Many events have taken place since the outbreak of the Aqsa
Intifada in September 2000, but few insightful lessons have been
drawn from them. No serious attempts have been made by Israel's
political leadership to answer the question of why the second
Intifada erupted, and why has it continued despite the terrible
price Palestinians have been made to pay under Israeli military
occupation. Indeed no lessons were drawn from the first Intifada
(1987-1991) over the reasons that led a defenseless population to
initiate an uprising and live under the harshest of conditions,
while facing the strongest army in the region and one of the most
powerful in the world.
The underlying reasons for both Intifadas, despite differences in
political circumstances and tactics, are, nonetheless, very much
the same. These are the burning desire to end the military
occupation, to stop the encroachment of colonial settlements, with
the aim of gaining independence and embodying it in a viable
sovereign state - without jeopardizing a just solution to the
refugee problem. In this, the Palestinians are not demanding any
more than other peoples have achieved and enjoy, and nothing that
has not been legitimated, time and time again, by UN and Security
Council resolutions.
The Second Intifada
The second Intifada erupted as Palestinians gained awareness, seven
years after signing the Oslo Accords, that Israel's governing
bodies were not interested in reaching a peaceful settlement to the
conflict based on a balance of justice, but on an imbalance of
military power. The "generous offer" that was proposed by then
Prime Minister Ehud Barak and echoed by most of the Israeli mass
media was left, unfortunately, without a Palestinian rebuttal,
while the understanding reached at Taba between the Palestinian and
Israeli negotiators was lost in the leadership contest between
Barak and Ariel Sharon, then buried following the latter's victory
under the catchphrase of security for Israelis, rather than peace
and justice for all. We have seen that Prime Minister Sharon's
tactics have brought more insecurity for the Israelis and more
repression and suffering for the Palestinians.
In the aftermath of the failure, or expected failure, of political
negotiations, and the intensification of armed confrontation
between Israelis and Palestinians demanding an end to the
occupation and settlement building, an Israeli strategy for
unilateral separation emerged, supported by a significant
percentage of the population. Some Israelis supported the idea
because they believed it would put an end to the evils of the
occupation, and remove the "demographic threat" which they see as
leading either to a bi-national state or to the implementation of
an apartheid system. It is true that the call for unilateral
separation signalled the bankruptcy of the view that Israel can
continue occupying the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip, and
expect Palestinian acquiescence. But it indicates a refusal to
accept a negotiated settlement with the PLO based on UN
resolutions, or to acknowledge the historic injustice that Israel
has inflicted on the Palestinian people.
De Facto Annexation
According to Ephraim Sneh1, the separation plan meant the de facto
annexation of 30 percent of the West Bank, half in the Jordan
Valley, and half in the settlement blocs. He acknowledges that once
Israel puts an effective fence on the eastern side of the
settlement blocs, it means de facto annexation. The separation plan
would leave 70,000-100,000 Palestinians from the West Bank on the
Israeli side of the fence, to whom Israel would not want to grant
citizenship. Sneh opposes the plan because of the likely reaction
of the international community, and because armed operations
against Israelis would gain legitimacy not only among Palestinians
but also internationally. In addition, Israeli settlements inside
the fence would become easy targets.
As for Jerusalem, the Sharon government approved a plan to tighten
security and checkpoints along a "seam" between the West Bank and
the city, severing it from surrounding Palestinian villages (and
the remainder of the West Bank) and all the socio-economic,
cultural and religious links between the two.
Nevertheless many Israelis saw advantages in unilateral separation
following the collapse of negotiations with the PLO and the rise of
suicide bombings inside Israel. They believe that such a strategy
would improve Israel's negotiating position and its defenses. They
also think that it would hide the ugly face of the occupation, and
reduce the daily humiliation of Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. This is in addition to removing the "danger" of a
demographic slide toward a bi-national state or an apartheid
system.
However the separation strategy could only take the form of a
"border fence" drawn at will by Israel, eating up more Palestinian
land, including the major settlement blocs, and leaving East
Jerusalem completely under Israeli control. Those who support this
strategy would not jeopardize future negotiations on refugees and
other strategic issues in the final status negotiations. But
Palestinian negotiators know only too well where Israel stands on
such issues, and they know that building a separating wall or
fence, already operative round the Gaza Strip, can only harden the
position of Israeli negotiators. Separation gives no guarantee of
security to the Palestinian entity, whatever name it is given or
assumes, as Israeli tanks will still be able to enter it within
hours, with or without pretext. This is not comparable to Israel's
withdrawal from south Lebanon where a sovereign state is in
existence and there are no problems of refugees or strategic issues
to be settled between Israel and the Lebanese. But even in Lebanon,
as at least Israelis would acknowledge, the unilateral withdrawal
there has not ended the conflict. It cannot lead to an agreement,
as it did not result from one. The situation there could still
erupt into a major military conflict at any moment.
