On November 28, 2007, the Palestine-Israel Journal (PIJ) held a
roundtable discussion on the Arab Peace Initiative at the American
Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem. The Palestinian participants were
Ziad AbuZayyad, PIJ co-editor, attorney and former Palestinian
Authority minister and member of the Palestinian Legislative
Council; and Jamal Zakout, advisor to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.
The Israeli participants were Prof. Elie Podeh, head of the Islamic
and Middle Eastern Studies Department at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem; and Prof. Galia Golan of the Lauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center,
Herzliya, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who is a member
of Peace Now. The discussion was moderated by Haaretz senior
commentator Danny Rubinstein and PIJ Co-Editor Hillel
Schenker.
Schenker: Our next issue will be devoted to the Arab Peace
Initiative and the role of the [third parties]. Since this
roundtable is taking place a day after the Annapolis conference,
obviously we will relate to it within the context of the Arab Peace
Initiative and all of the regional countries who attended the
conference.
Rubinstein: Is Palestinian public opinion happy with the results of
Annapolis?
AbuZayyad: My general impression is that nobody is happy with
Annapolis. Palestinian people are not dancing in the streets. We
didn't see any concrete result come out of Annapolis. All that they
achieved is the declaration that they will start negotiating. So
this was nothing but a ceremonial meeting.
Zakout: First, my personal assessment is that after seven years of
no real peace process, yesterday was a declaration of the [end] of
ignoring the partners and the peace process. It declared that there
is no other choice other than to sit at the table and face the
future with real responsibility. I think that this is a good start,
but we need more. The second point is the [avoidance] of mentioning
the Arab Peace Initiative in the Joint Understanding statement. If
the Israeli government tries to escape from the Arab demands for
full peace and full normalization, they are trying to achieve peace
without paying the price for it. Thirdly, I think that all the
Palestinians, including those who demonstrated against Annapolis,
will follow Abu Mazen if he really succeeds in putting together a
peace plan that addresses the fears and worries of the Palestinian
nation. The Palestinian people want to see something on the ground.
You can have good speeches, but the people are still feeling real
pain and they want to see that this pain and the occupation are in
the process of being ended.
Rubinstein: Galia, maybe you can talk about the opposition in
Israel.
Golan: There must have been something good happening yesterday,
because the right-wing - and in particular the settlers - were very
upset yesterday. It would seem to me that the right has interpreted
[Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert's speech as a real commitment
to reach an agreement on all the points, including Jerusalem. It
remains to be seen if that is really the proper interpretation, but
certainly the right wing believes that that is what happened
yesterday. Olmert's speech did cover everything and also had an
emotional side. He talked about the refugees in a sympathetic way
without saying anything about what he intends to do on the issue.
The appearance of some kind of timetable was important. The
statement committed to reaching an agreement by the end of 2008.
This is not a real timetable, but it prevents this from being
open-ended. The other important point is monitoring - which was
missing from the Oslo Accords. At least here there seems to be some
international monitoring of the negotiations to ensure they
actually continue and move forward with the Road Map. But the most
important thing was the show of support from the Arab world for
[Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas] Abu Mazen and the Palestinian
path of negotiation.
Rubinstein: Elie, we all agree that there is a lot of importance in
what happened yesterday. Do you share this view?
Podeh: Yes. First of all, the Israeli reactions were hardly
surprising. The left was very enthusiastic, the right was very
antagonistic; generally these are predictable responses. Looking
beyond that, I think that it can be a good starting point to resume
the peace process that was stalled seven years ago. This is a very
important development. The conference was also important for
several reasons: After many years during which the agenda was fixed
by other parties, primarily by radical forces, I think this is the
first time in a long time that what we call "the moderate forces" -
I prefer the term "core alliance" - are determining the facts on
the ground and are starting something that can be continued. The
fact that the Americans were able to draw Syria into the conference
was also very important.
From the Israeli point of view, Olmert's speech was significant in
several ways. First, this is the first time that an Israeli prime
minister talked about the suffering of the other side openly and
publicly. It's not the full acknowledgment that the Palestinian
side wants to hear, but in many places he made a comparison between
the Israelis and the Palestinians, as if they are equal sides to
the same conflict. Secondly, Olmert made a very important comment
about the Arab Peace Initiative. He said, "I value this initiative.
