During the Arab League summit held in Riyadh in March 2007, the
Arab states revived the strategic Arab option for making peace with
Israel on the basis of international legitimacy and international
and humanitarian law. This was a clear indication of their resolve
to opt for a strategic solution, and not a provisional or tactical
one meant to buy time or to weather the crisis in relations between
the Arab countries and the international community, especially the
United States.
In addition to re-adopting the 2002 Beirut Summit resolution, the
Arab League formed an expanded follow-up committee comprising 12
states, some of them directly concerned with the peace process and
others representing regional groupings in the Gulf and the Maghreb.
Accordingly, the committee's basic function is to push the Arab
Peace Initiative and to secure its acceptance by the international
community and Israel, and from there to convert it into the basis
for the re-launching of the political process that had long been
halted by a host of obstacles.
One main obstacle is the lack of seriousness and readiness on the
part of the Israeli leadership to conclude a historic peace
agreement with the Arab states. This could be attributed to its
incapacity at the time to withstand the strain of peace with all
the Arab countries; in other words, the Israeli leadership is
unwilling to pay the requisite price for peace or to attempt to
sell it to its own constituency at a time when Israeli society is
becoming more intransigent and shifting increasingly towards
right-wing policies. One major cause is the presence of over a
million immigrants from the former Soviet states, who have formed a
social base for the religious and national right-wing forces.
Furthermore, the role of the U.S. as an honest broker and mediator
has lost all credibility since the onset of the peace process in
Washington in the 1990s, as the broker turned into a partner of one
side. The process has since lost its appeal and the dynamics that
were meant to make it a sustainable process involving various
parties and tracks.
Why Revive the Initiative Now?
Given this diagnosis of the crisis in the political process, the
question is: What are the variables that have led the Arabs to
renew their commitment to an initiative which they had crafted
several years before, but had not made any attempt to market, much
less to adopt and to convert into a political plan of action to be
placed on the international agenda?
The region is going through serious political turmoil. At the
forefront we have the failure of U.S. policy for the region and the
political process that it has sponsored. Then there is the Iraq
occupation and quagmire that have turned Iraq into a breeding
ground for terrorism in the region. A similar scenario exists in
Afghanistan. In addition, we now have an intensification of the
conflict with Iran, an important and influential regional player,
and whose geopolitical interests run counter to those of the U.S.
Against this backdrop, the timing seemed very appropriate for
reinstating the Arab vision for peacemaking in the region by
re-launching the Initiative.
The escalating crisis arising from Iran's nuclear program and the
fear that it might succeed in producing unconventional weapons, or
worse, nuclear weapons, as did North Korea, and thus consolidate
its superiority in the region is seen as a strategic threat to U.S.
influence in the area that shouldn't be taken lightly. The U.S.
does not want to see its hegemony over the sources of energy, not
only in the Arabian Gulf, but also in Central Asia and the Caspian
Sea imperiled in the near or distant future.
The U.S. needs to garner the support of its allies in the region
and to strengthen this front in order to isolate Iran as a prelude
to either imposing political conditions on it without prejudicing
American strategic interests, mainly securing the unimpeded flow of
energy supplies; or to prepare the field - should the need arise -
to deal a stinging military blow to Iran's military and strategic
installations that will set it back decades and will block it from
becoming a dominant regional player or a rival to American
strategic interests.
Another factor for the re-launching of the Initiative is the area's
political vacuum over the past seven years, specifically after the
failure of Camp David II. As the peace process headed into a phase
of deep lethargy as a result of the above-mentioned
Israeli-American policies, this vacuum needed to be filled. During
the last few years, the EU has been showing signs of a more robust
approach to the conflict in an attempt to fill this vacuum. After
its adoption of the Euro and expansion, it has emerged as an
economic force rivaling the U.S. in the Middle East as well as
worldwide. Moreover, several European countries still have the
ambition to retrieve their former role and influence in the region,
given their historic ties there, especially with the waning of the
U.S. political role as a result of its one-sided support of Israel
and its indiscriminate "war on terror."
An Attractive Initiative
Conceivably, some Arab policymakers may have considered the moment
opportune to re-launch the Initiative based on their perception of
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government, which is devoid of
any political vision relating to the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli
conflict. This is especially true after the freezing of the
redeployment plan in the West Bank that was slated to form an
extension of Ariel Sharon's unilateral solution. Olmert's
government was left without an agenda except that of scrambling to
create facts on the ground by expanding settlements and building
the separation wall. It only led to heightened tension, not only in
Palestine but also in the Arab moderate camp, and placed Israel in
the uncomfortable position of clashing with American strategy,
given the latter's political debacle in the region.
The Initiative carries with it a number of enticements, most
importantly, normalization in return for withdrawal. It should be
noted that normalization will not be limited to the Arab countries,
but will extend to Muslim ones through the participation of 54
Muslim countries. Additionally, it is the first time the question
of refugees is formulated thus: "a just solution to the refugee
problem to be agreed upon," which posits the possibility of
discussing the issue of refugees beyond the parameters of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. Basing themselves on the
reality in Israel, Arab policymakers believed that reviving the
Initiative would by necessity meet with success.