An Anti-Apartheid Measure
There are Israelis who present the wall as a means of preventing
the emergence of an apartheid system. They argue that apartheid
exists only when a minority rules over a majority and that physical
segregation is not a sufficient condition for apartheid. They argue
that since Palestinians will soon become a majority in Mandate
Palestine (perhaps as early as 2010), Israelis favor separation to
safeguard against the gathering danger of political apartheid.
According to this view, political and physical separation is the
only way to avoid Jewish minority rule over an Arab majority in the
near future, and for the State of Israel to remain both Jewish and
democratic (ethnocratic some say). But there is no reason that
apartheid should exist only when a minority rules over a majority.
What is significant is a system of segregation (geographic,
political and cultural) that is imposed by a powerful group against
the will of a less powerful one. This is exactly what is happening
in the Israeli-Palestinian situation.
Since separation will be unilateral and imposed by force, it cannot
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is why it is seen by
Palestinians as another Israeli attempt to force on them an
unacceptable and unjust situation. Thus, sooner or later,
resistance will appear which is likely to unleash further measures
of suppression that can only feed into the creation of a system of
apartheid as new Palestinian areas come to be cordoned off into
"reserves" to facilitate military control and collective
punishment. Indeed the apartheid system, as exemplified by
Bantustans, is embodied in the classification of Palestinian areas
into A, B, and C; in the by-pass roads linking settlements to
Israel; in the demolition of hundreds of Palestinian houses when no
Jewish house has been demolished, and the attempts to legislate for
the construction of Jewish-only communities.
A Negative Future
Thus Palestinians can only see a negative future under unilateral
separation. The aim is not the acknowledgement of Palestinian
political and civil rights, but to strengthen Israeli control over
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the slicing, particularly from
the West Bank, of a sizeable area for annexation. Once again
Palestinians are faced with a fait accompli, and with a situation
that presents a threat to their national destiny and future
well-being.
Unilateral separation is more than just "they are there and we are
here", for Israelis are "here as well as there" and Palestinians
are stuck in areas cordoned off for them by military force. The
fact that these could, in the future, be called a state is neither
here nor there, as it is the Israeli government which decides what
Palestinians can and cannot do if no genuine understanding of
Palestinian needs, narrative and rights is implemented in an
agreement between the two peoples. Unless both sides are
reconciled, any unilateral move, particularly from the stronger,
occupying party will amount to the imposition of a settlement by
force. A settlement must come not through a swing in the balance of
power, but instead through a balance of justice and equity. A
settlement imposed by force is bound to invite resistance from the
Palestinians.
Apart from the political and territorial implications of unilateral
separation, it is a racist idea. It is based on the imposition of
spatial confinement on a national group (i.e., the Palestinians)
into sliced off areas, restricting the movement of people and
goods. Unilateral separation reflects an assumed superiority on the
part of Israel that as a state, it is above international law and
legitimacy as embodied in UN and Security Council resolutions, and
in UN Charter and Human Rights conventions.
Israelis who think unilateral separation can move Palestinians and
Israelis closer to peace are deluding themselves and delaying the
prospect of a viable settlement of the conflict. Whether they know
it or not they are leaving Palestinians with only one option, and
that is a continuation of the struggle against Israel as long as it
stands between them and the achievement of their national
aspirations.
Putting Palestinians behind walls and barbed wire fences will not
make the injustices done to them disappear, nor will it make the
need to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict less urgent. It
only serves to ignore the problem and refuses to acknowledge the
need for an historic compromise that a majority of Palestinians,
through the PLO, have shown a clear readiness to reach. It is a
compromise based on a two-state solution, with Jerusalem as capital
of the two states, and a just solution to the refugee problem. If
this settlement is not made possible, then the Palestinians will
have to fight against the apartheid system being imposed on them
and the destruction of their national project for a viable,
democratic and independent statehood.
Negotiations Must Have a Role
If the interests of peace are to be respected then negotiations
must be given a role to play. A peace proposal would also have to
include the following interlinked elements: ending the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (including East
Jerusalem); the evacuation of colonial settlements, and the
implementation of a fair solution to the problem of Palestinian
refugees. Peace has to be anchored in the acknowledgement of the
historic injustice that has been dealt to the Palestinians by the
formation of the Israeli state. This is the only option that
accepts Palestinians as a people, with rights like any other,
instead of attempting to demonize them through labeling them
terrorists or building walls to confine them to "reserves".
1 Labor Minister of Transport in the Sharon government, former
Deputy Minister of Defense in the Barak government, and in 2000,
head of a project preparing a unilateral separation plan in case
the Camp David talks failed.