Following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (September 28,
2000), the Palestine-Israel Journal held a discussion on
November 8, 2000, on its significance and implications. The
participants were Professor Sari Nusseibeh, president of
al-Quds University, and Professor Edy Kaufman, who teaches
human rights in the Department of International Relations at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is chair of the board of
B'Tselem.
Sari Nusseibeh: I can tell you what bothered me about the
period in question, especially during the first week.
I'll begin with how I saw things on the Palestinian side. As I
heard or read Palestinian spokesmen, I got the impression that they
were putting out two different messages at one and the same time.
On the one hand, I heard the message that this is an action in
which we, the Palestinians, were the victims. In other words, it is
being orchestrated by Israel in order to force the Palestinians to
accept what they refused to accept at Camp David. But then
listening sometimes to the same person, you would hear the message
that we are undertaking this action in order to make Israel accept
what they wouldn't accept at Camp David. These are contradictory
messages. In an action you are either the actor or the victim, the
recipient. I wasn't sure whether we were actually doing this by
design, or simply reacting to the other side.
When I listened to what the Israeli side was saying, I was amazed
to hear that their general view was that this is a design
perpetrated by the Palestinians, a grand Palestinian design, and
that the Israelis are simply reacting to this onslaught brought
about by the Palestinians.
It seemed to me that each side, therefore, was accusing the other
of having a grand design, hence the intense reactions. I came to
believe that what we had here was a chain of actions and reactions
with each side believing that the other side is behind this.
Am I right in my judgment? Are we simply witnessing here a tragedy
in the fullest sense of the word in which we are pulling each other
down simply by miscalculation, and misrepresentation and misreading
each other's intents and actions? Or is there really a design, and
if so, who's behind it? As regards an answer, to this moment, I am
honestly quite confused.
Edy Kaufman: Post facto, we academics tend to explain
everything rationally and to see grand designs and analyze them. In
the very first days, I was totally confused - as you were, Sari -
and I did not have a lot of explanations. Clearly, in the way it
escalated so quickly, there was an element of surprise. For a long
time, I remember myself saying, as a lecturer, that either there is
going to be a peace accord or a new intifada, either/or. What
really surprised us in general in Israel was why now, when things
were getting pretty close to an agreement. I remember listening to
a lecture by Khalil Shikaki in which he was showing quite
professionally how the disagreements were narrowing. After a long
time, things seemed to be now moving a little faster. So why now? I
was surprised about the timing rather than about the possibility
that eventually there would be an uprising if there were no peace
accord.
The interpretation in Israel is also very much related to people's
political perceptions. Those intransigent Israelis who have been
opposed to the Oslo process saw the uprising as once again
expressing the true face of the Palestinian leadership. They see
the Palestinian media not only as attacking Israelis in the West
Bank and Gaza, but as even saying things perceived to be in favor
of the destruction of Israel, throwing the Jews into the sea, etc.
They claim that when you give them weapons and they use them
against you, this is a confirmation of their expectations. The
mainstream, the people around Barak were surprised. They say, Look,
we were ready for more concessions than any other Israeli
leadership, and this is the way you pay us back. There is also a
lot of anger on the Israeli side from these people.
Within the peace camp - some (perhaps a majority) put a lot of
blame on our own behavior, even at Camp David, and with all Barak's
"generosity." There was a problem with the whole way we presented
it. We spoke about giving you a gift rather than about the rights
of the Palestinians, not to all of Palestine but to a mere 22
percent. We could have said: This is definitely your territory, and
we have some problems with settlers; can we talk about how to solve
them? Instead, the approach was very much "Take it or leave it."
Many people will react angrily against a diktat, even if it's
better than previous ones. So within the peace camp, using the term
in its broad sense, you find people, including myself, who
understood the grass-roots anger of the Palestinians: while we were
talking at Camp David we were still building or enlarging
settlements, let alone the fact that the peace dividends
anticipated by the Palestinians were not being honored.
So I would say that a small minority among the Israelis, even
though we were surprised, are ready to accept our own
responsibility. We don't think, like the majority of Israelis, that
the other side is double-crossing us at a time when we want peace.
