How can the Palestinians get the best possible deal from the
Declaration of Principles?
Excerpts from a study prepared by the Political Analysis Unit of
the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. The Center,
directed by Khalil Shikaki, was established in 1993 as an institute
for scientific, academic research and political analysis. The
Center examines the local, regional and international changes and
developments and the range of its impact on the building process of
the Palestinian National Entity.
Board of Trustees: - As'ad Abu Sharkh, Ibrahim Abu Lughd, Rashid
Khalidi, Raja Shhadeh, Khalil Shikaki, Hisham Awartani, Sa'id
Kan'an (head), Mariam Miri.
General
The Palestinian-Israeli agreement, which includes the Gaza-Jericho
First project and which was signed between the PLO and the
Government of Israel in Washington on September 13,1993, forms the
basis for ending the hostility and conflict which lasted for
decades between the two sides. Through acknowledging the mutual
legitimate and political rights, both sides seek, through this
agreement to reach a fair, complete and lasting settlement, which
achieves historic reconciliation and peaceful coexistence between
the Palestinians and Israelis.
1. The Positive and Negative Sides of the Agreement
The Positive Points
Following are the points which include positive aspects, but at the
same time may contain dangers: 1. Although the agreement does not specifically mention
Palestinian national rights, it includes for the first time an
official Israeli recognition of the Palestinian People and of their
legitimate and political rights. Despite the fact that the Israeli
recognition of the PLO (which brought in the Diaspora Palestinians
in the settlement, in form but not in content), does not form an
article in the agreement, and despite the complications arising
from this, this recognition adds a political and national
impression for the Palestinian people and the problem of
Palestinian Nationalism, where Israel previously denied its
existence in this form.
In this agreement, the phrase "Palestinian people in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip" is used, and although this might be explained as
confining the definition of the Palestinian people in these two
areas and ignoring the Diaspora Palestinians, yet there is a
confirmation that the Palestinians are a nation as other
nations.
In the introduction to this agreement, there is also an indication
of mutual recognition of legitimate and political rights, which
offers an opportunity to the Palestinian side to insist on the
principle of equality for both sides.
Recognizing Palestinian Nationalism represented in the PLO,
Palestinian legitimate and political rights and the Palestinians as
a nation, are all factors toward independence and sovereignty,
regardless of future preference for independent existence.
2. Another positive point in this agreement is the Israeli
Army withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories after
26 years of occupation. By this action, Israel is abandoning
ideological and practical attitudes believed to be irreversible.
Although the subject of sovereignty over the territories of Gaza
and Jericho from which the Israeli army will withdraw was not laid
out in the document, the establishment of Palestinian Jurisdiction
in these areas will be de facto, since in reality, sovereignty is
exerted by whoever exercises jurisdiction over the land.
3. Under the article "Aims of the Negotiations", a clear
indication that one of the aims of the negotiations is establishing
a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five
years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the negotiations on the permanent
status will lead to the implementation of these two resolutions.
This means that the transitional period might continue for a period
of less than five years, and in this way, the Palestinian side will
have the chance to shorten the transitional period. As there is no
mutual understanding or explanation between the two parties, as to
what Resolution 242 means regarding the subject of withdrawal, the
Palestinian side should insist on a permanent status based on an
Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel after
the 1967 war. According to the consecutive dramatic developments
that we witnessed, crowned by the mutual recognition between Israel
and the PLO, and the meeting between Rabin and Arafat in the White
House, it is no longer impossible or improbable that Israel will
agree to the establishment of a clearly defined Palestinian State,
which does not threaten its security. In addition, Israel might
find that the establishment of this state is not necessarily
against its interest. It is worth mentioning that in the
Palestinian-Israeli agreement, there is no clear mention of a
refusal to the establishment of a Palestinian State.
Israel's quest for the advantages and horizons of the peace process
with the Palestinians and Arabs, and the emergence of a high degree
of mutual confidence between both parties will make it easier for
Israel to accept the choice of the Palestinian State.
4. Holding elections "under agreed supervision and
international observation", draws these elections away from being
an internal Israeli matter. The agreement also states that these
elections will constitute a "significant interim preparatory step
towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements." It is also clear that the
participation of the Palestinians of Jerusalem in these elections
is guaranteed, but the nature and conditions of this participation
are not defined in the agreement, and that it is subject to an
agreement between the two parties. Defining the structure of the
Council, the number of its members, and the authorities empowered
to it; executive, legal and judicial, will have a significant
effect on the possibilities of negotiating the permanent status and
achieve sovereignty. Therefore, the result of the negotiations
between the two parties on various aspects of the Council will ease
or hinder transforming this Council to a transitional authority
towards the establishment of a state.
