Jerusalem and Ramallah heads of European Union (EU)
Mission,November 25, 2005.
SUMMARY
1.East Jerusalem is of central importance to the Palestinians in
political, economic, social and religious terms. Several
inter-linked Israeli policies are reducing the possibility of
reaching a final-status agreement on Jerusalem, and demonstrate a
clear Israeli intention to turn the annexation of East Jerusalem
into a concrete fact:
* the near-completion of the barrier around East Jerusalem, far
from the Green Line;
* the construction and expansion of illegal settlements, by private
entities and the Israeli government, in and around East
Jerusalem;
* the demolition of Palestinian homes built without permits (which
are all but unobtainable);
* stricter enforcement of rules separating Palestinians resident in
East Jerusalem from those resident in the West Bank, including a
reduction of working permits;
* and discriminatory taxation, expenditure and building permit
policy by the Jerusalem municipality.
2.The plan to expand the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim into the
so-called "E1" area, east of Jerusalem, threatens to complete the
encircling of the city by Jewish settlements, dividing the West
Bank into two separate geographical areas. The proposed extension
of the barrier from East Jerusalem to form a bubble around the
settlement of Ma'ale Adumim would have the same effect. 2004 saw a
near tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished in
East Jerusalem. We expect a similar number of demolitions in 2005.
Eighty-eight homes in the Silwan neighborhood with demolition
orders outstanding against them attracted much attention in
June.
3.When the barrier has been completed, Israel will control access
to and from East Jerusalem, cutting off its Palestinian satellite
cities of Bethlehem and Ramallah, and the rest of the West Bank
beyond. This will have serious economic, social and humanitarian
consequences for the Palestinians. By vigorously applying policies
on residency and ID status, Israel will be able finally to complete
the isolation of East Jerusalem - the political, social, commercial
and infrastructural centre of Palestinian life.
4.Israel's activities in Jerusalem are in violation of both its
Roadmap obligations and international law. We and others in the
international community have made our concerns clear on numerous
occasions, to varying effect.
Palestinians are, without exception, deeply alarmed about East
Jerusalem. They fear that Israel will "get away with it," under the
cover of disengagement. Israeli actions also risk radicalizing the
hitherto relatively quiescent Palestinian population in East
Jerusalem. Clear statements by the European Union and the Quartet
that Jerusalem remains an issue for negotiation by the two sides,
and that Israel should desist from all measures designed to
pre-empt such negotiations, would be timely. We should also support
Palestinian cultural, political and economic activities in East
Jerusalem.
RECOMMENDATIONS
On the Political Level
* Clear statements by the European Union and the Quartet that
Jerusalem remains an issue for negotiation by the two sides, and
that Israel should desist from all measures designed to pre-empt
such negotiations.
* We might consider issuing a statement focused on the issue of
Jerusalem at the General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) in November. We could also press for a similar statement to
issue from the Quartet.
* Phase One of the Roadmap calls for the re-opening of Palestinian
institutions in East Jerusalem, and in particular the Chamber of
Commerce. The re-opening of these institutions would send a signal
to the Palestinians that the international community takes their
concerns seriously, and is taking action. We might include a call
for their re-opening in the statements referred to above, and
explore with the two parties how and when their re-opening might be
accomplished.
* Request the Israeli Government to halt discriminatory treatment
of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, especially concerning working
permits, building permits, house demolitions, taxation and
expenditure.
* The EU might consider and assess the implications and feasibility
of excluding East Jerusalem from certain EU/Israel cooperation
activities.
On an Operational Level
* Organize political meetings with the Palestinian Authority (PA)
in East Jerusalem, including meetings at ministerial level.
* Initiatives (statement letters, contacts, meetings etc.) focused
on issues like access, building permits, the consequences of the
barrier etc.
* In view of the Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for 25
January 2006, encourage the parties to agree on the terms and
substance of their coordination to allow for satisfactory elections
to take place in East Jerusalem, referring to the parties'
obligations under the interim agreements and the Roadmap (PA to
hold elections and Israel to facilitate them) and taking into
account the recommendations formulated in the Rocard EU Elections
Observation Mission (EUEOM) report. Offer 3rd party technical
assistance and monitoring capacity if required and adequate.
* The Jerusalem master plan that is currently in the approval
process should undergo a technical assessment followed by a
decision as to how to evaluate the plan in terms of legal
implications, public awareness etc. The plan currently exists only
in Hebrew (the plan should be translated into Arabic and
English).