For the moment, most Israelis are still confused, or blame the
other side. Things moved very fast in the last five weeks after the
provocative visit of Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Haram
al-Sharif/Temple Mount. By the way, I read in the press that Barak
never spoke about Haram al-Sharif at Camp David, let alone
publicly. He referred only to the Temple Mount. That has to do with
the style I'm talking about in the Israeli discourse, handing out
"gifts" to the other side and a "Take it or leave it"
posture.
In spite of this provocation, there was, to my mind, an incredible
over-reaction on the part of the Palestinian leadership. Since it
was higher than I would have expected, some people are asking
whether there was a preconceived plan and the Sharon provocation
was an excuse. I myself also ask was it all spontaneous, or as you,
Sari, mentioned in your second scenario, whether President Arafat
used the opportunity to promote his policies through turmoil and
rebellion. Perhaps there was overreaction on both sides. Since
Arafat couldn't get any more from Barak through negotiations at
Camp David, the uprising could achieve three aims: to
internationalize the conflict; to make the Palestinians appear as
victims; and to try to win Arab solidarity. Then we Israelis
exacerbated the situation by over-killing in terms of human rights:
the excessive use of force against adults and children, aiming at
the upper instead of the lower part of the body, etc. Why couldn't
water cannons have been used? Inevitably, all the funerals - many
of them of children - ignited the rebellion against Israel. But
what I am trying to say is that a possible explanation of why it
went so fast might be the overreaction of the leadership on both
sides.
Sari Nusseibeh: If I understand you, basically you believe
that (a) there is probably a grand design behind all of this, and
(b) the likelihood is that the designer of the grand design is the
Palestinian side.
Edy Kaufman: Sharon also had a petty design - first, to
compete with Netanyahu over leadership of the Likud, and second, to
try to sabotage the peace process. As for Barak, if he couldn't
sign an agreement with Arafat, at least he wanted a second-best
option to make a coalition with Sharon. These were petty designs,
but shouldn't be belittled.
Sari Nusseibeh: But over and above Barak's immediate
political considerations, you think that you can only really
understand what's happening on the political level as an action
perpetrated by the Palestinians in order to achieve through this
what they couldn't achieve in the Camp David talks?
Edy Kaufman: I borrow this from what you said. But I
mentioned at the beginning that I have doubts. Academics can
rationalize many things that perhaps don't have any
rationale.
Sari Nusseibeh: I got the impression from what you were
saying that you tended to believe there was a design and that the
designer was the Palestinians.
Edy Kaufman: I think that apart from the so-called petty
designs, Arafat may have considered the possibility of what the
Palestinians have been saying - that we need to take by force what
was taken from us by force.
Sari Nusseibeh: Yes. But the question that each one of us
has to settle is the following: a major conflict, the Al-Aqsa
uprising with its fallout, is unfolding before us. Is this an
action that manifests somebody's design or plan, or is this simply
a series of actions and reactions that builds up - that escalates
in its own dynamics with no specific design.
Of course, people can jump in here and there with their own small
designs as things unfold. But that's not the question. The first
question is not the small designs but whether, on the whole, there
is a grand design. The second question is whose grand design is it?
Of course, the Israeli side tends to attribute the design to the
Palestinian side and the Palestinian side tends to attribute the
design to the Israeli side.
Edy Kaufman: Right.
Sari Nusseibeh: Where does the truth lie, if there is a
truth in this case? It's obviously easy to accuse the other side of
a design. If one settles this question, one can then look forward.
If you assume this is by design, you can look forward to the days
and months to come and try to do some forecasting; whereas if
things are simply an escalating action-reaction kind of thing, one
has to consider it in that light.
Edy Kaufman: Don't you think you could have a combination of
a little of both? I don't think that Barak or Sharon had in mind
that there would be such a situation a month after the uprising
broke out.
Sari Nusseibeh: But why not?
Edy Kaufman: There was clearly a design centered around
internal political coalition considerations.