5. Concerning the transfer of authority from the Israeli
Military Government and its Civil Administration to the
Palestinians, there should be a distinction between the areas of
Gaza and Jericho on the one hand, and the rest of the West Bank and
Jerusalem on the other. In the areas of Gaza and Jericho, the
authority transferred to the Palestinians will be complete except
for foreign affairs, external security and settlements.
During the transitional period, the Palestinian aim should be to
spread the Palestinian authority over spheres that remain subject
to Israeli control, aiming at achieving complete Palestinian
sovereignty over them.
As for the rest of the West Bank territories (excluding Jerusalem),
the authorities of education and culture, health, social welfare,
direct taxation and tourism will be transferred to the
Palestinians, in addition to transferring other authorities and
responsibilities agreed upon by both parties.
In this context, the Palestinian side should strive to take over
all these authorities as soon as possible, as well as raising these
authorities to the same level as the authorities exercised in the
areas of Gaza and Jericho. Subsequently, removing gradually the
differences and borders between the areas of Gaza and Jericho on
one hand, and the rest of the West Bank on the other hand, on the
condition that the final aim should be establishing an authority
and an infrastructure close to the authority of the independent
sovereign state, which will make the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state, a definite result of the permanent
status negotiations.
6. Concerning sovereignty or "range of authority" mentioned
in article (4) of the agreement, both sides look at the West Bank
and Gaza Strip as "a single territorial unit, whose integrity
should be preserved during the interim period". This formula might
be characterized by the notion of "structural vagueness", for the
Palestinian side considers Jerusalem part of the West Bank, while
the Israeli side does not. Therefore, the matter of Jerusalem is
left vague and is included in the statement "except for issues that
will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations". Despite
that, the Palestinians of Jerusalem may be allowed to exercise
actual authority over a number of Palestinian Institutions, such as
the elected Council's headquarters (if it remains in Jerusalem),
the Waqf, buildings of the Palestinian Broadcasting Authority,
among other Palestinian centers and institutions). It is also
possible that Palestinians will be permitted to continue
maintaining and developing relations with foreign Consulates and
other international institutions present in Jerusalem. Therefore,
the Palestinian side should strive to enhance the elected Council's
power in the various spheres mentioned earlier, as well as
enhancing the Palestinian presence in the city and its Arab
character in general.
7. The beginning of the permanent status negotiations within
a period not exceeding the third year of the interim period is a
positive point, and the Palestinian side should seek to transform
the present negotiations concerning the interim period into a
process of continuous negotiations, so as to move, immediately
after signing the phased agreement, to immediate negotiations,
because of the importance of the time element and from fear that
the Israeli side might benefit from this element in making changes
on the land and in its interest.
The Palestinian side should also strive to make the date of signing
the agreement the beginning of the five-year period, and not the
end of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, as mentioned
in the Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
The Negative Points
1. The most important negative points in the agreement are the
postponement of fundamental issues such as, Jerusalem, settlements
and refugees, to the permanent status negotiations. Regarding
Jerusalem, there are no guarantees in the agreement that Israel
will not make any alterations in the sites of the city in the
interest of Israel, during the transitional stage especially as it
will be the stronger side. There are also practical considerations
that will force the Palestinian side to establish the institutions
of the Palestinian Entity outside Jerusalem, which will weaken the
Palestinian existence in the city and enhance Israeli control over
it.
Concerning the settlements, the agreement states that it will be an
issue of discussion in the permanent status negotiations, and the
agreement does not embody any indications concerning the
possibility of eliminating or evacuating them. In addition to that,
there is no article in the agreement which determines the cessation
of settlements, or freezing or limiting their expansion inside
Jerusalem.
Concerning the settlements in Gaza and Jericho and the rest of the
West Bank, there are no guarantees in the agreement for
non-expansion within these settlements, by construction or increase
in the number of settlers. As for Gaza and Jericho, Israel will
retain a "sovereign" status over the settlements existing on the
Palestinian territory from which the Israeli Army withdraws.
