A public opinion poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between September 7-9, 2005, in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The focus was on the Palestinian
perception of the meaning of the Israeli disengagement from the
Gaza Strip in the context of the implementation of the Israeli
disengagement plan, and public expectations of the day after, with
a focus on the future of the peace process. The poll also dealt
with voting intentions and considerations in the upcoming
Palestinian elections, as well as domestic Palestinian conditions.
The total size of the sample was 1368 adults interviewed face to
face in the West Bank (892) and the Gaza Strip (476) in 120
randomly selected locations. The margin of error is 3
percent.
Three main findings emerged:
1. The Palestinian public views the Israeli disengagement from the
Gaza Strip as a victory for armed resistance to occupation; it
gives Hamas most of the credit for this achievement.
2. In the meanwhile, with the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza
Strip underway, public top priorities are shifting: focus is now
placed on matters of reconstruction and state-building, such as
economic conditions, corruption, and law and order.
3. The change in priorities is weakening interest in armed
resistance and increases demands for its cessation. Moreover, the
change in the hierarchy of priorities is weakening the electoral
appeal of Hamas and strengthening that of Fateh in anticipation of
the upcoming parliamentary elections.
It is evident that the unilateral nature of the Israeli
disengagement from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting
dynamics: on the one hand, a greater appreciation of the role of
violence, and thereby the need to keep the armed pressure on Israel
and to protect the arms of the resisting groups; on the other hand,
a greater optimism about the future and the critical and urgent
need to begin the process of reconstruction and state-building, and
thereby the need to maintain the existing ceasefire and the
consolidation of Fateh's position.
Prevailing Conditions on the Eve of the Israeli Disengagement
from the Gaza Strip
Findings show significant increase in the percentage of those who
see the Israeli disengagement as a victory for armed resistance
from 72 percent in our last survey in June [2005] to 84 percent in
this present survey. The largest percentage (40 percent) gives
Hamas most of the credit for this achievement, while only 21
percent give the credit to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and 11
percent to Fateh. Belief that Hamas deserves most of the credit
increases among women (44 percent) compared to men (36 percent),
among holders of the preparatory certificate (47 percent) compared
to holders of a university degree (32 percent), among housewives
(45 percent) compared to employees and farmers (29 percent each),
among those would definitely refuse to buy a lottery ticket (45
percent) compared to those who would definitely agree to buy one
(32 percent), among those working in the private sector (40
percent) compared to those working in the public sector (29
percent), among the married (42 percent) compared to the unmarried
(33 percent, and among Hamas supporters (69 percent) compared to
supporters of Fateh (24 percent).
Despite the high public appreciation for armed resistance and for
Hamas, findings show a majority opposition to continued armed
attacks. Sixty-two percent oppose (and 35 percent support) the
continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a full
Israeli disengagement from that area. Opposition to armed attacks
from the Gaza Strip after the Israeli disengagement is greater in
Gaza than in the West Bank (65 percent and 60 percent
respectively). Findings also show that that a majority of 77
percent support the continuation of the current ceasefire while
only 22 percent oppose its continuation. This attitude is reflected
in the opposition of 56 percent (and support of 37 percent) to the
suicide attack that took place in August 2005 in Beersheba.
Opposition to armed attacks is also reflected in the majority
support (60 percent) for the collection of weapons from armed
factions in the Gaza Strip; 37 percent oppose such a step.
Percentage of support for the Gaza collection of arms is equal in
the Gaza Strip to that of the West Bank but it increases among
those definitely wishing to buy lottery tickets (73 percent)
compared to those definitely opposed to buying lottery tickets (46
percent), and among Fateh's supporters (74 percent) compared to
Hamas' supporters (43 percent).
The high positive evaluation of the role of violence, while
simultaneously opposing its continuation, reflects a shift in
public priorities towards a focus on reconstruction, where poverty
and unemployment come at the top of the public list of priorities
(40 percent) followed by the occupation and corruption (25 percent
each) and internal anarchy (8 percent). In June 2005, these
percentages stood at 34 percent for poverty and unemployment, 33
percent for the occupation, 24 percent for corruption, and 8
percent for internal anarchy.
Similarly, findings show strong support (73 percent) for the
establishment of a Palestinian state (with the 1967 lines as its
borders) that would start in the Gaza Strip and gradually extend to
the West Bank. The idea of a Gaza-first state received identical
support in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip. But it found greater
support among those intending to vote for Fateh in the upcoming
parliamentary elections (82 percent) compared to those intending to
vote for Hamas (67 percent). It is important to point out that the
question clearly identifies the borders of the state as those of
the 1967 and, therefore, some or all respondents might have assumed
that no further negotiations would be required to determine the
final borders of the state. In other words, one should not assume
that support for this Gaza-first state is automatically equivalent
to support for the state with provisional borders referred to in
the Road Map.
The Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip has created an
optimistic atmosphere, particularly in the Gaza Strip. For example,
findings show optimistic expectations regarding future improvement
in the economic conditions among 64 percent of the public, progress
in the peace process among 57 percent, links between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip between 57 percent, the view that the Israeli
disengagement from the Gaza Strip is the beginning of the end of
the Israeli occupation among 56 percent, and the view that further
disengagements will take place in the West Bank in the future among
60 percent. But pessimism remains high, particularly in the West
Bank, regarding the possibility of continued Israeli control over
the Rafah crossing and thereby the transformation of the Gaza Strip
into a big prison (among 57 percent) and the expectation that the
Israeli disengagement will be followed by internal infighting
(among 60 percent). It is worth noting that the poll was conducted
during the period in which Musa Arafat, security advisor to the PA
president, was assassinated in the Gaza Strip.
