Many observers within and outside of Israel have tried to analyze
what made Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a well-known "hawk" and one
of the founding fathers of the Jewish settlement project, place on
the table his highly controversial unilateral disengagement plan.
This plan - whether eventually fully implemented or not -
legitimized the pulling out of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from
Gaza under heavy Palestinian fire, a move that clearly contradicted
Sharon's position that no concession should be made under
Palestinian threat of violence against Israel. It also legitimized
the evacuation of all Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and some
in the West Bank, which in the past he had defined as critical to
Israel's security. It should be emphasized that the disengagement
plan, as put forward by Sharon, was not conditioned by any
Palestinian reciprocal move - a rather strange decision, taking
into consideration the traditional insistence of all past Israeli
governments on the quid pro quo principle. The reasons for this
allegedly unexplainable policy have been extensively discussed by
experts and the media. Speculations ranged from Sharon's personal
psychological motivation to be remembered by future generations as
the statesman who achieved a breakthrough in the dead-end path of
the failed Oslo process, to a Machiavellian strategic master plan,
envisioned by him, to deepen the occupation in the West Bank by
diverting external and domestic attention to the relatively limited
move and concessions in Gaza.
We would like to suggest that, whatever major explanation one may
come up with or prefer, the wide and stable public support for this
move, since it was first announced, has been a crucial factor
contributing to the plan's sustenance and the steps necessary for
its implementation. In other words, the strong backing of
Israeli-Jewish public opinion provided Sharon with a formidable
ally in his efforts to go ahead with the plan in the face of fierce
opposition from the radical right and from his own party.
Deep Change in Israeli Thinking
The past four years, from October 2000 when the al-Aqsa intifada
broke out to the time of the writing of this article (December
2004), were characterized by extreme violence as well as by deep
disillusionment with the possibility of making peace between
Israelis and Palestinians in the foreseeable future. These negative
regional developments, the dismal impression left by the collapse
of the Oslo process, the unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks
against Israeli civilians within the Green Line and the tough
Israeli counter-measures, unfolding against the traumatic global
background of 9/11, created a deep change in Israeli thinking about
the Middle East conflict and the feasibility of the different means
of dealing with it. It is not surprising that, today, the most
devoted supporters of the Oslo framework are thinking, at most, in
terms of conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Those
who doubted the possibility of moving away from war in the first
place are now viewing the situation in terms of a war.
Self-Encapsulating Mentality
The convergence of the escalation of the local and global threat
perceptions led to the emergence of what we refer to as the
"self-encapsulation mentality" among Israeli Jews. This mentality
combines a rallying-around-the-flag facet with a collective turning
of the nation's back on the Palestinians and other external actors
who are viewed as sympathetic with their national cause. The recent
ruling of the International Court in The Hague against the
separation barrier is considered just one example of the wide and
unjustified international criticism of Israel's way of defending
itself against the new dangers created by the Palestinian intifada.
This mentality reflects a growing desire to reduce Israeli rule
over and responsibility for the Palestinian areas, yet it is
accompanied by a prevalent refusal to actually end the occupation
regime or evacuate Jewish settlements in the territories beyond
what is absolutely necessary if the Israeli control is to be
reduced. This mentality is best reflected by the sweeping and
consistent public support for the construction of the separation
barrier, as well as the extensive support for the unilateral
withdrawal plan. Both moves share the same features - looking
inwardly while turning Israel's back on the Palestinians.
Support for a Physical Barrier
Although widely condemned by the Palestinians and heavily
criticized by many individuals and bodies all over the world, the
building of the separation barrier has been highly welcomed by the
Israeli-Jewish public from day one. This support is explained,
first and foremost, by the prevalent belief that the fence offers a
proper defensive response and protection from the suicide bombers.
Indeed, the Peace Index survey of May 2002, as well as other
measurements taken in the last year or so, indicates that 75
percent of the respondents share this belief. However, this support
can be explained, to a similar degree, by the basic continued
desire of a solid majority of Israeli Jews to see a physical
barrier between Israel and the Palestinians (the Peace Index survey
of April 1995, for example, indicated that, even when the Oslo
process was still very much alive, almost three-quarters of the
Jewish public thought that, from the Israeli point of view, a
physical barrier separating the two people would be highly
advisable, even if peace prevailed). While the most obvious
explanation for this trend is the search for security and some
basic doubts regarding the ultimate intentions of the Palestinians,
it seems the widespread support for one kind of a barrier or
another also derives from the desire to maintain the Jewish
character of Israel, which might be "diluted" if the Palestinians
are let in uninterruptedly.
