In recent years, the idea of third party involvement in the search
for short-term methods for calming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the quest for long-term solutions has appeared with growing
frequency in the discourse of both the media and the experts. In
essence, the recommendation is for a more active role in the
process for international factors.
Since the beginning of the conflict, external factors have been
involved in one manner or another, particularly the great powers.
However, given the background of the escalating violence in the
region, the cessation of (at least the open) direct negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians, and the repeated failures of the
"remote control" mediation efforts by the American government (the
Tenet, Mitchell, Zinni and other initiatives) and of European
bodies and emissaries to calm the situation and extract the peace
wagon from the mud since the failure of Camp David II and the
outbreak of the second intifada in the fall of 2000, the idea that
there is no alternative to active intervention in the conflict by
third parties is being heard with greater frequency. Given the
relative success of such efforts in Kosovo and East Timor, various
proposals for international intervention - unarmed, an armed
international peacekeeping force and even an international
trusteeship - have been placed on the table.
The Israeli and Palestinian positions have always differed
concerning the question of international intervention. The
Palestinians have for years been calling for the
"internationalization of the conflict," i.e. an increase in the
involvement of factors from the international community, among
other things because they believe such factors have a principled
support for their cause, Israel has always opposed such active
involvement, even on the part of its principal ally, the United
States. However, given the aforementioned developments in the last
few years, a certain amount of flexibility has evolved within
Israel, as well. concerning the position that rejects international
intervention, at least in Israeli Jewish public opinion, if not in
public governmental policy.
Looking for an Honest Broker
Today, in essence the discussion about international involvement is
divided in two. The first question that has to be asked is - Who
will be the third party? The second is: What will be its authority
and what will be the character of the external intervention if it
takes place? In actuality, both of these aspects are intimately
connected. Even those who strongly recommend external involvement
understand that there is no likelihood that a free hand will be
given to a third party that does not have the confidence of one or
both of the direct parties involved. The more acceptable a third
party is to both the Israelis and the Palestinians, the greater its
room to maneuver in the field will be, and vice versa. The problem
is that, among the many areas of disagreement between the parties
is the question of who is likely to be an "honest broker" - and the
definition of "fairness" of mediation tends to be a function of the
subjective evaluation of whether the third party is, in principle,
"for us or against us." The question of the ability of an
international actor to function in a satisfactory manner as a "fair
mediator" on the basis of its past activities as a third party in
international disputes is hardly taken into consideration by either
the Israelis or the Palestinians. Rather, such potential third
parties are judged by the two sides on the basis of their
subjective image as being pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian. Not
surprisingly, in many cases, this creates mirror images. Any factor
considered pro-Israeli by the Israelis is automatically considered
by the Palestinians to be anti-Palestinian. And anyone considered
pro-Palestinian by the Palestinians is immediately defined as being
anti-Israeli by the Israelis. Thus the possibility that the two
sides will agree about a third party to intervene in the conflict
is very low. This means that if there will be intervention, it is
most likely that it will not be voluntary, but rather coerced, at
least from the point of view of one of the parties. This will
produce a low and maybe even zero level of cooperation with the
intervening factor on the part of one or possibly both of the
parties in the best-case scenario, and a level of active hostility
in the worst-case scenario.
Let us now discuss the question of how the Israeli-Jewish public
views the question of international intervention and, in
particular, that of specific bodies that could be involved.
Only the Americans
The most outstanding finding, which was repeated in many surveys
during different periods - when the peace process was active,
frozen and after it collapsed - is that the only international
factor Israeli Jews want to see deeply involved in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and even have an increased
involvement, is the U.S. In response to the question: "Given your
evaluation of the state of the peace process today, are you for or
against a greater involvement of the following countries and bodies
in the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinians?",
80% said in April 1997 that they are very or quite in favor of
American involvement (15% were quite or very against, and about 5%
had no opinion.) A similar picture was gained a year later - in May
1998, 77% were for and 20% were against (with 3% having no clear
opinion on the matter). The question was asked once again in June
2003, i.e. two and half years after the Camp David summit failure
and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. And again the
numbers were very similar - 80% were in favor of American
intervention, and even increased intervention, while only 17% saw
such intervention as negative. In other words, the standing of the
United States as a desirable intervening factor was not eroded at
all.
In addition, there is almost a complete national consensus in favor
of American intervention, that encompasses - as demonstrated by a
cross-tabulating of the answers for this question with voting
patterns for the last Knesset elections - all of the country's
political camps. Even within the group with the most reservations -
National Religious Party (NRP) voters, who are afraid that American
involvement will include pressure to evacuate settlements - there
is a clear-cut three-quarters majority in favor of such
intervention.
