Although October 7, 2023 marked the beginning of a devastating war whose primary victims were the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, its population, infrastructure, and cultural fabric, the conflict quickly evolved into a regional confrontation that reignited long‑standing wounds across the Middle East. What began in Gaza soon expanded to the capitals of Tehran and Sana’a, to the Gulf countries, and further to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. It also emboldened Israel to pursue a different kind of campaign in the West Bank; one aimed at eliminating national Palestinian rights and existence as a key to a resolution of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict once and for all rather than continuing to manage it as it had for many years.
The war coincided with the rise of an extreme right‑wing Israeli leadership, backed by the weaponry and ideological support of the American Evangelists and the right of the Republican Party under President Donald Trump. This alignment enabled the conflict to escalate to unprecedented levels, including an open discussion of a project to establish a “Greater Israel” encompassing territories of allied Arab states, restructuring the Arab region, annexing the West Bank, forming a new military alliance between Israel and Somaliland to give Israel access to the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait and challenge the Houthis control of it, and pursuing efforts to topple the Iranian regime with the explicit aim of dismantling its political and military leadership network.
The manner in which this initially bilateral war (Israel–Gaza) transformed into a trilateral or even multilateral confrontation, through the United States acting by proxy alongside Israel against Iran, and subsequently into a broad regional conflict encompassing most countries of the Middle East, combined with the inability to achieve decisive outcomes on any of these fronts, places us today before a complex impasse. The expanding scope of Israeli objectives, driven by the ambitions of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his extremist government, further complicates the landscape. As a result, it has become difficult to issue any definitive judgment regarding the outcomes of these arenas or to assess their future impact on the political configuration of the region.
To begin, and as a reminder of the key pillars that shaped the motives of the joint Israeli American vision for the war’s objectives and trajectory, we can conclude the following aims:
1. Prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program and dismantle its network of regional proxies.
2. Neutralize the capabilities of Iran’s proxy network through coordinated action with regional states, in order to limit its ability to operate across borders.
3. Consolidate American leadership in the region.
4. Deepen strategic integration and joint military development between the United States and Israel.
5. Advance the “Three Seas Initiative”: linking the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf under a unified command structure.
6. Treat Arab states as secondary partners, while consistently working to dismantle any armed force not aligned with the U.S.–Israeli security framework and ensuring that the core conflict remains unresolved under all circumstances.
Preliminary Conclusions
The small and large wars that have unfolded across the region over the past three years have produced fundamental shifts that now serve as the basis for anticipated trajectories of regional change. Among these:
First: This war, whether in its Israeli‑led campaign in Gaza or in its confrontation with Iran, has underscored the profound costs of direct military engagement in the absence of a strategic political horizon capable of guiding the conflict. This reality has pushed all parties toward a model of crisis management and long‑term conflict containment rather than toward decisive outcomes framed in terms of victory or defeat. The battles have proven impossible to resolve through the application of “maximum force,” given the determination of the opposing actors, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis, to resist aggression, refuse defeat, and reject the consequences imposed upon them, despite the severe human toll borne by civilians.
Second: It has also become increasingly evident that the current Israeli extreme right leadership views the Palestinian people as a strategic existential threat. The government appears to have moved beyond the stage of conflict management toward re‑engineering the Palestinian reality, creating conditions that render life unsustainable in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and pushing the population toward a third wave of displacement following the wars of 1948 and 1967. Israel has shifted from rejecting the two‑state solution to seeking the elimination of any Palestinian political or administrative entity, even one with limited authority. This approach includes efforts to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, weaken all Palestinian actors, and impose new demographic and geographic realities in the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967.
The Israeli government has also perceived an opportunity to assert absolute Israeli dominance over the region and reshape the Middle East according to its strategic interests. This vision encompasses new arenas such as Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Türkiye, and Iran. Israel has expanded its presence into southern Syria, sought to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, proposed security buffer zones in southern Lebanon, and pursued U.S.‑brokered security arrangements with both Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, it has extended its reach into Somaliland, formally recognizing it and establishing a security presence near the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait as mentioned above.
Israel’s open articulation of its expansionist ambitions has posed a direct threat to the interests and security of key regional powers, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This has prompted these states to seek new partners in Türkiye and Pakistan, leveraging their role as intermediaries between the United States and Iran. The aim has been to provide reassurance and help shape a regional security architecture capable of addressing the Gulf states’ security concerns.
Third: The war has also exposed, to an unprecedented degree, the limitations of American protection for the Gulf states and clarified the obstacles that complicate any full U.S. return to the region. It has become evident that the extensive American military presence, spread across dozens of bases, has functioned more as a liability than a safeguard for Gulf countries. Rather than deterring Iran, it facilitated Iran’s ability to strike and neutralize U.S. military assets deployed across the region, destabilizing all Gulf states and forcing them to bear significant costs without prior consultation. The war has revealed the limited capacity of the United States to exercise comprehensive control over the Middle East, while underscoring the decisive importance of the Gulf states in the region’s security and energy equations.
Fourth: The Gulf states themselves responded to the war in varying ways. The United Arab Emirates emerged with a particularly prominent role through its close alliance with Israel, while Oman maintained its traditionally neutral and mediating posture throughout the conflict. Despite sustaining significant military strikes, none of these states, except the UAE, declared war on Iran.
