Any final Israeli-Palestinian settlement that fails completely to
solve the refugee problem will not provide a realistic and durable
solution to the conflict. A new eruption of Palestinian-Israeli
violence would only be a question of time. The frustration of
Palestinians' aspirations for a "just" solution - according to
their understanding of the term - would incite and inflame the Arab
agenda in general and particularly the Palestinian agenda. Were
Israel to leave this problem unresolved, it would encourage the
Palestinians to continue to nurture their political goal of
destroying Israel.
Thus it is surprising to observe the almost utter indifference to
the Palestinian refugee problem exhibited across nearly the entire
spectrum of the Israeli political establishment. Instead of giving
the issue a high priori¬ty at the multilateral talks, Israel
has seemed unconcerned. Instead of being the interested party
urging pursuit of a solution - instead of raising it at the Oslo
and Cairo negotiations, and forcing the Palestinians to adopt a
realistic approach - Israel has done its best to avoid a
discussion.
When it comes to the Palestinian demand for the "right of return,"
Israel's position (except for the brief episode in 1949),' has been
consistent: The polit¬ical establishment is unanimous in
denying any "right" to return to Israel.
Israel denies the legality of the Palestinian claim. If it
recognizes the "right" of return, it would also be admitting
responsibility, and perhaps even culpability for creating the
problem. But Israel categorically denies any responsibility for the
war of 1948. On the contrary, the guilt and responsibility are all
Arab-Palestinian, and it is completely irrelevant whether Arab
leaders encouraged the local population to leave their homes, or
whether they departed to escape the fighting. Israel would deny any
responsibility even if there were no practical demands for a
"return" of refugees; even more so when recognition of such a right
would deny Israel the right to control and veto the number of
returnees. Israel's posi¬tion is very clear: the option of
"return" should, under no circumstances, be provided to the
Palestinians.
This explains why so many Israelis reject a formal commitment to
absorb even a limited number of Palestinian refugees. Of 70,000
refugees who applied for family reunification from June 1967 to
June 1994, Israel admitted only 22,179. This figure also includes
returnees to East Jerusalem. Israel's policy in this regard was
always strictly humanitarian, and Israelis see no reason to make a
political commitment regarding any fixed quota. Furthermore, Israel
considers that a unilateral decision, and will not permit
Palestinians to be involved in its deliberations.
Israel totally rejects "return" for material reasons. There is no
possibili¬ty of allowing the refugees to return to their
original homes and lands without completely undermining the fabric
of Israel's society and people. Many Israeli towns and villages,
both rural and urban, are built on former Arab-Palestinian land.
One cannot hand back these lands and properties without uprooting
hundreds of thousands of Israelis, if not more, thus opening up a
Pandora's box and courting disaster for Israel.
Even if "return" were not literally to former property, but merely
a gen¬eral Palestinian immigration into Israel, the result
could be a very signifi¬cant increase of Palestinian Arabs
that would threaten the Jewish character of the state. Israel is
already concerned with a possible irredentist threat from its
present Arab minority. Palestinian Arabs today make up some 18
percent of Israel's population, and in two areas adjacent to Arab
territories across the border - the Galilee and the Negev - their
relative strength is significantly higher (in the Galilee they
already number at least 50 percent).
The "return" of the refugees would significantly worsen this
delicate bal¬ance, increase the irredentist threat, and even
endanger Israel's 1967 borders.
Compensating the Refugees
The traditional position of all Israeli governments, as of the
mid-19S0s, has been unequivocal refusal to admit any responsibility
for financial compen¬sation to the Palestinian refugees.