* All MS and EC to increase project activity in East Jerusalem with
a balance between service provision, relief, development and
political projects (taking into consideration the Multi-Sector
Review). Support for civil society is important. An inventory of
current EC and MS activity in East Jerusalem would be a useful
first step.
* Regarding house demolitions for lack of building permits in East
Jerusalem, the EU could pursue various options:
- support legal projects designed to support Palestinians
threatened by house demolitions and those who have been victims
thereof;
- promote initiatives to legalize "illegal" houses (e.g. through
introducing retroactively alternative town planning schemes);
- facilitate a solution for obtaining building permits;
- EU projects with a Palestinian NGO on legal counseling concerning
building permits and house demolitions;
- EU project on the development of a master plan for urban planning
and legal housing for Palestinian neighborhoods in East
Jerusalem.
* Facilitate a solution of the access issue. This would comprise a
range of political and operational measures, both short and long
term
* Support local and international organizations in their
information efforts on East Jerusalem.
* Enhance EU assistance to Palestinian institutions in East
Jerusalem, including cultural activities and community
empowerment.
DETAIL
1. Jerusalem is already one of the trickiest issues on the road to
reaching a final-status agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. But several inter-linked Israeli policies are
reducing the possibility of reaching a final-status agreement on
Jerusalem that any Palestinian could accept. We judge that this is
a deliberate Israeli policy - the completion of the annexation of
East Jerusalem. Israeli measures also risk radicalizing the
hitherto relatively quiescent Palestinian population of East
Jerusalem.
EU Policy on East Jerusalem
2. The EU policy on Jerusalem is based on the principles set out in
UN Security Council Resolution 242, notably the impossibility of
acquisition of territory by force. In consequence, the EU has never
recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem under the Israeli 1980
Basic Law (Basic Law Jerusalem Capital of Israel) which made
Jerusalem the "complete and united" capital of Israel. EU Member
States have therefore placed their accredited missions in Tel Aviv.
The EU opposes measures that would prejudge the outcome of
Permanent-Status Negotiations, consigned to the third phase of the
Roadmap, such as actions aimed at changing the status of East
Jerusalem.
3. In conferences held in 1999 and 2001, the High Contracting
Parties reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and reiterated the need for full respect for the
provisions of the said Convention in that territory.
4. In July 2004 the EU acknowledged the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the "legal consequences of the
construction of a Wall in the occupied Palestinian territories
including in and around East Jerusalem" and voted in favor of the
General Assembly Resolution that recognized it. While the EU
recognizes Israel's security concerns and its right to act in
self-defense, the EU position on the legality of the separation
barrier largely coincides with the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion.
Settlements
1. Israel is increasing settlement activity in three east-facing
horseshoe shaped bands in and around East Jerusalem, linked by new
roads:
* first through new settlements in the Old City itself and in the
Palestinian neighborhoods immediately surrounding the old city
(Silwan, Ras al-Amud, A-Tur, Wadi al-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah);
* then in the existing major East Jerusalem settlement blocs
(running clockwise from Ramot, Reches Shu'afat, French Hill,
through the new settlements in the first band, above, to East
Talpiot, Har Homa and Gilo);
* and finally in "Greater Jerusalem" - linking the city of
Jerusalem to the settlement blocs of Givat Ze'ev to the north,
Ma'ale Adumim to the east (including the E1 area, see below), and
the Etzion bloc to the south.
Settlement activity and construction is ongoing in each of these
three bands, contrary to Israel's obligations under international
law and the Roadmap.
"E1" and Ma'ale Adumim
2. E1 (derived from "East 1") is the term applied by the Israeli
Ministry of Housing to a planned new neighborhood within the
municipal borders of the large Israeli settlement of Ma'ale Adumim
(30,000+ residents), linking it to the municipal boundary of
Jerusalem (a unilateral Israeli line well east of the Green Line).
E1, along with a maximalist barrier around Ma'ale Adumim, would
complete the encircling of East Jerusalem and cut the West Bank
into two parts, and further restrict access into and out of
Jerusalem. The economic prospects of the West Bank (where GDP is
under $1000 a year) are highly dependent on access to East
Jerusalem (where GDP is around $3500 a year). Estimates of the
contribution made by East Jerusalem to the Palestinian economy as a
whole vary between a quarter and a third. From an economic
perspective, the viability of a Palestinian state depends to a
great extent on the preservation of organic links between East
Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem.
