The settlement enterprise in the West Bank has been one of the most
successful, as well as one of the most pernicious features of the
thirty-five years of Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.
No effective and viable Israeli-Palestinian peace can be achieved
without tackling both the causes for, and the results of, the
concerted settlement campaign.
The motives underlying the establishment of Israeli settlements
across the Green Line have varied over the years. The earliest
settlements, in the Jordan River Valley, were created ostensibly
for security reasons. The security argument has been used to excuse
if not to justify all subsequent construction (although events have
shown, time and again, that such initiatives proved to be a severe
liability in times of crisis). Some settlements and their
satellites (Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba) were set up for ostensibly
historical reasons. Others were constructed to meet the growing
demand for cheap housing (Ariel, Ma'aleh Adumim), and others still
for patently nationalistic and/or messianic reasons (the Jewish
settlement in the heart of Hebron, the return to "Joseph's Tomb" in
Nablus, to mention but two). All too often, regardless of the
reasons behind the motives for establishing a settlement, the whole
settlement operation was defended in political terms, as a
bargaining chip in the negotiating process.
Three Reasons for Settlement
These well-known reasons for settlement expansion - which have been
analyzed at length for years - are not as important as the
objectives they sought to achieve. As time progressed, it became
abundantly clear that the settler leadership had three main
purposes in mind. First, settlers wanted to fulfill a vision of a
Greater Land of Israel, of Israeli control of the entire area
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.
Second, therefore, settlements were purposely placed in areas that
would separate Palestinian population clusters, denying the
possibility of Palestinian territorial integrity not only in the
West Bank, but also in the Gaza Strip. This intention was
reinforced by the bypass road plan implemented during the past
decade, which impeded Palestinian mobility and, along with the
lateral roads linking the Tel Aviv area with the Dead Sea, totally
truncated the West Bank. Behind these concerted actions lay the
notion that the mere existence of strategically located settlements
would prevent the creation of a Palestinian state.
Third, settlers and settlements sought to complicate, if not
defeat, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Since no successful
conclusion of the Palestinian-Israeli talks can be anticipated
without agreements on the territorial dimension, the presence of
settlements throughout the area was intended to obstruct a
permanent agreement. Settlement expansion and fortification,
therefore, have had distinctly political goals consistently at odds
with the quest for peace and the possibilities of its
realization.
A 'Success Story'
Perhaps as troubling as the motives for this activity have been the
reasons for its success. The more than 160 settlements established
since 1967 were created with the compliance of the government in
office, and frequently with its active support. The post-1967 Labor
governments of Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin promoted settlement in
the Jordan Valley and approved the return of Gush Etzion. These
leaders did not act assertively to thwart illegal efforts of Gush
Emunim to set up footholds in Sebastia in the Nablus area and in
Hebron. When Menachem Begin, after his election to office in 1977,
retroactively legalized the Sebastia (Elon Moreh) initiative,
official backing for settlement was sanctioned. The state offered
funding, tax incentives, services, protection, and legal backing to
the well-organized and politically influential successors of Gush
Emunim (Amana, and later, the Yesha Council).
With an arrogance bordering on folly, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak
Shamir repeatedly ignored international protestations of settlement
activity, United States queries, opposition demands to put an end
to settlement expansion, and Palestinian voices that cautioned
against such action. By the time Yitzhak Rabin came to power in
1992, caravans had turned into cities and dirt paths had become
highways that separated Palestinians from each other. The late
prime minister, despite the launching of the Oslo process, was not
anxious to confront the settlers, who were the backbone of the most
vocal (and ultimately violent) opposition to his peace policy.
During his tenure, new settlement plans were approved, existing
outposts were expanded, and (official statements notwithstanding)
insufficient steps were taken to halt construction.
The Land Grab
When Binyamin Netanyahu came to office in 1996, a signal was sent
(directly and via Ariel Sharon, then minister of infrastructure) to
begin a land grab. Sharon cajoled settlers "to take the hilltops."
Roads to illegal sites were approved, pipelines laid, building
materials supplied, and protests ridiculed. In many respects, this
policy was pursued as a means of diminishing the fragile trust
between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, thereby undermining
the peace process in its entirety. In the three years of the
Netanyahu administration, 42 new sites were established, a full 30
in the waning months of his government after the signing of the Wye
River Memorandum in November 1998.
Ehud Barak could not ignore the inheritance passed on by his
predecessors. His decision to dismantle 15 outposts (the first such
action by an Israeli leader) in fact gave ex post facto
authorization to the other illegal encampments. Thus, the debate
over the legality of particular settlements actually accentuated
the reluctance to grapple with the basic question of the legitimacy
of the settlement enterprise as a whole.
