On July 11, 2007 the Palestine-Israel Journal (PIJ) held a
roundtable discussion at its offices in East Jerusalem on Future
Options. The Palestinian participants were Dr. Munther Dajani,
chair of the Faculty of Arts at al-Quds University; and Dr. Walid
Salem, director of the Society of Democracy and Community
Development. The Israeli participants were Dr. Meron Benvenisti,
former deputy mayor of Jerusalem; and Dr. Ron Pundak, director
general of the Peres Center for Peace and one of the architects of
the Oslo and Geneva Accords. The debate was moderated by Ziad
AbuZayyad, PIJ co-editor; and Gershon Baskin, co-director of the
Israeli-Palestinian Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI);
and attended by Hillel Schenker PIJ co-editor.
Ziad AbuZayyad: I want to start with the question: Do you believe
that the one-state option is now more relevant than any time
before?
Gershon Baskin: If I can tag on to that question: Is the two-state
solution dead? Is it still valid?
Ron Pundak: The idea is definitely more exposed now, meaning that
more people are speaking about it, but I don't think it makes it
more relevant. It is more on the table because people are sick and
tired of the current situation and are looking for other options,
such as the Jordanian option, the Egyptian option for Gaza and the
one-state option. But I do not see this option being given any
thought within the Israeli public. Among the intellectuals in
Israel and Palestine, it is being discussed, but it is not at all
spilling over into the public at large. Personally, I am very much
against this option, because politically and ideologically, it is
wrong for the Palestinians and the Israelis. It will lead to a
chaotic situation which will not lead to a solution, just to a
deterioration of the current situation. So yes, people are
discussing it more, but no, it is not more relevant.
Meron Benvenisti: The question of whether a one-state solution is
relevant or not depends on how you look at it: Is your question
prescriptive or descriptive? You should look at it as a descriptive
situation of the status quo. We've been looking at one state since
at least the beginning of the 1980s - except that it isn't working.
We are hiding behind slogans that are totally irrelevant and
obsolete, such as "occupation," which means it is temporary,
therefore it will just go away; or different notions of the
two-state solution, which is now the slogan of Mr. Olmert, Mr.
Sharon and the Israeli right.
And what we are facing now is one state, governed and dominated by
the Israeli side, who rules over five Palestinian subgroups, and
for each there is a different approach and a different Palestinian
reaction - a situation typical not of two sides, but of one
multi-communal state, one geopolitical entity that is controlled by
one ethnic group. The five subgroups are: Israeli Arabs, who have
their own agenda and are dealing with Israel on a separate track
and are turning their backs on the Palestinians as far as their
immediate interests are concerned; the Jerusalem Arabs on this side
of the fence, with a different agenda, different worries forced
upon them by the Israelis; the Gazans, and now it is especially
clear that Israel has forced on them a different reaction, and they
have to come up with their own policy vis-à-vis the Israelis;
the West Bankers; and the Palestinian diaspora. Not that the
Palestinians have accepted it; maybe they have no way to resist it
- but this is a fact that we should take into consideration.
That is why the two-state solution is not the opposite of a
one-state solution; it is just a description of the status quo. Not
that Israel dictates the situation, but the whole politics of it is
not a politics of two separate entities. What we have, therefore,
is a one-state non-solution, the opposite of a solution: a
condition. The reality today is not to seek a two-state solution. I
am especially wary when I hear that Mr. Olmert is now championing a
two-state solution. The two-state solution we fought for 25 years
ago probably has a different meaning today; he means a Bantustan,
and he is waiting for the Palestinians to accept that
Bantustan.
Ziad AbuZayyad: You were the first to say about this situation that
it is an irreversible situation. What were your feelings when
Sharon evacuated settlements from the Gaza Strip and showed that
dismantling settlements was possible?
Meron Benvenisti: I was against it. It was a trick based on the
formal importance of settlements. He wanted to have a precedent;
this is how he wanted to develop the solution to the Palestinian
question - by creating a Bantustan, separating that Bantustan from
the West Bank. The settlements are only one aspect of Israeli
control. There are the land, the roads, the military system. The
expression of Zionism is not in the settlements themselves anymore,
but in the roadblocks, the total control of Israel over the West
Bank. Therefore the evacuation of settlements from Gaza is
meaningless, because the whole question of settlements is an
intra-Zionist feud, between Peace Now and the right. Both sanctify
settlements; for them to take away the settlements or to build
settlements is important. For the rest of the world it should mean
nothing.
