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reflect those of the European Commission. The European Commission
does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included nor does it
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1. Food Insecurity in Palestine
1.1. The Problem
In the context of analyzing the immediate causes, the term "'food
security"' refers to the ability of a community, family or
individual to be able to eat sufficiently, in terms of both
quantity and quality, as prescribed by international standards of
calorie, protein and vitamin intake. Whilst this may seem
straightforward enough, the term comprises three inter-related
components (availability, access and quality), all of which
must be simultaneously achieved.
Food needs to be available in order to be accessed, in the granary,
the kitchen, the local store or market. In general, sufficient food
(of sufficient quality) does exist in Palestine, year on year,
despite the constraints imposed by the current political
situation.
Yet, availability alone is not necessarily enough to provide food
security, for sufficient access to available food is often
denied. This may come about as a result of economic constraints
(poverty), and therefore the inability of an individual to purchase
the food necessary (if not receiving entitlements through
humanitarian aid). In a related way, access may also be denied due
to physical constraints, such as the separation barrier, or a
checkpoint manned by the Israeli army which may restrict personal
movement. As a result, people may be unable to access the resources
(land, irrigation water, jobs) whereby they can grow or buy enough
food.
Indeed, the symptoms of food insecurity are very much in evidence,
at the levels of community, family and individuals. Not only is
there an immediate physical and social cost of incipient hunger and
malnutrition, but also detrimental long-term economics. An ill-fed
population incurs enormous costs in terms of irreversible loss of
cognitive function in children, vulnerability to disease and the
cost of this to the health service and productive sectors, a
discouraged and unemployed youth, and so on. Causality is
bidirectional - the food-insecure get sick, and the sick get
food-insecure as they have not the energy to work, or look for
work, to relieve that food- insecurity. A nation's human health is
a strong predictor of the health of its economy. It follows that
there is a huge macro-economic cost in the region to taking no
action to relieve food insecurity in a sustainable manner - we
cannot afford to do nothing.
It is hardly surprising that Palestinians regard the continued
occupation, in all its manifestations, as the main cause of their
food insecurity. Agricultural and other livelihoods have been
progressively eroded and destroyed over the last six years, since
the 2nd intifada erupted in September 2000, and for those without
paid work or access to expatriate remittances, food security is now
seriously compromised.
Thus, food insecurity in Palestine is not primarily an outcome of
technical dysfunction. Rather, it is due to socio-economic and
political dysfunction. And it is clearly a truism that continuing
food insecurity at such a high level in Palestine cannot be in
Israel's interests either, from both the security and economic
self-interest. Such facts must surely concentrate the political
will on both "'sides"' to resolve their long-standing differences,
and thereby remove the apex cause of food insecurity.
1.2. The Solution
The international community has tried to assist Palestine,
contributing to the access component of food security, through
supplementing the efforts of indigenous humanitarian food
distribution networks (by the PNA1, political associations or
NGOs). However, humanitarian aid in the country is not
well-coordinated amongst the various players, and based on
imperfect knowledge of who most needs the food. This has resulted
in some deserving cases receiving none, whilst other families
receive it from more than one source (though even this does not
assure that sufficient food is provided for their
needs).
The combined humanitarian aid efforts have undoubtedly saved lives,
yet they are not sustainable in the medium or long term. Also,
there is no "'development"' component to humanitarian aid. At best
it is a stop-gap measure, whilst at worst it can create dependency
and undermine the will of people to become independent of food aid.
The ideal should surely be for humanitarian aid to be phased out,
in favor of development initiatives that create wealth, enabling
people to buy (access) the food which is available. Indeed, many
international agencies are actively involved in funding development
projects, which go some way to relieving poverty and providing a
food-secure future, through strengthening the country's physical
and social assets.