3. E1 is an old plan which was drawn up by Rabin's government in
1994 but never implemented. The plan was revived by the Housing
Ministry in 2003, and preliminary construction in the E1 area began
in 2004. Since his resignation from the Cabinet, Binyamin Netanyahu
has tried to make E1 a campaign issue.
The development plans for E1 include:
* the erection of at least 3,500 housing units (for approx. 15,000
residents);
* an economic development zone;
* construction of the police headquarters for the West Bank that
shall be relocated from Ras al-Amud;
* commercial areas, hotels and "special housing," universities and
"special projects," a cemetery and a waste disposal site;
* About 75 percent of the plan's total area is earmarked for a park
that will surround all these components.
* So far only the plans for the economic development zone have
received the necessary authorizations for building to commence. The
plans related to residential areas and the building of the police
headquarters have been approved by the Ma'ale Adumim Municipality
but not yet by the Civil Administration's Planning Council.
4. The current built-up area of Ma'ale Adumim covers only 15
percent of the planned area. The overall plan for Ma'ale Adumim,
including E1, covers an area of at least 53 square kilometers
(larger than Tel Aviv) stretching from Jerusalem to Jericho
(comment: Israel's defense of settlement expansion "within existing
settlement boundaries" therefore covers a potentially huge area).
In August 2005, Israel published land requisition orders for
construction of the barrier around the southern edge of the Adumim
bloc, following the route approved by the Israeli cabinet on 20
February 2005 (including most of the municipal area of Ma'ale
Adumim).
5. The E1 project would cut across the main central traffic route
for Palestinians traveling from Bethlehem to Ramallah. This route
is actually an alternative to route 60, which, until 2001, was the
main north-south highway connecting the major Palestinian cities
(Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron) on the
ridge of mountains in the West Bank. And Palestinians currently
have only restricted access to route 60 (either permits are
required for certain segments or roads are blocked), especially
from/to the Jerusalem area.
6. Since 2003, some preparatory work has taken place. In the
northern sector of E-1, where residential housing is planned, the
top of a hill has been leveled in order to allow construction. In
the southern section, where a police station and hotels are
planned, an unpaved road has been constructed. But no further work
has been carried out for over a year. On 25 August 2005, Israel
announced plans to build the new police headquarters for the West
Bank in E1, transferring it from its present location in East
Jerusalem. Many previous settlements have started with a police
station, and we are aware from Israeli NGOs that Israel has plans
to convert the existing West Bank police headquarters, in Ras
al-Amud, into further settlement housing.
Settlement Building inside East Jerusalem
7. Settlement building inside East Jerusalem continues at a rapid
pace. There are currently around 190,000 Israeli settlers in East
Jerusalem, the majority in large settlement blocs such as Pisgat
Ze'ev. The mainstream Israeli view is that the so-called Israeli
"neighborhoods" of East Jerusalem are not settlements because they
are within the borders of the Jerusalem Municipality. The EU, along
with most of the rest of the international community, does not
recognize Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and
regards the East Jerusalem "neighborhoods" as illegal settlements
like any others - but this does not deter Israel from expanding
them. Some of these settlements are now expanding beyond even the
Israeli-defined municipal boundary of Jerusalem, further into the
West Bank. The Jerusalem municipality has also been active around
Rachel's Tomb, outside the municipal boundaries.
8. Smaller in number but of equal concern are settlements being
implanted in the heart of existing Palestinian neighborhoods, with
covert and overt government assistance. Extremist Jewish settler
groups, often with foreign funding, use a variety of means to take
over Palestinian properties and land. They either prey on
Palestinians suffering financial hardship or simply occupy
properties by force and rely on the occasional tardiness and/or
connivance of the Israeli courts. Such groups have told us that
they also press the Israeli authorities to demolish Palestinian
homes built without permits. Israel has previously used the
"Absentee Property Law"1 (generally applied only inside Green Line
Israel) to seize property and land. The Attorney General declared
that this was "legally indefensible" in the Bethlehem area earlier
this year and the practice has stopped, but the law remains
applicable to East Jerusalem and can be resurrected any time the
Israeli Government sees fit.