I value its contribution. We will continue to refer to it within
the course of the negotiations." He didn't accept it, but he said
that he values and appreciates it.
Rubinstein: I was listening quite carefully to the speeches. And as
Elie said, the Arab Peace Initiative was mentioned by Olmert in a
very sympathetic way. Yet today I heard Nabil Abu Rudeineh say that
the Palestinians believe Israel rejected the Arab Peace Initiative
because the joint statement centers around the Road Map and not the
Arab Peace Initiative.
AbuZayyad: If you listen carefully to [United States President
George W.] Bush and to the joint statement, you will find that they
are talking about all phases of the Road Map. When I hear someone
saying that the state is more important than its borders, it brings
me directly to the topic of provisional borders. This is something
that we totally reject. If they speak about the first phase, there
are commitments and obligations on both sides. To start talking
again about the implementation of the three phases of the Road Map,
even though it is well understood that the second and third phases
are no longer applicable, makes me worried. The clear reference to
Bush's letter of assurances to [former Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon
means that the U.S. administration is still committed to these
assurances which imply accepting de facto the changes Israel made
on the ground in the occupied Palestinian territories including the
Jewish settlements, the infrastructure and the exploitation of
water and natural resources. This means legitimizing the annexation
of parts of the West Bank to Israel, in contravention of
international law, the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and the
UN Security Council resolutions.
There was a very strong demand from the Arab countries to start
normalizing relations with Israel and not link that to the peace
process. This is in contradiction with the Arab Peace Initiative
and the traditional position of the Arab countries that the
progress in normalization with Israel should proceed parallel to
the progress in the peace process. The dismantlement of settlements
and outposts which were built in the occupied Palestinian
territories is envisaged by Arabs as the beginning of Israel's
change in behavior and a sign of positive change. However, in
Annapolis they were speaking about removing "unauthorized outposts"
and stopping the "expansion" of the settlements. This is Israeli
language. And this language is not conducive to any progress in
making peace. For me all settlements are illegal.
Rubinstein: If you say something is illegal it means that the
others are legal.
AbuZayyad: The source of legitimacy is not the decision of the
Israeli government. The source of legitimacy for me is in the UN
[Security Council] resolutions including 242 and 338, and the
Fourth Geneva Convention which obliges Israel not to move its
population and settle them in an occupied territory. Olmert
rejected the Arab position in diplomatic language in his speech.
All the Arab countries that participated in this meeting were
betrayed and misled. The call to finish the negotiations by the end
of 2008 is a target, not a deadline. Even this positive thing is
not real.
Rubinstein: Do you also think that both sides ignored the Arab
Peace Initiative?
Zakout: I think real change started yesterday. Instead of being
stuck in security and only security, we now have a formula:
security and political negotiations moving together. The issue of
the Road Map was raised in previous meetings between the Israelis
and the Palestinians, including with [U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza] Rice, where they discussed how to deal with the main
issues that the Palestinian people are expecting to see on the
ground: the settlements, the wall and the release of prisoners.
Here two things have changed. There is a parallel implementation
instead of conditional implementation. It was agreed that Israel
would stop expanding settlements immediately, including natural
growth, and we must not release Olmert from this commitment.
On the Arab Peace Initiative, I think that Olmert wants the Arab
countries to normalize relations while ignoring the formula of the
Initiative and the obligations that Israel must deal with. If
Israel were to look at the Arab presence in Annapolis only as a
sign of normalization, it would be misleading to everyone,
including to the Israeli population. The Saudi Arabian minister of
foreign affairs said very clearly: We will not normalize relations
with Israel before the conclusion and implementation of a peace
treaty.
Also, I think that Olmert trying to mention the Qassams and suicide
bombings is an old tactic that must not be used in that way. It is
another way to mislead the Israeli population. Attacks in Israel
have been minimized since the "golden days" of the peace process.
Secondly, the issue of Gaza is not in the hands of the PA. I
personally am - as are many of the Palestinians, including the
majority of Gazans - against using these rockets, which is harming
the Palestinians more than anything else. We must differentiate
between trying to achieve a ceasefire to stop the attacks that harm
the negotiations, and using the rockets as an excuse not to go into
the peace process. We need to build real trust to go ahead with the
agenda of the negotiations. If Israel really wants to have normal
relations with the Arab countries, I think the position of Israel
toward the Arab Peace Initiative must be improved.
