For decades, the international community has spoken about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the language of process: negotiations, confidencebuilding, stabilization, reconstruction, security arrangements, and political horizons. Palestinians have lived the consequences of that language differently. While diplomacy attempted to manage the conflict, successive Israeli governments expanded control over Palestinian life, land, movement, rights, and political future. The question now is not whether the conflict needs another mechanism. It is whether governments are prepared to confront the entrenched system of control that keeps producing the next crisis.
This is why liberation, for Palestinians, is not an abstract slogan. It is the demand to live free from the actual mechanisms of domination: occupation, blockade, forced displacement, settlement expansion, land confiscation, military rule, collective punishment, and permanent fragmentation. It is the demand not to be managed, pacified, administered, or periodically reconstructed after destruction, but to be recognized as a people with the right to self-determination.
This dispossession did not begin in Gaza in 2023, nor did Israeli control begin with the 1967 occupation. The structures that produced the Nakba were set in motion before 1948, through a national project that pursued sovereignty by transforming the land demographically and territorially, with devastating consequences for the indigenous Palestinian population. Since then, Palestinians have lived through repeated forms of dispossession: expulsion, exile, military rule, siege, settlement expansion, and political fragmentation. Their experiences are not identical, but they are connected by a common structure of denial and control. Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, refugees, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the diaspora are often treated as separate files. Palestinians experience them as parts of one unresolved national question.
This is not only a Palestinian narrative. It is increasingly reflected in the legal record. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful, that Israel is obligated to end that presence as rapidly as possible, and that settlement activity must cease.¹ Two months later, the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel end its unlawful presence in the occupied Palestinian territory within twelve months.² These developments reinforced what diplomacy has too often avoided saying plainly: the occupation is not a temporary problem to be managed until talks resume. It is a legal and political structure that must end.

The Nakba Is Not Only Memory

Yet the facts on the ground continue to move in the opposite direction. Humanitarian reporting has documented worsening conditions across the occupied Palestinian territory, including settler attacks, displacement, movement restrictions, medicine shortages, damaged livelihoods, and fragmented movement between and within Palestinian areas.^{3 4} Recent assessments warn that the West Bank economy is being dismantled through movement restrictions, land confiscation, withheld revenues, and severe financial distress, while Israeli decisions in Hebron and other settlementrelated measures deepen control over land and space.^{5 6} In Gaza, public reporting in June 2026 indicated that more than 1,000 Palestinians had been killed by Israeli fire since the October 2025 truce, while Israeli forces continued to control more than 60 percent of Gaza’s territory and much of the population remained displaced.⁷ A ceasefire without liberation may reduce the scale of war, but it does not end the structures that produce recurring violence.
This is why Palestinians speak of the ongoing Nakba. It is not only memory. It is a lived political structure. In conflict-resolution terms, the problem is not simply that Israelis and Palestinians have failed to reach an agreement. The problem is that one side has had the power to control the conditions under which the other side lives, negotiates, resists, moves, organizes, and imagines its future. A process that ignores this asymmetry is not neutral; it recasts domination as peace. Much of the international response has fallen into this trap. It can mobilize aid, convene meetings, fund civil society, support institutional reform, sponsor dialogue, issue statements, and design transitional mechanisms. But it has been unwilling or unable to impose meaningful costs on the policies that make peace impossible: settlement expansion, annexationist governance, blockade, forced displacement, military impunity, and the denial of Palestinian self-determination.
The issue is not a lack of diplomatic language. The issue is the absence of political will. Political will is measured by consequences, not statements. States that oppose settlement expansion must impose costs when land is confiscated and settlements expand. States that support humanitarian access must not tolerate obstruction or siege conditions as bargaining tools. States that support Palestinian self-determination must stop treating Palestinian representation as optional.