Concerning the issue of the refugees, postponing it to the
permanent status negotiations might afford the opportunity of
settling them, or some of them, in places where they already reside
outside Palestine. It may be difficult to absorb these refugees
inside Palestine after the final settlement because of arising
situations and the capacity of the Palestinian Entity as well as
the possibility of not receiving any support from foreign states to
finance absorption projects.
Although the return of these refugees, if they really return, will
be within the geographical range of the Palestinian Entity, yet
Israel may resist this return for fear that its demographic balance
might deteriorate.
2. This agreement does not include any clear indication or
implied acceptance of enabling the Palestinians to exercise their
right of self-determination or establishing their independent state
on Palestinian soil. It also neglects mentioning this matter in the
permanent status negotiations. If, in the transitional stage, no
positive change appears on the Palestinian - Israeli relations, as
a result of the interior dynamics of the peace and negotiation
process, among other factors, the Palestinian side might find
itself in a situation of incomplete sovereignty, or in a
confederation with Jordan. In addition to this, the agreement does
not define a period of time for the completion of the permanent
status negotiations, which may extend to years, during which
practical developments may occur, which can alter the reality on
the ground against the interest of the Palestinian side.
3. Another negative point of the agreement is the absence of
geographical sovereignty and Palestinian authority over Jerusalem,
except for exceptions mentioned earlier in the part dealing with
the agreement's positive points.
4. Ambiguity surrounds several articles mentioned in the
agreement. The agreement does not mention the principle "land for
peace", when indicating Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for the
settlement in the final stage.
5. Among the other negative aspects of this agreement in the
Palestinian sphere, is the fact that it gives a lot of immediate
privileges to the Israeli side, while it gives the Palestinian side
only a few. The agreement also subjects the Palestinians to Israeli
conditions aiming at testing the Palestinian abilities and
intentions, as well as giving the Israelis the power to freeze the
agreement, if they do not like the Palestinian performance. Also,
the internal split in the Palestinian arena may lead to squandering
the Palestinian abilities and resources necessary for building and
enhancing the Palestinian Entity.
2. The Security Dimensions of the Agreement:
Gaza Strip and Jericho Area:
The two most important problems in this agreement concerning the
security side in Gaza and Jericho are:
• The continuing presence of the settlements and what is
entailed by the Israeli Army being in charge of their
security.
• The free movement of the army, settlers and other Israelis
on roads and streets of the Gaza Strip and Jericho.
The seriousness of these two problems increases, particularly in
the Gaza Strip, where the continuous presence of settlements is a
vast mistake that threatens to destroy the entire process, for in
addition to the Palestinian need of the land and water utilized
today by the settlements, these settlements will:
• Form a serious security threat to the safety, security and
peace of the Palestinian Entity.
• Give the Israeli Army a prominent presence, while defending
the settlements and settlers, which will form continuous
provocation to the citizens as well as giving them the motivation
to work against the Israeli Army and settlers in general.
• Place the Palestinian authority in the position of the
supporter and defender of "the Israeli usurper" when the
Palestinian authority offers security to the Israeli Army and
settlers whether within the settlements (by thwarting planning
attempts of operations against the settlements or attempts to
penetrate them), in the streets and roads, or during their presence
in towns, villages or camps.
Concerning the Jericho area, it is very difficult to diagnose the
security dimensions until the geographical border of the region is
defined and the number of settlements and settlers remaining in it
is known.
The Strategic Threat To Palestinian Security:
The failure of the Palestinian Security Forces in what Israel calls
"the test", that is maintaining internal security and cooperating
with the Israelis in defending the safety of the settlers and
Israelis, may create a strategic threat to Palestinian security,
portrayed by the return of the Israeli Army to occupy territories
it withdrew from previously. This will constitute a mortal blow to
Palestinian hopes for freedom and independence. This dangerous step
is quite possible in a situation where the Palestinian Security
Forces seem unable to stem the wave of violence where Israelis are
killed daily.
The Rest of the West Bank:
Concerning the rest of the West Bank territories, the redeployment
of Israeli Forces in territories outside the cities does not
confine the presence of these forces to specific areas, which means
that the Israeli Army will have the freedom to consolidate in the
largest section of the Palestinian territories located outside
populated areas. This will make the security problem in the rest of
the West Bank more serious.