Golan: Much of Olmert's speech was for domestic consumption and not
for the conference itself. Quite clearly the things he mentioned
about Qassams were for domestic consumption. There is no way he
could show a willingness to negotiate the core issues without also
throwing a bone to the Israeli public and to the opposition. To me
there is a contradiction in what preceded Annapolis and what seems
to be happening. On the one hand, there is a commitment to deal
with final status issues by the end of 2008. But on the other hand,
they throw in the Road Map, in which the final status issues are
supposed to come in the third phase, which includes another
international conference. So when is the second phase, if there is
a second phase, if indeed the third phase is happening now?
Actually, it is a good idea to eliminate the second stage, but I am
not certain that is what is intended. Actually, I am not happy at
all with the Road Map being brought in, because it is perceived by
Israel as a road map of sequential, not parallel, stages, and thus
intended to delay - or should I say avoid - progress. It is
important, however, that Annapolis established that demands will be
parallel.
This brings me to the Arab Peace Initiative, which really has two
components. One component deals with final status issues as a
minimalist blueprint. It deals with the key issues only and this is
the part that Israel has not accepted. There is no agreement on the
part of the Israeli government yet to go to the June 4, 1967 lines,
even with swaps, and there is no agreement on Jerusalem or the
refugee question. In my opinion, the Israeli government should
welcome the formula regarding refugees, which calls for a fair and
agreed-upon solution. This gives Israel a say in the process. The
part of the Arab Peace Initiative that Israel accepts, is, of
course, the Arab commitment to normalization, the end of conflict
and the security for Israel. These are the things all Israelis
presumably would welcome, making the first part - withdrawal and so
forth - well worthwhile.
Be that as it may, I think that I would have preferred not to have
gone through any of this process since 2002. The Israeli government
should have accepted the Arab Peace Initiative when it came out.
But I am not entirely convinced that it has much relevance today.
Now we have to see if negotiations will achieve an agreement with
the Palestinians, at which point the Arab Peace Initiative would
kick in again in the form of normalization. When it came out, it
was an invitation for Israel to negotiate. Yet, now that Israel has
finally decided to negotiate, and I hope that it has, there are
still no assurances that these negotiations are going to be
serious.
Podeh: I've followed the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli
response to it since 2002 and my analysis tends to see Olmert's
statement as more than just diplomatic language. If we analyze the
Israeli attitude since 2002, you will see a gradual change in the
Israeli position. The first Israeli reaction was silence. In the
last year, we saw a few changes. Even Sharon said a few years ago
that he saw a few positive elements in the Arab Peace Initiative,
which Olmert repeated a few months ago. Then we have now what
Olmert said in the conference. I think there is some evolution in
the Israeli position. It is a reaction, at least partially, to what
is happening in Israeli society. Israelis know today much more
about the Arab Peace Initiative. The newspapers are talking and
publishing information about it all the time. Olmert cannot escape
from it and also understands the historic importance of that
statement.
Why was the plan not mentioned in the formal statement? I am only
guessing; I don't really know, but we do know that Israel is
objecting to two or three points in the plan: The first one is the
call for full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines. No Israeli
government since October or November 1967 has accepted the demand
for full Israeli withdrawal. The second objection is to the clause
regarding the refugee problem. Formally, Israel sees the clause as
a reference to [UN General Assembly Resolution] 194 or to the full
implementation of Palestinian return to Israel - which is not the
case - but this is still the Israeli position.
The third point is that Palestinians treat the plan as "obligations
or conditions." [Hebrew University political science professor]
Shlomo Avineri published an article in Haaretz some time ago that
talked about the unacceptability of the plan being presented as
conditions. I rejected that because I thought of the Arab Peace
Initiative as a plan to be negotiated, not as a condition. So in a
way you, the Palestinians, affirm that we are talking actually
about conditions, and if these conditions are not fully met, we
have no bargain.
Zakout: We didn't say that. I think that the Palestinians are
afraid that Israel will take from the Arab Peace Initiative only
[the Arab countries' offer] to normalize relations, and then ignore
and neglect the Palestinians.