Public Opinion Is Moving Faster Than Governments

Over the past three years, something has shifted that governments have been slow to understand. The shift is among people: students, younger generations, civil society actors, artists, faith communities, labor groups, diaspora communities, and ordinary publics who have watched Gaza’s destruction in real time. Palestinian suffering can no longer be so easily abstracted, ignored, explained away, or buried inside process language. A generation is seeing the Nakba not only as inherited memory, but as a present reality unfolding before them.
Public opinion in many societies has moved faster than governments. Recent global polling shows increasingly unfavorable views of Israel across many countries, especially among younger people in North America and Europe.⁸ In the United States, public sympathy has also shifted markedly, with recent polling showing Americans nearly evenly divided between both sides after decades of a clear Israeli lead.⁹ This reflects a deeper recognition that permanent inequality cannot be made peaceful through better messaging.

Younger Palestinians Are Reclaiming the Language of Liberation

A similar shift is taking place among Palestinians. This does not mean Palestinians have one unified view of the final political formula. Some continue to see two states as the most practical route to sovereignty. Others imagine confederation, one democratic state, or another rightsbased framework in which all people living on the land have equal rights and responsibilities. Recent Palestinian polling reflects this diversity, while also showing support for international legal and diplomatic action, forms of unarmed popular resistance, and continued interest in negotiated outcomes, while identifying occupation as the central threat facing Palestinian society.^{10 11} Across these differences, a deeper consensus is emerging: Palestinians are no longer willing to treat process as progress.
For many Palestinians, especially younger generations, this is not simply a debate about diplomatic formulas. It is a lived reassessment of what decades of “peace process” language have produced. Gaza’s destruction has made the Nakba visible not only as inherited memory, but as renewed trauma in real time: families fleeing bombardment, carrying children, documents, bags, keys, and fragments of a life they may not be able to return to. What was once narrated as family history is now being witnessed as repetition. This has moved many Palestinians away from the language of conflict management and toward the language of liberation, not because they reject coexistence, but because coexistence without equality has too often meant asking Palestinians to normalize their own subjugation.
This shift should not be dismissed as radicalization. It is better understood as a collapse of faith in frameworks that have failed to protect Palestinian life or deliver Palestinian freedom. Palestinians are asking what political reality can ensure that no group rules over another, no ethnicity is preferred above another, and no people’s security is built on another people’s subordination. The institutional formula matters, but the principle must come first: political equality for everyone living on the land.

Peacebuilding Must Be Grounded in Political Reality

For the conflict resolution field, this shift should be heard as a warning, not as a rejection of peacebuilding. Civil society engagement matters. People need spaces where dehumanization can be challenged and where relationships across lines of fear, grief, and separation can be built. Still, people-to-people work cannot substitute for political intervention, and dialogue on its own cannot stop settlement expansion, lift a blockade, end military occupation, protect civilians, enforce international law, or create sovereignty. Recent Palestinian criticism of the peacebuilding industry has made a similar point: too much elite peacebuilding takes place in conference rooms, recycles familiar participants and organizations, and measures success by events, reports, and donor outputs rather than by social impact, democratic legitimacy, or engagement with the difficult realities on the ground.¹²
The problem is not dialogue. It is dialogue stripped of power, accountability, and political purpose. In a context of deep asymmetry, peacebuilding cannot be limited to helping people understand one another while the structures around them remain untouched. Serious peacebuilding must support those trying to change the conditions that make peace impossible: Palestinian and Israeli organizations documenting human rights abuses, challenging occupation, annexation, settlement expansion, home demolitions, displacement, and restrictions on movement; defending civic space; advancing legal and political accountability; protecting vulnerable communities and building public pressure for equality and rights. This kind of work does not ask civil society to perform coexistence inside an unjust reality. It helps Palestinians and Israelis confront the structures that sustain the conflict while building the civic power needed for any future political agreement to be legitimate, accountable, and durable.