The Political Dangers of Security Failure:
The Palestinian political leadership in Gaza and Jericho may resort
to radical political steps aimed at controlling matters, in the
face of increasing violence directed at the settlers and Israelis,
if the Palestinian Security Forces fail to contain the violence, in
its attempt to prevent an Israeli threat to reoccupy the territory,
and to convince the Israelis to hand over the responsibilities of
internal security in the rest of the West Bank. This leadership
might try gradually to restrain public freedom, suppress opposition
and restrain it from expressing itself. By doing this, the first
Palestinian experiment in independence will be turned into a Police
Dictatorship.
3. The Attitude of the Opposition and the Palestinian Street in the
Occupied Territories.
The Attitude of the Opposition:
All opposing fronts in the West Bank unanimously agree that they
will not resort to the use of violence and not try to foil the
agreement, but at the same time express their fear that the
Palestinian authority, or the main faction supporting the agreement
(Fatah), may resort to violence to suppress opposition, restrict
its movement or restrain it from attacking Israeli targets, which
may lead to the eruption of internal fighting. In this accord, the
opposition points to what .was mentioned in, Arafat's letter to
Rabin, which includes the PLO's recognition of Israel, and in which
Arafat commits himself to exert authority over all the elements and
employees of the Organization to secure their compliance and punish
whoever violates the articles of the declaration of principles.
Although what was mentioned in the letter is restricted to the
elements of the Organization, yet the opposition fronts fear that
they are included in this commitment.
The opposing fronts announced that they will not participate m the
elections mentioned in the agreement. But the attitudes of the
opposition vary. While the "Popular Front For the Liberation Of
Palestine" (PFLP) assures that it will not participate in the
elections in any form, the Democratic Front (DFLP) distinguishes
between participating in represen¬tative elections, which is
the right of all members of the Palestinian people, and
consequently may be accepted by the Democratic Front, and the
appointing elections for the autonomy, which they oppose. The
attitude of Hamas towards participation in the elections will be
defined by the nature of the elections, while the Jihad Movement
opposes these elections in general and in particular.
The announced or current attitudes of some of the opposing factions
do not necessarily reflect their real attitudes towards the
agreement or to specific issues in it, such as elections, or
dealing with the authority emerging from the agreement.
In the past, some of these Fronts have changed their previous
attitudes. The best example of this is the attitude of both the
(PFLP) and the (DFLP) which initially opposed Resolution 242; but
later on their acceptance of 242 became one of the Fronts' claims
to be a party to the peace process.
After Israel recognized the PLO, and the PLO entered the
negotiations, one of the main reasons for opposing the negotiations
disappeared, and if the PLO succeeds in convincing Israel to stop
the settlements, another reason for the opposition would also be
eliminated.
The most recent Jordanian decision concerning the official
disengagement between the two parties, the Palestinian and
Jordanian, in the Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation and the
independence of the Palestinian delegation to the peace
negotiations, removes a third reason for the opposition to the
negotiations.
The Attitude of the Street:
The Palestinian street received the agreement with a mixture of
support and reservation; the support, in particular, came because
the PLO itself conducted the negotiations with Israel, where the
poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research, several days after the publication of the agreement
(10.9.93), revealed that the ratio of supporting this agreement in
general reached around 65 percent while only 28 percent opposed it,
and the rest said they were not sure.
The reservations occurred because the majority of the Palestinian
people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip do not believe that this
agreement will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State and
because more that 60 percent believed that discussing the issues of
Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees should not be postponed to the
"permanent status" negotiations, while an overwhelming majority (82
percent) said that a referendum of the Palestinian people
concerning the agreement should be carried out. The results of the
poll clarified that concerning the conditions of mutual
recognition, there is a Palestinian support and reservation. Around
57 percent supported altering the National Charter to achieve an
official Israeli recognition of the PLO, while the percentage of
support for ending the Intifada did not exceed 47 percent.
Although a strong opposition to the agreement exists, and although
there are important reservations on some of its articles even among
its supporters, the poll points shows that there is an overwhelming
majority (almost 80 percent), which calls for expressing opposition
through a democratic dialogue only, while the ratio of those
supporting violence did not exceed 13 percent. Even among those
opposing the agreement such as those sympathizing with Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, People's Party, and the Democratic Party, the ratio
of those supporting violence did not exceed 18 percent. The
smallness of this ratio shows that predictions of a civil war are
exaggerated.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Palestinian public opinion
like any other public opinion, is liable to be influenced by and in
conformity with the decisions and policies taken by its leadership,
especially if those decisions and policies are accompanied by
positive tangible results.
