The search for a durable and just resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has consumed international diplomacy, scholarly debate, and local lives for generations, frequently oscillating between hope and despair as peace initiatives rise and fall amid cycles of violence. In the immediate aftermath of the horrific October 7th attack and the subsequent genocidal war on Gaza—which shattered already fragile frameworks and exacerbated the psychological scars of decades of conflict—there is profound urgency and necessity for reimagining political possibilities. Among these, federal and confederal solutions, long studied but seldom attempted in earnest on this terrain, have returned with new relevance and intellectual vigour, offering a blend of reality-based pragmatism and transformative ambition. Formulating their potential requires not only technical definitions and policy analyses, but a deep engagement with the lived realities and historic grievances of both societies, as well as a clear eyed look at the obstacles and incentives shaping their future.

    At the heart of the matter is how sovereignty, identity, and coexistence might be structured so that both Israelis and Palestinians can achieve security, dignity, and agency without one group’s triumph spelling the other’s disaster. Federal and confederal arrangements each lie somewhere between separation and unification, offering distinctive models of how pluralism and autonomy might interact. To truly analyze their capacity for shaping a new future for Israel/Palestine, it is essential to start with precise definitions and compare their inner workings.

Federalism

    Federalism, in its most classical sense, is a form of constitutional government that strategically divides powers between a central authority and regional or local units — states, provinces, regions — each with constitutionally protected domains of autonomy. The central (federal) government oversees matters defined as national: defense, foreign affairs, currency, overarching legislation. Local governments control education, policing, cultural affairs, and other regionally specific competencies. This dual sovereignty model is meant to safeguard minority rights while unifying disparate populations, and it presupposes a willingness among constituent groups to invest in joint institutions and shared national citizenship. Examples abound in the United States, Germany, India, Australia, and Switzerland; in each case, the balance between unity and diversity is struck through constitutional mechanisms designed to ensure that neither level of governance becomes wholly dominant.

Confederation

    By contrast, a confederation is best understood as a permanent but loose alliance of sovereign states, each retaining the ultimate authority over its internal affairs, and delegating specific, limited powers to joint institutions for mutual benefit in discrete policy areas, such as security, infrastructure, or trade. This model minimizes the absorption of sovereignty by a central government, and instead privileges negotiation, coordination, and voluntary participation. Britannica captures the distinction succinctly: a confederation is “a permanent union of sovereign states for certain common purposes.” Classic examples include the early United States under the Articles of Confederation, Switzerland’s early cantonal model, and — more controversially — the European Union in its developmental years. Confederations stand or fall based on their member states’ commitment to collaboration and the flexibility of their institutions to adapt to shifting political and security needs.

    In the context of Israel/Palestine, these models offer creative alternatives that challenge the weaknesses of historic peace paradigms. For decades, negotiations have swung between the two-state solution — anchored in the notion of strict separation, with two independent states coexisting side by side — and the one-state solution — focused on a single, shared entity with — ideally — equal rights for all. The two-state solution enjoys broad international support but is persistently undermined by the realities of settlement expansion, contested borders, and the symbolism and logistics of Jerusalem. The one-state solution, while theoretically offering full equality, stirs deep fears of demographic domination and erosion of national identity, particularly acute among both Israelis determined to preserve the Jewish character of their state and Palestinians seeking sovereign recognition and restitution for generations of dispossession.

    Federalism’s promise in Israel/Palestine is clear in abstraction: a strong central government could guarantee equal rights and common security, harmonize economic development, and provide shared citizenship under a constitution expressly designed to protect pluralism and empower minorities. Under a federal arrangement, the country would be subdivided into autonomous regions — Israel proper, Gaza, the West Bank, and possibly Jerusalem as a federal district. Each would maintain its own government, with substantial powers over internal affairs. The federal capital of Jerusalem, jointly administered, would symbolize unity and shared investment in coexistence. Refugee and settler populations might remain in place, enjoying full legal protections as members of the broader federation, and economic integration across regions could foster mutual prosperity and interdependence.

    Yet, the practical obstacles to federalism are formidable. Decades of mistrust mean that deep integration is perceived as existentially threatening, particularly when one side fears demographic and cultural dilution and the other fears institutionalized dominance. The asymmetry of power and resources — military, economic, and diplomatic — makes negotiations exceptionally fraught, with each side suspicious that structures will be manipulated to shortsighted advantage. The psychological leap required to embrace federal power-sharing in a context so thoroughly shaped by violence and exclusion is immense. Political leaderships remain resistant to ceding core claims, and constitutional arrangements alone cannot mitigate the uncertainty and anxiety that pervade both societies.