9. Some of the Jewish settlements lack building permits, but not
one has been demolished - in marked contrast to the situation for
Palestinians. There are also plans to build a large new Jewish
settlement within the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, a step that
would be particularly inflammatory and could lead to the further
"Hebronization" of Jerusalem. The aim of these settlers, and
settlements, is to extend the Jewish Israeli presence into new
areas. As a result, President Clinton's formula for Jerusalem
("what's Jewish becomes Israel and what's Palestinian becomes
Palestine") either cannot be applied - or Israel gets more.
Separation Barrier/Wall
10. Israel has largely ignored the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the barrier.
On 20 February 2005, the Israeli Government approved the revised
route of the separation barrier2. This route seals off most of East
Jerusalem, with its 230,000 Palestinian residents, from the West
Bank (i.e. it divides Palestinians from Palestinians, rather than
Palestinians from Israelis). The Barrier is not only motivated by
security considerations. On 21 June 2005, the Israeli High Court
ruled that it was legal to take into account political
considerations, in addition to security considerations, for the
routing of the barrier in East Jerusalem because East Jerusalem had
been Israeli territory since its annexation in 1967 (i.e. political
considerations are not legal in the West Bank, which has not been
annexed to Israel). On 10 July, the Israeli Cabinet decided to
route the Jerusalem barrier so as to keep around 55,000 East
Jerusalemite Palestinians, mainly in the Shu'afat refugee camp,
outside the barrier. The fact that the Cabinet decision not only
included short-term but also long-term measures designed to
accommodate the new situation created by the barrier - e.g.
constructing new educational institutions and encouraging hospitals
to open branches "beyond the fence" - appears to contradict the
notion of the barrier being a temporary rather than a permanent
structure. And if Israel were to provide adequate municipal
services to the areas excluded (as it is promising to do) this
would be in contrast to hitherto poor service provision in the rest
of East Jerusalem. Israeli NGOs working on the Jerusalem issue have
looked at Israeli proposals to ensure that the people affected are
not "cut off" from the city, and judged them deficient.
11. The barrier extends like a cloverleaf to the northwest,
southwest and east, beyond even the (Israeli defined) municipal
boundary of Jerusalem, leaving 164 square kilometers of West Bank
land on the "Israeli" (western) side. Combined with settlement
activity in these areas this de facto annexation of Palestinian
land will be irreversible without very large scale forced
evacuations of settlers and the re-routing of the barrier - which
reportedly cost 800,000 euros per kilometer. It will also block the
alternative Bethlehem-Ramallah route for Palestinians, forcing them
to travel via tunnels or Jericho.
12. We should ensure that any support we provide to East Jerusalem
is not simply an attempt to reduce the negative consequences of the
construction of the separation barrier. The ICJ ruling on the
barrier, accepted by the EU with limited reservations, states: "all
States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction."
Restrictions on Demolitions of Palestinian Housing
13. The Israeli authorities place severe restrictions on the
building of Palestinian housing in East Jerusalem. The Israeli
authorities will only issue building permits for areas that have
"zoned master plans." The municipality produces such plans for
areas marked for settlement development, but not for Palestinian
areas - only Palestinians are expected to draw up their own plans,
at great (generally unaffordable) expense. So each year
Palestinians receive less than 100 building permits, and even these
require a wait of several years. At the same time, rules requiring
Palestinians with Jerusalem residency status either to reside in
the city or risk forfeiting that status have forced thousands of
Palestinians in this situation to move from other areas of the West
Bank back to Jerusalem, adding to the severe pressure on housing.
As a result, most new Palestinian housing is built without permits
and is therefore considered "illegal" by the Israeli authorities
(although under the Fourth Geneva Convention, occupying powers may
not extend their jurisdiction to occupied territory). The
restrictions and demolitions also leave undeveloped (but
Palestinian-owned) land available for new settlements or the
expansion of existing settlements.
14. In 2004, at least 152 buildings (most of them residential) were
demolished in East Jerusalem, a sharp increase over previous years
(66 in 2003, 36 in 2002, 32 in 2001 and 9 in 2000). In May 2005,
the Jerusalem municipality's intention to destroy 88 houses in the
Silwan neighborhood became public. Following media scrutiny and
international pressure, they have put these demolitions on hold,
but the future of Silwan remains uncertain, with demolition orders
remaining in place. In the meantime, elsewhere in Palestinian
neighborhoods, homes continue to be demolished on a regular basis.
According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 52
buildings (including a seven-story building and eight petrol
stations) have been demolished in East Jerusalem so far this year.