Walid Salem: My point of departure might be to try to analyze the
processes that are taking place on the ground. And what I see is
that the one-state option is getting more support among the
settlers and the Israeli right wing, while the Palestinian side is
moving from the option of two states that recognize each other to
that of two states without recognition. Meanwhile, among the
Israeli right wing, including the settlers, there is a growing
demand for a one-state solution - Eretz Israel Hashlema (Greater
Israel). There are articles written about these groups who call for
a "Second Judea." I know they are a minority in Israeli society,
but since after Gaza, we have this process of freezing or
dismantling settlements in the West Bank, these ideas might get
more of a chance to grow among the Israeli right wing and get more
support among Israeli public opinion. I am reading a lot about it
in Nekuda, articles that call for a community-based solution more
than a politically based solution, dealing with the Palestinians as
a community rather than as a political entity. Another reason that
these ideas might grow is that the Palestinians are becoming
invisible in Israel. You do not see them in Tel Aviv, in Jaffa, in
Haifa, etc. With the Palestinians becoming invisible, the Israeli
concern for the Palestinians' right to self-determination is
diminishing, so the ideas that call for a one-state solution can
grow. Therefore, I see more possibility that this idea might grow
in Israel, more than it will grow among the Palestinians.
Another point about the two-state solution: Within the current
balance of power, and thinking realistically, the two-state
solution is still the solution. Otherwise you might think along the
lines of Jihad in order to get a one-state solution, or along the
lines of non-violent continuous struggle, which is what Edward Said
called for. So the idea of a one-state solution is a recipe for a
long Jihad, either violent or non-violent, on the Palestinian side.
On the question of Jerusalem and refugees, you might find a
solution within the two-state solution. So even if Jerusalem is
kept open, the two-state solution will continue to be relevant,
with Jerusalem as an open city and capital to two states. Also
there are the five options of Taba about refugees, which also can
work within this framework of a two-state solution. So I see these
two options; otherwise we are paving the way for the right wing in
Israel and among the Palestinians.
Munther Dajani: First, one state or two states - these are two of
the scenarios on the table. Who will be in charge under the
one-state solution? On the other hand, the two-state solution
offers both Palestinians and Israelis what they crave: a Jewish
identity and a Palestinian identity. However, in thinking outside
the box, perhaps a transitional stage is needed to create the
proper environment for peace through trusteeship, that is, bringing
in international forces, such as in South Lebanon, to be in charge
of the occupied territories as a preliminary step. The second step
is to call for self-determination for the Palestinians. It might be
separation or integration; one day after declaring the State of
Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians will decide with
whom to ally themselves politically and/or economically, whether
with Israel, Jordan or Egypt, or to remain as a single independent
unit.
As it stands now, Israel is dominated by the old colonial mind of
its policymakers, aiming to be in control of all Palestinian land,
roads and resources as well as the people. This means they haven't
learned anything from the lessons of their years of occupation
running between 1967 and 2007. The first intifada of 1987, as well
as the second intifada of 2000, showed the Palestinians'
determination to resist and to claim their land and identity.
Between 1995 and 2000 Israel thought the status quo would last
forever, and its leadership worked on enhancing their positions,
hoping to grab more land than what was agreed upon. That was a big
blow to the peace process, particularly in that there were no
confidence-building measures to bridge the wide gap between the two
peoples in conflict. The two main pillars of Oslo were
confidence-building measures and mobility of people and goods.
People keep forgetting that. Neither of these two pillars was
implemented. Instead of providing mobility for people and goods,
more than 300 checkpoints were established. Nor did the Palestinian
Authority work towards instituting any confidence-building measures
with the Israelis. This was looked upon as a transitional stage
where the Palestinian leadership hoped it would improve its
position, and on the other side, the Israelis also thought they
could improve their position. So neither was actually working to
achieve a comprehensive settlement.
Furthermore, Israel keeps talking about Jerusalem being united. How
can Israel promote a "united Jerusalem" when everybody sees that on
the ground the city is divided? They also keep hiding behind the
issue of refugees and the right of return. Even the issue of right
of return can be solvable in a sense, because if the right itself
is sacred, we can, however, negotiate how many and where to return.
