian national project continues to be raised in
political and academic circles, despite the derailment of the
Madrid process initiated in the 1990s, successive Israeli
governments' reneging on their commitments to the Oslo agreements
and their obstructing the start of final status negotiations at the
conclusion of the interim period in 1999. Then came the collapse of
Camp David (2000), where the American broker showed an overt bias
in favor of Israel, providing it with political and diplomatic
cover - even unstinting support - and later allowing it to
reformulate the political process and to impose an agenda that
departs from previous agreements and the stipulations of the Road
Map.
Although the Road Map was drafted by the Bush administration, it
did not include implementation mechanisms. Then-Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon raised the 14 Israeli reservations, blocking the
implementation of the first stage. Thus, Israel was given a free
hand to redraw the situation on the ground, and Sharon went ahead
with his project of a unilateral solution and separation from the
Palestinians under the pretext that there was no Palestinian
partner. He withdrew unilaterally from Gaza and implemented the
construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. The Bush
administration rushed to adopt Israel's vision for a solution, and
even went as far as to impose it on the other members of the
Quartet (the UN, the European Union and Russia), who now consider
it the basis for arriving at the two-state solution, even though at
this juncture, it begs the question: What two states are we talking
about, when the separation wall has fragmented the West Bank and
turned it into a collection of cantons isolated from one
another?
The results of the second legislative elections and the victory of
Hamas with a parliamentary majority have exacerbated the deadlocked
process; it has led to a new and dangerous turning point with the
political isolation and the economic and financial siege that was
clamped down not only on the Hamas government, but also on the
entire Palestinian people and the other political forces. And when
the national unity government was formed with the participation of
Hamas, many promises were made but none of them were carried out,
and not a single step was taken to end the siege and the political
isolation, despite the contacts the American administration and the
EU have held with non-Hamas ministers.
Palestinian in fighting, and especially the recent crisis between
Hamas and Fateh, have rendered the feasibility of a two-state
solution a very remote possibility - without any settlement on the
horizon and with a comatose peace process. The situation has led
many in the political and academic fields to rethink the situation
and to start considering alternative options, reviewed below:
A Return to the Secular Democratic State
The proponents of this idea rely on the rationale that since Israel
rejects the two-state option and prefers to see it disappear, it
would be preferable to revert to the bi-national state project.
Perhaps those who call for this option have failed to notice the
transformations that have occurred on the ground since this concept
first came into being in 1947. Among the most significant changes
is the creation of the State of Israel and its overriding concern
to preserve its Jewish character and to get rid of the Palestinian
Arab minority inside Israel. The annual strategic Herzliya
Conference inevitably winds up with a discussion of the dangers of
Palestinian demography and the threat it poses to the Jewish
character of the State of Israel; and with calls for transfer or
population exchange with the Palestinian Authority (PA), but not
for a withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories.
Moreover, the call for a bi-national state has become, for all
practical purposes, largely academic, against the background of the
separation wall that constitutes a unilateral Israeli delineation
of the political and demographic borders for the Palestinian
entity. And even if the bi-national state were ever to materialize,
with the existing balance of power, it will be nothing more than a
replication of the defunct apartheid state in South Africa.
Confederation with Jordan
The implication here is that the problem is merely one of
interlocutors - i.e., With whom should Israel negotiate? With the
Palestinian leadership or with Jordan? - and that, once this
problem had been solved, Israel would be ready to withdraw to the
June 4, 1967 borders and Jerusalem and to envisage peace with a
Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.
Translated on the ground, this option is unfeasible, especially
because of the so-called "security zone" in the Ghor Valley, for
which Israel has slashed between 3-15 kilometers from Palestinian
land. The idea of a confederation with Jordan has been incorporated
into the resolution of the Palestinian National Council, but it is
contingent on the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state, and would take place only through the free and voluntary
choice of the two peoples. Therefore, a confederation now would not
extricate the peace process from its crisis, but would drag the
Palestinians and the Jordanians into a premature and an
uncalled-for struggle.