Podeh: The Israeli government should not, and probably cannot,
accept the plan as is, but it is a good basis for negotiations.
First, there is a very major change in the Arab position toward
Israel; and secondly, it can be a good basis for negotiations not
only with the Palestinians, but also with the other Arab countries,
because it relates also to the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The fact
that the Saudis are behind it means that we have the Arab League
umbrella for this initiative, and so we have an important
instrument that should be used in future negotiations.
Schenker: How important is the very existence of the Arab Peace
Initiative? One of the explanations for the failure of Camp David
in the summer of 2000 was the lack of Arab backing for the process.
We should recall that the Arab Peace Initiative was only ratified
in 2002.
Golan: I think we saw that the Arab presence in Annapolis was
really an extension of the Arab Peace Initiative. There are other
reasons that the Arab states are taking the positions they are
taking now, i.e., the dangers of Iran, of radical elements in their
own societies and so forth, but in my opinion, the Arab Peace
Initiative was the basis for their participation. More importantly,
that is what brought the Arab backing for the path that Abu Mazen
has chosen. If Hamas were to sign on to the Arab Peace Initiative,
it would place Israel and a few others in a very difficult
position. I think the Arab Peace Initiative is an absolutely
extraordinary document. It reversed the rejection of Israel in the
region and supplied the one major element that Israel supposedly is
looking for: normalization and end of conflict. Now, of course,
something has to be done, which is how we get to the clauses
themselves. But the clauses, with the exception of the formulation
on refugees, are not new. This is how we go into every negotiation.
It is the legitimate interpretation of 242, with some things that
weren't in 242, but this was here from the beginning: the return to
June 1967 lines and the creation of an independent Palestinian
state, East Jerusalem as the capital and a resolution to the
refugee problem. There is nothing new in those except for a new
formulation of the refugee question. I do think that while these
are the old demands, there have been enormous changes over the
years also in Israel's position. The willingness to talk about
Jerusalem, namely the Arab neighborhoods, is already a step
forward. It's been broached. It's been rejected but broached again.
I think it's an opening. The idea of swaps, as long as they are
equal and agreed upon, is also something new, and at least on the
table. Finally, Israel is more willing to see international
involvement. Moreover, you now have formerly right-wing politicians
and leaders talking about a two-state solution. This has become the
slogan of the Israeli government, which is an extraordinary change.
There are at least new possibilities for the demands that are in
the Arab Peace Initiative.
AbuZayyad: It is true that one of the arguments about the failure
at Camp David is that the Arabs left Arafat alone. But this was not
the real or only reason for its failure. Although I don't want to
go into that because it is not the topic of the discussion, you
must realize that the Arabs cannot accept Israeli sovereignty over
Haram el-Sharif. This is what the U.S. administration and Israel
wanted the Arabs to pressure Arafat to accept. The Arab Peace
Initiative came in 2002 against the background of the failure of
the Camp David talks and the second intifada. The Arab countries
wanted to stop this wave of violence and bloodshed on both sides by
coming out with this initiative. But Israel did not respond
positively to it, and violence on both sides silenced any reason or
logic. Some say that the Arabs did not market the Arab Peace
Initiative well, and that is why the Israeli public, the Israeli
government and the international community did not accept it. I
don't buy this argument.
The simple fact that they failed to reach an agreement on
principles in Annapolis is for me clear evidence that the problem
is not the Arab Peace Initiative, but rather the hidden agenda of
the Israeli government. In the Arab Peace Initiative there is an
offer from 22 Arab countries to recognize Israel and establish
normal relations with it if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders,
accepts a Palestinian state alongside Israel and concludes an
agreed-upon solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. This is a
very clear message to Israel that we do not insist on exercising
the right of return, but we will put this issue on the table. In
the end, any solution to the refugee problem will be agreed upon by
Israel. Can anyone imagine that Israel will agree on the
implementation of the full return of all the refugees of 1948? No.
The Arab countries thought that if they signaled this to Israel,
Israel would buy the Arab Peace Initiative. Unfortunately, Israel
did not want it.
The Arab Peace Initiative is not talking only about the West Bank
and Gaza but a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and
the Arab countries, including Syria if Israel withdraws from the
Golan Heights. The Israelis, it's very clear, don't want to
withdraw from the occupied territories; they want to take the land.