While Israel bears no responsibility for the creation of the
Palestinian refugee problem, no one denies that Israel greatly
benefited from the Arab property that came under its control, and
that formed an important ele¬ment in the infrastructure for
absorption of massive Jewish immigration after the 1948 War of
Independence. Israel's refusal to pay any compensa¬tion was
based on a very practical argument: Israel was obliged to absorb
almost all the Jews forced to flee Arab countries (from Iraq to
Morocco), who in turn left behind most of their property. Contrary
to the Arab poli¬cy that refused to absorb and integrate
Palestinian refugees, Israel wel¬comed, absorbed,
rehabilitated and supported these hundreds of thou¬sands of
Jewish refugees, without any Arab compensation. Under the
cir¬cumstances, Israel saw no reason to pay any compensation
without a pre¬cise accounting of the numbers absorbed by
Israel and the value of their property left behind. No such
accounting was ever made. It is quite rea¬sonable to assume
that were such a calculation made, the result would demonstrate at
least parity between the two groups' properties, if not a
bal¬ance favoring the Israeli claims.
The question worth examining, however, is quite different: should
such a quantitative comparison be the only or the main Israeli
consideration? Indeed, this was not Israel's position during the
first years of statehood. The US suggested in 1949 that Israel
allow the return of one-third of the refugees (assumed to be some
200,000) while the U.S. would cover the costs of resettling the
other two-thirds in Arab countries. Israel's prime minister at the
time, David Ben-Gurion, rejected the prospect of admitting such a
large number of Palestinians, but he did offer them compensation.
In so doing, he did not agree to personally compensate each
individual refugee. Rather, he called for the creation of an
international fund. Israel would be one of the fund's contributing
members, but would have no responsibility for the solution; and the
fund should initiate collective resettlement pro¬jects in the
region, and not enter into individual claims and
compensation.
Once the U.S. realized that it was not realistic to expect the
return of a substantial number of refugees to Israel, it encouraged
the idea of com¬pensation. Israel had been requested to pay
some U5$30-S0 million - a very low figure compared to any realistic
evaluation of the Arabs' abandoned property. An Israeli government
commission estimated the value of that property at some $400
million. An Arab League evaluation at the time reached the sum of
$3 billion.
Return to the Palestinian Authority
Israel will have to grapple with two additional issues. The first
is the return of the 1967 displaced persons (DPs) to the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip; the second is the legislating of a Palestinian
"Law of Return" (once an inde¬pendent Palestinian entity is
established) which grants all Palestinian Arabs the right to
immigrate and to be integrated into the new state, should they
desire (very much like the Israeli Law of Return).
Regarding the former issue, one should differentiate between two
groups of DPs: Firstly, the permanent residents of the West Bank or
the Gaza Strip who were caught away from home in June 1967 or
thereafter and have not been allowed to return; and secondly, the
1948 refugees who fled a second time, comprising most of the former
residents of the Jericho refugee camps (now in ruins). The total
number of DPs in 1967-68 was a lit¬tle over 300,000.
Considering their birth-rates, it would be a fair assump¬tion
that their number today is between 550,000 and 600,000, after the
deduction of some 88,000 DPs who have returned since 1968. (A total
of 56,375 permits were issued through June 1994 and the total
number of indi¬viduals returning under these permits was
66,099 to the West Bank and 18,671 to the Gaza Strip. In addition,
Israel approved residency for more than 3,000 women who entered the
territories as visitors and married local Palestinians.)
It is quite understandable why Israel rejects the return of the
second group. It makes no sense to uproot these refugees for the
third time, only to relocate them in new refugee camps. Their
future should be determined at the time the parties discuss and
agree on a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem.
Nevertheless, were the Palestinian Authority to promise that all
these returning DPs would be resettled and rehabilitated within the
five years of the interim phase, Israel would not object to their
return. The majority of Israelis might even consider this a
positive step.
From this point of view, it is quite surprising that the
resettlement of the 1948 refugees was not on the agenda of the Oslo
and Cairo talks, during the formulation of the guidelines of the
"Gaza and Jericho First" agreement. Israel should have insisted
that, together with its departure from the Gaza Strip and the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinians
undertake responsibility for all refugees presently living in the
Gaza Strip: bringing an end to their legal and formal refugee
status; relieving UNRWA of its duties in the area; stopping the
distribution of all food rations; and dismantling the refugee camps
and moving their residents to new and permanent housing.
