There is a general consensus in Palestinian and Israeli political
and intel¬lectual circles that the peace process is passing
through a deep crisis, and not just a tactical one. Each side
attempts to saddle the other with the blame for the failure of the
negotiations. In fact, the cause of the crisis lies in the very
structure of the interim agreement.
The crux of the problem is the staged approach based on a
differentiation between transitional stage and a final settlement,
and this cannot be rectified by cosmetic changes. The only way out
of this predicament is to tran¬scend the interim stage and to
embark directly on negotiations for a final settlement.
The aim for an interim stage was threefold: First, it was a
confidence¬building measure, providing a joint and common
language to pave the way to success in the real and difficult
negotiations - those of the final set¬tlement. Second, it
aimed to convince each side of the good intentions of the other.
Finally, it set out to better the economic conditions of the
Palestinians, providing proof of the advantages of peace, and to
improve the security of the Israelis for the same purpose.
Opposite Results
Yet, almost a year after the implementation of the interim
agreement, real¬ity indicates that it has achieved quite the
opposite of what was intended. For one thing, Israeli security
conditions have deteriorated and Palestinian economic conditions
have not improved. Instead of a growing feeling of mutual
confidence, there is a spate of mutual recriminations, with an
increasing number of people on both sides calling, for one reason
or anoth¬er, for suspension of the negotiations. All this
raises a big question mark: how relevant or useful is the interim
stage? It should be noted, of course, that negotiations about
interim arrangements are also in essence negotia¬tions about a
final settlement. Each side is trying to influence the final
out¬come in their discussion of what purport to be interim
arrangements.
In the Washington negotiations, the divide between Palestinians and
Israelis stemmed from one root: the disagreement over the concept
of an interim stage. For the Palestinians, it is an irreversible
step toward one final outcome, the application of U.N. Resolution
242, i.e., complete Israeli with¬drawal from the land occupied
in 1967.
On the other hand, for the Israelis, the interim stage was meant to
leave all options open for the final settlement. And so, in this
stage, arrangements can be reversed.
This basic discrepancy explains the failure of the parties to reach
an agreement in nine rounds of talks in Washington. In contrast,
the reason they did reach an agreement in Oslo was because they
satisfied themselves with principles and did not explore details
which would have inevitably led to confrontations akin to those
which eventually caused the breakdown in Washington. In Oslo, it
was believed that the impetus generated by the Declaration of
Principles (OOP) would guarantee the creation of a climate
conducive to negotiations. And because it lent itself to
interpretations in harmony with the respective understanding of
each side, the OOP enjoyed wide support among both the Palestinian
and the Israeli public.
A Revised Balance of Power
A major disparity in the negotiating balance of power emerged in
the Cairo discussions on the implementation of the OOP in May,
1994. There the Palestinian side lost an important trump card,
considerably diminishing its maneuvering capability. First, by
concluding a separate agreement with Israel, the Palestinians were
deprived of the cohesiveness in the Israeli¬Arab negotiating
process. Development in negotiations between Israel and the other
Arab countries could be achieved since progress on the Palestinian
track ceased to be a condition for progress on other Arab
tracks.
Secondly, the secret character of the Oslo agreement, reached in
private, cost the Palestinian side its public support. The
Palestinian negotiators thus experienced a sense of isolation
vis-a-vis their own public which, oth¬erwise, would have been
a great supportive factor.
Finally, reaching an agreement outside the framework of the
interna¬tional patronage of the Washington negotiations
deprived the Palestinian side of the recourse to international
legitimacy. Indeed, it has permitted the international powers to
absolve themselves of responsibility toward the Palestinian problem
by creating the impression that the problem had, for all practical
purposes, been solved. All that was left was to offer financial
support.
This revised balance of power, then, has evidently worked in
Israel's favo!", enabling it to steer the negotiations in Cairo in
a direction entirely in line with the Israeli understanding of an
interim stage as spelled out in the DOP.
The Cairo agreement stripped the DOP of a great deal of its
balanced con¬tent. Many aspects of this have been widely
discussed and analyzed, such as the withdrawal from Gaza, which
became redeployment of Israeli troops; or the right to legislate,
which was made conditional on Israeli con¬sent; or, indeed,
the committees of coordination and cooperation which gave Israel,
in many areas, the right of veto on the authority transferred to
the Palestinians.
A Timetable Is Imperative
The most dangerous element in the Cairo agreement which has
subse¬quently dictated the course of events, is, undoubtedly,
the fact that it stripped the Oslo accords of one of its main
features: the time link between its various components. The OOP was
an integrated deal, tied to a tight schedule: it starts with the
withdrawal in Gaza and Jericho, followed three months later by thp
transfer of part of the powers. At a specific date, elec¬tions
were to be held, preceded by redeployment of the Israeli army. This
was to be followed by the transfer of the remaining powers and a
second stage of redeployment, and after not more than two years,
negotiations for a final settlement were to start with an agenda
already decided in the OOP.
