In the ongoing discourse concerning the ultimate territorial
configuration of separate Israeli and Palestinian entities/states,
two sets of issues are continually raised. The two themes -
security and historical attachment ¬are often used by
proponents of one to reinforce the other. Supporters of a Greater
Israel will always attempt to strengthen their irredentist
arguments with the security component, thus making it more
acceptable to those groups for whom security remains a keyword, but
for whom religious and historical factors do not play any major
role in their decision making.
The Security Factor
The notion of security has always been the common denominator which
carries the weight of "consensus" amongst much of Israel's Jewish
population. This is continually evidenced in the clamor for, and
popularity of, army generals within the political system. It was
highlighted most strongly in the last elections when the perceived
"security" message of Binyamin Netanyahu took precedence over the
peace emphasis of Shimon Peres. And, of course, Netanyahu has
resorted continuously to the security argument ever since coming to
power. The suicide bombings have played into his hands in tpis
respect, while the constant emphasis on security, rather than
peace, has proved a useful means by which to cover up his
government's failures, be it the Bar-On affair or, most recently,
the ill-considered Mossad operation inside Jordan.
Highlighting the existential threat that faces the state, the
desire of the Arab countries to "push Israel into the sea," and the
continued use of "terrorism" as a means of struggle, all these are
used as a means of maintaining the perpetual feelings of fear and
threat emanating from the "other" side and, as such, preventing the
Israeli populace from believing that peace, or conflict resolution
at the least, is a tangible and realistic possibility.
Retaining control of territory is, for many, the most tangible
means by which security is achieved. The creation of a cordon
sanitaire, well away from the major [Israeli] population centers,
controlling the strategic high ground, such as in the Golan
Heights, and maintaining strong and "defensible" boundaries, is a
traditional territorial concept of security. This takes precedence
over all other factors. Thus, whether or not most Israelis desire
to control some two million Palestinians is often considered an
irrelevant argument, if the implications of handing over control
would bring about a withdrawal from areas deemed as important for
"security."
Defensible Boundaries
From this perspective, the Allon Plan does not differ greatly from
the Oslo II map, or for that matter from many other proposals aimed
at bringing about the final territorial configurations. The Jordan
Valley continues to be perceived as a security asset; controlling
the slopes overlooking the Israeli towns is perceive9. as a
strategic imperative, as is retaining control of the Golan Heights.
Yet the major territorial security asset held by Israel, the Sinai
Peninsula, was returned to Egypt as part of the Camp David Accords.
A solution to the security problem was found in the guise of a
multinational force. The desire to reach an agreement enabled the
appropriate arrangements guaranteeing physical security to be put
into effect. Notwithstanding, the perception of Egypt as a
potential security threat remains uppermost in the minds of many
Israelis, not least because the practical implementation of
conflict resolution has not been followed up by any real
normalization of relations between the two countries.
The traditional security discourse has held that if a state has
strong and "defensible" boundaries, then any threat to the major
population centers can be geographically removed from the towns
themselves to the front line. This classic line of thinking was
best expressed in the Allon Plan doctrine, where Yigal Allon
believed it necessary that Israel establish its security boundary
along the line of the Jordan River as a means of pushing the
perceived military threat to the state away from the Green Line
boundary which existed prior to 1967 and which, in the public
discourse, symbolized the "suicide" boundaries of the state. In the
traditional mold of Israeli security thinking, Allon proposed the
establishment of civilian settlements along the Jordan Valley as a
means of maintaining Israeli security control.
Forgotten Failures
Despite Israel's military victories, it is conveniently forgotten
that many of the classic Israeli security solutions have proved to
be major failures during the past 30 years. The Bar-Lev Line
collapsed at the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The role of
civilian settlements as a means of enhancing regional security also
proved to be outdated as Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights
were overrun by Syrian troops and had to be evacuated as a means of
ensuring the safety of the residents. The so-called security zone
in Southern Lebanon has proved to be ineffective in the face of
even the simplest of Katyusha rockets carried on a person's back,
such that it has been termed the "(in)security zone." And the
prolonged years of Intifada violence claimed many lives - both
Israeli and Palestinian - despite the Israeli declared intention of
retaining direct control throughout the West Bank for reasons of
security and ensuring the safety of Israeli civilians.
Traditional notions of security, worldwide, are undergoing change.
