Whenever negotiations on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
falter, the latent question about an alternative to the Oslo
Declaration of Principles (DOP) inevitably surfaces. This question
is valid and urgent, but there are more precise and basic questions
that might be asked. Does a more efficient method for achieving
peace, stability and security for Palestinians, Israelis and the
whole region exist at this point? Which of the two sides holds the
key to such an alternative? And having found one, would that side
be will¬ing to change the course of the peace process?
To answer these questions a basic point must first be established:
the Oslo accords have provided neither the Palestinians nor the
Israelis with the peace and security for which they had
hoped.
For both sides to see advantage in peace, the least of their
minimum vital demands must be addressed. The Oslo accords, whether
in formulation or implementation, fell short of those expectations.
Without an honest, unequivocal admission of this failure, the
search for alternatives is futile.
Disparity at Work
The Oslo accords are the product of a clear disparity in the
balance of power in favor of Israel. Instead of seizing this golden
opportunity for achieving a viable, lasting peace with the
Palestinians, Israel used its supe¬rior position to advance
its own interests at the expense of those of the Palestinians.
Hence, the agreement was still-born even before the ink dried on
the signatures. For both signatories, it was merely a tactical
step, meant to be eventually transcended.
The Palestinians, exhausted and besieged by the Gulf War, both
region¬ally and internationally, reached a swift and secret
agreement in Oslo to preempt any competition on the part of the
other Arab countries partici¬pating in the Washington talks,
and to consolidate the traditional position of the Palestinian
leadership, which was at risk of being supplanted or removed. In
the rush to obtain Israeli recognition for this leadership, the
Oslo accords - a purely Palestinian affair - were signed without
careful examination of details or consequences. Yet they were
touted to the Palestinian public as a "historic achievement."
These shortcomings notwithstanding, Palestinian supporters and
den¬igrators of Oslo alike share a strong national consensus
on the necessity of acquiring the minimum level of their legitimate
rights, Le., an end to the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian land
occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state
there. The Oslo agreement is thus viewed by its Palestinian
supporters as the means for providing the impe¬tus to secure
these basic rights. Apart from this, the agreement is devoid of any
meaning and can become an obstacle which the Palestinians will have
to eliminate.
For the Israelis, on the other hand, the aim in Oslo was to exploit
Palestinian weakness in order to solve the Palestinian problem and
to pave the way for normalizing relations between Israel and other
Arab countries, and most importantly, to extract an acknowledgment
of legitimacy for the existence of the Jewish state.
Except for the subject of Jerusalem, the Israelis, unlike the
Palestinians, lack a general consensus about the nature of an
acceptable agenda to end the Palestinian problem. There is a fierce
internal conflict in Israel about the interpretation of the
equation "land for peace." Some would like to make peace with the
Palestinians and the Arabs but to retain all the land, while others
are willing to return part of the land for peace.
In the Balance
The basic flaw in the peace process is essentially this lack of an
Israeli con¬sensus. The Palestinians embarked on the Oslo
process knowing full well what they wanted; the Israelis did not.
The only common ground between the two sides at this stage -
admittedly, for different reasons - is the need to discard Oslo.
The Palestinians want to jump forward because the agree¬ment
did not fulfill their aspirations. The Israelis want to jump
backward because, for them, the agreement bore its fruits
regionally and internation¬ally. As the Israelis enjoy
ascendancy in this context, moving backward has become the rule and
procrastination the order of the day. Until the Israelis make a
decisive move, the future of the Palestinians and of Oslo will
remain hanging in the balance.
Israeli delaying tactics and failure to implement the clauses of
the accords (due to internal conflicts and government ineptitude)
led to a gradual loss of credibility for the Palestinian
authorities, in the eyes of a frustrated and despondent people. The
situation was further aggravated by an escalation in such Israeli
practices as continued settlement activities, land
confisca¬tions, closures and arrests. Lack of improvement in
the conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories - indeed,
their steady deterioration since the agreements were signed, caused
the Palestinians to lose faith in the intentions of the Israelis
(whose obvious aim was to mold the Palestinian future according to
Israeli standards), and also to lose hope that the Oslo accords
would ever grant them their legitimate rights.