Table 1: Position on American Involvement, According to Vote in the
2003 Knesset Elections (In percentages - the Jewish public)
For Against Don't Know
Labor 88 10 2
Likud 80 19 1
Shas 78 22 -
Meretz 96 4 -
NRP 75 25 -
Shinui 84 14 2
National Union 88 12 -
The reason for this overwhelming support is, as one could have
assumed, the Israeli public's positive estimation of the American
motivation to defend Israeli interests in the course of such
intervention. Yet it is clear that open support by Washington of
the Israeli side would preclude the United States from filling the
role of an "honest broker," therefore one shouldn't expect it to be
defined as "pro-Israeli" in response to a question in the survey.
Thus, the following table demonstrates that about half of the
respondents defined it as "neutral," while about one-quarter
defined it more as pro-Israeli, and slightly less defined it as
pro-Palestinian:
Table 2: Within the framework of American auspices and mediation
for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, do they, in your opinion,
express greater support for the Palestinian side, the Israeli side,
or do they act in a neutral manner? (In percentages - theJewish
public, May 1998)
Greater support for the Palestinian side 20
Greater support for the Israeli side 24
Act in a neutral manner 50
Don't know 6
It is interesting to note that, when we compared the attitude of
the interviewees to the Oslo process with their evaluation of the
level of fairness of American involvement, we found, not
surprisingly, that while only 8% of the Oslo supporters considered
the Americans to be pro-Palestinian, the number rose to 38% among
the opponents.
This means that, in the eyes of the Israeli-Jewish public, the
United States is the actor whose intervention is considered
desirable, and it is also perceived as being "fair." However, this
does not necessarily indicate the desirable direction of future
developments, since surveys that were held on the Palestinian side
indicate that, in the eyes of the Palestinians, the United States
is perceived as clearly leaning toward Israel's interests. A survey
carried out by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Research in
December 2000 found that 84% believe the United States leans toward
Israel. This situation hasn't improved, it has only gotten worse,
since in another survey carried out by the center in October 2003,
97%(!) of the Palestinian respondents said that U.S. policy toward
the conflict leans toward Israel.
What about other international factors? As has been noted, the
Palestinians are very interested in a deepening of the European
involvement in the region, and are constantly calling for that. The
Israelis, on the contrary, view with great suspicion, and actually
even with no small amount of hostility, the European countries,
individually and in the form of the European Union as their general
body. Thus, in 1997, only 39% viewed intervention of the Western
European countries favorably (54% were against and the others had
no clear opinion). A year later, the figures were 43% in favor and
53% against (and 6% had no clear opinion). In June 2003 we divided
the concept "Western European countries" into individual countries.
It turned out that only Great Britain gained a level of confidence
- with 52% being in favor of it having more intensive involvement
in the conflict, while 46% were opposed. Contrary to this, only 10%
favored French involvement, while 84% were opposed. When it comes
to Germany, the picture was closer to France than to Great Britain
- only 26% in favor and 73% opposed. As for the European Union,
which is perceived by the Israeli public as being very supportive
of the Palestinian agenda, the figures were as expected - 33% in
favor and 61% against. A breakdown of the findings about the EU
according to the vote for the Knesset reveals differences between
the various parties, however the general - negative - direction for
all is similar, with the exception of Meretz voters, where we found
56.5% in favor of intervention (with 43.5% against).
The reason for this lack of confidence emerges from the breakdown
of the answers to the question about the degree that Europe is a
"fair mediator" or whether the European countries are biased toward
one side or the other. Only a minority - about 31% believe they are
neutral while a clear majority, about double the number - 60% -
believe the Western European countries favor the Palestinian side,
while only a small minority, less than 4% believe they favor
Israel.
Table 3: Do the Western European countries, within the framework of
their involvement in negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians, express greater support for the Palestinian side, the
Israeli side, or do they act in a neutral manner? (In percentages,
the Jewish public, May 1998)
Express greater support for the Palestinian side 59
Express greater support for the Israeli side 4
Act in a neutral manner 31
Don't know 6
And yet, it turns out that the escalating violence of the past few
years has led a not insignificant part of the Israeli public to
consider favorably the idea of international involvement to calm
the conflict. Thus in June 2003 the public was divided in its
positions: Concerning the general question of external involvement
in the quest for a solution, it turned out that 48% were in favor
and a similar percentage against.