The conventional role of territory as a provider of physical
security is nowhere near as relevant as it was 20 years ago. The
boundaries of a state have become less and less efficient as
barriers with the passing of time. New technologies spurred on by
the use of satellites and cyberspace have meant that boundaries no
longer prevent the dissemination of information and/ or propaganda
from one side of a boundary to another .. Equally, state boundaries
are becoming less significant in their traditional role of
preventing the movement of warfare from one side to the
other.
The introduction of modem warfare technologies has meant that the
strategic role of territories has changed significantly. For
Israel, it has changed in two somewhat paradoxical ways - at one
and the same time pushing the security boundary farther away from
the safe border, while at the same time bringing it closer to the
population centers.
Boundaries - Nearer and Farther
Both peace treaties which have been signed between Israel and her
neighbors - with Egypt and Jordan - have, in effect, pushed the
security boundary farther away from the population centers than
ever before. Part of the respective peace treaties forbids the
other side to introduce troops into the adjacent territories. Egypt
is forbidden to introduce any major troops into the Sinai
Peninsula, while Jordan is forbidden to allow any foreign troops to
enter its own state territory. As such, the security boundary has,
in effect, been pushed farther south and farther east than ever
before, giving Israel an extended cordon sanitaire. The
introduction of troops into these areas in contravention of the
terms of the peace agreements would, for Israel, be a sufficient
casus bellum.
But while the peace treaties have pushed the security boundary
farther away, new warfare technologies have brought the boundary
into the heart of the Israeli cities. Not only did the Gulf War
change the way we think about boundaries, but it also brought a new
component into the security discourse, namely the fact that no one
is safe from missiles, even in the heart of the country. In his
book on the "New Middle East," Shimon Peres argues that in an age
of ballistic missiles which can fly over distances of hundreds of
kilometers, paying scant regard to the land boundaries and
anti-missile systems on the way, territory no longer has a major
role to play in the modem era of warfare and security
doctrine.
It was this new reality that led to the outward flow of people from
the cities, especially Tel Aviv, during the Gulf War, and the
subsequent creation of a new army command - the Ore! or hinterland
command - as a means of dealing with the new security threats
facing the population centers during a potential future
conflagration. Prior to this, the army commands were focused
exclusively on the border regions and frontier zones.
In the wake of the Gulf War, the Israeli government attempted to
use this changed security perspective to promote population
decentralization, away from the center of the country into the
peripheral regions, in much the same way as the Barlow Report in
Britain during the Second World War attempted to use the strategic
concerns of over-centralization as a means of population dispersal
away from the southeast region and the growing metropolis of
London. In neither case has the security factor played a long-term
role in changing the population distribution of these or other
countries. Economic incentives of residing in and around the urban
core have proved to be much stronger than the quickly forgotten
dangers of ballistic missiles in an overcrowded urban
metropolis.
Paradoxes
One of the great paradoxes of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been
the symmetry by which both sides have completely failed to
understand or comprehend the security fears of the "other" side.
Israel argues that the Arab states pose an existential threat to
the State of Israel by virtue of their relatively large size - both
territorial and demographic. For many Israelis, the notion that the
ultimate intention of the Palestinians is simply to destroy Israel
and push her citizens into the sea, has not dissipated as a result
of the Oslo peace process. The suicide bombings and other acts of
violence have only served to strengthen this feeling of
insecurity.
For the Arab nations, Israel is perceived as a security threat,
whose intention it is to continue its policies of military
expansion and territorial aggrandizement. The military might of
Israel, as evidenced in the June 1967 war, is seen as being no more
than one stage on the way to Israeli expansionism, resulting in the
occupation of territory and the creation of even more refugees. The
expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the
construction activity at Har Homa Uabal Abu Ghneim), only serve to
strengthen the Arab fears that the Palestinians will be left with
very little land on which to establish an independent state.
Retaining sufficient land is, for the Palestinians, an essential
component of their own security discourse, as are issues of
military balance and the retention of strategic superiority within
the Israeli discourse.
Israelis fail to understand the fear that the Arab nations have of
Israeli military power, not least because the internal Israeli
discourse focuses around the concepts of defense, rather than
offense, and because the role of the armed forces is seen as being
one which has to prevent any potential "invasion" by the "other."
For their part, the Arab states fail to understand Israeli fears
that they will be "pushed into the sea." "How," they ask, "is that
possible when the military deterrent is in Israel's favor and when
Israel continues to hold a clear strategic superiority?"