Sari Nusseibeh: Let's assume for a minute the following
Palestinian scenario:
Barak went to Camp David knowing that he wasn't going to make the
kind of offer that would be acceptable to the Palestinians. He knew
there would be a reaction. It didn't come immediately. He worked
out a deal, or he himself used Sharon to make a provocation. There
was a reaction on the Thursday [September 28]. It wasn't good
enough. He came in full force on Friday with a large force of
soldiers in order to create this provocation. Barak wanted the
escalation to continue so he maintained a very high level of use of
force, giving orders on a daily basis, for instance, for shootings
and killing. He maintained a level of escalation that would enable
him slowly to tighten his hold on the West Bank and Gaza, close the
Palestinians in there, and eventually impose by force a political
solution of his liking. There is nothing difficult about this
scenario.
Edy Kaufman: What are the benefits to Barak of this? It
seems to me he's losing more than he's gaining. His position as a
politician has weakened. Neither has he been saying what you are
saying. It is not logical in cost-benefit calculation.
Sari Nusseibeh: I am just thinking aloud. Let's assume that,
in terms of his constituency - whether in the Knesset or the
government - he knew that his political life would be short-lived
if he were to go very far in making concessions.
On the other hand, if he were to take a more rigid and forceful
kind of attitude, he might at least save himself politically. He
might also have thought that, in any case, the Palestinians are
"asking too much," and that he himself wasn't prepared to give them
that much. And maybe he assumed that, rather than waiting for, say,
a declaration of independence and an Intifada that might put Israel
in a difficult situation, he would preempt the violence by carrying
out a provocation now. This would strengthen him and weaken the
Palestinians. Without the necessary information I am not saying
that I necessarily believe this to be the case. I understood, for
instance, that when he gave the go-ahead to Sharon to visit
Al-Aqsa, he didn't even consult his inner cabinet. So even the
police force in Jerusalem was left until the last minute not
knowing whether, in fact, Sharon was going to be allowed to visit
or not.
Edy Kaufman: Why is that consistent with it all being
planned? You now made a very forceful case that everything seems to
have been premeditated. But you also made a good case before about
an escalation of a series of unforeseen events.
Sari Nusseibeh: That's right.
Edy Kaufman: I tend to agree with your rationale that all
was planned up to a certain level. However, in the process things
got out of hand. Much was unforeseen. A lot of the damage that was
done wasn't part of the design, if any. I think we are facing a
situation where the realities dictate the dynamics. I do not
accredit our leadership - on both sides - with such great strategic
thinking - I wouldn't call it wisdom - that they planned and did
everything according to a grand design. For many of the events -
certainly the shooting in Gilo is an example - no prime minister in
Israel would endanger himself, whatever the personal or coalition
design.
Sari Nusseibeh: It's a question mark, but I think it's
necessary for both sides. People on the Israeli side must consider
these different options very seriously and look at the
possibilities, not simply fall into the mode of blaming the other
side. The same applies to the Palestinian side.
If there are people rational enough on both sides, maybe we can
emerge from this tragic mess.
Edy Kaufman: Let us look introspectively and critically at
what went wrong from Oslo days to the present. What did we do
wrong?
We can't prove the grand designs of politicians, but we can
criticize things like language, incitement, lack of recognition of
others. My approach is more incremental. Both this and the "design
approach" are definitely legitimate in terms of the learning
curve.
Sari Nusseibeh: They are different spheres of conversation,
but I think, as you say, both spheres are important.
Edy Kaufman: In dealing with "what went wrong,"we can start
from 1947, but let's start from Oslo. I don't remember how you felt
for the first two years, but there was some sense of achievement in
the beginning. There was mutual recognition, which was highly
important. The "Zionist entity" and the "terrorist organization"
suddenly were talking to and recognizing each other. There was
recognition that the "greater Israel" scheme and the "greater
Palestine" scheme had been left behind. Now Sharon is advocating
the Allon Plan, while Barak and the Labor Party are offering 90
percent of the land. Progress. The recognition of two states, the
right to statehood is no longer a problem. Even on the question of
Jerusalem, I think the majority of Israelis also recognize the
possibility of having Al-Quds as the capital of a Palestinian state
to the east of Yerushalayim. Where exactly is the border is still a
question mark. All this is on the positive side.
But on the negative side - and that's the self-criticism I would
like to make - there were no Israeli confidence-building measures
during the peace process. Some progress was made, but particularly
after the death of Rabin, Israel continued to build settlements,
and even built at an increasing rate during Barak's term in office.