The Holy Land Confederation

    It is against this background that the confederal solution acquires fresh salience and operational possibility. The Holy Land Confederation (HLC) proposal, presented in 2022, spearheaded by Yossi Beilin and Hiba Husseini, reflects years of experience and dialogue with political, civil society, and expert actors on both sides. The HLC emerges, as its authors and supporters argue, not as a utopian plan but as a practical, middle-ground structure that blends the separation of sovereignty (each state retains its constitution, government, and citizenship) with pragmatic cooperation through joint institutions overseeing security, infrastructure, economic development, and the fate of Jerusalem.

    Crucially, the HLC does not envision total fusion or absorption, but rather maintains Israel and Palestine as distinct, sovereign states, coordinating closely through shared governance agencies. Its approach to the thorny issue of settlements is especially innovative: agreed Israeli settlements in the West Bank would remain in place, inhabited by Israeli citizens under Palestinian sovereignty — comparable to EU arrangements where citizens may reside permanently in other member states with reciprocal protections. Similarly a limited number of returning Palestinians would be permitted residency in Israel under similar conditions. This reciprocal residency mechanism is designed to respect territorial integrity and accommodate the interests and anxieties of both Palestinian and Israeli communities, breaking through deadlocked negotiations where strict either/or formulas fail.

    Economic integration is positioned as a pillar of the confederal structure, not merely as a means of growth, but as an indispensable foundation for peace. Joint commissions would oversee cross-border projects in transportation, energy, water resources, and regional development, enhancing both material security and the lived experiences of Israelis and Palestinians. By forging incentives for mutual cooperation — and thus, interdependence — the confederation model seeks to disrupt the politics of punishment and distrust, offering practical avenues for lifting economic disparity and reducing the social resentments that power cycles of violence.

    Special attention is given to the central role of Jerusalem, which remains one of the critical stumbling blocks in all previous negotiations. Where the traditional two-state framework often contemplates division, or precarious dual capitals, the confederation imagines Jerusalem as a shared, jointly administered capital, open to all, and governed as the living symbol of a new era in which both peoples claim belonging without denying the other’s legitimacy. In practice, this would mean collective administration of holy sites, law enforcement, and core infrastructure — a monumental shift toward reconciliation and pluralism, if realized.

    The confederation’s impact on daily life would be profound. Instead of rigid borders and punitive separation, all residents would enjoy freedom of movement to live, work, and travel throughout the confederation’s territory, while retaining distinct citizenship and cultural identity. Local governance structures would continue, but more porous social and economic boundaries would encourage interaction and intermingling, breaking down the psychological walls that have defined the conflict for generations. The approach further commits to joint educational and cultural programs, aiming to invest in youth and future generations as the engines of a new, peaceful culture oriented toward compromise and mutual respect.

    The legal implications of the confederal arrangement have been described in expert interviews, notably by Hiba Husseini and others, as a structured path for transitioning out of frameworks marked by colonial attributes and discriminatory practices. As Husseini notes, real transformation requires not rhetorical shift, but legal, civic, and psychological mechanisms for equal rights, compromise, and recognition — underpinned by regional acceptance and international support. By guaranteeing civil protections for all residents, regardless of their state of citizenship, and by establishing mutual veto and mediation rights in joint institutions, the confederation can begin to erode entrenched patterns of exclusion and restriction, fostering a sense of real security for both communities.

Obstacles to the Confederal Model

    It must be acknowledged, however, that the confederal model faces its own serious obstacles. Political will is severely lacking, and recalcitrant leaderships profit from continued stasis and mobilization around maximalist grievances. The events of October 7th, and the Gaza war have deepened mistrust and made new arrangements seem remote to many. Public opinion is unsettled and traumatized, with many sceptical that any new arrangement can truly protect their fundamental interests. Implementation would require robust third-party guarantees — regional actors, international organizations, and great powers with the capacity and credibility to monitor, mediate, and enforce commitments. Security arrangements, in particular, would be fragile, vulnerable to sabotage or sudden crisis, and would demand adaptive expertise and outside support.

    Nonetheless, the confederation may offer unique advantages when compared to federalism in the current context. It allows each society to maintain and develop its national narrative, while building shared practices and interests through incremental steps rather than great leaps. It is flexible, responsive to feedback, and can deepen cooperation as trust accumulates over time. It draws on the lessons of the European Union, which demonstrated that even societies once bitterly divided could pursue lasting peace when material incentives, shared infrastructure, and mutual veto mechanisms created a positive-sum environment where compromise lost its stigma and practical benefits were distributed fairly. As Prof. Daniel Kurtzer and Prof. Alon Ben-Meir have stressed, success rests not just on the design of institutions, but also on their capacity to change the dynamics of distrust and animosity.

    Importantly, the confederation provides fertile ground for cultivating joint historical narratives, as evidenced by the HLC’s commitment to a co-authored history of the conflict, allowing each side’s truth to be heard and respected. This is not nostalgia or wishful thinking; it is an essential project for breaking down the narrative barriers that underpin cultural and political exclusion. By investing in shared history, educational integration, and common civic projects, the confederal approach offers a pathway for new generations to view themselves not just as adversaries or victims, but as partners in building a better future.