The municipality's budget for house demolitions (approved late, in
March) stands at NIS 4m (approximately 800k euros), a figure
slightly higher than last year. Our contacts estimate that this
will allow the municipality to demolish 150-170 buildings. In cases
where the municipality is deemed not to be carrying out its duty to
demolish illegal buildings (whether through lack of will or budget
constraints), the Ministry of Interior can and does demolish
buildings (14 in 2004, 6 so far in 2005). House demolitions are
illegal under international law (see above), serve no obvious
security purpose (but rather relate to settlement expansion), have
a catastrophic humanitarian effect, and fuel bitterness and
extremism. Palestinians continue to build illegally because they
have no alternative, and because the municipality and the Ministry
of Interior together can only demolish a fraction of the
approximately 12,000 "illegal" homes in existence. Palestinians
describe it to us as "a lottery."
ID Cards and Residency Status
15. Some Palestinians have blue Israeli ID cards, that give them
the "right" to live in Israel (in practice, in East Jerusalem), but
not to vote in Israeli national elections or take an Israeli
passport. The renewal of these blue ID cards is a lengthy,
cumbersome and at times humiliating process to be carried out every
year at the East Jerusalem office of the Israeli Ministry of
Interior. The remainder have green West Bank ID cards or orange
Gaza ID cards, and must apply for a permit to enter East Jerusalem.
Even for those West Bankers and Gazans regularly employed in East
Jerusalem, these entry permits have to be renewed every three
months. Between 1996-1999 Israel implemented a "centre of life"
policy meaning that those with blue ID found living or working
outside East Jerusalem, for example in Ramallah, would lose their
ID. A wave of blue ID cardholders therefore quickly moved back to
East Jerusalem. The residency of hundreds of Palestinians that
lived for a prolonged period outside of Israel and the Occupied
Territories was revoked, a policy that continues. Renewed
application of this rule and the construction of the barrier around
Jerusalem have led to a second wave of "immigration" of blue ID
cardholders to the city. Israel has also announced that it plans to
introduce biometric, machine-readable ID cards. This is of great
concern to Palestinians because it would enable Israel to check if
blue ID cardholders really do live and work in the city, and if
not, to expel more of them.
16. Israel's main motivation is almost certainly demographic - to
reduce the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, while exerting
efforts to boost the number of Jewish Israelis living in the city -
East and West. The Jerusalem master plan has an explicit goal to
keep the proportion of Palestinian Jerusalemites at no more than 30
percent of the total. But the policy has severe humanitarian
consequences - couples in which one spouse has a blue ID and the
other a green ID will be forced to leave Jerusalem (Israel permits
the transfer of blue ID status to spouses and children in theory
but very rarely in practice). Palestinians with Israeli IDs already
live in something of an identity limbo - neither Israeli Arabs, nor
linked to the Palestinian Authority - and these measures can only
worsen their situation. The separation of East Jerusalem from the
rest of the West Bank is crippling both areas economically, and the
influx of returning blue ID cardholders is exacerbating the housing
crisis - property prices and rents are soaring.
Municipality Policies
17. The Jerusalem municipality is responsible for the majority of
the house demolitions carried out in East Jerusalem (see above). It
also contributes to the economic and social stagnation of East
Jerusalem through other policies. The Israeli Committee Against
House Demolitions claims that, while Palestinians contribute 33
percent of the municipality's taxes, in return it spends only 8
percent of its budget in Palestinian areas. The exact figures are
hard to assess, but discrimination in expenditure is obvious.
Palestinian areas of the city are characterized by poor roads,
little or no street cleaning, and an absence of well-maintained
public spaces, in sharp contrast to areas where Israelis live (in
both West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem settlements). Even Jewish
ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods (which contribute very little in
taxes, for various reasons) are far better provided for by the
municipality. The provision of services in what is, according to
Israeli definitions, a single municipality, is therefore subject to
discriminatory practices. Palestinians regard municipal taxes as a
tax on their residency rights, rather than a quid pro quo for
municipal services. The high level of taxation (given that
Palestinian incomes are typically much lower) and discriminatory
law enforcement that appears to target Palestinians for fines for a
variety of offences (traffic violations, parking offences, no TV
license etc) further worsen the economic situation of Palestinians.
This makes it harder for them to maintain their residency in the
city, and more vulnerable to settler groups or Palestinian
collaborators offering them good money for their property or
land.