4. Possible Future Scenarios:
Several Palestinians believe that the Palestinian-Israeli
Declaration of Principles, places them at the beginning of the road
towards establishing their independent state. They see that the
Palestinian authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho will, during
the transitional stage, achieve two aims at the same time:-
• enhance its independence and sovereignty and expand the
range of its responsibilities over that area.
• extend to the rest of the West Bank, so as to dissolve
gradually, the differences between the two areas.
Of course it is possible to imagine both optimistic and less
optimistic scenarios.
The optimistic scenario assumes
1. That the Israeli side is willing to surrender the Arab
territories within the permanent status framework.
2. That Israeli opposition to the agreement, especially the
opposition of the settlers, will not take violent or provocative
forms, and that the problem of the settlements and settlers,
whether during the transitional stage or when talking about the
permanent status, will be solved. And that the official Israeli
side will be ready to suppress any radical opposition from the
settlers.
3. That the National and Islamic Palestinian opposition to
the agreement will not take a violent form and that, at worst, the
Palestinian Security Force will have the ability to suppress any
violent armed opposition to the agreement.
It is possible to imagine a situation where the major opposition
power Hamas, to maintain its popular base and to benefit from the
wide support which it enjoys, is forced to participate in the
elections and thus becomes part of the growing Palestinian
political system.
4. That the economic situation in the Palestinian
territories will develop positively, contributing to a sort of
political moderation and future optimism on Palestinian attitudes
and aspirations in general, and which will subsequently contribute
to creating a political and social stability.
It is also assumed that the majority of the population in the West
Bank will feel better personal security, where all negative aspects
which accompanied the Intifada in the last period, from burning
cars, killing suspects, "protection", recurring strikes and the
deterioration of the educational system and others, will
disappear.
The less optimistic scenario assumes that the
political circumstances after two or three years - at the beginning
of the negotiations concerning the permanent status - will not form
an effective pressure on Israel to accept the expansion of the
Palestinian state to include the rest of the West Bank.
If we assume that Israel does not really intend to give up the rest
of the Palestinian territories (now or in future), or that it will
not be exposed to strong pressures in future to do so, and that the
impetus of Palestinian resistance and challenge will be less in the
future than it is today, then it is possible to imagine the status
after two or more years becoming as follows:
1. the establishment of an actual Palestinian state in Gaza
Strip and Jericho area. It might be possible that within a period
not exceeding five years, the Gaza settlements will be evacuated.
Most of these settlements are agricultural and in order to survive,
need two basic elements: cheap Arab labor and a large amount of
water suitable for agriculture. As the Palestinian authority will
be capable of controlling the elements of labor entirely, and to a
large extent the element of water (the Gaza water will be very
saline by that time). It may be assumed that these settlements, on
the long run will not be able to survive, (although the Israelis
might resort to suggest establishing water desalinization projects
in the Strip in the interest of both sides). By the elimination of
settlements, it can be assumed that the article in the declaration
of principles concerning freedom of Israeli passage to the areas of
Gaza and Jericho will be altered in compliance with the new
reality.
2. The rest of the West Bank will enjoy autonomy in the ways
specified in the agreement, there will be two types of authority: a
Palestinian authority, its headquarters possibly in Jericho and
responsible for controlling civil affairs, and an Israeli authority
responsible for the settlements, security in general, and streets
and roads and partially responsible for the water and the bridges.
Then there will be a Palestinian-Israeli role-sharing to administer
West Bank affairs excluding Jericho, and a suspension of the issue
of sovereignty and an Israeli security control.
3. The area of Jerusalem will be outside the autonomy,
giving the Palestinian authority (in Jericho), specific
administrative responsibilities some of which are administrating
the affairs of the Waqf and the Holy Mosque and being concerned
with the affairs of the civil administration of the Palestinian
population who will be considered citizens of the Palestinian
authority.
4. The leadership of the organization, its offices,
institutions and military forces would have moved from the outside
to the inside to prepare for the establishment of the state, and an
effective Palestinian authority with the ability of control. Most
probably, the leadership of the organization will establish a
Palestinian Government and that the Organization itself will become
a symbolic framework with no authority whatsoever. The factions may
be transformed to movements and political parties competing for
power, leading to:
a) A radical change on the agenda of the Organization - the
Palestinian Government to reflect the interests of its new basis.