Elements to Take into Consideration

    In sociological and anthropological terms, confederalism recognizes the complex habits of identity and discrimination rooted in the region’s history. Interviews with experts reveal that while colonial attributes persist, they are not immutable; civil rights, recognition by neighbors, and the transformation of legal and institutional practice can progressively transition societies into a post-colonial reality. The same is true for the discourse around the term apartheid in the Israeli-Palestinian context, which, while it captures elements of exclusion, must be recalibrated as tangible legal and civic reforms take hold. This is another area where the confederation offers special promise: by articulating clear benchmarks for equality and reciprocity, and by creating joint oversight bodies with true mediating power, it can anchor real accountability versus rhetorical excess.

    There are also external political and diplomatic dimensions to consider. Confederal and federal solutions will both require the buy-in and at the least passive support of regional neighbors. New arrangements will prompt the recalibration of alliances and risk upsetting long-standing equilibriums. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf States all have relevant interests, as do the United States, the EU, Russia, and China. International organizations must be involved not only as facilitators but as co-guarantors and watchdogs, especially in the delicate early stages of any new arrangement. History provides ample evidence—whether in the Balkans, South Africa, or Northern Ireland—that international mediation and sustained engagement can spell the difference between breakthrough and relapse.

    Successful, federal or confederal solutions have served as models for the resolution of other protracted, ethnically charged conflicts — in Cyprus, Bosnia, Kashmir, and elsewhere — demonstrating that flexible sovereignty and dynamic integration can coexist with national pride and historic grievance. Within Israel and Palestine themselves, such models would enable actors to transcend the binary of victim and perpetrator and embrace a culture of mutual responsibility, shared prosperity and creative problem solving.

    It bears repeating that scepticism — especially after years of broken accords, failed summits, and the haunting proximity of violence — is not only understandable but necessary. There is no guarantee that either federal or confederal arrangements can succeed where so many others have failed. But that cannot be grounds for rejecting the search for new institutional paradigms, especially when the old ones have exhausted their potential and become the source of renewed tragedy.

Not End Points, but Beginnings – Practical Routes to the Future

    What, then, is the endpoint of this analytical inquiry? Federal and confederal solutions are not endpoints or panaceas, but beginnings — practical routes that recognize the complexity of sovereignty, identity, and the emotional charge of coexistence. They demand vision, fortitude, and a willingness to measure justice in the coin of dignity, security, and common gain. Confederalism stands out by insisting that national integrity and cooperation are not mutually exclusive, and by offering incremental, adaptive mechanisms to build and solidify peace. Federalism offers the inspiration of ultimate equality and shared citizenship, but may remain impractical absent a deeper reservoir of trust.

    Both models challenge not only the politics of exclusion and despair, but the very architecture of how conflicts end. They clear the definitional ground for new conversations, and they remind all parties that durable peace is not the enemy of justice or memory, but its condition. The confederation’s increments — reciprocal residency, shared Jerusalem, economic commissions, joint police patrolling, common education – are not concessions to weakness but acknowledgments of courage, the courage to imagine a life together when, for so long, all structures have forced lives apart. The narrative building component is perhaps its most audacious innovation: the idea that peace can begin in the shared telling of story, and in the mutual respect for experience, pain, and triumph.

    For Israelis and Palestinians weary of war and worn down by the cynicism of endless failure, these models point to a future where possibilities are not closed, and where the best of legal, civic, and economic imagination can rise to meet the most stubborn of realities. There will be setbacks, breakdowns, and new reasons for scepticism. Yet, if recent history is any guide, it is precisely at moments of collapse — when illusions of control have faded, and the costs of hostility have become intolerable — that new frameworks can seize the narrative and lay foundations for lasting progress.

    In the end, the attraction of confederal and federal approaches lies in their insistence on agency. The Holy Land Confederation in particular calls for a deliberate, stepwise transformation away from misery and confrontation, offering a living example of how creative institutional architecture can restore hope. It neither denies national ambition nor cedes to the logic of domination, but stakes a claim for dignity, security, and shared future. In the echo of October 7th, in the ruins of Gaza, and in the divided streets of Jerusalem, these solutions seek not heaven, but recovery: the necessary work of peace in a region that has known too little.

    Only by recommitting to the values of partnership, compromise, and rigorous honesty can new political structures become real — not just abstract designs, but bodies that protect and empower all who inhabit the land. The confederation, operational and evolving, offers a path to move from zero sum calculations to positive-sum futures, leveraging interdependence to undercut resentment and raise, at last, the bitterly deferred horizon of peace. Whatever its obstacles, whatever its critics, it represents a return to the promise at the heart of all great diplomatic endeavours: that history is not fate, and that the architecture of coexistence remains, even now, possible.