2. National Food Security Strategy (NFSS)
2.1. Purpose of the Strategy
The Strategy is needed for several reasons:
* to provide the framework for a sustainable and coordinated
"'solution"' to food insecurity in Palestine, replacing the
hitherto ad-hoc approach, promoting synergies and avoiding wasteful
duplication, and for components to be outcome-oriented rather than
activity-oriented ;
* to serve as the vehicle for implementing the PNA's food security
policy, whereby all its citizens would be food-secure;
* to provide a management tool for Government, enabling it to have
a clear vision of what and how it intends to prioritize, and to
oversee and coordinate the implementation of food security policy,
not least through commanding the development agenda rather than
merely responding to donor priorities;
* to demonstrate that clear vision to donors, thereby assuring
their commitment, so that Strategy implementation is properly
resourced;
* to facilitate related multi-sectoral planning and implementation
at Governorate and Municipality level, and provide a mandate
against which potential projects can be assessed as "'bankable,"',
and worthy of funding;
* to encourage a development agenda, with a preventative rather
than curative orientation, together with a better-coordinated
safety net of food security-related relief efforts.
2.2. Predicted Strategy outcomes
* Strengthened national capability to effectively resource,
coordinate, manage and monitor food- security implementation;
* Sustainable institutional mechanisms installed and operative, to
facilitate this implementation;
* Social and technical causes of food insecurity progressively
removed;
* Citizenry empowered to be less vulnerable to food insecurity, and
to remain so;
* Community, household and individual commitment expressed through
their own efforts during Strategy implementation, to which value is
added through close cooperation with local government, NGOs and the
commercial sector;
* A flexible user-friendly Strategy operational, menu- and
demand-driven, enabling communities, PNA agencies and donors to
buy-in according to interest and comparative advantage;
* Close collaboration, networking and complementarity promoted
between stakeholders in PNA (ministries, and agencies such as PWA
and PCBS)2, civil society and the private sector;
* All categories of citizens receiving equitable consideration
under the Strategy, especially the most disadvantaged, irrespective
of political affiliation;
* collective and focused "'action"' over "'rhetoric"'
fostered;
* interventions selected by citizens and supported by donors,
rather than the converse.
3. Participatory Development of the NFSS
3.1. Ownership
For the Strategy to be useful it has to be implementable, and for
that to happen it needs to be owned by the citizenry. For this
reason, the formulation of the NFSS needed to be, and was, fully
participative.
This was necessarily a time-consuming process, involving
facilitation, consultation, building trust and seeking consensus
amongst partners who traditionally do not necessarily work closely
with one another. The NFSS is indeed a Palestinian Strategy,
devised by Palestinians for Palestinians.
During the early stages of Strategy development in 2002, a
stakeholder analysis was conducted, resulting in the formation of
three Working Groups. These comprised umbrella group
representatives from civil societya and the private sector,b and an
Inter-Ministerial Working Group (IWG) from the PNA, with
representatives at Director-General level or equivalent.3.
The roles of each Working Group in promoting food security were
complementary:
* Within civil society, NGOs are seen as a vital link to sensitize
the citizenry about its rights and obligations, train its members
in the skills necessary to express its needs in "'bankable"'
documents, and assist in "'project"' implementation. Strategy
implementation at "'grass-roots level"' is foreseen as being led by
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs).
* The private sector is seen as providing services at both input
and output levels, such as finance for enterprise development, and
marketing.
* Thirdly, the PNA's role is to provide an enabling legal and
regulatory environment for NFSS implementation activities to
flourish.
3.2. Participative workshops
Through the three working groups mentioned above, there was
continual discussion on food security issues, mediated by the
consultants, and informed by the results of three previous
studies4,5,6. These studies helped the participants formulate the
most appropriate intervention instruments, and target the most
needy and vulnerable in society.
The food security discussion modalities comprised writing and
sharing working papers, small group meetings, and four large
workshops conducted in Arabic (two each in both West Bank and Gaza,
between March and June 20057), chaired by the PNA. There were also
meetings that the consultants convened with ministers, deputy
ministers and director generals, the chair of a PLC8 Committee and
other PLC members, numerous national and international NGOs, and
donors. Such discussions enabled a commonality to be engendered, a
meeting of minds on the focal points of interest relating to food
security, the role that each agency and individual could play, and
the benefits that could accrue, individually and nationally.