Decolonization Is a Practical Political Demand

This is why decolonization has to be understood as a practical political demand, not only a moral or historical frame. In policy terms, decolonization does not mean replacing one domination with another. It means dismantling structures of control and building a
political order based on freedom, equality, accountability, and self-determination. Operationally, this means ending the policies and institutions that give Israel effective control over Palestinian territory, borders, movement, resources, security, and political authority. For Palestinians, it means ending Israel’s ability to decide whether Palestinians can build, travel, return, farm, vote, govern, access water, receive aid, reconstruct homes, or live without fear of military violence.
Israeli society, like Palestinian society, contains many voices and political currents. There are Israeli groups and individuals, inside Israel and across the diaspora, who have challenged occupation, opposed dehumanization, defended Palestinian rights, and worked for a future based on equality and shared security. Inside Israel, those voices appear increasingly marginalized in the current political climate, even as similar voices have become more visible and organized in parts of the Jewish and Israeli diaspora. That plurality matters because it creates openings for change, even when some of those openings are emerging from outside Israel. At the same time, meaningful change requires confronting the reality of Israeli state policy, military control, settlement expansion, and unequal power.

Security Cannot Be Built on Permanent Insecurity

Recognizing that reality also does not deny Israeli humanity or Israeli fear. Israeli civilians have the right to live in security, and the attacks of October 7, caused real fear, grief, and loss. But fear cannot justify killing civilians, mass destruction, starvation, dehumanizing rhetoric, or permanent domination over another people. Security cannot be built by making another population permanently insecure. For Israeli leaders, institutions, and political constituencies that seek lasting security, deeper military control will not provide it. Walls, weapons, siege, surveillance, raids, and settlements may produce temporary tactical gains, but they do not produce peace. Real security requires Israelis to move away from the belief that Palestinian freedom is a threat and return
to the political table with Palestinian counterparts as equals whose rights cannot be postponed.

Liberation Requires Palestinian Representation and Agency

Palestinians living under occupation have never lacked the will to resist domination. But resistance must be connected to a broader national project capable of protecting Palestinian life, rebuilding political unity, and advancing liberation. That requires renewed representative structures, accountable governance, and a strategy that reconnects Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, refugees, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the diaspora. No people can be liberated by representatives appointed by others, and no liberation project can succeed without legitimate Palestinian ownership.
At the same time, Palestinians cannot be asked to renounce every form of resistance while legal, political, and civic avenues are blocked or ignored. Palestinians have pursued legal advocacy, human rights documentation, civil society organizing, international court action, diplomatic recognition, boycott campaigns, journalism, education, and nonviolent mobilization. Too often, these efforts are delegitimized, criminalized, defunded, or dismissed. In 2021, Israel designated six leading Palestinian human rights and civil
society organizations — including Al-Haq, Addameer, Defense for Children International-Palestine, Bisan Center for Research and Development, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, and the Union of Palestinian Women Committees — as “terrorist organizations,” a move condemned by international human rights organizations as an attack on Palestinian civil society and human rights defenders.¹³ Leaving Palestinians without meaningful legal, diplomatic, civic, or political instruments is not a path to moderation; it is a recipe for recurring violence.
This is the standard against which current proposals must be judged. They cannot be assessed only by whether they deliver aid, create committees, mobilize pledges, or produce interim security arrangements. They must be judged by whether they dismantle control and transfer real authority to Palestinians. On that test, the Board of Peace proposal illustrates the danger of the old model surviving under new language.