Then comes the question of Palestinian peace dividends. Not only
was it slow, but it was given not by right, but as a sort of a
gift. Meanwhile, the closures and the humiliation, etc., continued,
enough to make any society very angry. Even at Camp David II, where
there was a big effort to move on compared with the previous
governments, we were not yet willing to use the historic compromise
in terms of people's rights.
For example, if I were talking to President Arafat, I would say we
are talking of 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine, the 1967 borders.
You are right, you have lost a lot over the years. What we are
proposing is yours by right. Having said that, we need to talk
about the problems, which may include border exchanges.
Because we are not talking this way, we are alienating a lot of
potential partners on the Palestinian side. They feel the dictate,
the arrogance of power, the take-it-or-leave-it attitude. The last
item of Israeli self-criticism relates to the excessive use of
force in recent weeks, when the situation could have been handled
differently.
Sari Nusseibeh: The main problem that the Palestinians have
is what happened after they had gone through this major
psychological process of reaching a kind of balance with Israel -
Israeli existence, Israeli history, Israeli reality - on the one
hand, in return for something for themselves on the other hand.
They were hoping for a peaceful settlement, which would give Israel
legitimacy for its reality, and at the same time grant the
Palestinians at least the territories that came into Israel's hands
in 1967. The Palestinians would have a state there, in which they
would live normally and in dignity.
I think this was a historic point in time, a historic cross-point.
Unfortunately, I think that Israel misread the situation, and
failed to grasp the opportunity of reconciliation that was offered.
If you look back at the last five or seven or nine years, from the
Palestinian perspective, Israel has proved - this is how Israel is
perceived in Palestinian eyes - that it did not really seek a
reconciliation in which there would be proper mutual recognition of
the other's self-respect and freedom. Instead, Israel has used the
time in order to sink its teeth further into that territory that
was left from Palestine. Israel continued operating as an occupying
power relying on force and dispossessing the Palestinian
people.
This has of course created a reality in which, rather than using
the interim period for confidence-building between the two sides,
the hope that existed at that turning point in history was
destroyed. The hope that the Israelis were not perhaps the greedy
imperialist expansionists, but a normal nation, was shattered. But
since then, our reaction - and I am talking about myself, talking
about the average person - is to perceive Israel now as simply
playing out the role of any expansionist, occupying, authoritarian,
undemocratic force.
Today I saw Israeli soldiers walking around the streets of East
Jerusalem. To me, this exemplifies the sorry state in which we find
ourselves - sorry for the soldiers too because I want to ask them,
What are you doing, walking around with your guns? Are you happy
being an occupying force?
Unfortunately, after Israel missed the major opportunity, I
personally don't believe that it will be easy, if at all possible,
to recreate that particular moment in history. The intensity of the
anger being expressed today is a manifestation of the fact that the
Palestinian people came forward with a peace offer. But you totally
misread Palestinian reality and Arab reality, and this is a great
tragedy.
Edy Kaufman: I tend to agree with your explanation.
Unfortunately, most Israelis do not perceive it this way. As you
mentioned before, they lay the blame on the Palestinian side, not
only the leadership, but on Palestinian society at large. I think
that, in due time, we should also look into the mistakes of the
Palestinian side.
Sari Nusseibeh: The Palestinians are not angels, and I am
not interested in the least in defending Palestinian actions,
whether at the level of the leadership or the ordinary people. I am
as unhappy with many of the actions as you are. But there's a major
difference between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. The
Palestinians are an unorganized people living under pressure, under
occupation. They are suffering. They feel dispossessed. What you
see on the street, therefore, is simply an expression, a reaction
to this. The Israeli side, on the other hand, is organized. If
Barak, at any stage, orders his army to act in a certain way, this
will immediately be carried out. On the Palestinian side, you have
emotions rather than organization.
Edy Kaufman: I think there is a big responsibility of
leadership with regard to the Palestinian educational system. The
reason why the young people are so angry has to do with Israeli
occupation, but it also has to do with the anger they feel towards
the Palestinian Authority. These are acts of protest against
Israel, but they also have to do with the kind of educational
system being provided by their authorities. I am thinking of the
portrayal of Israel both in the textbooks, and in the media. I
worry very much about the way the media can be manipulated. With
all due respect to the media in the Palestinian territories, we all
know that the government has considerable leverage and control over
it. So I would not so easily let the responsibility of the
leadership off the hook.