The Palestinian reaction was violent and took the form of increased
mil¬itary and suicide operations, notably inside Israel. The
Palestinians can thus demolish Israeli internal security, which the
Israelis thought they had safeguarded with the Oslo accords.
With the foundering Palestinian hopes for liberation and
independence on the one hand, and the crumbling sense of personal
security for Israelis on the other hand, the possibility for
achieving peace, security and stabili¬ty through the Oslo
accords has also collapsed. To ensure the success of the stalled
peace process, and to fulfill the mutual interests of the two
sides, it has become incumbent to close the Oslo file and to
explore an alternative.
The Palestinians, though they know what they want from the peace
process, are not capable of proposing an alternative to Oslo and
imposing it on Israel. They lost such a prerogative when they
embarked on a negoti¬ating process according to Israeli
conditions. They divested themselves of all bargaining tools the
moment they consented to a two-stage negotiating process,
relegating the discussion of vital matters to a final stage. They
sur¬rendered principles in return for an agenda of measures,
in the hope that these would ultimately enable them to attain these
principles.
Israeli measures to obstruct implementation of the DOP in
accordance with the agreed timetable have blocked any progress in
the peace process. The Palestinians have become hostages to an
agreement in which they can neither advance nor retreat. The only
Palestinian alternative, at this point, would be to halt the
negotiations about details, currently taking place in Cairo. This
is not a complete exit from Oslo, but an attempt to pressure Israel
into abiding by the agreement. Going back to Oslo now, after all
the changes and developments that have since taken place on the
ground, is not certain to rescue the peace process from
failure.
The Israeli Government can, however, save the peace process. The
alter¬native is in its hands alone, although at the moment it
is reluctant to take a decisive step in that direction.
The Meaning of Separation
These have become accepted facts: first, the Oslo accords, though
they were controlled by Israel, have not provided the principal
expectation from the peace process - personal security for its
people. Second, the Palestinians will not relinquish their
continued efforts to achieve freedom and independence. Third, and
this has been acknowledged by the Israeli Prime Minister, the most
effective method of fulfilling the exigencies of both sides is by
separating them.
The Palestinians want to secure freedom and independence. The
Israelis want to secure personal safety and to avoid turning the
Jewish state into a binational one. If separation is the answer
(and the Israeli Government is convinced of that: the Prime
Minister has formed committees to study methods of implementing
it), wherein lies the problem?
In my opinion, it does not lie in the principle of the separation
but in its nature. Faced by continued internal pressure from the
right and the settlers, and the erosion in its popularity, the
Israeli Government has started to waver and procrastinate. Why take
a decision when the Palestinians have become so tractable and have
lost their leverage?
The separation suggested by the Israeli Government is for security
pur¬poses only. This type of incomplete and fragmented
separation does not meet Palestinian demands nor does it respond
either to Israeli right-wing pressures or the fears of the Israeli
public. That is why the present govern¬ment is locked in a
crisis which will ultimately lead to its downfall.
The way out of the predicament facing the peace process and the
Israeli Government is recognition of the inevitable: that Israel
will never obtain peace, security and stability as long as the
Palestinian people are not allowed to achieve the minimum level of
their legitimate rights. The Israeli Government must at once
proceed with separation in the one and only right direction:
complete political separation between the two sides, a
sep¬aration which necessarily entails the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Instead of using negotiations to impede the
establishment of a Palestinian state, the aim and task of the
negotiations must be to determine the nature and conditions for
that step
The alternative to the chronic impasse in the peace process lies in
the hands of the Israeli Government. The future of the peace
process, and the political future of the government, hinge on the
moves it makes. Will it rise up to this historic occasion or,
blinded by a narrow political vision, discard the opportunity and
relegate it to history?