Humanitarian and Political Consequences
18. Cutting the Link between East Jerusalem and the West Bank:
Palestinian East Jerusalem has traditionally been the centre of
political, commercial, religious and cultural activities for the
West Bank, with Palestinians operating as one cohesive social and
economic unit. Separation from the rest of the West Bank is
affecting the economy and weakening the social fabric. Since
Israel's occupation of the eastern part of Jerusalem in 1967,
Palestinian access to Jerusalem from the West Bank has been
increasingly restricted. During the Oslo Process, in 1993, the
Israeli government banned entry for all Palestinians from the West
Bank and Gaza without a permit. Settlements together with by-pass
roads have further restricted access in Jerusalem. And the barrier
has further aggravated the situation.
19. Threats to Residency Status: Palestinian blue ID holders
outside the barrier are increasingly unable to access East
Jerusalem, forcing them to access educational, medical and
religious services in the rest of the West Bank. This jeopardizes
their Jerusalem residency rights, according to the Israeli "centre
of life" policy.
20. Impact on the Education and Health Care Sector: West Bankers
also face increasing difficulties in accessing the major
Palestinian centers of health care and education in East Jerusalem.
Schools in East Jerusalem that depend on West Bank staff are at
urgent risk of closure. The same applies to hospitals: in addition
to the dwindling numbers of patients from the West Bank due to
access problems, some Israeli insurance companies are demanding
that staff must have Israeli professional qualifications and
registration. According to the PA Ministry for Jerusalem Affairs,
approximately 68 percent of medical staff working at hospitals in
East Jerusalem reside outside its municipal boundaries. The lack of
patients and staff will cause a decline of the number and range of
services, which often are not available in the West Bank.
21. Restriction on Religious Freedom: Christians and Muslims living
east of the barrier already have restricted access to their holy
sites. West Bankers are finding it increasingly difficult to get to
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound - because of the wider
system of permits to enter Jerusalem, and the barrier. No males
under 45 are allowed onto the compound. The Director of the Awqaf,
which controls the mosques, has complained particularly about
increasing Israeli measures to dominate and control the compound.
Police have been regularly patrolling the compound for a year. The
Israelis say this is to ensure good settler behavior, but the
effect is that it intimidates worshippers. The Israelis have also
introduced new measures over the past few weeks - cameras have been
placed at every gate, outside the Haram but pointing in. Thus every
entrance is tightly controlled. The Israelis have also begun
erecting fences on the buildings surrounding the Haram. Muslim
concerns regarding access to (and threats to) the Haram al-Sharif
mosques have both security and political implications. Perceived
"threats" to the mosques by Jewish groups and the denial of access
to Muslims regularly spark confrontations, and motivate Palestinian
extremists.
22. The wider political consequences of the above measures are of
even greater concern. As outlined above, prospects for a two-state
solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine are
receding. The greater the level of settlement activity in and
around East Jerusalem, the harder it will be to say what is
Palestinian, and to link this up with the rest of the West Bank.
Israeli activity in E1 and the fencing off of a broad area around
Ma'ale Adumim are of particular concern in this regard. Israeli
policies in East Jerusalem are making proposals for a resolution of
the conflict along the one developed by the Geneva Initiative in
2003, a civil society initiative which was welcomed by the EU,
harder to achieve.
23. Arrangements to facilitate the PA presidential elections in
East Jerusalem in January 2005 were unsatisfactory - Israel closed
down voter registration centers, candidates could not campaign
freely in the city, and restrictions on the number of polling
stations led to chaos on election day. The report of former Prime
Minister Rocard's Elections Observation Mission sets out the
problems clearly, along with recommendations for improvements ahead
of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, scheduled for 25
January 2006..
1. Israel passed the Absentee Property Law in 1950. It states
that any landowner who left her/his permanent residence at any time
following November 29, 1947 to any Arab State, or to any area of
the Land of Israel, which is not part of the State of Israel (i.e.
West Bank and Gaza) automatically forfeited any property within the
State of Israel to the Absenteed Property Custodian - a public
body, which subsequently transferred title to these properties to
the State. Most of these lands - primarily in the Negev and the
Galilee - were used to build kibbutzim, moshavim and development
towns for the Jewish population.
2. Map available at:
http://www.btselem.org/Downloads/Jerusalem_Separation_Barrier_Eng.PDF.