Pakistan also emerged with a notably adept role in the realm of public diplomacy, with ongoing discussions about potential defense‑oriented alliances involving Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The options available to the Gulf states for building their military and security architecture, as currently understood, are unlikely to rely on new alliances with Russia or China. Rather, they point toward continued procurement of American weapons, exploring avenues for de‑escalation and normalization with Iran as a neighboring power, reassessing the presence of U.S. military bases on their territories, and addressing the challenges of the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, and energy transport through frameworks of regional peaceful cooperation.
Fifth: This war has undoubtedly weakened Iran’s military capabilities; however, its resolve to resist, whether against the United States or Israel, has not diminished, either within its own territory or across the region. Iran continued to target U.S. and Israeli interests and actively sought to impose a ceasefire, particularly in Lebanon. It also became clear that Iran’s regional role has expanded and become central to controlling international trade routes and global energy flows through its influence over navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, while significantly strengthening its maritime deterrence capabilities across the entire region.
In the overall outcome, the war with Iran has not, thus far, produced decisive results, neither in terms of regime change, nor in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, nor in dismantling or neutralizing Iran’s regional influence, nor in achieving a political or military resolution.
Sixth: Regional hostility toward Israel has intensified, particularly as a result of the war on Gaza. Across the region, Israel is increasingly viewed as the primary threat after the United States, and it has come to be seen as a liability for American policy in the Middle East. A review of several public‑opinion surveys conducted in 2024 shows that 44% of respondents consider Israel the greatest danger, followed by the United States at 21%, and Iran at 6%. During the same period, 87% of a large survey sample expressed opposition to normalization with Israel, especially in light of the continuous statements by Israeli politicians declaring expansionist intentions toward all neighboring states in the region.
Seventh: While Israel has been preoccupied with the Iranian threat in the region, it has also closely monitored the expansion of Turkish (Sunni) influence in Libya and Syria, viewing it as a growing danger to its national security. Israel perceives the rise of moderate Islamic ideologies, those that employ anti‑Zionism as a tool for reviving the idea of a caliphate and unifying the Muslim world, as an emerging and imminent threat. This concern has intensified with Pakistan’s entry into the mediation track with Iran, alongside the deepening Saudi‑Egyptian‑Turkish rapprochement with Islamabad. In response, Israel has launched sustained media campaigns aimed at undermining Türkiye’s democratic system, isolating it regionally, weakening its influence within NATO, reassessing U.S. arms deals with Ankara, and diminishing its role in Syria and across the western Arab region.
The sharp tensions characterizing Israeli‑Turkish relations suggest the possibility of new confrontations emerging between the two sides once the current war subsides.
Conclusion
A review of the war’s trajectories and the transformations it has produced across the region confirms that we remain in a state of strategic vacuum. All agreements concluded in the region, whether in Gaza or with Lebanon, Syria, Iran, or the Houthis, are tactical and temporary in nature, and remain highly susceptible to renewed escalation.
The U.S.–Israeli relationship itself is coming under significant strain due to diverging strategies for managing the region and shaping its future, particularly in light of Israel’s insistence on imposing its vision by force, whether on the Palestinian question or on regional dynamics. This approach does not necessarily align with American interests or with the limits of U.S. political and military will and capabilities.
President Trump’s personality and his distinctive approach to international politics have become a central factor in shaping the current administration’s direction. The U.S. president has demonstrated, on several occasions, his ability to restrain Israel, opening the door to potential divergences in strategic outlook and prompting a reassessment of regional calculations.
U.S.–Israeli relations are under considerable strain due to diverging strategic approaches to managing the region and shaping its future. Israel’s insistence on imposing its own vision by force, whether on the Palestinian question or broader regional dynamics, does not necessarily align with American interests or with the political and military constraints facing the U.S. administration.
President Trump’s distinctive personality and unconventional approach to international affairs remain crucial in shaping the administration’s direction. On several occasions, he has demonstrated an ability to restrain Israel, opening the door to potential divergences in strategic vision and prompting a reassessment of regional calculations.
Two principal junctures now lie ahead that may influence, or even alter, the trajectory of the recent wars. The first is the early Israeli elections scheduled for October 27th, which may yield new political and military leadership with a revised strategic vision for ending these conflicts, including the broader Arab–Israeli dispute. Although a clear solution is unlikely to emerge soon, any shift toward an international, particularly American, framework, combined with Israel’s inability to advance plans aimed at ending the Palestinian question through displacement or the gradual erosion of Palestinian capacities, preserves the possibility of reviving a negotiated process later on, backed by broad international support and regional endorsement.
The second juncture is the U.S. elections, and the accompanying American mediation expected this fall. Their outcome will significantly shape the level of U.S. support for Israel and influence Washington’s assessment of the post‑war landscape, the structure of any eventual settlement, and the role of regional actors, such as the Abraham Accords partners, Türkiye, and Pakistan, in shaping it. The anticipated Palestinian legislative elections this year also form part of these complex developments; their results would primarily reinforce Palestinian resilience and help sustain daily life until a resolution to the conflict with Israel is reached. Together, these junctures highlight the striking resilience of the Palestinian people, whose ability to absorb repeated blows, and whose steadfast resolve remains clearly visible despite the brutality and intensity of the war.