One can understand why the Palestinians would have rejected such
demands as long as the parties had not yet agreed on the ultimate
permanent political solution; but it is difficult to comprehend why
Israel did not raise these issues.
It is still not too late to discuss these matters, even during the
interim phase. As to the first group, with the exception of those
DPs who might be a security risk, there should be no reason to
object to their return to their homes and families. Nevertheless,
those Israelis who reject the present government's political plan,
and oppose any Israeli territorial compromise, no doubt will
protest. From their point of view, the return of hundreds of
thousands of DPs to the West Bank would worsen the present
demo¬graphic balance between Jews and Palestinians (while
today the Jewish set¬tlers comprise some 12-13 percent of the
area's total population, their num¬ber would drop to some
eight to nine percent if all DPs were allowed to return). They
would claim that Israel was initiating a Palestinian
"trans¬fer," only in the wrong direction, contradicting
long-term Israeli interests.
Another problem would arise if some of the returnees tried to
reclaim properties in the West Bank that have been turned over to
Israeli settlements - Israel's legal position has been that the
properties of "absentees" come under the authority of the
"custodian of enemy property," i.e., become "pub¬lic land." It
is reasonable for Israel to insist that, as long as the core issues
of the final settlement have not been discussed and resolved (these
are sched¬uled for discussion during the final phase of the
process), and as long as the final borders and the future of
Israeli settlements have not been determined, Israel will refuse to
undertake acts that might precipitate these discussions.
A different kind of problem might be the immediate burden created
for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The massive influx
of hundreds of thousands of returnees, without a local economy
strong enough to absorb and integrate them, might be a cause for
anti-Israeli irredentist and terrorist activities. From this
perspective, Israel should not leave the decision to the
Palestinians. The question should be raised during the
negotiations, and Israel should insist on getting a clear answer as
to how the Palestinians intend to deal with it. It is quite
possible that the solution would be an immi¬gration quota, in
accordance with the local economy's absorptive capability.
No one should expect a massive and uncontrolled return of the 1967
DPs. The first to return should be those with a home and a family
awaiting them. These should be followed by DPs returning in
accordance with the expanding economic absorptive capacity of the
West Bank, with their place¬ment carefully considered so as to
avoid creating a serious security problem.
Another issue would be Israel's position regarding a Palestinian
"Law of Return," as part of the final status resolution. If prior
to such legislation the two parties agreed on all the other, "easy"
questions (like the estab¬lishment of an independent,
sovereign Palestinian state, the final borders, Jerusalem, Israeli
settlements and the refugee question), it is quite possible that
Israel would show flexibility on this law.
Israel could not, on the one hand, refuse to admit any Palestinian
refugee within its borders, while on the other hand vetoing the
Palestinians' attempt to solve this crucial problem within their
own terri¬tory. Furthermore, if a Palestinian state is indeed
established, Israel could hardly maintain the right to intervene in
the sovereign legislation of that state. Israel cannot reject the
right of Palestinian or Arab intervention against its own "Law of
Return," with the claim that this comes under Israel's sovereign
jurisdiction, and at the same time veto a similar Palestinian law.
And yet, very much like the return of the DPs during the interim
phase, a massive return of refugees could create a security and
irre¬dentist problem. To avoid precisely this eventuality,
both parties should work together and agree on reasonable
limits.
Endnote
1. The Israeli government agreed in 1949 to allow the return of
100,000 refugees to their homes and villages, but, in reaction to
Arab rejection of this gesture, soon changed its mind and retracted
its offer.
Taken from a publication of the Tel Aviv University Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies entitled The Palestinian Refugee Problem, by
Shlomo Gazit. It was published in 1995 in the framework of Study
No.2 of the Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians.