The voting for Hamas in the latest Palestinian legislative
elections (January 2006), does not necessarily constitute an
endorsement either of its agenda, or its modus operandi and
military option. It was rather the expression of a number of
elements which together led to an increase in the electoral votes
that went to the movement. In spite of the exaggerated estimate of
Hamas's victory, the real gauge of the direction of Palestinian
public opinion is the results of the proportional elections for
party lists, which were held on a national rather than a
constituency basis, where Hamas got 44 percent of the total
electoral votes. The fact that Hamas won an absolute majority in
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was due to the mixed
(parallel) electoral system adopted by the Palestinian Authority
(PA). According to this system, one half of the seats is elected
nationwide as one constituency where voters vote for a list. The
other half is elected on a personal basis in sixteen constituencies
where voters elect the individual candidate of their choice. It was
in this part of the elections that Hamas forged ahead because it
succeeded in choosing the right candidates, whereas Fateh failed to
do so. In any event, several factors have shaped the results of the
Palestinian elections; most prominent among them were the
following:
* The association of the PA with corruption, the connection between
Fateh and the PA and, as a consequence, the linkage between Fateh
and corruption. The latter is an issue that elicits much public
concern, especially in a society grappling with poverty and
deprivation, and yearning ever increasingly for social justice and
fairness. It was not surprising then that the slogan "Change and
Reform" which Hamas used in its campaign should resonate with the
voters.
* The failure of the Oslo peace process led by Fateh to deliver on
promises made to the Palestinian people: an end to the occupation
and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Not only
were their expectations thwarted, but the opposite occurred.
Throughout the past 15 years of fruitless negotiations, Israel has
maintained its colonization policy of building or expanding Jewish
colonies (settlements) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in
addition to the recent construction of the "separation wall," which
led to the gobbling up of still more Palestinian land. As such, the
Fateh-led PA was blamed for bringing about the settlements and the
separation wall through its mismanagement of the negotiations and
its one-sided concessions to Israel.
* The closure and siege on Palestinian cities, villages and refugee
camps which damaged the Palestinian economy, and the building of
the separation wall which caused a sharp rise in unemployment and
an increase in poverty. Again the onus of responsibility was placed
on the Fateh-led PA.
* The general security conditions which impacted negatively on the
Palestinian internal security and led to the spread of chaos,
crime, and the absence of the rule of law. For this, too, Fateh was
blamed.
* The failure of the Fateh leadership to run fair and clean
primaries for choosing its candidates for the elections in the
proportional list and the constituencies. This failure drove some
Fateh members to run as independents, harming thus the movement's
image and that of its designated candidates, and leading to the
dispersal of the votes among the many contenders from the same
movement. Hamas, on the other hand, was more solid and
united.
* Some other factors also played a role, such as the appeal by
Hamas to the religious sentiments of the voters, and its use of
mosques as venues for interaction with the people in order to win
their trust. Also, the distribution by Hamas of services and
material aid to poor and needy families helped in tipping the
balance.
* Finally, the uproar raised by Israel against the participation of
Hamas in the elections led, in the end, to an increase in the
popularity of Hamas and a greater sympathy for it.
It is worth noting that the Palestinian voters see in the
occupation the principal cause for all their ordeals and hardships.
Thus it is rare to find anyone who would blame Hamas's suicide
attacks inside Israel, for instance, as the actions which prompted
the building of the separation wall, or the closure and the siege -
to the contrary, the people sympathize with those who resist the
occupation and become its targets or victims.
Implications of a Hamas Victory
The question that poses itself in this context is whether the
results of the elections had been carefully calculated by Hamas, or
whether they turned out to be a surprise even to Hamas itself. And
was Hamas, as a consequence, taken unawares, not yet prepared to
assume the reins of government, with all that this implies?
The fact that Hamas decided to participate in the legislative
elections points to its determination to play a political role in
the Palestinian-Israeli arena. Whoever takes part in elections is,
naturally, seeking to enter parliament and to participate in public
life - whether in the government or the opposition.
It is a known fact that it is easier for radical parties or
movements to be in the opposition than to bear the responsibility
of governing and confronting regional and international obligations
and restrictions. It would be naïve to assume that the Hamas
leadership did not consider this reality. Despite that, the
movement participated in the elections, won with a large majority,
and accepted that one of its leaders be charged with forming the
future government. Sooner or later, though, Hamas will be called
upon to take many crucial decisions which it would not have had to
make had it remained in the opposition or outside the political
arena.
Hamas and Future Challenges
Some Hamas leaders, both from the inside and the exile, have begun
to adopt a statesmanlike rhetoric, sending positive and reassuring
signals regarding the future intentions of the movement; others are
still repeating the same old slogans - but neither group has made
any essential changes in the movement's platform or covenant. All
that Hamas is talking about at this stage is the proposal of a
long-term hudna (ceasefire) with Israel.
Hamas tried hard to convince Fateh and other PLO factions to join
its government. This did not work out simply because Hamas was not
ready to accept a clear-cut recognition that the PLO is the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to commit
itself to all the agreements signed by the PLO.