I feel that in the course of all these years, Israel has wasted its
opportunity in not understanding how to gain a degree of legitimacy
in the Middle East, in spite of the door opened before them by the
Palestinians. But another factor must be explained: perhaps, in
their frustration over our deeds, the Palestinians did not go the
extra mile when we speak about peace education in government
schools: for example, I think we have to make demands on the
Israeli leadership no matter what the Palestinians are doing, and
to make demands on the Palestinian leadership no matter what the
Israelis are doing.
Sari Nusseibeh: Edy, I honestly believe, with all due
respect, that you're barking up the wrong tree. I agree with you
that education is a major formative force, and that, in talking
about peace education in the past five years, government schools on
the Palestinian side should have been involved. You know how very
important I consider it to make peace and to actually live in
peace. But, however much you try to use education for creating a
peace culture, you cannot use it to eliminate the naked reality
that Israel imposes upon you, as an occupying force armed to the
teeth, treating you arrogantly and denying your rights. Looking at
the list of Intifada victims, you'll find that some or many of the
people who were killed were actually peace activists. You listen to
what parents are saying and you wonder, What influence is all this
having?
By the way, I happen to listen both to Israeli and Palestinian
news, and I get the impression that there are two totally different
stories being related. If you listen to the Palestinian news, a man
who was shot in Bethlehem yesterday, in the Palestinian perception,
was killed at random. On the part of the person who shot him, on
the Israeli side, you just assume that he was using knives and
rocks and the Israeli shot him in self-defense. It is really a very
brutal reality, and I think that Israel and the Israelis should be
aware of it. I agree with you that we make mistakes all the time.
Education is one example and I've always been for as much
cooperation as possible at the level of education. However, the
brutal fact is that Israel has to come to terms with the reality
that it is an occupying force and that it cannot really live at
peace with the Palestinians unless the occupation ends. Peace means
that you allow the Palestinians to have the kind of life you would
wish for yourselves and for your own children - in freedom and
dignity and so on.
We have problems internally. Yes, some of the rage you see being
acted out is actually partially also against our leadership. But
why? Because a lot of our people are angry that our leadership took
the peace path. They are fed up with the fact that our leadership
has, in a sense, promised the people statehood, independence,
freedom and so on, but it was not implemented. So yes, there is
this sort of rage against the leadership as well, in addition to
anger that exists against phenomena like inefficiency and
corruption.
Edy Kaufman: I think we are probably coming to the question
of what civil society can do. I tend to agree with your analysis to
a very large extent. The question is: are we paralyzed by the
events? In the Jewish tradition we mourn a death for a week. More
than a week has passed and many of my friends are still mourning
the end of Oslo or the "treacherous uprising," etc. They are
maintaining a mood of disappointment and frustration and anger. I,
for one, think that the time has come for more people - people
around me too - to finish with the mourning period and to start
asking what they can do. How can this tragedy that is unfolding
before our eyes, which doesn't seem to be waning of its own
volition, be redressed?
People have to intervene. It is my conviction that in Israeli
society, Israelis have a stronger responsibility because we are
already an established and more affluent state, and some of our
rules of democracy permit us to express dissent more freely. Our
system provides more leeway than that of colleagues and friends on
the other side. Their situation is more difficult in terms of their
struggle for national liberation within a regime that (I permit
myself to say) allows less space for dissent. Nowadays, in these
times of violence, this is even truer than usual.
Whether you believe in the grand design or in a tragedy of errors,
and however important is introspection, I think the dominant need
is for people to realize that the time has come to make a new start
and to shift priorities in their daily lives, and dedicate more
time to work for a just peace. We in Jerusalem cannot but see the
reality every day. Sometimes I can even smell the tear gas when I
go to the university on Mount Scopus. People in Tel Aviv don't seem
to have the same sense of urgency we do.
What worries me in my own camp is that this shifting of priorities
is too slow in relation to the urgent need to understand the
implications of occupation and above all - for this is the crux -
to stop the violence. As I mentioned before, there is a sense that
we were betrayed by Arafat, which is shared by many people and has
caused much anger. I think that people like us who have been
committed to human rights, democracy, peace and justice - you put
it very clearly in your terms - have to redouble our efforts
because after such a setback, we can't really allow ourselves to
permit a "Business as usual" attitude.
