The difficult journey of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
could be metaphorically described as a train, winding through hilly
countryside on its way toward its final destination at the top of a
mountain. Those blessed with vision tempered by realism, can
clearly see the final station - a comprehensive peace agreement
based upon a two-state solution. Others only see obstacles along
the way, and mistake the hills for the final peak, or worse yet,
invent imaginary stations on the route that only exist in their
fantasies.
The end of the train's track is, however, unambiguous: an
independent Palestinian state, sovereign, viable and demilitarized,
existing side by side with a secure State of Israel, along the 1967
borders, with minor adjustments based on a 1 to 1 territorial swap;
two capitals in Jerusalem, the Jewish populated parts to Israel and
the Arab parts to Palestine; the Old City in the heart of Jerusalem
under partitioned sovereignty with an international security
presence; and a fair solution to the Palestinian refugee problem
including compensation, rehabilitation, a right of return to the
Palestinian state and proactive Israeli involvement in the
implementation of these parameters.
The Road Map
Not all the tracks of the railroad have as yet been laid, and
recently the train has stalled due to the parties being at odds
with each other. As a result, the international community has
involved itself in order to assist in directing the process toward
the end point. This led "The Quartet" (the United States, Russia,
the European Union and the United Nations) to declare the "Road Map
to Israeli-Palestinian Peace," that aims to delineate the future
peace process and bring the sides closer to the final
objective.
The Road Map's main problem is that its initiators drafted a map
which is vague and confusing, thus not substantially advancing the
peace process. The Road Map does not define a clear objective. It
lays down unambiguous timelines, but not clear implementation
procedures or targets. Some of the declared objectives, such as a
Palestinian state with provisional borders, if implemented, will
harm and possibly derail the train. Another interim period will
only set the process back. The international players behind this
initiative, though well intentioned, lack a clear understanding of
the character of the conflict, and the role the international
community could play.
Peel, Partition and Camp David
It is necessary to start by examining the earlier stations along
the track in which the international players actively took part in
finding solutions to the conflict - a conflict between these two
national movements, which until recently have demanded all of the
land for themselves.
One might begin with an examination of the various commissions,
such as the Peel Commission of 1937 during the British Mandate
period, which started designing the partition, and eventually led
to the first major step toward peace: the UN General Assembly
Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, which recommended that the
disputed area be divided into two states - one Jewish and one Arab
- with greater Jerusalem defined as an international corpus
separatum, neither the capital of Israel nor of Palestine.
Another station along the railroad was the Camp David Accords of
1978, in which the U.S., under the leadership of President Jimmy
Carter, compelled Israel - as part of a framework agreement with
Egypt - to accept full Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip for an interim period, leading to a final status
agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 that "must
also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and
their just requirements."
When Israel and the PLO Boarded the Train
One might also begin the examination of international involvement
from the moment where it became clear that the government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) boarded the train
toward peace. Prior to this, both sides had dealt only with
theoretical formulas and unilateral approaches. With hindsight, it
is clear that the event that ultimately led the two sides to embark
on the train was the declaration of November 15, 1988, at the 19th
session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers, when
the PLO recognized Israel and announced its willingness to enter
into peace negotiations based on UNSCR 242. The PNC called for the
establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, in
order to attain a comprehensive political and security settlement
for both sides.
At this stage, Israel had not yet recognized the PLO as a
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and
consequently the train was still empty. The immediate result of the
PNC declaration was the resumption of dialogue between the U.S. and
the PLO. This occurred only after an extensive Swedish diplomatic
effort led by Sweden's Foreign Minister Sten Andersson. He was
already then able to recognize the train's real destination at the
top of the mountain, and understood that only the U.S. could
significantly influence Israel. Andersson thus serving as the
catalyst that led to renewed U.S. involvement.
The Importance of Europe
One of the main roles of the U.S. has been to push Israel forward.
But it is actually Europe that has been influencing the planning of
the process, i.e. the contours of the route towards a peace
agreement. Fifteen years prior to the PNC declaration of 1988, it
was Europe that dared to present the basic outlines of any future
peace agreement. Already in November 1973, the European Economic
Community (EEC) foreign ministers declared that a peace agreement
should be based on: "the need for Israel to end the territorial
occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967," and
the "recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting
peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinians."
This pronouncement, and even more so the historical Venice
Declaration on the Middle East seven years later, served as a
cornerstone and turning point in drafting any agreement, both in
regard to its solution and its partner. In Venice, in June 1980,
the European heads of state and government and the ministers for
foreign affairs of the European Commission declared the need for
"the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people;" that a "just solution must finally be found to the
Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees;" that the
"Palestinian people . . . must be placed in a position . . . to
exercise fully its right to self-determination;" that the PLO must
represent the Palestinian people and therefore "will have to be
associated with the negotiations;" that the nine states of the
European Community "stress that they will not accept any unilateral
initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem;" "the need
for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has
maintained since the conflict of 1967;" and that "they are deeply
convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious
obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East."
Europe was heavily criticized for this brave declaration both by
Israel and the U.S. However, with hindsight, it turned out that the
EC saw far and clear, and paved the way for the two sides to
eventually make real progress toward peace. This phenomenon of a
European-led political action can, and probably should, be repeated
now (summer 2004), when the two sides and the U.S. have lost their
direction toward reaching the solution.
Now is the time for a new European initiative for the Middle
East.
Unlike the U.S., which usually tilts in favor of the Israeli side -
while occasionally showing sympathy and empathy toward the
Palestinians, such as during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and
Bill Clinton - the major advantage for Europe is that it is able to
be both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian at the same time.