Each side sees the security arguments of the "other" as being no
more than a ploy designed to attract world sympathy and support for
their respective case. Neither believes that the security discourse
of the other is grounded in reality as perceived by them. Israelis
do not understand that Palestinians feel threatened ("we just want
to live in peace with our neighbors in our Jewish homeland"), just
as Palestinians do not understand the continued perceived
existential threat felt by many Israelis ("we just want to exercise
our rights as an independent and self-governing nation").
Land and National Symbolism
This symmetrical lack of understanding has been evident with
respect to the reported discussions between Syria and Israel. Syria
has argued that any form of demilitarization which takes place on
the Golan Heights, or even within Syria, thus creating another
cordon sanitaire for Israel, will have to be reciprocated with
Israeli demilitarization within Israel itself. But Israel argues
that the "only" security threat is from Syria, not from Israel, and
that only they (Israel) therefore are entitled to a cordon
sanitaire. It is unthinkable, they retort, that Israel's
territorial sovereignty will be dictated by an external power,
despite the fact that this is precisely what Israel demands from
the neighboring countries as part of the conflict resolution.
It is against this continual mutual mistrust that each small piece
of territory remains important in the defensive strategies of both
sides. One should not dismiss the ideological role of territory
within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Land is a central
feature of national symbolism. Land/territory must not be given up
under any circumstances to the "other" side. The core of the
struggle is in the competition for land in what is a small and
insufficient piece of real estate. This has been evidenced in the
publicity surrounding the issue of land sales. Palestinian land
agents have been killed as reprisal for selling land to Jews, while
attempts to privatize land within Israel have traditionally been
rejected, despite the economic sense of such a move, because of the
fear that land will be sold to Arab purchasers.
But territory continues to fulfill a perceptual role relating to
security.
Despite the impact of the ballistic missiles, territory is still
perceived as the ensurer of a more secure country. The farther the
boundary from the place of residence and the stronger the armed
forces lined up along that boundary, the greater the sense of
security on each side.
Away from the political rhetoric, the pragmatics of conflict
resolution focus on the removal of threat, both perceived and real,
by each side. This necessitates the withdrawal from territory on
the one hand, and the creation of appropriate security arrangements
on the other. If successful in finding the right security equation,
then the religious and historical arguments are of little
significance in influencing decision-makers (with the exception of
those for whom the religious arguments are an integral part of
their belief systems).
If security arrangements can be achieved to the satisfaction of all
parties, then they will not resort to religious or historical
arguments as a means of preventing the agreement from being
implemented, unlike the reverse case. If, on the other hand, the
right equation is not found, then it is always convenient to
display sympathy towards the "historical and religious attachments
to the ancient land," not least because it is the religiously
inspired groups which have best demonstrated their ability to
provide the civilian troops necessary to actively oppose any form
of planned territorial withdrawal.
The Military Establishment
Neither can one ignore the role of leaders - both political and
military ¬in perpetuating the security fears. Israel remains a
society in which the discourse of security and defense is central
to public debate and discussion. It is supposed to be "above party
politics"and, yet, it provides an important springboard for
potential politicians. The military establishment has vested
interests, both economic and political, in ensuring that this
security discourse remains the number one issue around which scarce
national resources are allocated. Defense spending is the single
issue around which Knesset members from virtually across the Jewish
political spectrum join together in opposing budget cuts.
It is difficult to imagine a post-conflict Israel in which the role
of the army within Israeli society would be significantly reduced,
perhaps even relegated to secondary importance after the critical
social and welfare issues facing Israeli society. Perhaps a vision
of a post-conflict Israel would be one in which there were two
houses of parliament, but instead of a British House of Lords,
Israel would have a House of Generals. They would be honored for
their past contributions to Israel's security, but would not have
any real role in molding state policy or determining national
priorities. The continued preeminence of the security arguments,
the refusal to recognize that the security discourse has changed,
would suggest that the post-conflict area remains a distant
aspiration.
Further reading
AlIon, Y. (1976). "The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 55, pp. 38-53. Falah, G. & D. Newman (1995). "The
Spatial Manifestation of Threat: Israelis and
Palestinians Seek a 'God' Border," Political Geography, Vol. 14
(8), 689-706.
Norton, A. R. & J. Schwedler (1993). "(In)security Zones in
South Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32
(1),61-79.
Peres, S. (1994). The New Middle East. New York: Henry Holt.
Sayigh, Y. (1995). "Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security
of the Palestinian State," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24
(4), 5-19.