They want to use the refugee issue as an excuse on the one hand,
and to keep the Israeli public intimidated by the Palestinians on
the other. The Arab League and the Islamic Congress were present in
Annapolis, as well as several major Islamic and Arab countries. All
of them came to this wedding, but there was no bride. I cannot
understand what the Israelis want. They have this offer from the
Arab countries which also opens the door to peace with Islamic
countries, and they say, "No!"
Galia said something true: now it is the Israeli government talking
about the two-state solution, yet you don't hear much from the
Arabs about it. If you listen carefully to the debate within the
Arab circles now, they are now talking about the one-state
solution, because Israel's policy of expanding Jewish settlements
and changing the nature of the occupied territories is undermining
the possibility of the two-state solution. Now maybe when Israel
speaks about the two-state solution they have in mind a Palestinian
state in the air, not on the ground. A Palestinian state with
provisional (undefined) borders is a state in the air. They can
give all kinds of titles to the Palestinians, telling them: You can
have a president, a prime minister, anything you want, but you will
have nothing on the ground. If this is what the Israelis are
dreaming about, I am sure that they are missing the train.
Zakout: First, I want to return to how Israel deals with the Arab
Peace Initiative. The Arab Peace Initiative is not conditional; it
is logical: Israel can't keep occupied land and enjoy the results
of peace. It's a package deal. For the last few weeks Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni refused to mention the Arab Peace Initiative
for the suggested declaration, yet she insisted, with the
Americans, that the Arab countries must be in Annapolis. One day
before Annapolis, Livni said that the Arabs must not interfere in
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Half of Olmert's speech was
about normalization. What does he want from any Palestinian or Arab
citizen? He wants the blessing of the Arab countries for the
occupation by Israel of the Arab territories?
Secondly, Israel must decide if it wants to negotiate with a
unified Arab delegation concerning all the conflict. It is a
goodwill gesture from the Arab countries, saying, "If you conclude
a peace treaty with the Palestinians, as well as with the Syrians
and the Lebanese, you will have not only normal relations, not only
recognition - you will be accepted as a normal state in the area."
It is not a negotiation plan, and it is not conditional, and it is
not a starting point; it is a package deal. Of course, during the
negotiations both sides will decide on the details, but they will
abide by the terms of negotiations based on UN Resolutions 242 and
338, which I am happy Olmert mentioned yesterday. He also mentioned
that the facts that began in 1967 will not continue, even though he
tried to avoid mentioning the 1967 border as the agreed-upon
starting point for land swaps.
Concerning the issue of refugees, I think that the formula put
forward in the Arab Peace Initiative is a golden formula. It
doesn't mean that Israel has a veto or can escape the
responsibility of finding a solution. This is very important for
the Israelis as well as for the Palestinians. Neglecting the issue
of refugees will be dangerous for peace itself. I don't want to
enter into the details of how it will be solved; it will be solved
around the negotiation table. But again, the presence of the Arab
countries in Annapolis, to emphasize or to endorse their
initiative, must be explained in depth to the Israeli population as
well as to the Palestinian population - that this time we have to
decide: We can continue to have the same games that caused the
explosion of 2000, or we can learn from the last seven years of
confrontation and address all the issues of the conflict. By the
way, the Arab Peace Initiative is mentioned in the Road Map.
Schenker: I also want to raise the question of the role of the
third parties in general. Is there a role for the Arab League, for
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, or is it only the Americans and
the Quartet, or is it parallel?
Podeh: I agree with many of the things that Jamal and Ziad
mentioned regarding the Israeli response to the Arab Peace
Initiative. In fact, back in 2003, I wrote that I was afraid that
Israel had missed an opportunity to promote some kind of
negotiation. That was already four years ago, but it is still the
situation today. As I said before, I do notice some positive change
in the Israeli position, but it's still not enough. I think that
the Arab Peace Initiative can offer a few advantages. One big
disadvantage is the fact that Israel might need to negotiate with
the 22 countries of the Arab League all at once. Even the Jordanian
and the Egyptian foreign ministers didn't come to Israel as
representatives of the Arab league, but in their own capacities as
foreign ministers, because the Arab League does not recognize
Israel.