The Unilateral Aspect
However, while in the mid-1990s, the creation of a physical barrier
was thought about in the context of a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians, the outbreak of the second intifada
following the fiasco of the July 2000 Camp David summit, and the
inculcation of the "There is no partner" slogan, introduced the
unilateral aspect to this desire- since the Palestinians were no
longer perceived as a worthy partner for consultation. Thus
according to the June 2001 Peace Index survey, 55 percent of
Israeli Jews supported the idea that, as no agreement was going to
be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel should
unilaterally leave the territories that were not critical for its
security , and build a buffer of some kind between the Palestinian
areas and the Israeli territories (33 percent opposed and the rest
had no clear opinion in this regard).
The unilateral disengagement plan, we maintain, was a natural
continuation of these collective cognitive trends. Thus to the
question asked every month from April to November 2004: "Today, do
you support or oppose Sharon's unilateral withdrawal plan?" a clear
majority responded in the positive (Figure 1). During the first
three months after its announcement, there was a gradual, though
relatively small increase in the rate of support for Sharon's plan
- from 59 percent in April to 68 percent by June. In the following
month ,this trend was halted, with the support level declining to
60 percent. However, this support level has remained extremely
stable in the subsequent months through November 2004, the last
point of measurement.
It appears, then, that despite the large resources and human
efforts invested in it, the overall effectiveness of the settlers'
and right-wing parties' campaign against Sharon's plan has been
very limited, precisely because it fits the "self-encapsulation"
mentality we indicated above. This, in turn, suggests that the
Israeli public is likely to maintain its current attitudes on this
issue, at least in the near future, as such states of mind are slow
to change.
Majority Support for Sharon's Plan
To what extent are the voters in all the parties a part of this
climate of opinion? For the sake of clarity, we have grouped the
major parties into four categories: left (Labor and
Meretz/Yachad)(1), center (Shinui), moderate right (Likud) and
radical right (National Union, National Religious Party [NRP] and
Shas). The results are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 clearly reveals that support rates for Sharon's plan vary
considerably, and in descending order, from left to right. However
it also suggests that, with the exception of the radical right, the
plan enjoys the support of the majority of all other political
camps: the left, the center and the moderate right voters.
We have attempted to assess the extent to which the fierce campaign
conducted against Sharon and his plan, by the settlers and their
supporters on the right has undermined the general public's belief
about the prime minister's determination and ability to practically
disengage. This is a highly relevant question since widespread
disbelief in Sharon's own fortitude, or in the possibility that his
plan can be realized, might weaken the broad support that has been
given to it, as shown in Figure 1. Consequently, in the Peace Index
poll of June 2004 we included the following two questions, with the
second question repeated in September of the same year: (a) "Do you
believe or don't believe that Sharon genuinely intends to implement
the Unilateral Withdrawal Plan?" and (b) "According to your
judgment, do you believe or don't believe that Sharon will be
successful in implementing the Unilateral Withdrawal Plan, despite
the opposition he faces inside his own party and among the settlers
and their supporters?"
The distributions of the responses to these two questions in both
months are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
Seventy Percent Believe Sharon is Serious
As can be seen from Figure 3, the vast majority of the
Israeli-Jewish public have apparently taken Sharon's intentions
seriously, with more than 70 percent believing or tending to
believe that he is determined to implement his plan, despite the
fierce opposition he faces. Consistent with these evaluations,
Figure 4 reveals that more than 60 percent in both times of
measurement were either completely certain or quite certain that
Sharon would succeed in implementing his plan. Perhaps not
surprisingly, further analyses have shown that the belief or
disbelief in the success of Sharon's plan and the support or
opposition to it are interrelated: Those who believe that the plan
will succeed tend to support it and those who don't believe in its
success tend to reject it. Although we cannot, of course, determine
the causal direction underlying this relationship, it seems
reasonable to assume that the two are mutually reinforcing each
other.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the data we presented points to a high degree of
agreement between Sharon's plan and public opinion. This
convergence, of course, makes the plan much more feasible, compared
to a situation in which a large segment of the population opposes a
policy made by the leaders - the case, for example, with the Oslo
formula, which was never accepted and believed in by more than
about one-half of the Israeli-Jewish population. The most
illuminating finding is, however, that under certain circumstances
it is the policy's content, not the political camp of the leader or
the citizens that determines the level of correspondence between
their preferences. Hence the highest level of concurrence with
Sharon's disengagement plan exists in the left and center camps of
the Israeli political map. It seems then that it is not a
pie-in-the- sky that an archetypal leader of the Israeli right
becomes - under certain circumstances - the savior of the
aspirations of the opposite political camp.
(1) The radical left, in Israels political map, is mainly
represented by the Arab parties, one of which, the Democratic
Front, a pro-Communist party, typically attracts a small number of
Jewish voters.