The Board of Peace Repackages Domination as Governance

The Security Council’s endorsement of the Board of Peace and an International Stabilization Force placed the Gaza transition within a U.S.-backed framework of reconstruction, security, and transitional administration.¹⁴ The Board’s own May 2026 report acknowledged that the framework remained incomplete: funds had been pledged but not fully disbursed, the Palestinian technocratic committee had not entered Hamas-controlled areas, the International Stabilization Force was still in preparation, and reconstruction remained tied to verified decommissioning.¹⁵ Additional public reporting noted a major funding gap in a rebuilding plan estimated at roughly $70 billion, with $17 billion pledged but not sufficiently disbursed.¹⁶
The problem is deeper than implementation delay. A recent policy analysis argued that the U.S. administration’s decision to treat the Board as an international nongovernmental organization, rather than a public international or multilateral body, weakens assumptions that some states and Security Council members may have relied upon when they endorsed it.¹⁷ If the Board operates as an INGO, legal, financial, congressional, and international oversight guardrails are far less clear. A body that claims to prepare Gaza for self-government cannot credibly do so while Palestinians lack authority within it and power over governance and reconstruction remains concentrated outside Palestinian hands. It also risks assigning Palestinians responsibility without authority: they may be blamed for administrative failure while borders, financing, security, reconstruction conditions, and ultimate political direction remain controlled elsewhere.
If Palestinians are asked to administer Gaza inside a framework designed elsewhere, financed elsewhere, secured elsewhere, and politically conditioned elsewhere, that is not liberation. It is reorganization under external control. As I have argued elsewhere, the danger of the Board of Peace is not only that it may fail to stabilize Gaza, but that it may succeed administratively while reproducing a modified version of the status quo: a technocratic framework that manages crisis without transferring real authority to Palestinians or addressing the structures of control that produced the crisis.¹⁸ Gaza cannot be rebuilt as a detached reconstruction zone; its future must be reconnected to the broader Palestinian question, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem, refugees, and the Palestinian right to self-determination.

The Way Forward: From Conflict Management to Palestinian Self-Determination

The way forward requires a different starting point. The international community must stop asking how Palestinians can be managed after each crisis and begin asking what must change so that Palestinians and Israelis can live with freedom, dignity, and security. This requires moving from conflict management to decolonization in practical terms. 

In Gaza, this means the answer to a failing Board of Peace is not another external authority. It requires shifting from a personalized, externally controlled board to a Palestinian-owned, UN-coordinated framework that uses institutions already operating in Gaza. Humanitarian delivery should be led through the established UN and humanitarian system, including UNRWA, OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNICEF, ICRC, and independent international and Palestinian NGOs. Early recovery and reconstruction should be coordinated through existing Palestinian-linked mechanisms, including the Palestinian Authority’s recovery plans, the World Bank’s Palestinian Fund for Reconstruction and Development, and UNDP/PAPP’s operational capacity in rubble removal, municipal rehabilitation, livelihoods, and infrastructure.^{19 20} Palestinian municipalities, professional associations, civil society, and technocrats should be empowered as implementers, not treated as subcontractors for decisions made elsewhere.
This would not resolve Palestine’s political future. But it would avoid the Board’s most dangerous flaw: assigning Palestinians administrative responsibility while denying them political authority. It would also require Israel and international actors to remove the restrictions that prevent humanitarian organizations from operating at scale. Aid cannot be urgently demanded while access for humanitarian organizations is politically obstructed. Any serious reconstruction framework must guarantee full humanitarian access, protect UNRWA’s mandate and operations, restore access for barred or restricted aid organizations, and ensure that reconstruction funds are tied to Palestinian rights, local ownership, and the territorial unity of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.²¹
Beyond Gaza’s administrative and reconstruction framework, the same principle must shape the broader political path. An enforceable ceasefire, full humanitarian access, and civilian protection are necessary first steps. So is the release of Palestinians held without charge or trial, including those in prolonged administrative detention, and the protection of all detainees and prisoners under international law. But these measures cannot be the end point. Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza, and its control over large parts of the territory, are not temporary technical matters; they are central obstacles to implementing the ceasefire framework, moving to the next phase, and enabling Palestinian governance and reconstruction. Israeli control over Palestinian territory and daily life must be dismantled: occupation, blockade, settlement expansion, land confiscation, home demolitions, forced displacement, and restrictions on movement, economic life, and institutional capacity.
Palestinian political renewal must also be supported without being controlled. Palestinians need legitimate, representative, accountable national leadership that can reconnect Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, refugees, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the diaspora. International actors can support such a process, but they cannot own it. Palestinian agency cannot be subcontracted.
Reconstruction must be rights-based. Rebuilding Gaza is not only an engineering project. It is a question of land, housing, property, return, compensation, public services, local economy, trauma, education, health, and legitimacy. Accountability must also become part of diplomacy. The International Criminal Court’s 2024 arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas figures underscored that accountability is not external to conflict resolution but part of any credible political order.²² Major human rights organizations have characterized Israel’s rule over Palestinians as a system of domination, apartheid, and persecution.^{23 24} These assessments are contested by Israel and its supporters, but they reflect a growing body of analysis that cannot be dismissed by renewed process language.
Israeli security must be reimagined through equality. Israelis will not be secure as long as Palestinians are dominated. Palestinians will not be free as long as Israeli security is defined as control over Palestinian life. A serious political solution must provide safety for both peoples, based on mutual recognition, enforceable rights, protection of civilians, and legitimate political agreement.