The Arab follow-up committee has made several attempts to promote
the Initiative on the various international and regional levels.
This includes the efforts made to draw in Israel on the official
level as well as on the popular level with the peace activists,
under the personal sponsorship of Jordan's King Abdullah II in
Amman and Aqaba. But all these Arab moves faced obstacles, and
although there was no total breakdown, the Initiative had lost its
initial momentum.
The Obstacles Facing the Initiative
First: Israel's continued evasiveness regarding the Arab Peace
Initiative and its failure to honor its commitments. Israel's
perception is that in light of the power imbalance in the region,
it is not obligated to pay a heavy price for normalization and
relations with the Arabs. It is pursuing a policy of
procrastination and trying to contain the situation through a show
of flexibility vis-à-vis the Initiative, while attempting to
void it of its substance, i.e., to start with normalization before
taking any tangible steps to withdraw from the occupied Arab and
Palestinian territories.
It is worth noting that this Israeli policy is not confined to the
ruling coalition, which is representative of large segments of
Israeli society, but also reflects the stance of the right-wing
opposition that rejects, on principle, giving so-called
concessions, especially on the issues of Jerusalem and
refugees.
With the erosion of the influence of the Israeli peace camp and its
diminishing clout as a force among Israeli public opinion, the
radicals are seeing a surge in their influence and power. Added to
this is the waning of political realism among the Labor Party
headed by Ehud Barak - the party that once was the principal
partner of the Palestinians in making peace. This situation is a
clear indication of how difficult it is to have the Initiative
accepted by Israel in the foreseeable future.
Second: Israel's attempt to once again play one Arab track
against another by showing a willingness to open channels of
negotiations on one track and freezing them on the others - or
ignoring them outright, as is the case with Lebanon. For example,
Israel is sending conflicting signals to Syria regarding its
readiness to negotiate with it, while hinting to the Palestinians
about reverting to the unilateral solution that has been
effectively frozen.
Such maneuvering could very well entice some Arab parties into
embarking on bilateral negotiations. This will only shackle the
Initiative and empty it of its substance, especially in view of the
reality on the ground and the difficulties the Initiative faces in
progressing or achieving any tangle results.
Third: U.S. attempts to reclaim the reins of the political
initiative and to impede the involvement of its European
allies. With the failure of its project in Iraq and with the
looming Iran crisis, the U.S. needs to revive the political
process, and this is what was signaled by President George W.
Bush's invitation for an international meeting in Annapolis.
There is no doubt that the American invitation, which the American
secretary of state had pushed with great difficulty after eight
trips to the region, had elicited very low expectations and
presumably produced modest results. Consequently, Annapolis cannot
be a substitute for the Initiative. Moreover, getting certain Arab
parties in this meeting, at their head Saudi Arabia, or other
Muslim parties like Indonesia or Malaysia, to normalize relations
with Israel cannot be confirmed as a gain for Israel, because
normalization cannot happen or be accepted before withdrawal.
Fourth: The internal Palestinian situation, which has become
more vulnerable, especially after the Hamas takeover in Gaza and
the political and demographic split from the West Bank, making the
Palestinians more likely to buckle under external pressure. The
message that Hamas is sending with its control of the Gaza Strip is
that the exclusive representation of the Palestinian people does
not reside in President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen); it follows that
he does not have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the
Palestinian people and that any agreement concluded with him can be
blocked by Hamas, not only by their rejecting it, but also by
refusing to renounce its control of Gaza. The implication is that
Hamas not only refuses to go back on its takeover of the Strip, but
the threat exists that the same experience would be repeated in the
West Bank if Israel withdrew from it.
An Interconnected Crisis
Unfortunately, this weakens the Palestinian position and gives
credence to Israel's claim that there is no Palestinian partner,
and that the only course for Israel to follow is to bide its time
and not to make any moves on the Palestinian track. It would hold
on to the security issue as postulated in the first stage of the
Road Map and would stop at that. This would constitute a serious
blow to the Initiative and, at its core, the Palestinian
question.
When all these issues are taken into consideration, it becomes
clear that the internal Palestinian situation is very much part of
the overarching regional crisis, or the struggle between the U.S.
and the so-called rejectionist front: Tehran, Damascus, Gaza and
the southern suburbs of Beirut. Such interconnectedness means that
the crisis has ceased to be only Arab or Palestinian, but has
become regionalized, involving many more parties.
Achieving progress in the wake of the Annapolis meeting should
contribute to easing the Palestinian internal conditions. The issue
of Lebanese elections is an element that should also be factored
in. If the present presidential vacuum is solved through consensual
elections, a breakthrough could occur from the Gulf to Beirut to
Damascus and Gaza, making it possible to revive the political
process and to reactivate the Arab Peace Initiative. If the
elections end up being confrontational, this would mean the
protraction of the conflict, with the possibility of only partial
and provisional solutions.
<