Sari Nusseibeh: Let's assume that what I am thinking aloud
is right, and that indeed we seem to have missed a unique and major
opportunity, then what we're looking at in the future in the long
term is really a state of protracted war between the two
communities. Maybe the people in Tel Aviv will not feel it. Okay.
But that will be the situation. And if that is going to be the
situation and you ask yourself the question, "Well, what does one
do?" I personally would stress the need to try to maintain human
contacts with people from the other side. This becomes even more
important in the present situation than it was four or five years
ago, when we hoped that we were moving towards a state of
peace.
It is when you are in a state of war that indeed you need people to
maintain human contact because, after all, it's necessary to
maintain some kind of sanity about who one is, beyond being Jewish
or Palestinian or Israeli or whatever. It's essential to remember
that one is, after all, a human being. But to tell you honestly, I
don't believe that even the feeble attempts that may be made in the
future to maintain such human contact are going to amount to
anything because, objectively, the real situation is so bad. And as
long as it is bad at the overall political level, I think that, in
a sense, if you like, peace-seekers and peace-makers will have very
limited space. They can wage a very important and significant
struggle, but it will be very limited.
Edy Kaufman: When the Oslo process started, there was an
impasse in the negotiations in Washington because we couldn't get
anywhere on the official negotiations, and progress came only after
an uprising (the Intifada of 1987) that lasted several years. Maybe
you are right that as things are unfolding now, one can't prevent
them because the antagonism is so strong. But if you think about
the day after - and there was a day called Oslo after the last
uprising - we all know, and you probably know more than anybody
else, that all these bridges that had been built, all these seeds
that had been sown, did have results. I think this effort, which
started in difficult times, including during the first Intifada
when there was very little hope in the government-to-government
sphere, must now be renewed with the utmost urgency.
There is a crying need for civil society cooperation, as we call
it, or people who share values across the ethnic and national
divide, and particularly Israelis and Palestinians ready to work
together.
Sari Nusseibeh: On the Palestinian side, I don't think that,
after all that has happened, we can be naive as peace-seekers and
as humanists. We should also read the reality properly. Now, it
might sound surprising, but in the late 1980s, and during the first
Intifada, I think there was much more hope than now for a
settlement and for dialogue between leaderships, and for a final
reconciliation.
Edy Kaufman: You mean at the time when Shamir was prime
minister?
Sari Nusseibeh: Yes, even then there was much more hope than
now in the sense of our reading future developments, our
understanding of what the Intifada might accomplish. Because - and
this is something I cannot over-emphasize - this time we missed a
unique opportunity.
Edy Kaufman: You mean it's irreversible?
Sari Nusseibeh: I don't think the opportunity is ever going
to come back. In terms of Palestinian and Arab good will or the
Palestinian psyche. The Palestinians and Arabs went as far as they
could, waiting and hoping for a response. In the end, cumulatively,
the response, as far as they were concerned, was a slap in the
face. This is the reason why they are enraged. And I personally do
not think it is easy or possible for many years to come to erase
this perception from their emotions and mental attitudes. You see,
before, in the 1980s, there was a debate over the question of the
Israelis wanting peace. Maybe it was only a question of making them
realize that we ourselves are ready to make peace with them. Today
this is a moot point. Today people say it's clear that the Israelis
do not really want peace. What they want is territory, settlements,
using the balance of power to impose terms of their liking. This is
how Israel is now perceived and how Israelis are now perceived, and
it's difficult to make people see things otherwise.
Edy Kaufman: Well, if that is the case, then at least we
should try to educate our peoples to differentiate, and not to look
at the other side as a monolithic group.
Sari Nusseibeh: That is absolutely right. That is one
terrible fall-out of this confrontation, the sweeping
generalizations on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides about
each other.
Edy Kaufman: We see from public opinion polls conducted by
your colleagues and by my colleagues that there is steady support
for the idea of a package that will include what is called a
two-state solution. On the Israeli side, Barak's "concession" of
"90 percent territory" won't get us anywhere because, according to
what you are saying, the Palestinians have compromised already, as
you indicated. But I can see progress and incremental change in the
perception, for example, that we are no longer talking to a
"terrorist organization," or by the additional dimension of a
Palestinian capital to the east of Jerusalem.