Since efforts to form a national unity government with the
participation of Fateh and other PLO factions have failed, Hamas
has formed a government mainly with its own members and
"independents" affiliated with it. This is the first time in the
Arab world that an Islamic movement comes to power through
democratic processes, and one can hazard the opinion that Hamas
will try every possible means to stay in power. This will also
entail a gradual fundamental change in its platform, but in its own
way.
A Hamas Government
To stay in power means that Hamas will have to change its position
for one that espouses the same notions and language of the
international community and which Fateh has embraced since the 19th
PLO National Council that was held in Algiers in November 1988, and
the historic decisions taken then to recognize UN resolutions 242
and 338 and to accept the principle of a two-state solution. If
this occurs, the result will be a new Hamas which will be much more
akin to Fateh but calls itself "Hamas." And perhaps it will attract
all Fateh cadres who have become disenchanted with their leadership
widely associated with unsuccessful negotiation methods and saddled
with corruption and power abuse.
If and when Hamas alters its position, it will assuredly have the
opportunity to effect the changes in return for parallel ones in
the Israeli position and politics - which the Palestinian voters
will perceive as achievements by Hamas. Hamas will be seen to offer
one concession after another, with each being reciprocated on the
Israeli side, in contrast to Fateh that repeatedly gave
concessions, but failed to get from Israel anything mentionable in
return. If Hamas does intend to introduce crucial changes in its
platform, it will have to do so within a timeframe that in keeping
with the precipitation of events in the area. It will also have to
obtain a reciprocal change in the relations with the international
community, and to extract from Israel whatever it is owed in return
for this change.
However, if this proves to be an over-optimistic scenario, and
Hamas does not change its platform and does not abide by all the
commitments of the PLO and the international community; or if its
timeline for concessions fails to keep pace with the volatility of
the situation in the area, it will find itself overtaken by events
and facing severe problems.
Hamas must realize that the world refuses to deal with a policy of
prevarication and temporization. It should declare unequivocally
whether it chooses the path of conciliation, with all the
conditions that this entails, or the path of resistance; and that,
while it offers Israel a long-term hudna, it does so in isolation
from any other political reference based on Oslo or any agreement
related to it.
In all cases, Israel is going to be the winner, whether Hamas is
tamed and goes down the road that Fateh took before it, or whether
it holds on to its covenant and platform of violent resistance.
Because in this case, Israel will take advantage of a Hamas-headed
government in order to proceed with unilateral steps to consolidate
borders and to create a new reality in the West Bank and
Jerusalem.
Israeli leaders claim that the coming of Hamas to power with a
sweeping majority in the PLC and the government would paralyze all
efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict. They see
in the platform of Hamas a justification for Israel to continue the
amplification of its military operations and its pressure on the
PA, and to simultaneously carry on with its building of the
separation wall and the implementation of its unilateral plan in
the West Bank, with the excuse that there is no Palestinian
partner.
Hamas has maneuvered itself into a situation where it is going to
face the real test of having to decide between being a pragmatic
movement capable of adaptation in order to survive, or a blinkered
movement that does not deviate from its goal, irrespective of
regional and international requirements and realities. Changing its
platform will trigger an internal rift within Hamas between those
who are sending out reasonable and pragmatic signals and those who
are sticking to the traditionally known position of the movement.
Should the hard-line, rejectionist current win, then the future is
going to be very bleak indeed. Although the failure of Hamas in the
political arena will be inevitable in this case, it is difficult to
foretell what is going to be its fate as a resistance movement that
has chosen the path of violent struggle to achieve its
program.
Pressuring Hamas
Financial pressure and withholding aid from the Hamas government
will cause a humanitarian catastrophe for the Palestinian people -
something that must not be allowed to happen. Donor countries
should continue their support for the PA, and Israel has no right
to withhold cash payments of the tax revenues which it collects on
behalf of the PA in accordance with the Paris Accords, and which
amount to U.S. $50-60 million per month. This money belongs to the
Palestinian people.
The call for piling pressure on Hamas to force it to respond to the
conditions set by the U.S. and Europe - namely, the renunciation of
violence and terrorism, the recognition of the right of Israel to
exist, and the recognition of all the agreements signed between the
PLO and Israel - is viewed as an imbalanced position. Palestinians
wish to see what conditions are placed also on Israel for it to
prove its readiness and willingness for a peaceful settlement to
the conflict.
Pressuring Hamas should not be a means to punish the Palestinian
people and to deprive them of sorely needed international financial
aid that assures them the minimum level of living requirements, as
is the case today. The halting of aid to the Palestinian government
under the pretence that it is now headed by Hamas is categorically
rejected. In the eventuality this materializes, it becomes
imperative to find alternative mechanisms and means to support the
Palestinian people and to secure for them continuity in the
provision of vital services, like health, education, water,
electricity, municipal services and others.