Zakout: That was because they came to ask Israel about its response
to the Arab Peace Initiative. If Israel accepted it, I think that
the situation would change.
Podeh: I agree, but still this is some kind of a nuance. But there
may also be a few advantages to accepting this plan, at least as a
basis for negotiations. First is the multilateral dimension of the
plan. Instead of focusing on the Palestinian track, I suggested
something like multi-bilateral tracks, meaning many bilateral
tracks going on simultaneously. This could incorporate the Arab
Peace Initiative as a basis by opening a track with the
Palestinians, the Syrians, the Lebanese and perhaps a general Arab
track to discuss some Arab issues. The second advantage is that you
have to acknowledge that there are domestic problems inside some of
the parties. The Israeli government is facing domestic problems,
but the Palestinians also have problems with Hamas, which obviously
will try to put obstacles in the way to any peace agreement. This
can be bypassed by bringing in the Arab states. Once you have the
umbrella of the Arab states, you might overcome the objection of
Hamas.
Zakout: Or increase internal problems if there is no real peace
treaty.
Golan: No, if the Palestinians do reach a peace agreement with
Israel, this backing of the Arab League will put Hamas in the
untenable position of being opposed by the entire Arab world.
Zakout: The Arab states have declared that if the Palestinians
achieve a peace treaty, they will accept full diplomatic relations,
regardless of Hamas. We also can't avoid the fact that the Arab
countries will face domestic problems if real solutions aren't
offered. This is the reason why the Saudi foreign minister said
that they were very hesitant to go if there could be no real
political result from Annapolis; it would be a disaster for
all.
Golan: I want to raise a new issue. I think the value of the Arab
states being involved is related to the United States. The U.S.
needed the Arab states there yesterday. I think the involvement of
the Arab states is one element that may get the U.S. to pressure
Israel into a negotiated settlement. In my opinion, Bush is not
looking at our conflict at all; he is looking at the region. The
presence of the Arab states there yesterday was tremendously
important, and that is the card that the Palestinians have. This is
what got the U.S. to agree to a target date or a deadline. So long
as the Arab states are involved in this way, it may bring about the
kind of American pressure that will be absolutely necessary for
Israel to actually reach an agreement. This is something that may
not be welcomed by Israel, but if we want to see a peace agreement,
I think it should be welcomed.
AbuZayyad: We should always take into account that real bilateral
negotiations can happen only between equal partners. We are a
people under military occupation, so we cannot negotiate with the
Israelis. When the Americans say, "We will not interfere, we will
not pressure, go and negotiate and come back to us," we get the
same results as from our negotiations with them in the past. We
will get nothing. At the end, no agreement or declaration of
principles. In the absence of equality between the two parties, it
is very important to have a third party mediating actively between
them, bridging the gaps, pressuring them to reach compromises, and
establishing monitoring and verification systems to follow up on
the implementation of any agreement reached to make sure it is
implemented honestly and properly. The problem with American
mediation is that they are not playing the role of an active
mediator. Recall what happened in 1978 during the Camp David
negotiations between [Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin and
[Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat under the auspices of [U.S.
President Jimmy] Carter. At the end of the day, when the parties
failed to reach an agreement, Carter put a document on the table
and said this is the American position. He kept pressure on the two
sides until they came to an agreement. In our case, the U.S.
administrations from Madrid until now, almost 16 years, have not
achieved any agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis,
because they refrained from putting any ideas on the table and
always claimed that their role is only to facilitate the
negotiations without interfering in them. However, as long as no
one at the top of the U.S. administration believes that this
process belongs to him, nothing real will happen. They say you
don't wash a rented car; you wash your own car. Maybe Rice tried to
feel that Annapolis belonged to her. But in the end, she is not in
a position to make the crucial decision. She is not the president.
She is trying to help the president get out of the situation in
Iraq and Iran, and to save the party on the eve of elections, but
there is no real mediation role that the American administration is
playing. We want to see a real fair broker that is courageous and
neutral enough to take the initiative and push forward to reach an
agreement.
Zakout: I think that a model that could change the role of the
third party is to put on the table the responsibility of all
parties to follow up on what was agreed and ask for a progress
report every two or three months, to show how to improve the role
of the Quartet in the Annapolis formula. The Quartet has been
monopolized by the Americans. We need other forces to share in the
process and not only be witnesses without any role. Here the Arab
countries could be proactive in the process on the basis of the
Arab Peace Initiative.