Refugees don't have to return to Israel, but may return to the
State of Palestine, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza, and should be
compensated as stipulated by UN resolutions. Jerusalem and
refugees, the two hardest issues for both the Israelis and the
Palestinians to swallow, will be up for negotiation; then we are on
the right track. For Israel cannot be democratic and at the same
time remain an occupier. Occupation is a contradiction of
democracy, and it is for the good of Israel in terms of morality,
security and acceptance in the Middle East region that it withdraws
from the Palestinian territories and puts an end to military
occupation. And the best way to do it is to institute
confidence-building measures during the period of trusteeship, and
then self-determination.
Ron Pundak: First, it took the Israeli public 14 years since 1993
to accept the idea of two states. Now you have more Israelis than
ever who support two states. Second, ideologically the idea of a
big Eretz Israel doesn't exist anymore within the main Israeli
constituencies; it is not on the table. Third, what you have in
Israel today is a new Zionism in the making. It is not post-Zionism
but neo-Zionism. The neo-Zionists, who are younger, would like to
see a prosperous Israeli state without the occupation, without the
settlements, without the moral questions facing each individual,
without the checkpoints, without the old ways of the Zionism of the
1920s or 1960s, and all this goes against the notion of one
state.
The notion of one state doesn't exist in the minds of 99.9% of the
Israelis. The forces within will go against it and will dictate to
any government to choose two states. The Olmert of two states is
not the Olmert of the 1970s and 1980s; if he had told us in the
1980s that he was in favor of two states, I would have been very
suspicious. Now I am very confident that he sees the two states not
much differently from what the moderates within the Israeli peace
camp are talking about.
Gershon Baskin: I would like us to be descriptive, to use Meron's
words, about the current reality in which we live. The current
reality is what one might call three states, or three political
entities, where the Palestinian political movement is completely
divided between Gaza and the West Bank with what seems to be little
chance of bridging the internal differences within the Palestinian
camp in the near future. And perhaps the Palestinian focus now is
on preventing what happened in Gaza from happening in the West
Bank. In this reality, what are the options for moving forward? Is
there any chance of conflict resolution here, or can we only talk
of some form of conflict management?
Ziad AbuZayyad: I think Meron rightly described the real situation
on the ground, while Ron was right in saying that the option of the
two-state solution is gaining more support among the Israeli
public. The problem is there is no relationship between what is
happening on the ground and the shift in Israeli public opinion in
favor of the two-state option. The fact is that what is happening
on the ground is undermining the idea of the two-state solution. I
am happy that more Israelis are supporting the two-state solution,
but sometimes I feel that those Israelis who speak in favor of two
states are only injecting me with morphine to keep me quiet while
others are working day and night to accomplish their ideological
expansionist project.
Ron Pundak: It is unintentional. They are doing it, but un
intentionally.
Ziad AbuZayyad: Many Israelis don't know what is happening on the
ground. They don't know and they don't care. And maybe there are
Israelis who do not want to know what is being done in the occupied
territories by their own government. And those who care politically
and consciously are leading me to the provisional state where there
will be a state on paper, titles and positions, ministers, members
of parliament, general directors, but with no power on the ground,
when all the land is taken by the Israelis. Is there any chance of
changing this process and making the two-state solution more
realistic, more applicable?
Walid Salem: I see the main problem of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict in the last few years as this big gap between what is said
and what is practiced. On one hand, it is completely right that we
have this growing group of Israelis who believe in the two-state
solution, but when it comes to practice - the settlement expansion
in the territories, building the separation wall on Palestinian
land and grabbing Jerusalem, not allowing Palestinians to enter
Jerusalem anymore - this process is not going in a direction that
gains more public support. So we have a big gap between the
agreed-upon goals and the process. I see as the main obstacle this
so-called concept of security. The different conceptualizations of
what security means leads us to contradictions in what we say and
what we practice on the ground.
Ziad AbuZayyad: We have two points of view: one looking
realistically at the situation on the ground and saying that the
two-state solution is not possible; and the other, with good
intentions, trying to give us hope by saying that the two-state
solution is the only practical option and it is still possible. Is
there any chance to bridge the two and make the two-state solution
possible, and if so, do we need to wait a long time to return to
it, or can we go straight ahead?
Munther Dajani: We are not taking into account the new realities.
