Although the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been dominated by
ideology and politics, there are some significant "side issues"
that could maintain and prolong the conflict if they are not fully
solved. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, water and
refugees are the two major sources of potential regional
instability that need to be addressed. There are several aspects to
the Arab-Israeli conflict over water, the most important of which
is the Israeli occupation itself, whether in South Lebanon, the
Golan Heights or the West Bank. The dispute over water, a rare
regional commodity, is, of course, also an issue bound up in the
territorial component of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As for
refugees, any final Palestinian-Israeli settlement that fails to
completely solve the refugee problem will not provide a realistic
and durable solution to the conflict. A new eruption of
Palestinian-Israeli violence would be only a question of time,
while the frustration of Palestinian aspirations for a just
solution would also negatively influence the Arab agenda. This
paper seeks to address those two issues and suggest ways
forward.
Water and Regional Cooperation
It is no secret that water either is, or will be, scarce in
practically all Middle Eastern countries. Competition for supplies
is increasing among user sectors within each country, which in turn
threatens to lead to competition among countries for control of
access to rivers, aquifers and other water sources. A lack of
adequate water supplies is known to retard the pace of social and
economic development, adversely impact employment and affect the
environment, hygiene standards and public health. If sustained over
a period of time, these problems will directly affect social
harmony, domestic stability and, eventually, regional peace. Only a
minority of people in this region currently understands the
importance of adequate water supplies in supporting the economy.
One approach to solving this problem would be to give water the
same level of importance as other sectors of the national economy.
Developing efficient water usage strategies is a very basic need
for the future development of all Middle Eastern countries1.
Competition could be erased, moreover, through an integrative
process based on a positive sum outcome from which all parties
would benefit. To that end, efforts should be directed to transform
confrontation into cooperation.
Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation, controlling access
to water resources and the main aquifers was an important guiding
principle as Israel mapped out its settlement policy and later
strategized over its negotiations policy in official or unofficial
talks. Maintaining access to water reserves has also been a factor
in determining the map for "unilateral withdrawal" that some
Israelis believe is a way out of the current conflict.
Palestinians, on the other hand, believe they have the right to
regain not only the territories occupied in 1967, but also the
water resources in those areas in accordance with international
law2.
There is nothing innovative in the idea of seeking new legal bases
to manage and share water resources. In order that such laws can be
successfully drafted and then implemented, two basic points should
be considered: The present water situation and how international
law relates to this. Socioeconomic development in the Middle East
and the current policies of water management indicate the
following:
1. Population growth is not expected to level off before the second
decade of the 21st century.
2. Development in the area indicates that improving standards of
living require more water to be allocated for municipal uses.
Accordingly, more waste water and general waste will be produced,
threatening to pollute existing water resources.
3. Aquifers will continue to be overexploited, which will lead,
sooner or later, to their depletion and salination.
4. Industrial development, tourism and trade are expected to grow.
This again requires large water resources, increasing demands on
availability.
5. Increasing the efficiency of water use through new and existing
technology is essential.
It is vital that viable long-term water-saving mechanisms,
especially in irrigated agriculture, are introduced. These would
include shifts from water-intensive, low-value crops to low-water
consumptive, high-value crops. An ethic of inter-generation equity,
which may require significant changes in the way we understand and
manage our water resources, must prevail. One mechanism to balance
future demands and water scarcity would be to implement a policy
that considers water a commodity in agricultural and industrial
uses, rather than a "free good."
It is essential that there be a shift in policy thinking that can
lead to activities, actions and strategies that will guarantee a
sustainable water supply for future generations. Examples of these
changes include: Introducing effective water management systems,
considering water as an economic commodity, maximizing irrigation
efficiency, applying water-saving technologies and lifting water
subsidies, with the exception of municipal uses to help the poor.
Unless these advanced concepts of water allocation are introduced
and applied in the near future in a planned and comprehensive way,
the Middle East stands to face one of its most severe socioeconomic
problems.
Any future water settlement must also deal with the present lack of
clarity over water rights, the separation between resources and
supply and separation between the various geographic areas,
particularly between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the
disproportionate water usage of settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza. This must be dealt with even if the issue of settlements
themselves is postponed. It would be an opportunity to emphasize
the role that water can play in regional cooperation and in the
promotion of peace. The Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis
should play a significant role in encouraging such an effort. There
are peaceful means for coping with the anticipated water shortage
through regional and international cooperation, from which all
parties stand to gain. Wars, on the other hand, will do nothing but
create more problems and propagate suffering, misery and hate. The
question that all Middle Eastern nations must now ask is: "How are
we prepared to resolve this nearing dispute - unilaterally,
bilaterally or even regionally - without resorting to force?"
Refugees and Regional Security
Misery, fear and hardship are invaluable tools for extremists of
all kinds. Many of the factors that cause large numbers of people
to migrate also cause communities to seek other forms of change in
their status or environment, often leading to conflict and even
war3. Any final Palestinian-Israeli settlement that fails to
completely solve the refugee problem will not provide a realistic
and durable solution to the conflict. A new eruption of
Palestinian-Israeli violence would only be a question of time,
while the frustration of Palestinian aspirations for a just
solution would also negatively influence the Arab agenda. Were
Israel to leave this problem unresolved, it would encourage the
Palestinians to continue nurturing their political goal of
destroying Israel4.
Israel totally rejects the possibility of Palestinian refugees
returning to their original homes and lands, as this would
undermine the Jewish nature of Israeli society. Many Israeli towns
and villages are built on former Arab-Palestinian lands. Further,
the traditional position of all Israeli governments has been a
refusal to admit any responsibility to financially compensate
Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, Israel has called for the
creation of an international fund for the refugees, to which it
would contribute. More than four million refugees are estimated to
live beyond the borders of former Mandate Palestine. About 350,000
of them are in Lebanon, where they face acute problems and
atrocious living conditions. Because of its domestic difficulties,
Lebanon rejects any political solution that would leave the
Palestinians within its borders or that would force it to absorb
Palestinians as its citizens.