The Madrid Conference
As previously noted, the PNC declaration, and the subsequent
renewal of the dialogue between the U.S. and the PLO, brought the
Americans back on the scene. The Americans pushed the two sides
into moving the train forward via the Madrid Conference of autumn
1991, in the wake of the first Gulf War. The U.S., Russia, UN,
Europe and various Middle Eastern countries took part in this
conference, an important station for the political peace process.
Although the framework was international, the driving force was the
U.S. It forced the weak Palestinian delegation - ostensibly
representing all of the Palestinian people, even though it was not
allowed to include any delegates from the PLO, the Palestinian
diaspora or Jerusalem - to merge with the Jordanian delegation.
Regardless, the strings pulled by PLO headquarters in Tunis, where
the real decisions were being made.
The train kept rolling from Madrid and arrived in Washington, D.C.,
where it stalled due to the awkward bilateral discussions that took
place under U.S. guidance from 1991 to 1993. Throughout these early
deliberations, the Israelis dictated to the U.S. a policy of
paralysis. The Israeli government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
had no intention of conducting any serious dialogue or negotiations
with any Palestinians. The joint Palestinian/Jordanian delegation,
which for all intents and purposes was solely a Palestinian
delegation, continued to receive orders from PLO headquarters in
Tunis. Subsequently, as long as Israel's policies were set by
Shamir, and the PLO was not the official partner for negotiations,
there was no chance for the process to advance.
The Oslo Station
The U.S., for its part, neither tried to coerce Israel to alter its
policies, nor to accept the PLO as the Palestinian partner. Only
after the establishment of a new Israeli government, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, did any
dramatic change occur that caused the train to once again start
moving forward. This time the real partners came aboard: the
representatives of a committed Israeli government, and moderate
Palestinians officially representing the PLO. From here, the train
continued to Oslo, the station from which a genuine journey
began.
The real advantage of the Oslo process was the ability of the sides
to engage in meaningful, bilateral and straightforward dialogue.
The third party, the Norwegians, did not attempt to become a
dominant player, and thus were able, impressively and modestly, to
create an atmosphere that allowed the Palestinians and Israelis to
address the fundamental issues facing them. Consequently, the
Norwegians, who did not have any official commitment to the EU or
the U.S., became honest brokers lacking any personal agenda, yet
fully committed to the Middle East peace process.
The first Israeli-Palestinian agreement (the Oslo process) was a
result of bilateral negotiations without the involvement of an
international player. The two sides had an idea - albeit vague -
about the details of the end game. More so, they had a common
vision of the contours of the path to be traveled in order to reach
their destination. The objective was to make a joint move that
would jump-start a political process based on the Palestinian
recognition of Israel and an Israeli recognition of the PLO, with
UNSCR 242 and the 1967 borders as the basis for negotiations. For
the first time, the two national movements embraced an accord aimed
at leading to a final status agreement that would provide a
solution to all the issues, including borders, refugees, Jerusalem,
settlements and security.
Despite the bilateral character of the Oslo negotiations, and the
Norwegian facilitation, the official signing ceremony took place on
the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C. This was not
the consequence of U.S. involvement in the Oslo process (until the
last moment, the Americans did not perceive this process as a
serious track), but rather because of the mutual
Israeli-Palestinian understanding that no agreement could be
implemented without the full and thorough involvement of the U.S.
From that moment on, the U.S. peace team reengaged itself in the
details of the new negotiations.
The train continued to slowly proceed through the various crises of
implementation; through the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the interim
agreement of 1994, which was signed in the U.S., all the way to the
second Camp David summit of July 2000.
Track 2 Efforts
Between the period of Oslo and the second Camp David summit, many
endeavors aimed at fostering Track 2 dialogue were taken by a
variety of countries, mainly in Europe. All of these initiatives
aimed to create foundations and possible breakthroughs to assist
and facilitate future negotiations. It is important to mention
several European initiatives, such as the Swedish efforts (yet
again led by former Foreign Minister Sten Andersson) in
facilitating the Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings on the framework
for a final status agreement, as well as the British assistance in
promoting joint Israeli-Palestinian efforts to explore possible
modalities for resolving the status of Jerusalem. The post Camp
David II assistance from the Swiss government in developing the
Geneva Accord is a similar and noteworthy approach.
Camp David II
The 2000 Camp David summit was planned - at least by its U.S. and
Israeli initiators - as a make-or-break summit. With the
participation of Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, and with Bill
Clinton in the chair, this should have been the stage at which the
U.S. administration performed at its best. Disappointingly,
however, the Americans were revealed to be amateur brokers, lacking
negotiating skills, and possessing very limited abilities to
influence either side. The U.S. peace team misread the situation
and overestimated the domestic restrictions of Ehud Barak. This
allowed him to offer the Palestinians much less than a reasonable
agreement, as well as to blame them for their legitimate
unwillingness to surrender and accept a bad deal.
The Americans were unable to see the path, much less lay down the
tracks toward the final station. It took the U.S. administration
six additional months, following the collapse of the Camp David
summit and the outbreak of a new intifada in September 2000, before
it was courageous enough to present the Clinton Parameters in
December 2000. These guidelines - with some minor modifications -
should have been put on the table during the Camp David summit. It
is not farfetched to say that, if the Americans had done so, we
could now be implementing a final status peace agreement between
Israel and a Palestinian state.
What Now?
Now it is up to the Palestinians and the Israelis to bring the
train to its final station on top of the mountain, and to reach a
comprehensive and fair peace agreement that ends 100 years of
bloody conflict. However, in the event that the two sides are
unable to find the way on their own, and require third party
facilitation, or even aggressive U.S. political intervention, the
international community must be prepared to fill that role.
Furthermore, even if the Palestinians and the Israelis are able to
reach an agreement bilaterally, the international players will have
to ready themselves to assist with its implementation, including
the possibility of an international presence in the area.