There is the appointment of Tony Blair [as Quartet envoy]; there
are people talking about the role of a third party, there is the
Quartet taking its responsibility and its role to solve the problem
on the basis of what Bush is saying, that he is ready to move on
the Palestinian-Israeli issues to create a two-state solution.
These are new facts on the ground that we have to take into
consideration.
Gershon Baskin: Can we talk about the two-state solution when Gaza
and the West Bank are two separate entities?
Munther Dajani: Why not? This is not a permanent state of affairs.
Whether it is at present two separate entities or one is not the
point. They have been two separate entities since 1948, when Gaza
was under Egypt and the West Bank under Jordan, until 1967, when
Israel conquered the land and reunified both entities between 1967
and 2007.
Gershon Baskin: Oslo talked about the territorial integrity of the
Palestinian territories.
Munther Dajani: Although Oslo talked about the integrity of land,
this was never implemented. If they wanted it to be integrated,
they could easily have linked Tarkumiya, near Hebron, with the Gaza
Strip. They would have dug a tunnel. The people who were proposing
that the West Bank and Gaza be linked have never done anything
about it. We are powerless because we don't have the control to
link it.
Gershon Baskin: Palestinians in the West Bank are telling me:
Forget about Gaza, deal with us; we in the West Bank are the
reality. Gaza is "Hamastan."
Munther Dajani: This does not reflect the views of the majority who
feel that Gaza and the West Bank are part of the national dream.
The West Bank and Gaza may be ruled as a federation. But we are
forgetting a very important element: Most of the solutions are
imposed on people. The decision is not in Tel Aviv, nor Gaza, nor
Cairo, nor Amman. The decision is made outside the region, and when
these solutions are imposed on us, I don't think we have the power
to change them. If the U.S. wants to solve the problem now, it can
impose on both of us a solution which everybody will accept, and
each one of us will think we are in a win-win situation. Here they
are taking into consideration not only the interests of the people
in the region but also their own national interests. It is not in
their best interest to have political and social instability in the
region. It may serve their interest in the short run, in changing
the facts on the ground, but in the long term, it starts to catch
up with them. We are sitting on a powder keg; the gap between the
poor and the rich is widening very, very quickly, and I think this
situation will blow up if not attended to.
Ziad AbuZayyad: There are two ideas, one put forth by Hamas and one
by some right-wing circles in Israel. Hamas suggested a hudna where
Israel withdraws from the West Bank and Gaza and allows the
Palestinians to have their own entity, but without signing a peace
agreement recognizing Israel. On the other hand, the Israeli right
wing suggested the long-term interim arrangement, retaining Israeli
control over most of the occupied territories, with little change
to the status quo. Do you think any of these will lead us to the
two-state solution, or to a one-state solution, or to something
else?
Meron Benvenisti: You have to take into account the overwhelming
power of the Israeli side. The whole issue of addressing it by
bringing outside forces to balance Israel's overwhelming power is a
pipedream. This is not South Africa. In South Africa they were not
allowed to play international cricket. Here even cricket will be
played, because it is very difficult for the outside world to fight
that Israeli accusation of anti-Semitism, invoking the Holocaust.
Third parties will have a very limited influence on the situation.
So let's assume that Israel will be in control. Therefore, as you
said, Ziad, beware, don't take the two-state solution as it is. Not
that there is an element of deceit, but an element of wishful
thinking on the part of those who analyze it that way.
To understand the meaning for the Israeli public of the two-state
solution and its growing acceptance, we should look at the wall and
at the settlement blocs and know that the maximum that the Israeli
public could accept is an area of less than 60%, 58% of the land
occupied in 1967. The viability of that state will be such that I
hope that the Palestinians will not take it. They would be
repeating their mistake in Oslo, of giving up the only asset they
have, i.e., legitimizing the Zionist entity. By declaring a
provisional state in that area, hoping it will develop, they will
seal the fate of the Palestinian national movement, turning it into
an interstate border dispute with Israel, instead of a national
liberation struggle. That is why the Israeli acceptance of the
two-state solution is the wrong analysis of the meaning of a
Palestinian state. This is a transformation in the notion of a
Palestinian state, which lost all its progressive and
forward-looking aspects and became the instrument of those Israelis
who are ready to give up parts of the West Bank that they have no
interest in. For the wall is not only the wall; it is a change in
the Zionist concept. We thought that we could get rid of the
Palestinians or assimilate them. We discovered in the second
intifada that this is impossible, so we are turning our backs on
them, and the wall is the answer to the question of a two-state
solution.