The International Community Must Move from Statements to Consequences

The international community must use leverage. For policymakers, this means conditioning military, diplomatic, and financial support on compliance with international law; refusing to recognize or facilitate annexationist realities; imposing consequences for settlement expansion, forced displacement, and obstruction of humanitarian access; supporting Palestinian political renewal without appointing Palestinian representatives from outside; protecting Palestinian civil society and legal advocacy; and refusing to legitimize any Gaza governance mechanism that lacks Palestinian authority, transparent financing, independent oversight, and a clear transfer of power. This requires enforceable benchmarks and consequences, not another process dependent on voluntary compliance.

The United States has shown in other regional files, including recent and still uncertain diplomacy with Iran, that it can use urgency, timelines, incentives, pressure, and consequences when it defines an issue as strategically important.²⁵ Iran is not a template for Israel-Palestine, and the outcome of that diplomacy remains uncertain. The comparison still illustrates a basic point: Washington can apply pressure when it chooses to do so. It should bring that same urgency to Israel-Palestine. Washington should make clear
to the current Israeli government, and to any future Israeli government after elections, that U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial support is not unconditional. This is no longer a marginal position: mainstream policy voices, including liberal pro-Israel advocates, have argued that U.S. assistance should be tied to Israeli actions, compliance with U.S. law, and alignment with U.S. interests and values.²⁶ Continued support should be linked to concrete steps: a permanent ceasefire, full humanitarian access, an end to forced
displacement and settlement expansion, protection of Palestinian civil society, real Palestinian authority in Gaza, and a political pathway that ends occupation and recognizes Palestinian self-determination.

Real Conflict Resolution Requires a New Political Imagination

Palestinian liberation is not a project of reversing domination; it is a project of ending domination. It means the ability to live, govern, move, build, remember, return, and decide. For Israelis, the choice is also profound. They can continue down the path of militarized control, dehumanization, and permanent conflict, or they can recognize that Palestinian freedom is not the enemy of Israeli security. It is the condition for it.
The conflict will not end because Palestinians are forced to disappear politically, surrender their rights, or accept permanent subordination. Nor will it end because Israel becomes more powerful. Power can contain Palestinians, fragment them, and delay their freedom, but it cannot turn domination into peace.
This requires more than a ceasefire and more than reconstruction. It requires a new political imagination. Whether the outcome is two states, confederation, or another rights-based framework, the principle must be non-negotiable: no group above another, no permanent control of one people by another, and no security built on dehumanization. The question is not whether one formula can be imposed in advance, but whether any formula can be credible while one people continues to rule over another. It also requires governments, publics, institutions, universities, unions, legal bodies, and civil society to continue shifting the political cost of maintaining the status quo.
For too long, Palestinians have been treated as a population to be administered, contained, or rebuilt after each destruction. Real conflict resolution will require a different political imagination: one in which peace is not defined by the absence of open war, but by the end of domination, the recognition of Palestinian freedom, and a political order in which no people governs another.