Hamas and the PA President
Mahmoud Abbas has acceded to the Palestinian presidency through
fair and transparent elections held in January 2005, in which he
got more than 63 percent of the votes. Consequently, he enjoys
electoral legitimacy and greater popular support than does Hamas
with the 44 percent of the electoral votes it got in the
proportional elections in January 2006. Since the Palestinian
political system is half-way between a presidential and a
parliamentary system, the president wields strong political and
executive powers. The question is what kind of relationship will
exist between President Abbas, who is affiliated with Fateh, and a
Hamas prime minister and government. And if there is going to be a
power struggle or a vertical rift in the Authority driving it to
adopt two contradictory programs, which of the two sides will be
able to impose its will on the other?
During his first year in office, President Abbas has proven that he
can be a statesman who rises above narrow party politics, and that
he is the president of all the Palestinian people and not just
Fateh supporters. He has insisted on holding the legislative
elections on schedule, in spite of the warnings that his party was
going to lose. He has succeeded in ensuring the necessary security
climate for the holding and the success of these elections and,
subsequently, in announcing the results. He was also able to
endorse the results while avoiding violence or confrontations among
the various factions, and also to secure the compliance of the
population with the results.
Nonetheless, President Abbas is perceived as one who does not
generally rush into decisions. If he wishes to carry out his role
of president of the PLO and the PA, and at the same time to attempt
to conciliate between this and his Fateh affiliation - which has
its dictates too - and to see that Fateh does not disappear from
the political map, he is going to find himself in the face of a
difficult task. He will have to change his style of governing and
to become more resolute and swifter in taking decisions, especially
when he is confronted by a situation where decisions have to be
made vis-à-vis a government that belongs to a party other than
his own and with a different agenda.
Abbas, Hamas, and the PLO
Hamas has tried in the past to place certain conditions for its
participation in frameworks and institutions of the PLO. It failed
on the ground that it exaggerated the estimation of its size,
demanding a bigger share of representation based on that. But Hamas
today is more self-confident after the majority proportion it got
in the PLC. Perhaps this explains its refusal to include in its
platform the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of
the Palestinian people; it wants to wait till it takes over the
PLO. The fact that President Abbas, on receiving the names of the
new cabinet from the Hamas-nominated Prime Minister, Ismail
Haniyyeh, announced that he would be the one to present the names
to the PLO Executive Committee for endorsement, signals the
beginning of friction or arm-twisting between Hamas and the PLO. It
is more likely, though, that Abbas will try to delay any
confrontation between the two, at least for the time being.
It is expected that President Abbas in his capacity as a Fateh
member will work on two tracks. The first is to reactivate the PLO
institutions and to give them an effective role in the negotiation
and decision-making process in whatever relates to them, so that
the pioneering role of the organization is preserved. Secondly, he
has to avoid a Hamas hegemony in the PLO by having Hamas
participate in the organization, but without becoming a key element
there.
Abbas and Fatah
As for Fateh, the challenges that the president faces as a member
of the movement far outweigh the ones he faces in rebuilding the
PLO. Fateh has not renovated its institutions or leadership since
the holding of its 5th conference in 1989. According to the by-laws
of the movement, a leadership framework exists which is the Central
Committee. Since 1989, a number of its members have either been
killed or have died, while others have fallen ill or grown old.
Nonetheless, the remaining members claim that they enjoy the
legitimacy of the elections and insist on carrying out their
leadership role in the movement.
If President Abbas wants to retrieve for Fateh its prominence, to
stop its fragmentation, and to resolve the deep fissures that have
started to appear within the movement, especially in the wake of
the controversial primaries of the legislative elections, he has to
initiate practical steps to reunite the movement and solidify its
cohesion. This means taking charge of reorganizing the movement
from the bottom up, starting with a clear definition of membership
and achieving internal conciliation through regional conferences
and ending in the 6th general conference of the movement. The
latter will have for task the election of the Revolutionary Council
and the Central Committee.
The presence of Hamas in the government, whether as a pragmatic
movement eager to stay in power, or as a hard-line movement that
will be compelled to abandon it or step down, calls for a strong
cohesive Fateh, with the capacity to act and to exercise its
influence.
A Final Word
The attempt to blackmail the Palestinian people and to humiliate
them by imposing disgraceful conditions on them will only lead to
an increase in the popularity of Hamas and the rallying of the
population around it.
The results of the recent Israeli elections (March 2006) clearly
show a decline in support for the extreme right and the settlers
movement. At least some eighty Knesset members will be ready to
join a government which will tilt, more or less, in the direction
of peacemaking. This opportunity should not be missed. And the
policy of unilateralism should be put aside for the sake of a
bilateral peace agreement.
Today, more than ever, the need exists for an international
initiative that will rely in its first part on a quick and
equitable implementation of the first stage of the Roadmap. Its
second part should focus on a practical plan to achieve a just and
lasting peace that will encompass the Arab peace initiative, which
was declared in Beirut in 2002, and to pick up from the point at
which the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had reached in 2000,
under the auspices of then-U.S. President Clinton. These have
espoused the principle of complete withdrawal from the territories
occupied in 1967, including Arab East Jerusalem, taking into
account the possibility of land swap on the principle of same area
and same value, and a solution to the Palestinian question in all
its aspects, including the refugee problem.
A mechanism and timetable for the implementation of this plan is a
must. An initiative of this kind will provide the opportunity for
an international involvement in order to impose a solution for the
sake of both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.