It is what remains that is important for the Palestinians to
ponder. The last thing that they ought to do is to accept the
Israeli notion of a two-state solution at present. That would mean
the second stage of Gaza, convergence, which means Bantustans -
basically one geopolitical entity west of the Jordan, with
different managements. One of them is the PA, which contributes to
that travesty of a Palestinian state by its mere existence and by
playing the game of nations. Nation-building is important, but
there is a price in maintaining the illusion that there are still
possibilities for separation. If there is separation, it is
separate but unequal. And that is the only way one should look at
this slogan, snatched by the right, of the would-be two-state
solution. I know Olmert very well. Don't think that he is
transforming himself. He and his boss, Sharon, have not changed
ever since 1981.
Ron Pundak: I will argue a different position. We should not allow
ourselves to deteriorate into managing the conflict, and should
strive continuously to solve the conflict, because managing the
conflict will lead to new conflict. We have here a conflict which
is more than 100 years old, two national movements fighting on the
same piece of territory, with each side believing that the entire
territory belongs to it. You can only solve it as it was solved
once in 1947 and not implemented, and as eventually it should be
solved: partition. The question is how to partition it in a way the
two sides can live with. When I speak of a two-state solution, I
would argue that the idea of a state with provisional borders or an
interim solution is a slogan of Sharon and not of Olmert. Sharon
spoke of a plan which eventually would have translated into the 58%
that Meron spoke of, but Olmert has spoken of 80-85% as a
unilateral approach.
There is only one way to preempt these interim issues, and what we
need is a very clear picture for both sides to know where we are
heading, a few solid and meaningful principles - not vague
principles like the Bush vision, but something about the end of
occupation, the 1967 border as a basis; 1:1 swaps of territories, a
solution for two capitals in Jerusalem, and refugees - but with
third-party involvement, such as a Security Council resolution
telling the two sides: The only solution the international
community will accept is based on these principles. Even if there
is an interim agreement or a hudna, it can only be within the
context of the final status principles; otherwise all these
measures are a part of the management of the conflict and not of
solving the problem.
On the Israeli side, as there is quiet on the security front,
public support for the legitimization of a viable Palestinian state
is growing. However, the Israelis are paranoiacs, and when
Ahmadinejad - who calls for the annihilation of Israel - is backed
by Hamas, he is interpreted within the Israeli public as speaking
on behalf of you. If, for example, Palestinian leaders spoke out
against him, then the Israeli public would pressure their leaders,
as they did in 1992-1993, to make the necessary concessions. I say:
Let's bring back the power to those who put pressure on the
decision makers by creating the environment for concessions. The
relevant politicians, such as Peres, Olmert, Livni, Ramon and
others, are ready for concessions; they are within the six points
of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh plan. But they fear that their constituency
will not allow it. It should be a joint process of what I call "the
70% silent majority" on both sides, which is ready today for the
known deal. Maybe the international community should show us the
way towards the solution.
Munther Dajani: This is exactly my premise, that we live in a
dynamic society and it is changing continuously, and what was
unacceptable yesterday is acceptable today and what is not
acceptable today will be very acceptable tomorrow. For there is a
new Zionism with new ideas and with new vision, and the young
Palestinian generation also has its own new ideas and vision. So to
build on the old relics of the past and to say we are not going to
be able to change anything is dangerous.
Hillel Schenker: Can you say a little about what the younger
Palestinian generation is thinking?
Munther Dajani: The younger generation envisions a democratic state
where religion plays an important role. They want to enjoy their
freedom and space. What we feel is happening in the universities is
that the notion that "father knows best" is not acceptable anymore;
you cannot dictate to young men and women today as we did 20 or 30
years ago. The new generation tends to reject the paternal
decision-making formula of the past and move forward. Twenty-four
hours before the Palestinian elections of 2006 there was a big
debate within Fateh, and the new guard challenged the old guard on
every single point that they had on their agenda.