The concerns and problems of the Diaspora (right of return/right to
self- determination) will not have top priority despite all good
intentions. The Diaspora will lose its political leadership, its
factions and military forces and will become less capable of making
its opinion heard and mobilize its potential.
The priorities of Gaza and the West Bank will become the priorities
of the Organization-Government: more independence and internal
control, provide the requirements of the infrastructure, achieve
economic growth, fighting poverty and unemployment, absorb tens of
thousands of returnees, facing Islamic "extremism", provide
security to the new political system, etc.
b) The conversion of the Palestinian Forces inside the
territories for police/intelligence work to achieve two Israeli
goals immediately: thwarting any Palestinian security threat
against Israel from the outside, and the coordination of these
forces themselves with Israel to thwart any internal Palestinian
security threat (from Muslims or opposing Nationalists) against
Israel.
When the negotiations concerning the permanent status commence,
Israel might be ready to accept that the establishment of a
Palestinian state in Gaza and Jericho as unavoidable. But most
probably, it will not be ready for this in the rest of the West
Bank, Jerusalem, and settlements existing outside Gaza.
The Israelis may insist on not surrendering sovereignty over
Jerusalem at all. They may also insist on refusing to withdraw from
the rest of the West Bank (note how the agreement does not contain
any mention to the principle of "land for peace" when referring to
Resolution 242), as well as refusing to dismantle most of the
settlements.
The Israelis may suggest a compromise solution: Israeli withdrawal
from most of the remaining occupied territories in the West Bank
and the establishment of a Palestinian State on it, to be united in
a confederation with Jordan, in return for the Palestinian
acceptance of annexing to Israel Jerusalem and significant areas of
the West Bank (around 15 percent of the West Bank land), including
the majority of the Israeli settlements.
As it is expected that the Palestinians might not accept this
solution immediately, it is possible to assume that the status of
the rest of the West Bank will remain as is to a large degree,
which means 1. Suspended sovereignty 2. Palestinian-Israeli joint rule - condominium 3. Israeli security control.
It is possible to assume that the territories of the autonomy will
be less stable, and violence aimed at Israelis may increase. A
bloody Palestinian¬-Palestinian struggle may also occur as a
result of which the Palestinian authority would tighten its control
in the face of the increase of Islamic and National impetus,
seeking to liberate it from the rest of the occupation by using
violence. The settlers may make trouble, to create this instability
for the same purpose. The Israeli government may not find in this
instability a threat to its strategic interests and may even
encourage it.
Under these circumstances, what will happen to the Palestinian
citizens of the autonomy territories in the West Bank?
A gradual population emigration from these territories toward the
territories of the Palestinian state can be assumed in search of
hoped for stability, for jobs in state institutions, for more
economic and political rights and privileges, moving away from
contacts with Israelis, and seeking to obtain a passport to travel
and search for a better life in Jordan, Europe or America.
The Palestinian emigration may lead to enhancing Israeli control,
on the territories of the autonomy in the long run, and the
Palestinians may find, in the end, that accepting the Israeli
suggestion concerned with annexing part of the West Bank is the
lesser evil.
How can the articles of the agreement now be altered to remove some
or all these fears?
First, to deal with the problems resulting from the security
problem, the following two solutions could be suggested giving the
priority to the first, and with full realization of the difficulty
of achieving it.
• To remove the Gaza Strip settlements completely and not to
grant the Israeli Army and citizens the right of entry and exit.
Entry and exit check points in the Strip should be under
Palestinian control, whereby only Israelis who do not present a
security threat or provocation may enter with Palestinian
permission.
• If this cannot be achieved, the following is
possible:
(a) Evacuating the settlements existing outside the Gush Qatif
Group, most important of which are the settlements of Netsarim,
Kfar Darom and the Beit Lahia group.
(b) Connecting the settlements of Gush-Qatif by two roads only, one
of which is internal, within the settlements' area itself and
connecting the settlements within the area with each other. The
other road connecting the settlements with Israel in such a way
that it does not pass through any Arab territory, except the
junction point of this road and the main Palestinian road which
connects Rafah with Gaza.
(c) Limiting the use of these two roads to the settlers, the
Israeli Security Forces and the Palestinian Security Forces whose
responsibility on these two roads is to prevent Israeli threats
against Palestinian internal security. Therefore, cooperation
between the Palestinian Security Forces and the Israeli Army
concerning the movement of the latter on these two roads, is
expected.