Dissolving the Palestinian National Authority
The old-new call for dissolving the PNA and calling upon the
international community to assume its responsibilities
vis-à-vis the Palestinian territories, since they are occupied
territories to which the Fourth Geneva Convention applies, comes
from a number of Palestinian academics and intellectuals. It
derives its justification from the existing conditions on the
internal scene, with the absence of any political breakthrough on
the horizon, on one hand, and the abysmal performance of the
Palestinian governments and the rampant corruption that has
characterized them. These periodic calls for international
intervention, in point of fact, mean nothing other than a return of
the occupation of the Palestinian towns and villages, including the
Gaza Strip. Those in favor of such an option tend to forget the
reality on the ground and Israel's plan to cut off Gaza from the
West Bank, to divide the West Bank into six cantons, to isolate
Jerusalem and to separate Palestinian urban conglomerations from
Jewish settlements and the Green Line as a result of the separation
wall. Against this backdrop, such an option becomes nothing more
than a political fantasy, devoid of any political realism - if only
due to Israel's desire and interest to reoccupy the Palestinian
territories.
Acceptance of the Israeli Plan for a State with Temporary Borders,
or a Protracted Interim Solution
Israel rationalizes its predilection for this plan on the grounds
that it constitutes Phase II of the Road Map. There is a consensus
among all PLO forces to reject this plan. Hamas, however, showed
serious interest in the plan when Sharon embarked on his unilateral
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. At the time, many calls
came from the Hamas leadership to form a so-called independent
administration in Gaza. This was rejected by all the Palestinian
forces and the presidency of the PNA, as it was perceived as
resonating with the Israeli plan for a protracted interim
solution.
The Separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank
With this option, we will be faced with a new paradigm of three
states for two peoples. This option was consolidated after the
Hamas coup in Gaza in mid-June 2007. This is what Khaled Mash'al
intimated in a press conference in Damascus when he talked about
setting up one central government within the framework of two
separate entities. Undoubtedly, this option conforms with the
Israeli plan for a state with temporary boundaries. Moreover, it
offers on a silver platter to Israel the opportunity to implement
its plan for a protracted interim solution, which it will then
proceed to make final by dealing with two weak, independent
entities that are in reality dependent on it and on international
aid and humanitarian relief. More importantly, this will strike at
the heart of the national project, which is the unity of the people
and the land and the establishment of an independent state, with
Jerusalem as its capital and with the return of the refugees.
The Independent Palestinian State or the Two States for Two Peoples
Paradigm
Holding on to this option would first allow the PLO to counteract
the Israeli project of unilateral separation, and/or the creation
of two separate entities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It
will also block Israel's evasion of concluding a peace agreement
through the implementation of the resolutions of international
legitimacy on the claim that there is no Palestinian partner, or
that the partner is weak and impotent to guarantee any signed
agreement, since an important portion of the Palestinian
territories have fallen outside its legitimate control.
Secondly, this option will ensure the renewal of the national
project grounded in the reactivation of the PLO and the holding of
legislative elections in the homeland and the diaspora based on
proportional representation. These will extend to all national and
Islamic forces that adhere to the PLO's political program and its
charter of independence, and consider them the national, political
and constitutional reference underpinning the integrity of the
Palestinian political system.
The de facto situation created by the Hamas coup in the Gaza Strip
must be addressed, and a search for a political formula for
dialogue with Hamas should be reached, based on Hamas' renunciation
of its revolutionary venture and on the restoration of legitimacy.
Hamas must recognize the dire consequences of its actions if it
were to stay on its course and the consequent damage to the
national project. The path to follow is to go back to the people
and to hold new presidential and legislative elections according to
proportional representation.
The aim is to deal swiftly with the situation to contain the
exacerbation of the split and the creation of a force whose
interest is to see a separation between the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank. Bringing the option of the independent state to fruition
demands persistence and perseverance on the part of the
Palestinians, and requires the international community and the Arab
states to assume their responsibilities in order to ensure its
implementation. A consensus already exists, both among the
international community and the Arab states, on the necessity to
end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the solution of two
states for two peoples.