The 400,000 Palestinians in Syria make up approximately 2.4 percent
of the total population. Most of them have regular employment and
Syria's economy and society would have no trouble integrating them.
The only obstacle to this happening is a political one. Prior to a
bilateral Syrian-Israeli agreement, Syria is expected to show some
flexibility in its demands. Jordan's difficulties are much greater.
In numerical terms, around half of the total Palestinian refugee
population is found there. Of that number, almost a million still
live in refugee camps and face harsh socioeconomic conditions.
State compensation, and the return of some refugees (particularly
those without Jordanian citizenship), would be expected to be part
of a final settlement.
Political Solutions
It is impossible to predict the development of the
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on a permanent settlement of the
refugee problem. A political solution to the refugee issue is
directly linked to the Palestinian peoples' right to
self-determination. From the Palestinian perspective, the refugee
problem is a direct result of the creation of the State of Israel.
The implementation of a future political solution will almost
certainly consist of a combination of the following elements:
repatriation, compensation and resettlement.
During the intensive permanent status negotiations that took place
from summer 2000 to January 2001, some progress was made between
Palestinian and Israeli negotiators in identifying a common middle
ground. On the Israeli side, there appeared to be recognition that
Israel would have to accept some refugee return, admit some
responsibility or regret for the refugee issue and accept primary
responsibility for financing refugee compensation. On the
Palestinian side, there was recognition that Israel would not
permit practical implementation of the right of return to
fundamentally change the demographic face of the Jewish state. As a
consequence, voluntary refugee repatriation (to a Palestinian
state) and resettlement (in either present host countries or, to a
much lesser extent, in other countries) would also be important
elements of an eventual agreement5.
However, these understandings were rendered moot - temporarily,
perhaps - by Ariel Sharon's election as Israeli prime minister in
February 2001. More generally, the upsurge in violence that began
in the fall of 2000 hardened public opinion on both sides. Within
Israel, protests by Palestinian-Israelis over their treatment as
second-class citizens led many Israeli Jews to fear any future
return of even token numbers of 1948 refugees, while the second
Intifada severely weakened support for the Oslo peace process
overall. Among Palestinians, popular support for the right of
return remained strong and the violence and increasing harshness of
the Israeli occupation disinclined many to consider
compromise6.
Over time, however, the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in
particular realized that a "return" to Israel was less and less
realistic. This eventually led to a revision of the Palestinian
strategy, and references to the concept of "return" began to
incorporate some limitations. This is clearly reflected in the
recently published Geneva Accord. Additionally, authoritative
Palestinian speakers have explicitly avoided answering the
question, "Where will the return be to?" Palestinian leaders were
clearly speaking and writing about a return to a future Palestinian
state though the Palestinian National Council never adopted this
definition.
Despite the large gap in the official positions of the two parties,
it is possible to discern some middle ground between Israeli and
Palestinian analysts on the refugee issue. Many Palestinians - both
intellectuals and officials - have spoken of a Palestinian right of
return that would be understood to mean a return to national soil
(in the West Bank and Gaza) rather than a return to 1948 homes. PLC
member Ziad Abu Zayyad, for example, stated that: "One must
distinguish between, on the one hand, the "right of return" as a
principle and, on the other hand, exercising that right by
literally returning to Palestine as a national homeland and to that
same home, piece of land or grove which a certain Palestinian owned
before 1948 as a private individual property7."
Rasheed Khalidi - emphasizing what he terms "attainable" (rather
than "absolute") justice - suggests that while "it must be accepted
that all Palestinian refugees and their descendants have a right to
return to their homes in principle..." it must be "...equally
accepted that in practice force majeure will prevent most of them
from being able to exercise this right8".
The Middle East is perhaps one of the very few regions in the world
where the question of immigration and refugees has developed into a
political dilemma of the first magnitude. The future stability of
the region and a recovery from its present state of fatigue and
exhaustion cannot be achieved if no fair solution is found for the
four million Palestinian refugees. To guarantee our regional
security, the focus should be on resolving inter- and
intra-regional conflicts and working to turn areas of confrontation
into possibilities for regional cooperation. While the issues of
water and refugees are extremely sensitive, they may also be the
issues that provide a blueprint for regional cooperation that will
ensure future regional stability.
1 The World Bank 1991, 1193/1/ Dublin Declaration 1992 ODA,
1993/USAID, 1993. Scientists from outside the region also confirmed
this - Feshelson 1994, Hadad Farid 1995, Tamimi 1998.
2 Ghassan Khatib, Bitterlemons, August 05, 2002.
3 From an address by Prince Hassan bin Talal to the Society for
International Development, Hague Declaration on Migration and
Refugees, December 30, 2002.
4 Shlomo Gazit, The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Study No 2, JCSS,
1995, p5.
5 Eldar, Akiva. How to solve the Palestinian refugee problem.
Haaretz May 29, 2001; and Sir, if you please, tear down your house.
Haaretz May 31, 2001.
6 Palestinian Refugee Research Net,
http://www.arts.macgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/prissues.html
7 Abu Zayyad, Ziad, 1994. The Palestinian Right of Return: A
Realistic Approach Palestine-Israel Journal. Spring 1994,
p77.
8 Rasheed Khalidi, 1994. Toward a Solution, in Centre for Policy
Analysis on Palestine, Palestinian Refugees: Their Problem and
Future (Washington, DC:CPAP, 1994).