Podeh: A full commitment of the U.S. president is no doubt very
needed, but I want to remind us all that Bill Clinton was very much
committed to achieving peace but did not succeed.
AbuZayyad: He did not succeed because he did not act during Camp
David in 2000. The summit was in September-October. The Clinton
Parameters came in December. So when he had the people present in
Camp David, he did not act.
Podeh: I think this is only part of the answer. In addition to the
full commitment of a U.S. president, we need to see trust on both
sides, and a willingness and ability to move forward. Only if you
have those components, with the full commitment of the U.S.
president, will the chances for success be high.
Golan: I would put it in the opposite direction - if you have full
support of the U.S. president, you can go a long way in getting
domestic support. The American role may conceivably be enlarged via
the Arab states, given the situation of America today in the Middle
East, and the stake the Arab states now have in a successful
Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.
Schenker: The big headline in Yedioth Ahronot today was "A New
Start." Is this a new start? Where are we going?
Golan: We are hoping it's a new start. We're hoping that on
December 12 there will be negotiations with a continued target date
of 2008. We've already raised all the issues. The problems are: a)
Will Olmert have the political will to do what is necessary
domestically within his own party, not only within his government?
and b) Will Olmert actually be interested in following it through,
or will he use the Road Map to justify delaying everything and drag
out the negotiations? These are my key question marks.
Additionally, will there be monitoring of the peace process? Will
the Americans push for real negotiations? Will the Arab states push
for real negotiations on the core issues? … What we had
yesterday was at least a demonstration of intent to do these
things. Whether or not anything will come of it, we can only
guess.
AbuZayyad: As I said earlier, nothing new came out of Annapolis
except a call to start negotiations. But I still believe that if
the American administration makes a real effort in the remaining
period of Bush's term to achieve an agreement with a process of
implementation that will be binding on the next administration,
this will be a great achievement. I hope something will materialize
in the next few months that the next administration will have to
adopt and build on. This could be the beginning of the process to
go forward.
Zakout: We have two options: to repeat history in a more dramatic
way, or to learn from the very dramatic mistakes. I think that both
sides know the limitations of the other side. We must start from
the point where we stopped in the negotiations and forget the bad
developments in the last years. The Clinton Parameters and the Taba
negotiations were a good achievement for both sides. I think that
would be a good starting point. Within less than a year we could
conclude a real peace treaty that could go on to the next
administration, unlike what happened in the last days of the
Clinton administration.
Podeh: My suggestion for a better Yedioth Ahronot headline would be
"Annapolis: a new start?" because you can't really know. It depends
on a lot of factors that can hardly be predicted now. If we want to
take our lessons from history, I think that one of the failures of
the Oslo process was that we didn't take into consideration
seriously enough the opposition forces. This is the situation more
or less today. In Israel, we have forces that are working against
it. Also on the Palestinian side, we have serious forces such as
Hamas that are working against peace. Each side has to turn inward
to try to pacify the opposition forces. Otherwise you get to a
situation where the domestic forces are determining the facts on
the ground and will blow any agreement we achieve.
Golan: I really disagree with that. I think it's the wrong
approach, and that's exactly what's been happening in the last few
months. If Olmert does try to make everyone happy, we will get
nowhere. They are going to try to sabotage a deal in any case.
Olmert has a majority in the Knesset even without [Avigdor]
Lieberman. He has a majority in the Knesset even without Shas. The
only way that we are going to get a settlement approved by the
public is if the government comes with an agreement. I think that
the same thing is true for the Palestinians. If you come with an
agreement, that's the proof. Then public opinion will come around.
You never will persuade the settlers. Olmert can sell even East
Jerusalem if it comes with an assurance: "end of conflict."
Zakout: If you don't deliver your goods, you will have strong
opposition. We are in a situation in which we didn't deliver our
goods to our supporters. The priority is to conclude a deal. This
is the only way to limit the power of the opposition.
Golan: You are not going to get a public agreement on Jerusalem
before an agreement. If you come with an agreement in place that
Jerusalem is part of, then the opposition has nowhere to go.