The Future of the Peace Process after Disengagement
Findings show strong support (69 percent) for comprehensive
final-status negotiations with the aim of reaching a
permanent-status agreement rather than an interim or gradual
solution which receives the support of only 25 percent. They also
show that support for the Road Map remains unchanged at 57 percent
and opposition at 40 percent. But support for final and
comprehensive negotiations does not mean optimism about their
outcome with the current Israeli government of Ariel Sharon.
Indeed, 68 percent believe an agreement with Sharon is not possible
while only 30 percent believe that such an agreement is possible.
Nonetheless, if a compromise agreement is reached with the current
Israeli leadership, 53 percent of the Palestinians believe that
Sharon is strong enough to be able to convince the Israelis to
accept it. Moreover, 50 percent of the Palestinians believe the
Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, is strong enough to convince
the Palestinians to accept it.
A compromise agreement acceptable to 63 percent of the Palestinians
is one based on a mutual recognition of identity whereby a
Palestinian state is established next to the State of Israel and
all final-status issues are resolved. Israel in this case, would be
recognized as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the
state of the Palestinian people. Opposition to this compromise
reaches 35 percent. (In December 2004, identical results regarding
this compromise were obtained.) If a two-state solution is reached,
75 percent of the Palestinians would support reconciliation between
the two peoples. Support for facets of reconciliation varies with
87 percent supporting open borders for labor and goods between the
two states, 70 percent supporting joint economic ventures and
institutions, 38 percent supporting enacting laws prohibiting
incitement, 36 percent supporting joint political institutions
aiming at creating a confederation between the two states, and 10
percent supporting textbooks that would recognize the State of
Israel and would not call for the return of all Palestine to the
Palestinians.
Voting Intentions and Considerations in the Upcoming Legislative
Elections
Findings show that 74 percent of the Palestinians will participate
in the upcoming parliamentary elections in January 2006. Voting
intentions among the likely participants indicate an increase of
Fateh's support from 44 percent in June 2005 to 47 percent in this
poll, and a drop in Hamas' support from 33 percent to 30 percent
during the same period. Eleven percent will vote for other factions
and groups and 11 percent remain undecided. From among eight vital
considerations in voting for election lists, # 1 is the ability to
fight corruption receiving 24 percent, # 2 the name or affiliation
of the list with 19 percent, # 3 the ability to improve economic
conditions with 15 percent, # 4 the ability to reach a peace
agreement with Israel with 14 percent, # 5 the ability to maintain
national unity with 10 percent, # 6 the ability to enforce law and
order with 8 percent, # 7 the ability to protect refugee rights in
negotiations with 6 percent, and finally # 8 the ability to insure
the continuation of the intifada with 4 percent.
Hamas is the most able to fight corruption (receiving 46 percent
vs. 37 percent for Fateh) and to insure the continuation of the
intifada (receiving 62 percent vs. 24 percent for Fateh). Fateh is
perceived as the most able to improve the economy (receiving 46
percent vs. 31 percent for Hamas), to push the peace process
forward (receiving 64 percent for Fateh vs. 21 percent for Hamas),
to protect national unity (receiving 46 percent vs. 37 percent for
Hamas), to enforce law and order (receiving 54 percent vs. 31
percent for Hamas), and to protect refugee rights (receiving 44
percent for Fateh and 37 percent for Hamas).
In a closed question, in a contest for the position of PA president
between Mahmoud Abbas (Fateh), Mahmoud Zahhar (Hamas), and Mustafa
Barghouti (others), Abbas comes first with 44 percent, followed by
Zahhar with 21 percent, and Barghouti with 19 percent. In a closed
question, in a contest over the position of vice president, Marwan
Barghouti receives the greatest level of support with 24 percent,
followed by Mahmoud Zahhar with 14 percent, Ismail Haniyyah with 13
percent, Mohammad Dahlan and Mustafa Barghouti with 9 percent each,
Farouq Qaddoumi with 8 percent and, finally, Ahmad Qurai and Saeb
Ereikat with 6 percent each. In a closed question, in a contest
over the position of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first
with 30 percent, followed by Zahhar with 22 percent, Mustafa
Barghouti with 17 percent, and Qurai and Dahlan with 8 percent
each. Public satisfaction with the performance of PA president
Mahmoud Abbas increased from 60 percent in June 2005 to 64 percent
in this poll.
Domestic Conditions and Political Sympathies
Findings show that an overwhelming majority (87 percent) believe
that corruption exists in PA institutions. A majority among those
(61percent) believe that this corruption will increase or remain
the same in the future. Only 33 percent believe that corruption
will decrease in the future. The percentage of those who believe
corruption does not exist in the PA does not exceed 9
percent.
Findings also show that about two-thirds (64 percent) believe that
these days they and their families lack security and safety, while
only 36 percent say they now have security and safety. A clear
difference exists between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with
more Gazans feeling safe and secure than West Bankers (55 percent
to 25 percent respectively).
As for the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas, 32 percent
(compared to 37 percent in June 2005) give it a positive
evaluation.
Popularity of Fateh today stands at 39 percent compared to 41
percent in June 2005. Fateh's popularity in the West Bank is almost
identical to its popularity in the Gaza Strip (38 percent and 40
percent respectively). Hamas' popularity dropped from 30 percent to
27 percent during the same period. Hamas' popularity is higher in
the Gaza Strip (32 percent) compared to 25 percent in the West
Bank.