However, the Cairo agreement neglected to tie the Israeli military
with¬drawal from the populated areas of the Gaza Strip with a
time frame for the other components of the OOP. The Gaza Strip was
one of the worst security burdens for Israel anyhow. Thus, once
again, the Palestinians lost an important playing card, tipping the
balance in favor of Israel and diminishing their negotiating
leverage.
Israel, in contrast, freed itself from the burden of security in
the Gaza Strip without committing itself to a time framework for
the implementa¬tion of the rest of the OOP. On top of that,
Israel threw the onus of security in the Gaza Strip on the
shoulders of the Palestinian National Authority - Israel had failed
to achieve that stability throughout the twen¬ty-seven years
of Occupation.
A Vicious Circle
This new reality led to a vicious circle. It gave rise to
Palestinian-Israeli ten¬sion and conflicts, on the one hand,
and to a Palestinian-Palestinian conflict on the other, splitting
the Palestinian people among themselves. Some argue that the
Occupation has not ceased, and that the present arrange¬ments
do not serve Palestinian interests nor are they likely to evolve
towards the realization of their aspirations. For them, the
struggle against Israel must still continue, including armed
resistance, be it in Gaza, the West Bank or Israel proper. Others
see themselves committed to the agree¬ment with all the
responsibilities it entails, a fact which leads them to
con¬frontation (sometimes violent) with the first group.
This situation has exacerbated Israel's security condition,
weakening the Israeli leadership in the face of its own public and
opposition. To weather the criticism and acquire more authority for
the resumption of the negoti¬ations and the implementation of
the agreements reached so far, Israel opted for a tougher stance:
thus the role attributed to the Palestinian National Authority and
Palestinian Police in the area of security, especially the safety
of all Israelis in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel.
There ensued a major loss of credibility in the peace process among
both the Israelis and Palestinians. This, naturally, provides the
opposition on both sides with ammunition, forcing their respective
leaders into more intransigence.
While the conviction exists that, in spite of real current
difficulties, both Israelis and Palestinians are committed to a
peaceful resolution to conflicts, the question poses itself about
the possibilities to extricate the peace process from its crisis
and restore its momentum before it is too late. This is especially
urgent since conditions conducive to both parties, as well as
international and local conditions, might not remain favorable for
long.
A More Realistic Approach
If the crisis, as we have seen, devolves from the staged approach
to the solution, the only outlet is to reconsider this particular
approach and to effect structural changes in the peace process. A
new approach would have to ensure that all elements of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the Occupation, settlements,
refugees, Jerusalem, the future of the Palestinian entity and
security on both sides, be placed on the negotiating table.
This position is supported by the following arguments: First,
experience on the ground has proven the inadequacy of the interim
stage which shows the old-new Israeli mentality of exploiting its
power advantage for its own ends.
Second, the political process does not take place in a vacuum, and
ele¬ments hostile to a political solution on both sides are
working very shrewd¬ly to exploit all possibilities to abort
the chances for peace. Their best ammunition is the failure of the
present process and the dwindling confi¬dence of the
public.
Third, a final settlement has a greater chance of success than an
interim solution, as the latter does not incorporate basic changes
encouraging the parties to accept compromises. In contrast, a final
settlement will comprise essential changes enticing both sides to
make concessions.
Fourth, putting all final problems on the negotiating table ensures
enor¬mous chances for flexibility, creativity and
trade-offs.
Fifth, a knowledge of the eventual outcome of the ongoing political
process builds mutual confidence, facilitates transitional
arrangements accept¬able to both sides, and curtails the power
of the opposition on both sides.
Sixth, dealing with the problems of a final settlement is proof of
greater realism. The real causes of the conflict have to be
confronted; avoiding them will not make them go away. The
settlements and the problem of Jerusalem are living proof of the
daily friction arising from a staged approach to the solution. The
presence of settlements in the Gaza Strip is a major factor
impeding the success of the interim arrangement there. In the West
Bank, settlements are blocking the implementation of the second
stage of the Oslo agreement.
However, there is ample evidence that Israel has already delineated
all the features of the final status. The recent developments in
expanding set¬tlement activity are neither arbitrary nor
subject to settlers' wishes, but are in synch with the Israeli
concept of a final resolution on borders, the set¬tlements and
Jerusalem. The connection of some of the settlements in the West
Bank into agglomerations forming geographic extensions of Israel
not only ensures their continued existence, it also paves the way
for reconsideration of borders.
In conclusion, there can be no peaceful settlement without the
elimina¬tion of the cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:
in essence, the injustice which befell the Palestinian people when
their land was occupied and they were stripped of their national
identity and turned into refugees. To reach a solution, all issues
have to be addressed directly, openly and coura¬geously,
without the zero-sum mentality.