Ziad AbuZayyad: To wrap up our discussion: Looking around we see
several regional problems. The feeling more and more is that the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is becoming part of the regional
problems, and some believe that the solution could not be bilateral
but could be part of a regional package deal. How much logic and
reality do you see in this argument? And is there any chance for an
international conference with an imposed solution to different
problems in the region, including the possibility of new
delineation of some states in the region?
Walid Salem: One note on conflict management, in order to come to
your question: This idea is very dangerous because it will depend
on the overwhelming power of Israel. It also gives time to those
within Hamas who believe in the overwhelming power of the Islamic
nation and who will use the hudna to build power to later liberate
the whole of Palestine. Others in Hamas believe that we need this
hudna to prepare Hamas to accept a two-state solution at a later
stage. We need to work with those who believe in conflict
management as a step towards the two-state solution, and bring them
together with Fateh people to cooperate towards conflict
resolution.
The Israeli-Palestinian problem became a more regional problem with
a lot of regional interventions. The solution is to be regional. We
might have one of two attempts: One is the Arab Quartet and the
international Quartet working with the Palestinians and the
Israelis. The second is the two Quartets trying to create tracks on
all the different fronts - Syria, Lebanon, also the Palestinians
with Israel.
Ziad AbuZayyad: I am speaking about an imposed solution.
Walid Salem: I do not see an imposed solution. No one can impose
any solution from the outside. How will Israel and the Palestinians
accept that? Unless you have the approval of the two sides, you
will not have a solution that will be implemented. There are many
lessons from Kosovo, how these imposed solutions did not take place
because of the rejection of the internal forces.
Gershon Baskin: Abd-al-Salam al-Majali put forward what seemed to
be a renewal of the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation idea, and
then last week King Abdullah said it's not on the agenda. Is it on
the agenda of resolving the West Bank question, at least?
Ron Pundak: I don't think that an imposed solution through an
international conference is at all practical today.
Ziad AbuZayyad: Even if there may be a war in the region?
Ron Pundak: The next war will not have a territorial dimension, but
a much more rocket and chemical warfare - a war which may dictate a
solution, but I don't think that it will result from an
international conference. I don't see the international forces as
being able: The Europeans are too split; the Americans will not go
against Israel. The most that I can see from the international
community is to come with principles regarding our bilateral
relations.
Meron Benvenisti: We have to take into account one important issue:
The Americans are going to leave Iraq in shambles, and we have to
think about the fallout of that terrible blunder, mistake, that
criminal act of Bush. I am worried about the repercussions of Iraq
on Jordan and then we will be back to square one: an Israeli
assurance like in 1970 to safeguard the integrity and the safety of
the Hashemite Kingdom. We will be the ones to resist any attempt to
export the Palestinian question to Jordan, which is the essence of
the Jordanian option. Now with what is going on in Iraq, I am
absolutely certain that Israel will do its utmost to keep Jordan in
its traditional role as a buffer state. Both options are bad, but
if we dump the Palestinians on Abdullah, we will be the ones
patrolling his kingdom, directly or indirectly, against what is
happening in Iraq. And we shouldn't look for anything that will
absolve us from our own responsibilities. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict will be confined to the boundaries of Palestine.
Munther Dajani: I do not think there is something called the
Jordanian option. Jordan has made it very clear that it has no
intention to seek any political confederation with the Palestinians
at the present time or in the near future. That is what the
Americans want; it is so much easier to bring in the Jordanians so
it becomes a Jordanian problem. They are always trying to solve
conflicts without taking into consideration the facts on the ground
or what the people want. They think Tony Blair is going to perform
miracles, but the problem he needs to address is that the
Palestinians want an end to the occupation, and to have their
independent state with Arab Jerusalem as its capital.
Ziad AbuZayyad: If the course of events stays as it is, where are
we heading from here?
Gershon Baskin: In our conflict, if we don't move forward, we are
moving backwards. If there is no forward movement, the situation
will deteriorate; we will face more violence; the chances of peace
will decrease. We will move back into Israeli unilateralism of the
disengagement or convergence - that will be the order of the day in
Israel. That is not acceptable today, but with increased
Palestinian violence against Israel it will become more acceptable,
and we may see the end of the two-state option, in which case I
foresee generations of inter-communal fighting.