What stands to reason for me, as one who is for evolutionary, not
revolutionary change, is the following: while I agree that we have
missed a golden opportunity, opportunities come and go, and we have
to persevere. Things won't change quickly because of all this
animosity that has been accumulating over the years. However, I
would rather not wait passively for the next opportunity.
Sari Nusseibeh: But the question is not education. The
question is not time. The question is attitude. Is Israel prepared
to go back to its 1967 borders? That is the question.
Edy Kaufman: Some Israelis are and some Israelis are
not.
Sari Nusseibeh: I know some Israelis are. But if Israel is
not prepared to do this, whether now or in ten years' time or
twenty years, or fifty years, then however reconciliatory you may
be, you are not reaching peace.
Edy Kaufman: In one way or the other, you can still
negotiate on this with many Israelis.
Sari Nusseibeh: Politically, Israel, as it exists today,
does not have the capacity to do this. It does not have a
government - and it's unclear that it will have in the foreseeable
future - that will be prepared to make the kind of offer to the
Palestinians that the Palestinians expect Israel to make to them as
a sign of reconciliation. Unfortunately, this is the case. I
realize it doesn't mean all Israelis are like this. I am saying
that objectively this is the Israeli political set-up. Therefore,
given this, if we look ahead, it really would be very romantic to
assume that a few years down the road, with some kind of work at
the level of civil society, things might change. Things will just
go from bad to worse, and maybe we will be looking, in ten, twenty,
thirty, forty years down the road, at totally different kinds of
solutions, if any.
Edy Kaufman: I look at comparative studies of other
conflicts. The uniqueness of our conflict exists, but there are
many similar protracted conflicts, and suddenly there is a
solution, including, for example, the very modest idea of
"Gaza-Jericho First" at the time of Oslo. To project such ideas is
part of the challenge of academics. They should at least have a
vision. There are constraints on many of the things that we are
fighting for, but surely, on a subject like Jerusalem, sovereignty,
etc., definitions are changing even in the dictionaries. I think
it's our responsibility to look into the gaps separating
Palestinians and Israelis. The gaps are smaller than they were in
1993.
I remember the project, in which your friends and my friends were
involved, about water, aquifers, underground water. There has been
tremendous progress there, to the point that there doesn't seem to
be any big disagreement between our leaderships. I use the example
of underground water, which perhaps is not as hot as Haram
al-Sharif, but I know that, even on Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount,
very creative ideas have been drawn up. It is only sad that our
leadership is not open-minded enough to try to deal with creative
ideas.
A fatalist may say that given the current position of the political
leaderships in Israel and in Palestine, as representing their
peoples, there is no way we can bridge this ten- to twenty-percent
gap, in connection with the possible territorial solution. An
optimist will say it is a matter of persevering. I personally am
more optimistic by nature. And maybe you can advance the solution
by many years, perhaps from thirty years to twenty years ahead, if
you persist. Eventually, given historic examples of other nations,
not only will there be a solution, but other people will ask how
come it took us so long. On a small scale, returning to
"Gaza-Jericho First" in 1993, why didn't we come up with that in
1988 (five years early) when the Palestinian National Council
changed its policy?
What I am trying to say, on a more optimistic note, is that I think
we in the peace camp should feel empowered at this time, more than
ever, to continue doing whatever possible, under very adverse
circumstances. It's not a given that ideas about peace are not
going to percolate into Israeli thinking.
So in the historic context of changing things over a shorter or
longer period of time, even if it looks that the odds are against
us, I think we do have a role to play. After all, many of the ideas
that the Israeli establishment is putting forth today were
considered taboo in Israel twenty years ago.
Sari Nusseibeh: I am glad that you are optimistic, and I
hope that you are right and that I am wrong. But seriously, from my
perspective, I think we are in a very grave situation. And I have
the sense that you, and perhaps other Israelis, do not realize how
grave it really is.
Edy Kaufman: We must try to keep human dialogue open, so we
can grasp the intensity of these feelings and continue to be able
to talk to each other.
Sari Nusseibeh: We can always talk as individuals.