(d) Ensuring that all Israeli movements on other Palestinian roads
should be within the framework of joint Palestinian - Israeli
patrols and that these movements should be restricted to:
emergency and legal purposes only, and
for a period not exceeding two years, after which the Israeli Army
will stop using these roads.
(e) Giving the Palestinian Security Forces the authority to prevent
the settlers from entering Palestinian camps and villages or using
the streets, if these forces see that this entry or usage may form
a security threat or provocation to the Palestinians.
(f) Reaching a clear understanding regarding the security
responsibilities as well as clarifying the following: 1. The party that will be in charge of the agreed upon
security procedure: Palestinian Security Forces, Israeli Forces, or
a Joint Force. 2. The type of the agreed upon security procedure:
collecting information, lodging complaints, arresting, shooting,
investigating, etc. 3. The party that may threaten or provoke: civil
Palestinians, non-civil Palestinians, ordinary Israelis, settlers,
army or Israeli security forces. 4. Type of threat or provocation: armed assaults for
political purposes, provocations (such as shooting in the air),
armed or unarmed assaults for criminal intentions. 5. The place where the security threat or provocation took
place: within Palestinian controlled territories, Palestinian
territories, where Israeli control over internal security such as
settlements exist, Palestinian territory where a joint security
supervision exists.
(g) When agreeing on the security responsibilities concerning the
two parties, the following should be taken into
consideration:
1. In case a threat occurs in the territories under
Palestinian control, the Palestinian Security Authorities should be
responsible for the entire security arrangements. In the worst
circumstances, Joint Forces could carry some of these duties.
2. In case a threat occurs in territories where internal
security is controlled by the Israeli Authorities, these
authorities can be responsible for security arrangements on the
principle of reciprocal treatment, in case Israelis are offered any
privileges as in the Joint Forces, for example.
3. In cases where accused persons escape to the other party
after carrying out offensive operations, the principle of
reciprocal treatment should be implemented.
Second, regarding the issues concerned with the Palestinian
opposition, the following can be suggested:
1. The Palestinian authority should adopt a free irrevocable
democratic system where the suppression of freedom is prohibited,
where the opposition may express its opinion, and where it finds
the opportunity open for achieving its goals without resorting to
violence.
2. The formation of a Palestinian representative election
system, which allows a proportional representation of all opposing
parties and does not make accepting the Declaration of Principles,
or part of it, as a condition for participating in these elections.
The election system should guarantee an equal chance of winning for
all the various Palestinian parties, disregarding their attitude
towards the Declaration of Principles and the agreements annexed to
it or emanating from it.
3. Guaranteeing the opposition's right to express its
opposition to the Palestinian Authority and to the Palestinian -
Israeli Agreement and to continue their resistance against the
Israeli occupation or the settlements presence through non-violent
methods. Non-violent resistance is a legal act in any democratic
system, and the Palestinian opposition may find that within the new
circumstances, this type of resistance may be more effective than
violence.
Third, in the political field, the Palestinians should strive for
following:
(1) Gradually enhancing the independence of the areas of Gaza,
Jericho and the sovereignty over them, by dealing with the issues
of settlement, external security, foreign affairs, control over all
borders and routes, full control over roads and streets, and
building a defense force capable of protecting the borders and
prohibiting infiltration.
(2) Gradual elimination of the differences and borders between the
areas of Gaza and Jericho and the rest of the West Bank, beginning
with the further redeployment of Israeli forces, which will
eventually be limited to one or two positions only in the entire
West Bank area. This should be accompanied by complete Palestinian
control over internal security and roads.
(3) Establishing a network of relations, institutions and
communications in the city of Jerusalem, aiming at enhancing the
Palestinian control over it. This should begin by opening the city
to free movement and unlimited travel for Palestinians from all
territories, and connecting Jerusalem to the services and
institutions of the Palestinian Authority by opening branches to
the offices of this authority in the city.
(4) Finding a mechanism to connect the institutions and jobs of the
PLO to the jobs and institutions of the Interim Palestinian
Authority in a way which complements and enhances each other
without dissolving one into the other.
The continuous existence of the PLO and its performance on
Palestinian land and in the Palestinian Diaspora to serve the
Palestinian "interior" or "exterior" will enhance the unity of the
Palestinians wherever they are.
Translated from the original by Khuloud Totah