Endnotes

¹ International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, July 19, 2024.
² UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24, “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” September 18, 2024.
³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Situation Report: Occupied Palestinian Territory, June 12, 2026.
⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Situation Report: Occupied Palestinian Territory, May 25, 2026.
⁵ International Crisis Group, Chokehold: Countering Israel’s Grip on the West Bank Economy, June 2026; Sam Metz, “The economy in the occupied West Bank is being dismantled, report says,” Associated Press, June 15, 2026.
⁶ Yosri Al-Jamal and Steven Scheer, “Israel seizes powers over flashpoint West Bank shrine from Palestinians,” Reuters, June 16, 2026.
⁷ Reuters, “Details of Gaza ceasefire agreement,” October 10, 2025; Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Death toll from Israeli fire in Gaza since ceasefire passes 1,000, says health ministry,” Reuters, June 18, 2026.
⁸ Pew Research Center, global public opinion survey on views of Israel across 36 countries, June 2026.
⁹ Gallup, U.S. public opinion polling on American sympathies toward Israelis and Palestinians, February 2026.
¹⁰ Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96, October 2025.
¹¹ Arab Barometer, Palestine survey data on governance, political trust, and attitudes toward political options, 2024–2026; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, polling on Palestinian political preferences and attitudes toward negotiation, resistance, and occupation, 2025–2026.
¹² Samer Sinijlawi, “The Paris Conference, the peace industry, and the illusion of representation,” The Jerusalem Post, June 11, 2026; Carol Daniel Kasbari, “The Trilemma of Power, Aid, and Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Context,” Middle East Institute, June 21, 2021.

¹³ Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, “Israel/OPT: Designation of Palestinian civil society groups as terrorists a brazen attack on human rights,” October 22, 2021; Adalah, “Israel’s declaration of 6 Palestinian human rights groups
as ‘terrorist organizations,’” December 30, 2021.
¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2803, November 2025, endorsing the Gaza framework and authorizing an International Stabilization Force.
¹⁵ Board of Peace, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, S/2026/418, May 15, 2026.
¹⁶ Emma Farge and Alexander Cornwell, “Trump’s Gaza board reports funding ‘gap,’ urges quicker disbursement,” Reuters, May 19, 2026.
¹⁷ Zaha Hassan, “Board Up Donald Trump’s Failed Board of Peace,” Diwan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 17, 2026.
¹⁸ Carol Daniel-Kasbari, “From Ambiguous Governance to Stabilization Failure in Gaza: The Limits of the Board of Peace,” IPI Global Observatory, February 19, 2026; Carol Daniel-Kasbari, “How to Keep Resolution 2803 From Becoming a U.S.–Run Occupation,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, December 10, 2025.
¹⁹ Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Palestinians use Gaza rubble to restore streets as US rebuilding plan stalls,” Reuters, April 27, 2026; UNDP/PAPP, “Japan and UNDP scale up debris and waste management in Gaza with fresh contribution of USD 9.1 million,” April 16, 2026.
²⁰ World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza,” country program page, 2026; World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, 2026.
²¹ Emma Farge, “UNRWA head warns on agency’s future work in Gaza ahead of his departure,” Reuters, March 20, 2026; Human Rights Watch, “Israel: Aid Groups Barred From Gaza, West Bank,” February 24, 2026.
²² International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine, arrest warrants issued for Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant, and Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, November 21, 2024.
²³ Human Rights Watch, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, April 2021.
²⁴ Amnesty International, Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity, February 2022.
²⁵ Reuters, “US and Iran make ‘encouraging progress’ at talks although tension remains,” June 22, 2026; Reuters, “Netanyahu and Trump on collision course as US, Iran agree to halt war,” June 15, 2026; Reuters, “IAEA chief says Iran inspections will go ahead, working on modalities,” June 24, 2026.
²⁶ Brookings Institution, “Equality as a guiding principle for US policy on Israel-Palestine,” March 25, 2026; Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “Peace Through Leverage in Gaza: How to Limit Hamas’s Influence and Ensure Israel’s Compliance,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2, 2026; J Street, “J Street’s Policy Agenda for the Trump Administration,” 2026; J Street, “Reassessing the US-Israel Security Relationship,” April 13, 2026.