This ambiguity has accompanied all the negotiations on the
permanent settlement between Israel and Palestine during the past
year. It peaked in the most deadly way during the violence which
broke out throughout the occupied territories at the end of
September [2000]. The Al-Aqsa Intifada has focused squarely on the
most blatant and provocative settler sites. Tens of Palestinians
were killed and hundreds wounded by Israeli soldiers defending a
handful of Jewish families in Netzarim, Psagot, and Hebron, as well
as religious fundamentalists in the heart of Nablus.
A Security Liability
The short-term lesson on these events is clear. Most settlements
are fast becoming a security liability of the highest order. They
attract the ire - and the fire - of Palestinian protesters, and
their protection has exacted an enormous price in people and
resources for reasons that are difficult to fathom. The long-term
lesson is more important: no real peace can be achieved without
accepting the principle of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank
and Gaza. Statehood implies territorial control. The land-for-peace
question is therefore at the heart of the dispute and its
resolution is imperative if the negotiations are to be
salvaged.
A candid Israeli debate on the settlements is long overdue. To
date, no frank discussion of this sort has taken place. The
discourse on the settlements has been dictated by the Israeli
right. The emotional appeal has relied on the disingenuous argument
that it is inhuman to uproot people from their homes. Those who
support such a move are depicted as cold-hearted and cruel. The
pragmatic defense of settlements has been more sophisticated: the
settlements exist, and any agreement must take into account the
changing situation on the ground. But neither of these points
addresses the core of the problem: the need to choose between
settlements and a viable peace. The new terms of debate compel
Israelis to decide whether they are willing to mortgage the future
of the state to the sometimes-whimsical desires of 200,000 settlers
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Four Aspects to a Resolution of the Problem
A fourfold formula for dealing with the settlement issue has been
in place for several years. The time has come to air it publicly
and to translate it into action. The first element of a settlement
solution involves the complete dismantling of small and scattered
settlement sites. Places such as Ganim, Kadim, and Masuah, as well
as the entire Jewish infrastructure in Gaza (to name but a few)
were strategically dispersed throughout the territories to preclude
any agreement. Just as the Israeli presence in "Joseph's Tomb"
could no longer be justified nor assured, so, too, must these
positions be evacuated. Now that a critical precedent has been set,
it may be easier to apply it to other locations as well.
The second aspect to a resolution of the settlement question is
essentially financial. Since many of those living across the Green
Line moved there to improve their standard of living, they can be
wooed back to within the boundaries of the State of Israel by
economic means. A fund that offers monetary incentives to those
returning to Israel would fall on very receptive ears today,
especially if it guarantees the maintenance of lifestyles prevalent
in the settlements elsewhere. The need for such an investment in
peace has been recognized for quite some time. Now it must be
carried out.
The third component of the solution entails negotiation. It is far
more difficult to transplant large concentrations of Israeli
settlers than it is to remove small outposts. The Camp David talks
explored the possibility of boundary adjustments, which would place
the major settlement clusters under Israeli sovereignty by
agreement. The prospects of an exchange of territories in such an
eventuality were not dismissed out of hand. In the aftermath of the
Al-Aqsa Intifada, it is clear that only a qualitatively equitable
land deal may be possible.
Finally, today, more than ever, it is evident that if any settlers
remain in place, they will have to accept the authority of the
Palestinian state. Israel will not be able to bear responsibility
for the well-being of those of its citizens who insist on staying,
of their own volition, within the jurisdiction of an independent
Palestine.
These four interrelated and mutually reinforcing facets of the
resolution of the settlement issue are by their very nature
difficult and complex. Their adoption and implementation in the
months ahead will be further complicated by the emotional and
psychological scars created by the recent round of violence.
Abandoning the Settlement Enterprise
The settlements are the linchpin of the talks over boundaries and
security that have informed the efforts to create a Palestinian
state by agreement. They will unquestioningly become the targets of
a unilateral declaration of independence. Yet sadly, the settlers
and their supporters acknowledge that their ongoing presence is a
recipe for the continuation of violence. Most people in both
communities still refuse to bow to this verdict of escalation. If
they really want to avoid such an eventuality, then there is no
escaping the conclusion that concrete steps must be taken to
abandon the settlement enterprise. Such an understanding is
essential to any political accord and, consequently, to securing
the future of all the peoples on the land.