Table 4: Positions toward external involvement (in percentages, the
Jewish public, June 2003)
Very much support international intervention by external bodies in
the conflict 21
Quite support 27
Quite against 18
Very much against 29.5
Don't know 4.5
A breakdown of the answers on the principled attitude toward
intervention according to party vote indicates that among Labor
voters, 49% support intervention while 47% are opposed. Among Likud
voters, 45% support while 5l% are against. Among Shas voters, only
38.5% support while 58% are against. Among the large parties, only
in Meretz does a clear majority support intervention: 70% support
as opposed to 30% who are opposed.
The figures that were obtained in 2003 concerning the principled
attitude toward foreign intervention weren't very different from
the figures in the previous survey carried out in April 2002.
Contrary to this, we found a significant change in the positions
concerning who would be helped by foreign intervention: There was a
clear decline in the percentage of those who thought that such
intervention would be more beneficial for the Palestinians - from
56% in 2002 to only 39% in 2003. At the same time, there was a
clear increase in the percentage of those who believed it would
benefit both sides to the same degree - from 21% in 2002 to 37% in
2003 (only minor changes occurred in the [low] percentage of those
who thought Israel would benefit more, from 11% in the previous
survey to 7% in 2003, and in the percentage of those who believed
it wouldn't benefit either side, l0%). This means the main change
was the decline in the percentage of those who consider foreign
intervention to be beneficial to the Palestinian interests, 7%, and
the rise in the percentage of those who see benefits for both
sides, though there are still many who believe that such
intervention will serve the Palestinian interest to a greater
degree than the Israeli interest, which explains the split
concerning the general question of external involvement.
As we have noted, the question of the public's acceptance of the
type of intervention is also very important. As the following data
clearly indicates, the Israeli public is ready to accept
intervention only if it does not involve an imposed solution. The
majority of the Israeli public agrees to missions by foreign
statesmen for mediation purposes, and beyond that, even supports an
international peace conference that will formulate a solution that
will become obligatory only if both sides accept it. However, only
a minority supports physical presence in the field of external
factors - the placement of an unarmed observation team or an armed
military presence, and an even smaller percentage supports the
formulation of a solution to the conflict by an international body
like the UN, that obligates the parties and will be backed by
economic or military sanctions. A breakdown of the answers
concerning the types of international intervention that would or
would not be acceptable indicates that, with the exception of
mediation by foreign statesmen, where there is a greater readiness
among voters for Barak in 2001 (74%) compared to voters for Sharon
(53%), concerning all the other forms of intervention, there are no
differences between the two groups, that is between the right and
the left.
Table 5: Types of international intervention and their degree of
acceptability (in percentages, the Jewish public, April 2002)
Missions of statesmen and government officials from foreign
countries to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians
Acceptable 60.5
Not acceptable 35.5
Don't know 4
Placement of unarmed observation force to oversee and report on the
activities of the sides
Acceptable 35
Not acceptable 59.5
Don't know 4.5
Placement of an armed international police force, that will
separate the sides and act against all those who use force
Acceptable 33
Not acceptable 61
Don't know 6
An international conference that will formulate a proposal for a
solution to the conflict, which will obligate only if both Israel
and the Palestinians accept it
Acceptable 64
Not acceptable 29
Don't know 7
A proposal for a solution to the conflict by an international body,
like the UN, that will obligate the sides, and will be accompanied
by economic or military sanctions if it will not be accepted
Acceptable 27
Not acceptable 67
Don't know 6
Summary
Surveys indicate that the general Jewish public changes its opinion
on many political questions related to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict according to changes in the field (increase and decrease
in the level of violence, progress or paralysis in the political
contacts, changes in the regional and global arena, etc.). Yet
these changes are no less frequent or inexplicable than the changes
of policy at the decision-making level.
In fact, it is possible to point to a number of quite stable trends
within Jewish-Israeli public opinion concerning the factors that
can possibly be acceptable for international intervention. First of
all, the United States is perceived, by both the right and the
left, to be a factor whose intervention is desirable. Secondly,
there is stable opposition, on the basis of the 'unfairness'
assumption, to opening the door to external intervention from the
European countries and the EU (though the attitude toward Great
Britain on this question is much more positive).
As for the very idea of intervention, apparently due to the
severity of the regional situation and the increase in the level of
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, recently there is
less of a fear and a considerable growing readiness to accept the
idea of international intervention. However, even under the current
circumstances, there is widespread opposition to an imposed
political solution and strong opposition to the physical presence
of international forces with authority and ability (armed forces)
to intervene actively in the developments.
The data concerning the Israeli public is taken from the Peace
Index surveys, carried out by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and the author, in
the framework of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel
Aviv University. The data from all the surveys can be found at the
Center's Web
site.