Hillel Schenker: The situation generates a tremendous sense of
difficulty and concern, and at the same time I do think there are
possibilities. Tony Blair is a high-profile Quartet envoy. He
wouldn't have accepted the new position if he didn't intend to
seriously make use of it. Given the sense of catastrophe in Iraq
there exists a potential for significant movement within the
international community to salvage something, to try to stabilize
the situation in the Middle East. The question is: Will there be
Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and Israeli and Palestinian
civil society, that will be ready to take advantage of the possible
opportunities? Otherwise we will descend towards another round of
mutual, internecine violence and possibly another round of
war.
Ron Pundak: I think there are currently two options. One is that
more of the same will lead to deterioration, there will be walls
within walls, and in my mind this is the beginning of the end of
Israel and of the Palestinian dream. Whether it's one state or two
states or three states, it will lead to a "separtheid" situation -
Israel continuously fighting everyone and maintaining an apartheid
system - as well as the end of peaceful relations with Egypt and
Jordan. This terrible situation will spill over to Jordan and the
entire Middle East. It's not one state, not a continuation of the
occupation, but tragedy.
A different, but just as realistic, scenario is a process in which
the three sides - Israelis, Palestinians and the international
community - realize that the only way is to create a final status
vision based on two states, within agreed-upon principles as a
joint agreement or an international decision through the Security
Council, leading us towards a process to enable Israel's withdrawal
from the West Bank and most of the settlements - towards
Ayalon-Nusseibeh, Geneva Initiative, Taba, Clinton, or any
agreement accepted by the majority of the two sides. We will have
to go through steps which are also connected to the internal
Palestinian dialogue; Hamas and Fateh will have to dialogue again.
I believe that Hamas eventually can come into an agreement of
accepting a fait accompli without accepting Israel necessarily. But
accepting it as a fait accompli is only possible if they feel that
the majority of Palestinians support it.
Meron Benvenisti: Gaza is going to develop into a city-state with
fair chances of development. The West Bankers are going to follow
the path and strategy of the 1948 Arabs. It will take time, but the
process of demanding collective rights that we see among the
Palestinian Israelis will eventually catch and the Palestinians
will make the transformation from short-term self-determination
into a struggle for more human rights, which will translate into a
coalition with Israeli liberals to ameliorate the conditions on the
ground, without wasting time on theoretical solutions, wasting time
on a Palestinian state.
If there is an optimistic approach, it is to think in terms of
gradual and incremental steps with the idea that no matter what,
the two sides will have to share the land, which cannot mean
surgical partition. Surgical partition will not be implemented, and
the cost of it is greater than a solution based on some reciprocal
and shared sovereignty. That is why I think that some Palestinians
in the West Bank will begin to take the position of the Israeli
Arabs, who understood their situation. And therefore I am now more
optimistic than those who believe that the goal is partition,
turning their back on Palestinians. I don't want to have a Jewish
state; I want to have a state of its people.
Walid Salem: If this situation continues, Israel will enter 1.5
kilometers into Gaza and create a security zone and stay there till
someone comes from the international community and crush Hamas. In
the West Bank, there will be some agreement between Israel and war
lords in some regions, and counter-war lords against these war
lords who will also have agreements with Israel. We will be
witnessing more settlement expansion, and therefore a lot of
special processes that accompany these settlement expansions. I see
Jerusalem becoming more and more like Jaffa, where the Palestinian
population will become perhaps not fewer, but more discriminated
against, with no rights.
Munther Dajani: For each scenario to take place, we have to see
steps in the right direction. If there was a Jordanian option, then
Jordan would be issuing passports for all Palestinians. For Israel,
for Meron's scenario to take place, Israel has to invest in the
West Bank and ease the conditions and spend millions of dollars on
development. Each one of these scenarios has a price, and the price
is clear for the Israelis, for the Palestinians and for the
Americans. The price for a comprehensive solution in the area is
for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to stop
saying that it doesn't have a partner, to accept the Arab Peace
Initiative, to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands, and to have
peace and normal relations with the entire Arab world.
Ziad AbuZayyad: What I understand from all you is that if things
continue in the direction we are going, we are going to hell - to
more violence, to an apartheid regime - but maybe at the end of the
day, after 15-20 years of suffering, we are going to one state, a
state of its citizens. Therefore, to avoid decades of violence and
suffering, we all agree that something should be done in order to
prevent this process on both sides, opt for the two-state solution,
and leave for the future generations to decide the shape of their
own lives and fates. With this in mind, I thank you all very
much.
<