From the proceedings of the first workshop in Jericho, a First
Draft Food Security Strategy in chart form was devised. The
proceedings were written in both Arabic and English, circulated to
delegates and their amendments incorporated. Through an iterative
process, the Final Draft Strategy, emanating from the fourth
workshop in Gaza, was offered to the Cabinet, and on August 15th,
2005, the PNA Cabinet endorsed it. In the PNA Gazette notification,
the coordination role for NFSS implementation was assigned to the
Ministry of Agriculture.
4. Characteristics of the NFSS document
The Strategy document comprises a preamble, together with four
charts.9. The preamble summarizes the nature of food insecurity in
the country, its causes, extent and context, and close relationship
with "poverty.". The charts represent the four strategic objectives
agreed at the first workshop in Jericho. These relate to the three
components of food security - improving the availability of food,
access to food, and quality/use of food - together with a fourth
chart addressing institutional aspects of Strategy
implementation.
Each chart lists the instruments of intervention that workshop
delegates considered had the greatest potential to remove food
insecurity. The purpose and expected outcomes of these
interventions were recorded, and the level of priority indicated.
The interventions listed are focused development initiatives, with
the exception of one; namely, better coordination of humanitarian
food aid, which comprises the last intervention listed under
Improving Access to Food.
Each identified activity in the Strategy charts should be viewed as
a "budget line." Some will cost more than others, and funds need to
be sought for each on the basis of bankable project documents in a
competitive funding environment. Each project document must
demonstrate its realism, its high probability of attainment and
large positive impact on one or more aspects of food security;
also, how the project will be implemented in a given community,
with maximum "ownership" and input "in kind" by that
community.
Simple and sensitive impact-indicators, and means of monitoring and
evaluating any intervention (including food aid instruments),
should be identified for any "'project"' proposal; and a convincing
needs assessment to underpin each, which would also have to
demonstrate cost-effectiveness.
The Strategy is ambitious, but not overly so, for not all its
intervention instruments may be implemented, as some may not
receive high enough demand-led prioritization by the PNA, and/or be
attractive to donors. Yet the provisions of the Strategy need to be
wide, including activities that are enabled when the political
constraints are mitigated.
The Strategy is compatible with and promotes the four Aims10 and
four National Programs11 of the Draft MTDP (2005-07)12 (publ.
February 2005), the nutrition strategy (approved by the Ministry of
Health, July 2003), and the Job Creation Strategy approved by
Cabinet in January 2004. It should also be compliant with PNA's
poverty strategy when it is formulated.13 The Strategy needs to
target in particular the most- geographically-, socially- and
economically- disadvantaged areas/households/individuals, often
living at the margin of the market economy. These must therefore be
adequately informed of the provisions of the Strategy, such that
they demand their needs be met through it, and indeed that
mobilized public opinion drives its implementation.
1 PNA: Palestinian National Authority. 2 PWA: Palestinian Water Authority; PCBS: Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. a Civil Society Working Group (CSWG): Association of Local
Authorities, General Union of Palestinian Charitable Societies,
General Union of Palestinian Women, Palestinian General Federation
of Trade Unions, Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network,
Palestinian NGOs Network b Private Sector Working Group (PSWG): Palestinian
Federation of Industries, Palestinian Food Industries Association,
Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Palestinian
Businessmen Association, PALTRADE, Palestinian Information
Technology Association, Banking Union. 9 Plus annexes listing the participants at all four
workshops, and summarizsed proceedings. 10 Link short-term relief to longer-term development needs;
enhance PNA leadership of aid management, coordination &
oversight; guide donor interventions for national resource
mobilization & allocation; build public sector capacity to
enhance planning for development (point 3, page 8). 11 Ensure social protection; invest in social, human &
physical capital; invest in institutions of good governance; create
an environment for private sector growth (point 137, page
48). 12 MTDP: Medium Term Development Plan. 13 Of the Millennium Development Goals aimed at reducing
poverty, three of the eight directly address food security, so a
linkage between the two issues is plausible and cogent.